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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with acquisition activity in the UK and, specifically the
prediction of takeovers. This is an important area for research for three reasons.
Firstly, acquisition activity involves a small number of companies but creates very large
sums of money. Secondly, acquisition activity can alter the composition of a company
or an entire industry very rapidly making it a valuable tool for business. Lastly, there
are many different topics within this field, allowing for a wealth of empirical analysis.
A considerable amount of early research was limited to observation leaving
some theories with little empirical backing. In addition, many earlier papers do not
consider economic conditions. Recently the UK has experienced a boom and a
recession. Both of these events may have effected acquisition activity and will be
incorporated into this study.
This thesis tackles several issues concerning acquisitions. Firstly, it deals with
the level of acquisition activity and determines whether this behaviour is random or
predictable. If it is predictable it should be possible to model this behaviour using
appropriate indicators. The second issue is the prediction of takeovers identifying the
companies likely to become involved in acquisitions. This study incorporates both
accounting data and macro-economic factors. Finally, there is an analysis of
acquisition benefits, considering the impact on share prices.
The findings here suggest that the level of acquisition activity is predictable.
However, in a boom it rises to an unprecedented level, demonstrating bubble-like
properties. The empirical work concerning the prediction of acquisitions suggests that
takeovers increase firm efficiency and remove poor managers. Furthermore, acquiring
companies seek expansion and increased investment opportunities. Examining
macro-economic conditions suggests funding and cash flow are important when
acquiring in a boom, whilst productivity and market protection are vital in a recession.
Finally, it appears that the target firm shareholders benefit irrespective of the outcome
of the takeover.
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Introduction
"Nothing brings a prince more prestige than great campaigns and striking
demonstrations of his personal abilities." So begins section twenty-one of The Prince,
Machiavelli's famous discourse on the art of government. Written in 1514, this treatise
became the ultimate text book on realpolitik and essential study for any would-be
monarch. The independent principalities that Machiavelli saw are long gone, but his
words are as applicable today as they were in the sixteenth century. In the modern
age, however, these observations are more appropriately used to describe the
behaviour of companies and, more specifically, the actions of firms in the market for
corporate control. Acquisitions can be a source of considerable publicity for the firms
involved in a takeover bid and such a deal is a clear demonstration of the acquiring
company's financial might. The successful completion of a takeover also reflects very
positively on the managers of the buying firm, the modern day equivalent of
Machiavelli's princes. This study will present an up to date analysis of the behaviour of
the market for corporate control as a whole, will examine the characteristics of
companies that become involved in takeovers and investigate the motives that prompt
these acquisitions. Finally, it will assess the benefits created by these acquisitions for
the shareholders of both the acquired and acquiring companies.
Acquisition activity is concerned with the control of companies. The desire to
purchase another firm can arise for many different reasons that will be discussed in
great detail in later chapters. In short, an acquisition serves to transfer control of a
company from one set of individuals to another. With the control of the firm comes
the right to decide how the assets of that firm will be used and how that company will
develop through the rest of its lifetime. The acquired firm can supplement the
purchasing company's original business interests or it can open up whole new areas for
future development. Either way it is an investment that involves considerable risks but
offers exceptional rewards for those individuals who become adept at this activity.
An acquisition is a highly complex combination of many actions that make each
takeover attempt virtually unique. For example, the way that an acquisition is funded
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or the response made by the target of the acquisition attempt will be determined by the
individual characteristics of the firms that are involved in that particular acquisition and
are quite unique. There are however, some aspects that are common to every takeover
which makes it possible to research this area.
There are many questions concerning the acquisition activity that remain
unanswered. This thesis will attempt to provide answers to several of them. In
particular, there are three issues that will be investigated. The first of these is
concerned with why the level of acquisition activity in the UK differs widely over time
and how this activity could be predicted. In some years there are perhaps fewer than a
hundred acquisitions amongst quoted companies whilst in another year the number of
takeovers rises to several hundred. Furthermore, the level of acquisition activity
appears to follow the general condition of the economy. In previous papers, however,
the merger waves have confounded attempts at prediction which leaves this subject
open to further work, as here.
The second question is concerned with the individual companies that take part
in acquisitions. Are there any features that all these companies have ? If there are,
then it should be possible to identify other firms that have a high likelihood of
becoming involved in takeovers. Furthermore, this rationale can be applied not only to
the acquired firms, as in previous research in this area, but also to the acquiring
companies. This analysis can also be extended to cover firms that do not take part in
takeovers to determine whether there are any fundamental differences between these
companies and the firms that become either targets or bidders in acquisition activity.
The next question that will be dealt with is an extension of the second issue. It
combines information about the economic cycle with the information about the firms to
determine whether the economic cycle can have an impact on the types of firms that
become involved in takeovers and if the characteristics of these companies change
when the economic cycle moves from boom to recession.
Finally, there is one more issue that this thesis will deal with. The benefits of
acquisition activity have already been the subject of some empirical analysis. However
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the evidence has not been conclusive. The methodology that is used in many of these
papers can sometimes produce erroneous results. Using an improved version of this
methodology it should be possible to determine whether takeovers really benefit
anyone and if anyone looses out as a result of this process.
Each of these questions has either been investigated previously albeit
incompletely or has not been tackled at all. Analysing the behaviour of the market for
corporate control as a whole has been the subject of previous research but the results
are inconclusive as none of the findings in previous papers can be applied effectively in
other time periods. The identification of companies that become involved in
acquisitions has also been attempted before but previous articles used a methodology
that can be improved upon. Combining macro-economic factors into the analysis of
the firms that become involved in takeovers is a completely new innovation and has
never been previously attempted. A second innovation is the analysis of the acquiring
firms against a control sample of companies that did not take part in takeovers during
the sample period. This will identify whether acquiring firms have specific
characteristics that make them prone to purchase other companies.
This research will be of interest to several groups of individuals involved in the
acquisition process. Lending institutions, such as banks and venture capitalists, would
be interested in knowing how the market for corporate control is going to behave in
the future before making any decisions about their future business strategy. For
example, they might want to consider the probability that a firm will become the
subject of an acquisition attempt before lending money to that company as this will
have an impact on that firms future performance. Many individual firms would also
want to know the probability that they will become involved in takeovers in the future
as this could alter their plans for investment. They might also wish to know how the
market for corporate control is going to behave as a whole as this could influence their
future, particularly if they operate in an industry where acquisition activity is high.
Conversely, firms may wish to use some of the techniques here to select a likely target
for a takeover attempt or to identify a potential rival in an acquisition that they are
planning to make.
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This study proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 is a survey of the recent literature
associated with mergers and acquisitions. It will also serve to highlight the many areas
within this topic where empirical research is lacking or the current research is limited in
some way. The topics in this chapter are arranged in the order that they would
become relevant in an acquisition and stretch from discussions of the corporate control
market as a whole through a wide variety of related subjects to reach takeover
defences and the legal aspects of attempting an acquisition. These articles demonstrate
the variety of different subject areas that exist within the corporate control market and
the assortment of diverse empirical techniques that are used when examining
takeovers. Chapter 2 examines the market for corporate control as a whole.
Predicting the number of acquisitions that take place in any one time period has been
the subject of several articles, see for example Melicher, Ledolter and D'Antonio
(1983). These papers often included models that were supposed to predict the level of
acquisition activity but none of these results worked effectively in time periods far
removed from the data that was used in their construction. These articles have also
been unable to predict the advent of merger waves, which remain an inexplicable
pti771e. Chapter 2 will examine the level of takeover activity in the UK and determine
whether this can be linked to the condition of the economy and, if so, to precisely
which macro-economic aspects acquisition numbers can be related. This is important
for two reasons. Firstly, this is an area for research in it's own right as there is still
considerable debate concerning the nature of the supposed link between the economic
cycle and the number of acquisitions. Secondly, the findings of this analysis will help
in Chapters 4 and 5 which are concerned with the nature of firms that become involved
in takeovers.
Chapter 3 deals with the sampling issues that are relevant in the construction of
data sets used in the later empirical chapters. The number of companies that become
involved in acquisition activity is relatively small when compared to the remainder of
the population of companies in the UK. In order to examine these firms accurately
samples need to be created that maximise the amount of data that can be gathered from
the involved firms. This raises questions concerning the efficiency, consistency and
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bias in estimations when a particular selection procedure is used. These issues need to
be discussed and resolved before collecting the data and creating the data sets. This
chapter also deals with the collection of the data and relates the motives for
acquisitions to the characteristics of involved firms, as discussed in Chapter 1, and to
the available accounting variables. In addition to the acquired and acquiring
companies, data sets will also be created to pair these firms with companies of a similar
size that did not take part in takeovers in the sample period. By comparing involved
and non-involved firms it should be possible to determine whether certain companies
are predisposed to enter the corporate control market.
Chapter 4 alters the perspective to consider the individual companies that take
part in acquisitions, using the data sets created in Chapter 3. It will be possible to
identify characteristics of companies that have a high probability of becoming involved
in takeovers by examining their accounts and other features of these firms. This
analysis will also reveal information concerning the motives that prompt takeover
activity. This chapter introduces a new methodology to the analysis of takeovers
which is, theoretically, an improvement on the techniques that have been used, such as
the technique used by Dietrich and Sorensen (1984). Cox's Proportional Hazard
Function is a specific type of duration model which can incorporate information about
the life span of a company when calculating the probability of that firm becoming
involved in a takeover. This technique will be used here, as will the logit model that
has been used in previous papers on this subject. A comparison of the results
generated by these two methods will confirm whether there are practical improvements
in the use of the hazard function to mirror the theoretical advantages. Chapter 5 is an
extension of the investigation started in Chapter 4 which incorporates the results of
Chapter 2. These macro-economic factors will be added to the logit and hazard
function models by generating principal components. The effect of these terms is
identified by interacting the macro-economic components with the accounting
variables. Furthermore, the data sets will be split into boom and recession periods to
examine whether there are any differences between the factors that distinguish
companies that take part in takeovers under different economic conditions.
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The penultimate chapter in this study, Chapter 6, will determine the benefits
created by acquisitions. In this chapter event studies will be used to determine the
level of cumulative abnormal returns that are received by the shareholders of target and
bidding firms. In previous event studies concerning the benefits of takeovers the
market model is generally used to estimate the returns on a share. It is possible that
this methodology can lead to incorrect estimates and, consequently, to biased results.
In this chapter both the usual market model and an improved form of the same model
will be used. This approach will identify the magnitude of the benefits, either positive
or negative, that an acquisition creates for the owners of the shares and should confirm
the findings of the previous chapters with respect to the motives for takeovers.
Finally, the conclusion summarises the findings of the study and draws the salient
points from each investigation. It also suggests areas for future research which arise
from this thesis and the issues that remain in the analysis of acquisition activity.
This thesis contributes to the current knowledge concerning acquisition activity
in several different areas. Firstly, it analyses the level of acquisition activity during a
merger wave in the UK, the years 1987 to 1990, and demonstrates a link between
macro-economic factors and the number of takeovers. It also offers a possible
explanation for the merger wave phenomena that could account for the failings in
previous research on this subject, specifically why no model can be found that predicts
the level of takeover activity in more than one time period. The second contribution is
in the introduction of a new methodology in the analysis of the companies that take
part in takeovers. The hazard function is a theoretical improvement on previously used
methods and here its practical superiority is also demonstrated. This technique
provides more information than its predecessor, the logit model, and is a better
predictor of acquisition activity. Once this improved methodology is used, the motives
that prompt takeovers can be more clearly defined and the characteristics of the
involved companies can be visualised more effectively. This thesis applies this
methodology to both the bidders and the targets of acquisition activity which
represents another innovation as previous research tends to be limited to just the
targets. Here the analysis compares acquired and acquiring firms to each other and
then expands this investigation to analyse these firms in comparison to companies that
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do not take part in acquisitions. This presents a more complete view of the types of
firms that become involved in takeovers than has appeared in previous research.
The third contribution expands the previous analysis by combining
macro-economic factors in the analysis of the firms that take part in acquisition activity
to distinguish the influence of external factors on the firms that take part in acquisition
activity. This also serves to compare the differences between acquisitions that take
place in a boom and acquisitions that take place in a recession.
Finally, in the analysis of the benefits that are created by acquisitions an
improvement is made on the methodology that has been previously used. This
innovation should improve the accuracy of the results and, consequently, improve the
level of information that can be gained from this sort of event study. As before, this
study compares the firms that take part in acquisitions with companies that remain
uninvolved in takeovers which again presents a more complete picture of the impact
that acquisitions can have on the value of shares. This study will also provide more
information about the motives for acquisition activity and offer more empirical backing
for the findings of the previous empirical two chapters.
I.
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Chapter 1. Literature Review
Introduction
This chapter serves to demonstrate the broad nature of this research area. It is
important to note that the articles that deal with the subject of mergers and acquisitions
are rarely restricted to just one aspect of the topic and many papers will be discussed in
more than one of the following sections. This review is composed in such a way that it
follows, broadly, the progression of an acquisition. It starts with articles referring to
the corporate control market in general terms, section 1.1, and the recent trends within
that field. This is followed by section 1.2 which is composed of articles that discuss
the impact acquisitions have on the economy and vice versa before progressing to
Section 1.3 which deals with the different types of acquisition currently in existence.
Section 1.4 examines the motives that are believed to induce acquisitions and is
followed by section 1.5 which deals with factors that, although not motives, may
hasten the acquisition process. The next step in an acquisition is detailed in section 1.6
which deals with the analysis of the takeover process and the various methods of
valuation that are used to estimate how much the target is worth._ Section 1.7 deals
with the financing of the takeover bid and the medium of exchange. It is essential to
fimd the process in an appropriate manner and there are several papers that discuss the
various options open to the acquiring company and the effect that these choices can
have on the final outcome of the acquisition. The next topic, dealt with in section 1.8,
is the importance of acquisition defences and the impact that these measures can have
on the takeover process. Section 1.9 considers the benefits produced by the
acquisition whilst Section 1.10 discusses the legal position and the working of the
Mergers and Monopolies Commission as it is important to ensure that a takeover
always remains within the parameters set by the current regulations and to understand
the consequences for the companies if it does not. It is not sufficient, however, to limit
the discussion of regulatory issues to just the UK as there are also the European
Community's regulations and standards of acceptable practice to consider. Section
1.11 deals with the papers discussing the European angle and the type of acquisition
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activity that exists in other countries. This section also deals with the papers that
compare the takeover activity in the UK with acquisitions in other countries and
examine the similarities and differences that these articles highlight. An acquisition
may take place so that the acquiring firm can attempt some form of radical
restructuring. There are many other ways of restructuring a corporation that may be
preferable in certain circumstances. Section 1.12 reviews articles that examine the
relative merits of takeovers compared with the alternative methods of restructuring a
company. Finally, there are the articles that discuss the possibility of predicting
acquisition activity and the methods that might be used in an attempt to identify the
companies that will become involved in takeovers.
1.1 The Market for Corporate Control
The market for corporate control is continually changing and developing.
There are many articles that discuss the trends in the corporate control market but
many of them fail to support their claims with any empirical analysis. One article that
does offer a comprehensive evaluation of the changing trends is by Hughes (1993).
This paper was designed to provide a comprehensive review of the important papers in
this area and to collate their results into a clear picture of the development of the
corporate control market. The author found considerable evidence that merger activity
increased greatly in the 1950's and 60's. This increase in merger activity continued
until it peaked with two periods of intense activity in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
In particular, the years from 1967 to 1973 demonstrated a level of activity that was at
least as great as anything experienced before in the UK. Citing his own research on
the topic, Hughes demonstrated that of the top two hundred companies in the country
in 1964 thirty-nine had been acquired before 1969 and of the equivalent group in 1969
another twenty-two were either merged or acquired by 1972. This level of activity
was very unusual given the general business climate of the time. Hughes explained this
behaviour in terms of the incentives and encouragement offered by the Industrial
Reorganisation Corporation at that time. Hughes does not mention the first oil crisis,
however, which would almost certainly be responsible for the end of that merger wave
in 1973 as firms would be highly unlikely to attempt takeovers in a period of such
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uncertainty. Moving to more recent periods Hughes demonstrated that the level of
activity from 1974 to 1981 was approximately half that exhibited in the late 1960's. He
showed that the level of activity grew rapidly to reach new heights in 1986, the year of
the Big Bang. These conclusions are based on press reports detailing the cost of these
acquisitions in terms of relative expenditure, using the 1962 level as a baseline. After
1986 the number of acquisitions continued to grow until 1989. In this period the level
of nominal expenditure was approximately the same as in the late 1960's but, in real
terms, was several times greater. Hughes concluded that these bursts of activity in the
corporate control market were closely related to the growth in the economy that
occurred at approximately the same time. In particular, the positive correlation
between the boom experienced in the UK economy in the 1980's and the intense
merger and acquisition activity at the same time is apparent. This article continually
quoted figures gathered by the Central Statistical Office and reported in the press to
illustrate the points that the author made.
Boisi and Essig (1994) concentrated on the patterns of activity in the 1980's
and examined acquisitions in the USA. However, this does not prevent the authors
from noting several interesting points about the UK market. In particular, they claim
that the number of acquisitions did not alter fundamentally throughout that decade
_
despite popular belief that activity reached a peak in the years 1988 and 1989. The
essential difference, according to Boisi and Essig, is in the value of the acquisitions in
these years which increased enormously. Both authors have been employed within the
corporate control industry and so it seems likely that their perspective is accurate
despite their failure to provide empirical backing for this statement or to make it clear
where their data comes from. The most important point in this paper is the current
attitudes in this field and once again this is based on the authors observation and
experience. Boisi and Essig claim that, after the extravagant behaviour of the 1980's,
the takeover market in the 1990's is far more cautious than previously. In the late
1980's, they noted, acquisitions began to take place that were misguided and generated
more by reckless enthusiasm rather than sensible corporate planning. As a result,
several of the companies involved found themselves in considerable difficulty and the
10
entire corporate control market moved towards more cautious selection and careful
planning.
The two papers discussed above refer to the fact that the level of acquisition
activity seems to track the general level of the economic cycle but they failed to explain
why this should be or how the corporate control market fits in with the other markets
in the economy. The articles in the next section deal with the perceived links that exist
between the economic cycle and the market for corporate control.
1.2 Economic Effects and the Corporate Control Market
An important question that arises when studying acquisition activity is why
does the market for corporate control exist ? This is not a question that can be
answered simply but an interesting suggestion is made by Scherer (1988). He argued
that two market failures could be corrected by the proper functioning of a third
market. Scherer believed that competition in production and input markets may fail to
eliminate firms that are not minimising costs and maximising profits. Were the stock
market operating efficiently, he claimed, these firms would be removed automatically.
Thus a market in corporate control is necessary for the efficient working of the
economy as a whole, as it will remove those inefficient companies that the market fails
to eliminate naturally. Scherer used Line of Business data collected by the Federal
Trade Commission to create a sample of four hundred and seventy-one American
acquisitions between the years 1950 and 1976. Using ninety-one firms for which data
was available, Scherer attempted to illustrate his hypothesis by examining changes in
average profitability before and after the takeover. Unfortunately, the results proved
to be inconclusive on the subject of market efficiency and the author contended that, if
takeovers existed to remove inefficient managers, post-acquisition profits should
exceed pre-acquisition profits by a noticeable margin. Again this supposition was not
confirmed by his results and Scherer was unable to find an adequate explanation for
this which makes his paper inconclusive.
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Hughes (1993) also examined the effect of mergers on the economy using a
trade-off model. This model is based on the idea that there is a static partial
equilibrium trade-off between allocational efficiency losses and the cost-efficiency
gains that appear after the takeover. Hughes acknowledged that there are problems
with this approach, namely that there is often a difference between social benefits and
cost benefits. There are some effects that may induce further mergers which must be
considered and the assumption of a self-equilibrating economy with full employment,
on which the static model is based, ignores the issues of investment, technical change,
export preferences and employment effects which are also involved in the calculation
of the social benefits of merger activity. Consequently, the trade-off model tends to
produce results that use the issues of allocative efficiency as a proxy for monopolistic
power. Hughes appeared to favour a similar perspective to Scherer, namely that the
control of a company can be visualised as a valuable asset independent of any other
considerations. Under this approach managerial efficiency is ensured by the "survival
of the fittest". This implicitly assumes that the bidding firms will always have efficient
managers and the targets will have comparatively inefficient managers who will lose
their jobs when their firm is acquired. For this theory to work Hughes claimed that the
following assumptions must hold. Firstly, that the share price always reflects the
expected profitability of a firm and that the bidders are able to identify the presence of
_
poor management as distinct from unfavourable circumstances. Finally, the acquirer
must be prepared to alter the wealth-maximising policies of a firm and be confident of
making enough money after the merger to recover the cost of the takeover. If these
conditions do not hold, mergers are not generated by the efficiency argument and other
reason must be identified. Hughes did not empirically test this but seems to believe
that an examination of the benefits generated for the different parties in the merger and
acquisition process will make the fundamental accuracy of this statement apparent.
A similar theory was advanced by Fairburn and Gerosld (1993). The authors
contended that when evaluating any merger or acquisition the central concern is the
likely effect that such an activity will have on the performance of the entire industry.
Fairburn and Geroski called this idea the "Structure - Conduct - Performance Theory".
This stated that the performance of the companies within an industry can alter the
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conduct of the other firms in that industry and ultimately change the structure of that
industry. Fairburn and Geroslci began by reviewing a number of previous studies in
which this theory was tested. The results of these studies agree with Fairburn and
Gerosld's conclusion that a link does exist between the structure of the industry and the
performance of the companies operating in that industry. The link appears to be
non-linear, complex and rather weakly defined but Fairburn and Geroski were in no
doubt that it exists. Clearly any factor that dramatically affects the market share of a
firm will have a substantial effect on the profits of that company. The most obvious
example of these factors in the context of this thesis is a horizontal acquisition. If this
theory is correct then it suggests that mergers and acquisitions can alter the profits of
all the companies in a certain industry simply by altering the market shares of one or
two firms. This idea can also be taken in reverse and, in this case, it states that if the
behaviour of a few firms can alter an industry then the nature of the industry can
obviously have an impact upon the actions of the firms within it. The extension of this
idea is that it may be essential for a company to attempt an acquisition because of the
circumstances that it finds itself in.
This leads on, naturally, to consider the impact of the economy on the market
for corporate control. If the corporate control market can alter the way that the stock
market functions, as Fairburn and Geroski clearly believed, then it is very likely that the
behaviour of the economy will have a considerable effect on the level of merger and
acquisition activity. This point was discussed at length by Rock (1994). Rock
believed that there are several economic forces that influence the overall level of
activity in the merger and acquisitions field. He named five and attempted to provide
brief explanations of their importance and effect. The first of these is the economic
outlook which, the author contended, is probably the most important economic
influence on acquisition activity. Rock maintained that if the economic outlook is
promising and people are optimistic, activity in the acquisition market will increase
significantly. He illustrated this point with the example of the USA in the early 1990's.
This economy was actually one of the fastest growing in the world at that time but the
market was depressed with a noticeable lack of consumer enthusiasm or confidence.
As a result the acquisition market was noticeably depressed compared to the confident
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times in the 1980's. Whilst the country and the people involved in the stock market
were not feeling conspicuously confident about their economic future, the enthusiasm
for mergers and acquisitions was negligible. The second of Rock's economic factors
that can have an impact on merger and acquisition activity is the availability of
financing alternatives. No acquisition, however beneficial, can progress beyond the
planning stage without adequate financing. It is important, then, to consider the
availability of funds to those involved and the alternatives that they have. If there are
limited funds available to the acquiring companies then they are going to have to
consider either retaining earnings or borrowing the necessary funds which may prove
to be prohibitively expensive especially when the market as a whole is depressed. The
next point is concerned with the balance between the offer made by the bidding firms
and the target shareholders' expectations for their company. If the shareholders think
that the value of the stock is going to move up significantly in the future then they may
not want to sell now, irrespective of the premium offered by the bidder. The fourth
point in this paper refers to the strategic challenges produced by the continually
changing face of the business world. The laws governing mergers and acquisitions are
continually in review in different countries around the world and so the potential
acquirer must endeavour to stay abreast of these changes and understand how they
might affect any planned takeovers. Finally, there is the reputation of mergers and
acquisitions. If the corporate control market is unpopular for some reason then the
practitioners will find it harder to complete their deals. In this situation, funding will
be more difficult to come by and the shareholders of the bidding company unwilling to
take the risk of acquiring another firm. It is unfortunate that Rock had no empirical
evidence to offer in support of his conclusions but the rationale behind his approach is
clear and he made a persuasive argument for believing that the economic climate must
have a considerable effect on the functioning of the market for mergers and
acquisitions.
Having reviewed these articles on the nature of the merger and acquisition
market in general terms it seems that the market can be viewed both as an essential
occurrence that can be used to correct for inefficiencies in other markets and as a less
important event that can be triggered by a certain conjunction of external events. To
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examine further the literature on mergers and acquisitions it seems appropriate to go
on to the papers that are concerned with the different types of acquisitions that exist.
Reviewing these articles will make it apparent that there are several different types of
takeovers each of which is more or less applicable depending on the desired outcome
that prompted the bid in the first place.
1.3 The Nature and Type of Acquisitions
The first paper discussed here is the article by Hughes (1993) which contained
a table based on data for the UK produced by the Office of Fair Trading covering the
years from 1965 to 1989. This classified mergers and acquisitions into three groups.
The largest group by far is the horizontal activities; the combining of two or more
firms in the same industry to create one large firm that occupies a much more dominant
position in the market. The second group is the diversifying acquisitions, sometimes
called conglomerate or unrelated takeovers. These acquisitions refer to the combining
of companies that are unrelated and, usually, operate in different industries. The
smallest group is the vertical acquisitions. These are the combination of two or more
companies that are connected by the production of a certain good. These are the three
types of mergers and acquisitions that are most frequently believed to take place and it
is rare to see any other types of mergers and acquisitions mentioned in the literature.
One of the very few exceptions to this rule is the paper by Lorange, Kotlarchuk and
Singh (1994) where the authors claimed that there are four types of acquisition.
Lorange, Kotlarchuk and Singh claim that it is essential for a company to continually
develop and seek to allocate the available assets in the best manner possible in order to
survive and prosper. To do this it is essential to have a clearly defined business
strategy that defines the company's fundamental development aims. The types of
acquisition that have developed are a direct result of these business strategies and,
consequently, it is impossible to understand the correct use of acquisitions without
understanding the strategies. This paper started with a brief explanation of the three
main types of business strategy that exist today. The first of these is the Portfolio
Strategy. This is the development of a set of inter-related businesses that will provide
flexibility and stability for the company. The second type of business strategy is the
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Business Family Strategy which refers to the building of a set of closely related
business activities that are centred around a common type of technology. Lorange,
Kotlarchuk and Singh's last type of business strategy is the Business Element Strategy.
This plan involved the growth of a competitive product or strategy aimed entirely at
capturing the trade from a particular firm. To maximise the chances of a successful
outcome to any acquisition activity, it is important to ensure that the acquisition fits
with the firm's business strategy. Keeping this in mind, Lorange, Kotlarchuk and Singh
suggested that there are four main types of acquisition. The definitions of the first
three types of takeovers are the same as in Hughes' (1993) article. The first of these is
the horizontal acquisition which is primarily related to the business element strategy.
Secondly there is the vertical acquisition which, the authors contended, is most
effective when combined with either the business element or family strategies and
thirdly there is conglomerate acquisition which focuses on how the target can enhance
the overall stability or profitability of the entire conglomerate. The fourth type of
takeover is unique to this article and the authors called it a concentric acquisition. This
involves an acquirer and target that are related through their use of common
techniques or information. By definition, this is often used in conjunction with the
business family strategy where such an acquisition can be used to provide an unifying
factor for a seemingly disparate collection of firms. The point that the authors were
trying to make is that acquisitions are not separate self-contained activities but should
be considered in the context of the company's business strategy. Again this paper did
not contain any empirical evidence and the conclusions were based on the authors
experiences working in the field. A similar approach was taken in a paper by
Thompson, Wright and Robbie (1992). The main subject in this paper will be
discussed later but the authors suggested that acquisitions should be viewed as just one
possible way of restructuring a corporation and all the other alternatives should also be
considered in evaluating this action.
The next paper, however, takes a rather different view. Boisi and Essig (1994)
suggested that the acquisition of another company is simply a form of arbitrage. This
arbitrage is concerned with establishing the best possible way of allocating the assets of
the acquired company. This is based on the assumption that acquisitions will always
16
follow when a firm is perceived to be under-performing. The arbitrage connotations
result from the fact that it is impossible to have complete information about the target
firm before buying it and the risk element of the arbitrage stems from the existence of
incomplete information. The management of the acquiring company are gambling that
the target's recent poor performance is solely due to the inefficiencies of the current
managers rather than some more fundamental factors. Assuming that these opinions
are correct acquisitions are just part of normal every day business operations. This
seems sensible when an acquisition is just the tool used to alter the current condition of
a company or prompted by the quick actions of an arbitrageur. It is clear, however,
that there will never be a consensus of opinion concerning the precise nature of
acquisition activity in the literature.
These articles examined the various different ways in which acquisitions can be
viewed. Now it seems appropriate to consider the motives that are believed to be
responsible for this type of activity. There are a great many factors that are said to
induce takeover activity and the following section attempts to summarise this subject.
1.4 Motives for Acquisition Activity
The various motives for acquisition activity constitute one of the largest
sections of the literature concerning this subject. This section does not represent all of
the motives that exist but, for reasons of clarity, has been restricted to the most
frequently discussed motives.
1.4.1 Synergy as an Acquisition Motive
Boisi and Essig (1994) claimed that the most popular motive in the current
literature is synergy. This is certainly one of the most frequently mentioned motives.
Synergy means a combined action or activity resulting in an outcome at least as great
as the sum of the involved parts. Thus any synergistic motive is one that is designed to
exploit some form of advantage from the combining of two or more companies, for
example economies of scale. The term synergy is used to encompass a great many
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different motives, everything from the combining of research and development
departments to risk reduction via diversification. In fact, two of the motives that will
be dealt with separately, competitive position and tax advantages, can be placed under
the heading of synergy. There are several papers that consider synergy to be the only
acquisition motive. For example, Spatt (1993), whilst not concentrating specifically on
acquisition motives, made it plain that the only motive he considered is the synergistic
one. Spatt's paper will be considered in detail later.
Lev (1992) mentioned two other motives but, again, synergy was clearly the
most important. Lev's article will be examined in detail in the section concerned with
the benefits of the acquisition process. Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) produced an
article in which they hypothesised that the perceived value of the synergy gains would
be fundamental in determining whether an acquisition took place. This paper involved
no data but instead used games theory to replicate the effects of merger activity and
tender offers. Berkovitch and Khanna claimed that there is an equilibrium synergy
level existing in the normal operation of the market. If the expected synergy level for
the prospective action is less than this equilibrium value then a merger is the only
option. Alternatively, if the expected level exceeds that value, the authors claim that a
tender offer should be forthcoming. This suggests that the synergy gains will always
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be significantly greater in an acquisition, provided that the offer is accepted early on in
the bidding process. This paper failed to consider the behaviour of anyone other than
the two firms involved in the takeover attempt and it also assumed that increasing
synergy is the only possible motive, which may not prove to be true. Another person
who clearly believed in the importance of synergy above all other factors is Achtmeyer
(1994) whose paper was designed to present his ideas on how the synergistic benefits
of an acquisition can be maximised. Achtmeyer is a corporate lawyer and has spend
many years advising companies on how to get the best out of their proposed
acquisitions. Achtmeyer pointed out that to maximise the potential synergies in the
acquisition a realistic approach needs to be taken in the planning and evaluation of the
acquisition. In particular, he noted that the post-acquisition integration needs to be
smooth. It is advisable to have a definite plan for this and not to improvise as
problems arise. To evaluate the success or failure of an acquisition from a synergistic
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perspective is difficult and requires an accurate idea of how the synergies are likely to
manifest themselves.
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) also found strong support for the importance
of synergy. They examined three potential motives for acquisition activity and
endeavoured to estimate the proportion of takeovers that each motive generated.
Berkovitch and Narayanan examined three hundred and thirty American companies
involved in acquisitions between 1968 and 1988. Their hypothesis was that the total
gains in the acquisition would be positive only if synergy was the motive. The authors
calculated the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each of the involved companies
based on the changes in the share price around the takeover. From this value the total
gains to both the target and acquiring company can be estimated. According to
Berkovitch and Narayanan the total gain to the target firm is equal to the CAR
multiplied by the market value of the firm's equity, minus the value of shares held by
the bidder. In comparison the gains to the acquiring company are the CAR multiplied
by the market value of that firm. The total gains are the sum of these values. The
results were then examined in the light of the authors belief about the link between the
size and sign of the total gain and the motive. In this sample the authors found that
synergy was the primary motive, accounting for seventy-five percent of the
acquisitions they examined. Unfortunately this paper appears to fail to - address the
possibility that an acquisition could be prompted by a combination of several motives
rather than just one. Equally, the authors did not consider the possibility that the result
of an acquisition might not always be as they predict. For example, a takeover
motivated by synergy might create a negative total gain and would not be counted as a
synergistically motivated action under their approach. This could lead to the
misclassification of some of the acquisitions in the sample which could place the final
conclusions of the paper in some doubt.
1.4.2 Agency Issues as Acquisition Motives
Synergy, as mentioned above, is not the only very popular motive. One of the
others is the agency issue. The agency motive needs to be examined in two parts.
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Firstly, there are the issues connected with the managers of the acquiring firm and
secondly those concerning the managers of the target company.
The Managers of the Acquiring Company and the Managerial Ambition Motive
This motive represents the idea that acquisitions take place to satisfy the
ambitious aspirations of the managers of the acquiring firm. Lev (1992) pointed out
that this is considered to be one of the most important motives. There is more prestige
in being the manager of a large company than a small one and involvement in the
corporate control market as a bidder creates a very positive impression. This provides
the managers with the incentive to acquire other firms. How, then, is this an agency
problem ? Quite simply the shareholders would prefer to have the company's profits
issued in the form of dividends than used in the expensive acquisition of another
corporation. The conflict of interests that arises typifies the agency problem.
Theoretically the managers have no option but to comply with the desires of the
shareholders but it is widely accepted that the level of control that the shareholders
have in reality is somewhat limited due to informational inequalities. This is how
acquisitions motivated by managerial ambition are able to take place. Several papers
have examined this point.
The first to be reviewed is by Larcker (1992). This article hypothesised that
the level of control the shareholders are able to exert is reflected in the type of
acquisition activity that the company enters into. Larcker offered no empirical work to
support this view but based his results on the popular theories about acquisition
activity. He concluded that the structure of the managers compensation contract alters
their behaviour. For example, if the contract is based on the company's accounts the
managers are likely to concentrate on cash based transactions. In particular Larcker
believes that this has an impact on the type of acquisition activity the firm undertakes.
If the managers are allowed a considerable degree of freedom then the company is
likely to attempt higher risk takeovers than firms where the managers are under tighter
supervision. In many cases managerial accountability is virtually negligible as there are
few effective ways to control them. It has been suggested that shareholder lassitude is
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responsible in many cases for the development of this situation. Jensen (1988, 1992)
has written two articles that examine this situation. In the first of these papers the
author concurred with Larcker's idea. However Jensen went on to speculate that,
provided the shareholders receive dividends, they are highly unlikely to concern
themselves with the mangers activities. This paved the way for Jensen to propose his
"Control Hypothesis of Debt". This theory suggested that it is possible for the
managers to gain control of the firms funds whilst still issuing dividends to the
shareholders and, thus, retaining their support. Jensen suggested that the managers
should issue debt instead of dividends which should ensure that the shareholders will
be satisfied, since they will receive the money due to them even if the company fails.
This leaves the management free to use the retained earnings to finance an acquisition
without any impediment. Jensen even suggested that the managers will consider
investments with low potential returns or high risks rather than pay dividends although
he offered no empirical evidence to support this theory.
The second paper by the same author (1992) dealt specifically with the problem
of funding acquisitions in the face of shareholder disapproval. Jensen called this
extended hypothesis his "Free-Cash Flow Theory". He believed that there are
instances where the managers of a company are genuinely wrong in their approach and
that the market endeavours to inform them of this fact by lowering the company's share
price. If the managers do not alter their strategy the share price will remain low and it
may become apparent that the only way to force the necessary changes on the
company is for another group of managers to gain control. Jensen claimed that agency
costs arise from the differences in opinion between the shareholders and the managers.
These costs include the efficiency loss induced by the wrong managerial policy.
Jensen's theory combined this concept with his control hypothesis of debt. If
the firm is to maximise the value of the shareholder's investment this excess cash must
be paid out as dividends. Paying the shareholders reduces the resources available for
expansion but a large dividend usually increases the value of the firm on the stock
market. Giving the managers control of the "free cash" instead of using it as dividends
may result in the company's share price dropping thus making it difficult to attempt a
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takeover. Jensen again advocated the issue of debt as an acceptable substitute for
dividends. This substitution also reduces the agency costs associated with the free
cash flow as it minimises the cash available for the managers to spend at their
discretion in the future. Jensen used data from other papers to test the effectiveness of
this idea. All this data demonstrated is that a large proportion of the observable
behaviour of these companies is consistent with his theory. The author pointed out
that this does not prove that these firms have free cash flow but that this was likely as
their behavioural patterns would be quite different if this were not the case.
The Managers of the Acquired Company and the Issue of Managerial Control
There is, of course, another side to the agency problem. The ambitious nature
of the managers of a successful company might encourage them to go out and acquire
other less fortunate firms but how do these other companies get into the position
where they are suitable targets for a takeover ? One suggestion is that the incumbent
managers have ignored the shareholders wishes for so long that the companies owners
are now prepared to consider selling to a potential acquirer to rid themselves of the
undesirable management. This idea was examined by Schleifer and Vishny (1988) who
observed that controlling the actions of managers can be difficult. In order for the
company owners to force the managers to behave as the shareholders want they must
be able to both monitor the managers' activities and constrain these actions if
necessary. Compensation contracts are supposed to ensure that the managers have the
same interests as the shareholders. Unfortunately, these contracts can be prohibitively
costly and fail to cover every eventuality. In many cases there are no effective
methods for controlling managers available to the shareholders. In the absence of
adequate control, the shareholders may be forced to resort to threatening to sell their
interests in a takeover. When a company is acquired it is usual for the management to
be sacked which should form an effective deterrent for the managers, but sometimes
the threat needs to be carried out. This is a very extreme response to the problem but
occasionally it is the only possible solution and an acquisition can be invited by the
owners of the firm. The authors suggested that takeovers could be improved as a
technique for controlling managerial activities if the new managerial team were
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compensated in shares which reduced the conflict of interest between managers and
shareholders.
Some authors maintain that the threat of an acquisition alone should be enough
to bring the managers back into line. One article that put this theory forward was by
Dodd (1992). Dodd examined the share prices of both bidding and target firms for
several years before an acquisition to illustrate his point. The emphasis of this
examination is directed towards any abnormal returns that might exist and how these
change when the takeover is announced. Dodd found that in the majority of cases the
target firms have negative abnormal returns of up to fifteen percent below average
which become positive when the announcement is made. In comparison, the bidding
company's shares drop in value. Dodd used this evidence to support his view that the
acquisitions are facilitated by shareholder dissatisfaction with the current management,
which suggests that these managers would be sacked as soon as the takeover was
completed. This would suggest that the management would have a strong incentive to
concur with the owners wishes in a takeover attempt.
Agency Issues Concerning External Parties
As has been mentioned before, an acquisition is a very extreme way of.
disciplining the management. The whole problem results from a lack of accountability
and the absence of an effective monitoring system. This problem was debated by
Davis and Kay (1993) . They claimed that adequate control mechanisms do exist but
are not used correctly. In particular, they believed that non-executive directors should
monitor the managers actions on behalf of the shareholders. This is not the case in
practice as the people who are appointed to these posts are often nominated by the
current managers. Thus the non-executive directors may be subject to the same
conflict of interests as the managers and are more inclined to support the managers
than fulfil their obligation to the shareholders which, again, forces the company's
owners to consider selling as a last resort. The non-executive directors are not the
only other people who may suffer from a conflict of interests. This point was made by
Foster (1992) who concentrated on the activities of investment bankers. Foster
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believed that there are times when investment bankers encourage their clients to enter
into acquisitions that are not advantageous to the client. The bankers fee is calculated
as a percentage of the cost of the transaction which creates an obvious conflict of
interests. This article emphasised the case of Chock Full °Nuts, an American
fast-food manufacturer, who acquired a brewery, Rheingold. According to the
chairman's statements in the early 1970's the company was looking for acquisitions to
expand their business. Rheingold was acquired but it was soon apparent that this was
a very poor investment. By 1977 they were forced to sell the brewery and were left
with a very substantial loss to deal with. Chock Full °Nuts had acquired a firm that
was in very serious trouble and in an industry that the management openly admitted
they knew nothing about. Foster admitted that this is a very extreme example and
investment bankers cannot persistently advise their clients so poorly. Furthermore, it is
possible that Chock Full ()Nuts did not take advice on this purchase or might even
have ignored advice from their bankers.
This sort of article is unusual, all the others concerned with the agency issue
refer to the differing interests of the shareholders and the managers. The latter agency
issues, those referring to the target company, often involve the concept of an inefficient
management in conjunction with the major issue of controlling the managers. The
inefficient managers problem is the first of the efficiency motives.
1.4.3 Managerial Inefficiency as an Acquisition Motive
The managerial efficiency issue can be summarised in the following terms. If
the managers of the target firm are inefficient then it is likely that that Company will be
acquired by a firm that has a more efficient management. This is another very popular
motive in the recent literature. For example, Boisi and Essig (1994) noted that one of
the most significant advantages in an acquisition is the increase in overall efficiency
produced by the arrival of a new and more efficient management. This opinion is
echoed by Franks and Harris (1993) who considered that there are only two types of
takeovers; allocational and acquisitional. The first of these is designed to bring about
the reallocation of the resources of the two companies to a new and more efficient
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configuration. The empirical work that was contained in this paper refers to the
impact of a referral to the Mergers and Monopolies Commission, which happens to a
very small percentage of takeovers in the UK. Jensen (1988) argued that increased
activity in the corporate control market exists in the wake of new financing options.
He claimed that this will force managers to work more efficiently and be more flexible
to ensure their own survival. Managerial incompetence was also considered by
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993). They called it "hubris" and believed that it would
result in the target company being undervalued by the stock market. They found that
it was responsible for the second largest group of takeovers in their sample. It is
generally accepted that managerial inefficiency will result in a devaluation of the target
firm, as proposed by several of the authors. It is possible, however, that companies
can become undervalued without the mangers being particularly inept, this phenomena
is caused by the incomplete information on stock market rather than anything specific
to the company.
1.4.4 Acquisition Motives Based on Asymmetric Information
Scherer (1988) considered the impact of informational disparity between the
stock market and the target firm. Scherer recalled that stock market prices follow a
random walk and it is only semi-strong efficient. Under these circumstances it is
possible for a company to be under valued simply by chance. Equally, random shocks
to the share price can also place companies in the position to acquire other companies
when they are not necessarily genuinely capable of sustaining the acquisitions.
This leads onto the next group of acquisition motives which are those
prompted by informational differences. If the managers of the bidding company
believe that they know something the rest of the market does not know then this may
be the opportunity that they need to undertake an acquisition. In general, these
informational differences refer to the perceived value or potential of the involved
companies. This motive is particularly popular in the papers that use games theory to
model the action of firms in takeovers. Hart (1993) used informational inequalities as
the primary takeover motive in his paper. Hart considered a two period economy in an
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uncertain environment. The goods in the economy are allocated in period zero and a
constrained stock market is defined as one that operates under conditions designed to
maximise profitability for the different companies. Hart defined conditions for an
equilibrium to establish under which takeovers are permitted. This paper concludes
that such an equilibrium exists only if trivial share allocations are considered in the
model and the holders of the largest share allocations are able to control the behaviour
of the firms. The results can only be optimal if multiplicative uncertainty exists, which
is a direct result of the informational limitations of the model. Giatnmarino and
Heinkel (1986) also used games theory to replicate contested acquisitions. They
decided that a contested acquisition can be viewed as a game between an informed
bidder, who has a realistic notion of the true value of the target firm, and an
uninformed bidder who does not have the same level of knowledge. The takeover
attempt is modelled as a bidding game with rational expectations and asymmetric
information. Expected synergy gains are used to associate probabilities with the
signals that the bidders receive. The target firm's shareholders are assumed to accept
whichever of the bids offers them the greatest premium in the first few rounds of the
game. The game develops following a simple set of rules which are designed to give
the uninformed bidder the tactical advantage of bidding second and knowing the value
of the other company's offer. Two equilibrium situations result, depending on the
behaviour exhibited by the uninformed bidder. In the Passive Competition case the
uninformed bidder is indifferent between not bidding and bidding the full value when
the informed bidder has made an offer which is less than the target firm is worth. In
the White Knight case the uninformed bidder will always counter-bid if the target
shareholders refuse the informed bidders first offer. In this manner Giammarino and
Heinkel were able to replicate scenarios in which there are sequential bidding patterns,
overbidding, managerial resistance and white knights. Whilst the results of this paper
demonstrated the sequence of events in a contested takeover, they did not allow the
examination of the motive that drives either of the competing companies to make a bid
in the first place. The main concern with papers like the two discussed here is that the
game theory applications are based on so many assumptions that their findings are
difficult to translate to practical applications in the real world, although bidding games
can replicate very simplistic scenarios.
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These are not the only articles to discuss this topic however and the remaining
papers use more realistic methodologies. The main issue with this motive is, as Boisi
and Essig (1994) observed it is impossible for the management of the acquiring firms
to know everything about the target until after they have acquired it. This means that
most acquisitions based on informational asymmetries are generated by the belief that
the acquired company is undervalued. The important feature in an informational
asymmetry acquisition is that the true value of the target firm should remain hidden
from the rest of the market until the acquisition has been completed. This issue was
discussed by Franks and Harris (1993) in their paper examining the effects of a referral
on an acquisition. If an acquisition is referred there will be an unavoidable delay,
irrespective of the final outcome. During this period it is possible that the additional
information, which prompted the bidding firm to start the acquisition, could be made
available to the rest of the market. Under these circumstances it is possible that the bid
will be contested by another potential acquirer and the advantage to the original
acquirer will be lost. In an acquisition, it is also possible that information will also be
revealed about the nature of the acquiring company. This is the belief held by Eckbo,
Gianunarino and Heinkel (1990). They claimed that the type of bid made by the
acquiring company, and in particular the quantity of cash in the offer, discloses the true
value of the bidding company. This article will be reviewed in detail in Section 1.7
which discusses the medium of exchange in acquisitions.
1.4.5 Acquisition Motives Based on Tax Advantages
The next factor that induces acquisitions is the potential tax advantage motive.
This is sometimes placed under the synergy heading, but does appear in some of the
articles as an independent motive. The idea behind this theory is that the bidding
company may be able to create or retain tax advantages by acquiring another firm.
There are three main aspects to the potential tax advantages. Firstly, if either the
acquired or acquiring firm has incurred losses for tax reasons in recent years it is
possible that these losses can be used to reduce the tax liability faced by the company
in the future. The second aspect is the idea that by increasing the size of the firm via
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an acquisition it is possible for the acquiring company to place itself in a higher tax
band which often enables the firm to increase the value of the depreciation that it can
write off for tax. Lastly, there is the idea that a takeover enables the acquiring
company to increase debt capacity if the acquired firm has unutilised debt capacity.
The interest on this debt is sometimes tax-deductible. All of the articles in this section
refer to American data where the tax laws are such that these tax gains can become
large enough to make an acquisition beneficial. Under the current UK tax laws the
degree of tax advantage that a firm could accrue in this way is far smaller than in the
USA and it is debatable whether it would be large enough to motivate an acquisition
unless it were taken in conjunction with some other motive. Nevertheless, this is a
frequently mentioned motive in the recent literature although the empirical
investigations of this topic are very limited. This idea is one of the few acquisition
motives mentioned by Copeland and Weston (1988) who suggested that it is possible
to use one firm's tax position to offset the others, thus benefiting the combined
company. Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) also suggested that the tax situation of
the new company formed by an acquisition could be far more advantageous than the
position either of the involved firms could have reached separately. It is possible that a
larger firm may have more options for controlling tax than a smaller company and,
since acquisitions increase the size of the firm, this may be one possible source of tax
advantages in UK acquisitions although it this aspect has not been the subject of
empirical analysis.
1.4.6 Acquisition Motives Based on Market Share and Competitive Position
Another motive for acquisition activity is the use of an acquisition to increase
the market share of the bidding firm and to place it in a more advantageous position.
This is a motive that is sometimes called synergistic although, like tax, it is often
discussed separately. Once again, Copeland and Weston provided a short description
of this motive. They stated that a takeover can increase the acquiring firm's share of
the market far more quickly than it could through internal growth. A more in depth
consideration of this motive was given by Creehan and Leger (1994) who suggested
that, provided the sources of potential risk are minimised and the post-acquisition
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integration carried out carefully, it is easy to induce a great increase in the competitive
position of the acquiring company via the takeover. They pointed out that this gain is
facilitated by the existence of a high level of strategic fit between the acquiring and
acquired companies, aiding the smooth integration of the two firms, and that the
potential strengths and weaknesses of the resulting conglomerate must be evaluated
before initiating the takeover.
1.4.7 Diversification as an Acquisition Motive
The last acquisition motive is diversification. This refers to the fact that some
companies use an acquisition as a method of gaining access to a new area of the
market or even a new country. This is considered to be one of the fastest ways in
which a company can make this sort of change in its business practices. The acquiring
firm is saved the expense of building new production plants, for example, as this has
already been done by the acquired firm and does not even have to break into a new
market and establish a recognisable brand name as this probably already exists as well.
In addition to these commercial advantages an acquisition can often circumvent
barriers to entering a certain industry that exist for political reasons. For example,
many governments are protective of industries that they view as essential to their
economy and seek to prevent entry to this field to companies that are not based in that
country. By purchasing such a firm it is sometimes possible for foreign firms to gain a
foothold in these industries and expand their interests in this manner. Hughes (1993)
examined the Office of Fair Trading's data on UK acquisitions in the period 1980 to
1989 and found that diversifying acquisitions were the second largest group of
takeovers, surpassed only by horizontal takeovers.
1.5 Catalysts of Acquisition Activity
1.5.1 Defence Mechanisms as Catalysts of Acquisition Activity
There are some features of the target companies that, whilst not being motives
in their own right, can speed up the takeover process. These "catalysts" are not
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important enough to make the firm a target without some other motivation, but they
enhance the probability of the firm being acquired if it is considered for some other
reason. First of these catalysts are defence mechanisms. The first defence mechanism
to be examined in this context is the use of golden parachutes which will be discussed
in detail in section 1.8. This refers to the nature of the compensation contracts held by
the managers of the target firm which are designed as defence mechanisms. In
Larcker (1992) the main hypothesis referred to the level of control that the managers
have over the company and how much they can do without intervention from the
shareholders. Larcker included the results of a survey that he has conducted into the
opinions that shareholders have concerning the use of golden parachutes. He found
that the shareholders were generally unhappy about these methods of compensation,
which were seen as removing the managers obligation to work efficiently. Larcker
also observed that the stock market reacts less favourably to acquisitions where the
target managers have golden parachutes as the presence of these contracts can create a
conflict of interests. In Berkovitch and Khanna's paper (1991) it is suggested that
acquisition activity can be predicted by examining the value of the expected synergy
gains in combination with the existence of golden parachutes. In this article takeover
bids were modelled as auctions resulting in significant gains in synergy after the event.
The authors suggested that the managers of the target company will be given golden
_
parachutes in the event that the tender offer is accepted by the shareholders. In this
model a tender offer is always accepted as it is seen to make more money for the
shareholders and the expected synergy gain is higher. The assumption that golden
parachutes are automatically given to the managers in a tender offer is a considerable
simplification of the situation in reality. The authors made no comment either in
favour of or against the use of golden parachutes and it is difficult to establish whether
or not they approve of this sort of compensation contract. Jensen (1988) is rather
more objective. He admits that golden parachutes can reduce the differences between
shareholders and management when used carefully. Incorrectly implemented,
however, they can have the opposite effect and may encourage the incumbent
management to allow the firm to be acquired without making any sort of protest, even
if the proposed takeover is contrary to the firm's interests.
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Other defence mechanisms can also be catalysts in the acquisition process. It
has been found that some techniques are ineffectual and the fact that they exist at all
seems to encourage potential acquirers. This idea was tested empirically by Ambrose
and Megginson (1992). This paper was an attempt to identify the characteristics that
make a company a likely target for an acquisition. Aside from the usual accounting
variables they also included terms representing the nature of the takeover defence that
the companies had. Ambrose and Megginson found some types of defences had
exactly the opposite effect to that which they were intended to have. In particular,
voting rights defences appeared to increase the probability of the firm becoming a
takeover target.
1.5.2 Institutional Investors and Ownership Structure as Catalysts of Acquisition
Activity
The last factor to be considered in this section is the presence of institutional
investors. In an acquisition the response made by the institutions to a takeover offer
would seem to be very important and likely to have an impact on the outcome.
Several papers have addressed this topic including Ambrose and Megginson (1992).
The authors added variables representing the level of institutional investment in the
companies in their model. They quoted past research that has resulted in conflicting
conclusions on this point. For example, they observed that Schleifer and Vishny
(1988) found institutional investors provided an extra incentive for the managers to
work hard as they provide a closer watch on the company's activities, resulting in a
decrease in the probability of the company being acquired. Unfortunately, Ambrose
and Megginson were unable to produce any clear results on this subject. Their model
was estimated using the data on four hundred and seventy-three companies that were
identified as either being targets, bidders or neither of these on the 1st of January 1981.
The terms representing the ownership structure were not statistically significant in their
model and as such provided no new information on the subject of institutional
investors. A similar result can be found in the article by Cosh, Hughes, Lee and Singh
(1989). As in Ambrose and Megginson, the authors were sure that institutional
investors must have an effect on the corporate control market as they have become so
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prominent in the last three decades. In particular, Cosh et al wanted to address the
impact of these investors on the selection of takeover targets and discover whether the
institutions discourage this type of activity to maintain stability in the market or
encourage it to create short term gains. The institutions are, potentially, able to
influence the amount and direction of the takeover activity of the firms that they invest
in. Accordingly, Cosh et al made two predictions. First, the increasing institutional
dominance of the market will change the behaviour of all companies in the market
irrespective of their individual institutional holdings and secondly, agents that are not
subject to any form of direct institutional holdings will not be affected. The empirical
work in this paper is based on the comparison of two periods. The first period, 1981
to 1983, is typified by low acquisition activity. Fifty-nine companies were found with
three years of post-merger data on the Exstat tapes. The second sample is taken from
a period of intense activity, 1986, and included seventy-seven companies. Both of the
samples were split into subsections depending on the level of institutional investment in
the bidding firm. Univariate and Multivariate tests were used to examine the split
samples for size, profitability and growth rates. The tests were designed to highlight
any differences between the companies with high institutional investment and the firms
with little or no institutional investment. Again the results were inconclusive, Cosh et
al found that the increased presence of institutional investors does not appear to
change any of the basic characteristics of the takeover selection process. This is
surprising considering that shareholders of the size and importance of the financial
institutions would have an effect on the behaviour of companies with whom they are
involved.
Perhaps, then, it is not the presence of institutional investors that produces the
different levels of acquisition activity that have been observed in differing industries
and countries. An alternative suggestion has been provided by Jenkinson and Mayer
(1992). In this paper it is suggested that the level of corporate control activity differs
across industries and countries because the patterns of corporate governance are
traditionally different. The authors compared patterns in company ownership and
control in the USA and UK to the same factors in the rest of Europe and Japan. They
found that there were notable variations in these areas. In the UK and USA it is usual
32
for the owners of a company to be removed from the managers of that firm. There is
also little sign of any continuity of ownership across the generations. This means that
there is no longer the "family interest" in the firm and the concept of family ownership
is greatly reduced. This is not true in the other countries that were examined in this
paper and, the authors claimed, this is responsible for the far more active and hostile
acquisition market that exists in the UK and America compared to many of the other
countries in the world. This hypothesis is based on the experiences that Jenlcinson and
Mayer had working in the corporate control field and contains virtually no empirical
work besides a few figures concerning the levels of activity in the different areas.
Their conclusions do not appear to be unreasonable, however, and the differing nature
of corporate control may well depend on the traditional patterns of behaviour in the
relevant countries. Again, the lack of empirical evidence is unfortunate but the theory
could explain the diverse levels of activity across the corporate control markets.
1.5.3 Company Under-Valuation and Size as Catalysts of Acquisition Activity
It has been previously mentioned that the value of companies can be altered
and that acquisitions can be prompted by informational asymmetries. Equally it is
possible, as Scherer (1988) suggested, for the stock market to inaccurately value a
firm. The combination of these factors represents another catalyst for acquisition
activity. It has been suggested that undervalued companies are more likely to be
acquired than other firms. Equally, smaller firms are thought to have a higher
probability of becoming acquisition targets than large companies. Dietrich and
Sorensen (1984) and Palepu (1986) are amongst the authors who employ both of these
factors in their examination of acquisition activity. Once again, this factor is important
as is reduces the cost of the takeover as the size of a company is often directly related
to the value of shares in that firm. Neither of these factors, or the previous ones in this
section, are important enough to generate acquisitions on their own, barring very
exceptional circumstances, although they are all factors that may help in the selection
of a potential takeover target given that an acquisition has already been decided upon.
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1.6 Analysis and Company Valuations
Assuming that a company has decided on an acquisition, it is necessary to
analyse and evaluate the takeover to ensure that the most suitable target is selected.
This is vitally important in the acquisition process. If the valuation of the firms in the
takeover is inaccurate then the acquisition could result in a costly disaster for the
bidding company. There are many papers that discuss various methods of analysing
potential takeovers and how best to estimate the value of the target to the acquirer.
One of the most comprehensive descriptions of the analysis process can be found in the
paper by Rappaport (1994) who describes in detail the steps involved in the analysis of
a potential acquisition. First, there is corporate self-evaluation. It is important to
know the value of the involved firms and how this value will be affected by several
different scenarios. This process may bring to light not only the company's suitability
for an acquisition but may also demonstrate that another form of strategic restructuring
could take place as an alternative. Secondly, the value of the acquisition must be
ascertained. Many companies use the discounted cash flow (DCF) methodology to
determine the value of a potential takeover and, as with the use of DCF's in ordinary
investment analysis, the forecasts will be extended over as many periods as the
managers are comfortable with. When the level of uncertainty becomes excessive,
_
there is little point in continuing. The bidder's cost of capital is the appropriate
discount rate for the analysis, if the acquisition target's risk level is judged to be the
same as the acquirer's. The cost of capital is the minimum acceptable rate of return
based on the rate that investors could expect if the funds were invested in some other
way. Rappaport's article concluded with a demonstration of this technique based on a
fictitious company acquisition.
Reis and Cory (1994) examined the various approaches that can be taken to
acquisition analysis and sums them up as the following three options. The first of these
is the intrinsic value which captures the discounted present value of the free cash flows
generated by the assets of the company. These are evaluated as a going concern plus a
terminal value also discounted at an appropriate value. Secondly, there is the
acquisition value which can be quite different from the intrinsic value of the firm. The
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acquisition value is the value of the firm as it would be traded in the corporate control
market and estimates the value that it represents to a potential acquirer. Finally, Reis
and Cory considered the liquidation and replacement value. The assets of the firms are
very important in the analysis of a potential takeover target and this type of valuation is
often useful. To know how much the assets are worth in these two extreme cases can
help generate a framework within which the assets can be placed at their current value.
The authors also noted that the attendant methodologies are just as important as the
evaluation approaches themselves. A few of the most frequently used techniques are
mentioned here. Reis and Cory began by observing that the intrinsic value or DCF
value of the firm the acquirer is considering buying is, effectively, a time series of
future cash flows. The terminal value method, as mentioned above, is often useful as
the value of a company under extreme circumstances is examined. Lastly, present
value calculations are based on the costs of debt and equity, estimated with the CAPM,
to the firm. As with all business evaluation techniques it is important to choose the
method most appropriate to the company's decision making process, to ensure that the
relevant information is available in the correct form. Once this has been done it should
be relatively easy to produce a meaningful acquisition evaluation.
The same issues were considered in the article by Edwards (1994). Edwards
noted that the fundamental purpose of any company is to generate wealth for the
shareholders through the efficient allocation of assets. If an acquisition can help the
management to fulfil this obligation then that is what they should do. There are,
however, two other driving forces behind merger and acquisition activity that need to
be considered. The first of these is the need to consolidate current businesses activities
and the second is to reduce risk via diversification as far as possible. These two
objectives may seem to be mutually exclusive but can work together effectively. A
company may undertake a horizontal acquisition, for example, to consolidate its
business activities. At the same time increasing their market share would reduce the
risk of the company loosing out to larger competitors. Thus, it is possible to apply
these two initiatives at the same time. Edwards believed that the acquisition activity
can be considered as a source of cash flows and split into the following groups. The
elements of gross margins include factors representing the nature of the industry and
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the company's market share. Next there are the factors in the expense component.
This section involves the figures for manufacturing and research expenses. Finally,
there are the elements in the resource component. This section includes the values
representing the financing, investment and variable costs of production. Once all these
factors have been appraised, the complete process can be valued. Edwards claimed
that it is usual to employ some form of discounted cash flow measure to represent the
value of the acquisition in today's terms. Consequently the valuation process needs to
consider the time horizon and a suitable estimation technique. The time horizons are
the easiest element to evaluate as the number of years considered is based solely on
whatever time span the managers are comfortable using. It has been suggested that the
bidding company should use its own cost of capital when enumerating the value of an
acquisition although Edwards also considered the idea of using projected earnings after
taxes as a substitute for the discounted value technique. Either way he claimed that it
is essential to form a matrix of possible outcomes that represent the firm's various
options, including the acquisition, before making any decisions.
Ritch (1994) took a similar line. He stated that it is essential to plan
thoroughly in advance before attempting an acquisition and suggests the following
issues are important. Careful strategic planning is essential to be _fully aware of the
strengths and weaknesses of the bidding corporation before any sort of successful
acquisition can be contemplated. The selection of a target can be difficult and must be
done with great care. On the other hand it is important to be able to react quickly to
changes in the business environment. Several potential targets probably exist so it is
important to examine them thoroughly before making any decisions about which one is
going to give the greatest advantage to its acquirer. As with the previous authors,
Ritch clearly believed that strategic planning is very important but it is interesting that
he also notes that the bidding company may have to move quickly to take account of
any sudden changes in the business climate. A brief description of the valuation
process was given by Myers (1992). Here it was suggested that incremental cash
flows should be substituted for discounted cash flows, as this may give a more
accurate result. Unfortunately Myers did not include any empirical testing of his idea
although he did explain his methodology in some detail. The cost of a merger is
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calculated as the price paid for the target firm less the value of that firm as a separate
entity. Comparing this price to the value of the expected synergistic benefits should
indicate whether the merger is advisable. Regrettably, Myers did not discuss how the
synergistic effects should be measured or what should be done if the acquisition is not
being attempted for synergistic reasons.
Throughout the papers discussing the analysis of an acquisition and the
techniques that might be used, there are several common themes. It is essential to plan
the acquisition well in advance, a realistic approach is obviously necessary and the
value of the firms needs to the calculated very carefully to establish the advisability of
the selection of the target. This last issue is so fundamental to the success of the
acquisition process that has featured in articles as a separate point. Franks and Harris
(1993) suggested that the perceived value of the target firm can be a motive for a
takeover if the company is seen to the undervalued. Creehan and Leger put a different
perspective on the issue of company value, as they believed that the increase in value
generated by the takeover is not necessarily financial but is strategic. They suggested
that the whole evaluation of an acquisition should be based on the appraisal of the level
of strategic fit between the bidding and target companies. The next step in the
acquisition process is the raising of finance and the selection of the correct medium of
exchange for the bid. This is the next section of papers to be reviewed. -
1.7 Financing the Acquisition, Selecting the Medium of Exchange and
Approaching the Target Firm
The first three sub-sections here concentrate on a relatively small number of
articles most of which were written by people who are involved in the acquisition
process. These papers detail the various options that the authors consider to be
important and those that they have found to be the most successful. None of these
articles incorporate empirical work but are based more on practical issues and the
experience of the authors. The last section, Section 1.7.4, involves empirical work as
the articles are concerned with the signalling effect of acquisition activity which has
been examined empirically by several authors.
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1.7.1 Financing Options for Acquisitions
It is obvious that the correct funding of the takeover is fundamental to the
success of the venture. To this end it is important to understand the various options
that are available and the advantages or disadvantages inherent in using each one.
Jensen (1988, 1992) considered issuing of debt instead of dividends as an appropriate
way to raise the funds for the takeover. This, however, vastly over-simplifies the
options that exist as Still (1994) demonstrated. Still demonstrated several different
financing options that are currently popular in the corporate control market. These
financing options are dealt with in the same order as they are reviewed here. Still
made no comments concerning which of these approaches is the most effective. He
contended that the choice of financing should be based on whichever method best suits
the acquiring firms current situation.
Revolving Credit and Term Loans
Revolving credit and term loans are formal agreements from the lender to
provide a specified amount for a selected period. The borrower can take advantage of
this agreement at any time within the "life" of the deal. This technique is Often used to
insure against unexpected eventualities in the future. 1 he interest rate is usually the
London Interbank Lending Rate (LIBOR) plus a premium chosen by the lender.
Bridge loans depend on later refinancing and are relatively short term. They are used
in acquisitions only if the timetable of the deal is suddenly reduced. Interest rates are
usually high, between 2% and 5 % above the prime borrowing rate. These financing
methods offer the bidder a great deal of flexibility but cost more than most other
methods of raising money.
Private Placements
Private placements consist of the sale of stock to a limited number of carefully
selected investors. This sale is generally used to refinance the initial acquisition
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funding. Employee stock ownership plans (ESOP's) are often involved in private
placements as they are both a retirement plan for the workers and source of fresh
finance for the firm without passing stock to outside parties. Leveraged ESOP's are
often used to acquire control of the company, whilst non-leveraged ones involve
periodic trading in the stock of that company. There is a close link to leveraged
buy-outs; where an investment group buys the firm and uses the assets owned by the
target to refinance the debt created by the purchase.
Operating Capital Leases and Securitised Credit
Operating capital leases occur when the firm sells its assets and then leases
them back, thus releasing the necessary funds for an acquisition. Securitised credit is
the issue of an asset backed security. These are useful in the financing of leveraged
transactions but are not suitable if the firm cannot support very large levels of debt.
Interest Rate Management
The last factor in Still's paper referred to the various techniques of interest rate
management. The ability to alter the nature of the pricing in a credit agreement is very
important. The most prevalent techniques are swaps, caps and collars. All of these
enable the firm to generate funds if used advisedly. The syndication of credit is
provided by a group of banks working together. The rating of debt uses either a
commercial or in-house rating to evaluate the perceived risk of the borrowing company
in light of its proposed acquisition activity. This rating may be of interest to the banks
who could use it to determine whether they are prepared to lend money to the firm.
This has a clear impact on the ease with which a company can attempt a takeover.
1.7.2 Selecting the Medium of Exchange
An issue closely related to the financing of the acquisition is the selection of the
medium of exchange. It is important to chose the right mixture of assets and cash to
suit the present circumstances and, where possible, maximise the profit produced by
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the takeover. It is often the case that the method of financing the acquisition and the
medium of exchange cannot be dealt with separately but are inextricably intertwined.
This article by Slusser and Riggs (1994) considered the selection of the medium of
exchange and included some references to raising the necessary finance although this
does not appear to be a priority in this paper. The authors discussed several different
types of currency that could be used in an acquisitions and mentioned the advantages
and disadvantages of each option. They claimed that it is possible to combine these
types of bids but did not specify when this would be more or less beneficial than using
a single approach. As in Still's article, the authors stated that the precise combination
of stock and cash would be unique to each acquisition and based on the individual
circumstances.
Specific Securities
First, there are specific securities. If the acquisition is paid for in debt securities
then it is essentially funded by the target firm, as the gains produced by the takeover
will repay the debt. This can be effective provided that everyone knows the true value
of the paper that they are either giving or receiving. This medium of exchange is very
popular in buy-outs where the funds required to purchase the company are raised using
_
the assets of the firm as security.
' Cash Payments
Cash Payments have the advantage that everyone knows precisely what they
are getting and there is no need for any delay in the acquisition. It can also allow for
considerable flexibility in the tax-allowances that can be claimed by the purchasing
firm, depending on the tax laws in that country. The problem with cash, however, is
that the bidding firm must have the funds readily available before launching the bid as
there can be no delay in paying when the shareholders accept the offer.
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Common Stock Transactions
Common Stock Transactions can be particularly advantageous to sellers who
plan to remain shareholders after the acquisition. There may be some tax advantages
although these will depend on the current legal position. In the USA exchanging
shares is a tax-free transaction although tax is still due when the stock is eventually
sold. For this method to be successful it is important for everyone to know the
perceived value of the target firms stock. The advantage to the purchasing firm is that
they do not have to pay out large sums in cash but instead can issue paper which is
much easier. The attraction for the shareholders of the target firm is that they have the
opportunity to retain a stake in the firm after the acquisition.
Debt or Preferred Stock
Using debt or preferred stock to finance an acquisition is commonplace when
the acquiring firm is facing difficulty raising the funds for the takeover and does not
wish to issue securities. In particular, preferred stock is often used in friendly deals
where the payment structure is negotiated. The advantage to the shareholders of the
target firm is that they may be able to defer taxation when these types of securities are
used. This is especially true if instalment notes are used. It is often possible for the
shareholders to defer paying tax until the final payment is made whilst still receiving
interim payments and earning interest on these payments. The disadvantage in using
these types of payments is that the deals are difficult to structure owing to the more
complex nature of the medium of exchange.
Convertible Securities and Contingent Payments
Convertible securities can be used as compensation in an acquisitions. Part of
the purchase price is contingent on the target reaching some predetermined goal by a
certain time. This can be used to bridge large gaps between the bid and ask prices in
the acquisition but it relies upon a fair evaluation of the costs and benefits inherent in
the transaction. This has the advantage of allowing the purchasing company to pay for
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the takeover in instalments which makes funding the purchase less of a strain. The
benefits to the shareholders are debatable in this case as they must face the risk that,
owing to unpredictable external conditions, the company will fail to meet the goals that
are specified in the contract. In this case they will loose out as the later payments will
not be forthcoming.
Hansen (1987) offered another possible reason for offering shares rather than
cash. He examined forty five acquisitions that took place between mining and
manufacturing companies in the years 1976 and 1977. A model of a bargaining game
involving asymmetric information was set up to replicate the behaviour of the firms in
an acquisition involving both debt financing and incorporating revealed information as
the game progressed. Based on the results generated in this manner Hansen was able
to conclude that bidding companies will offer shares rather than cash if they are
uncertain about the precise value of the target firm. This is, presumably, easier for the
acquiring company to fund without having to place an exact value on the target. A
cash offer is unambiguous and could lead to rejection from the shareholders if they
consider that the offer undervalues their shares. Conversely, the value of a share can
alter depending on the circumstances and using such a medium of exchange offers the
bidding firm the opportunity to make the target shareholders an offer without making it
clear exactly how they have valued the target, which can be to the bidding firms
advantage. Higson (1991) also examined the reasons for offering either cash or shares
in an acquisition attempt. He gathered information on three hundred and seventy-three
companies that were involved in acquisitions between April 1976 and October 1987.
Using regression models he was able to link the type of payment using the bid to
accounting variables. From the results of this analysis Higson concluded that cash is
offered when the acquirer has a high level of liquidity. This corresponds to the notion
that acquirers offer cash when they can afford to do so and only use shares when they
do not have the necessary funds.
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1.7.3 Approaching the Target Company
When the financing of the deal has been determined and the medium of
exchange selected, these factors need to be matched by the correct approach to the
target company. Several possible approaches are discussed by Ritch (1994).
specifically, Ritch suggested four methods of approaching the target firm that may
prove useful in the event that opposition is expected from the target's managers. Ritch
claimed that most unsolicited takeovers use one of four approaches to gaining the
required proportion of the shares available.
The "Saturday Night Special" Approach
The "Saturday night special" is a seven day cash tender offer that is usually
launched on a Saturday. The weekend break prevents the target from organising an
effective defence by making it difficult for the managers to be assembled until the
beginning of the next working week. This approach is very rare these days as the law
in most countries prohibits the use of the short time scale essential to the success of
this type of surprise move. In the UK the law states that an acquisition must be open
for at least twenty-one days which would prohibit the use of such a short run offer
_
structure although there is no embargo on the bid being launched at the weekend.
The "Bear Hug" Approach
The "bear hug" is an unilateral offer made directly to the managers of the
target. It usually takes the form of a letter which discloses enough information about
the proposed price and conditions that the target company is obliged to make a formal
announcement acknowledging that it is the subject of a takeover. Presumably, the
resulting improvement in the target's market price and standing are supposed to make
it difficult for the board to reject the offer. It can also be followed by an ordinary
tender offer if the target does not respond favourably within an allocated time period.
Again, it is very difficult to organise a defence as the bid becomes common knowledge
at the same time as the managers hear about it for the first time. In the UK the bidding
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firm is obliged to make an announcement stating its intention to launch a takeover bid
in the near future although it is not obliged to make details of the bid clear in this
document, which fits in neatly with this approach.
The "Nibble" Approach
The gradual acquisition of the target's stock, via the stock market in normal
transactions, Ritch called the "nibble strategy". In the UK this can be used to gain
anything up to thirty percent, although a public announcement must be made when the
holding exceeds five percent of the target firm. Once the bidder passes the thirty
percent level they must make a tender offer. This gradual activity is easier to finance
than either of the surprise methods above, but does allow the target the time it would
need to make the acquisition difficult to complete. This is the most common approach
in the current market but the laws on disclosure in the UK reduce the element of
surprise considerably.
The Swipe Approach
The "swipe" occurs when a tender offer has already been accepted. Another
_
firm offers to buy the same shares at a increased premium. This is a very effective
manoeuvre as the current owners have already agreed to a change in control and at a
lower price than the new offer. The first bidder has done all the work necessary to
persuade the shareholders to sell their stock before the second bidder makes any move.
Once the second bidder announces an improved bid it is likely that the shareholders
will favour this offer. Such an improved bid is often used to prevent management led
buy-outs.
Two Tiered Bids and the Elimination of the Free-rider Problem
Another type of approach that a bidder could use is discussed in a paper by
Spatt (1993) who considered the adverse effect of the free-rider problem on takeover
bids. This problem arises when the shareholders believe that their shares will soon be
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worth more than the bidder is offering if, for example, their company's assets were
more effectively allocated. Under these circumstances it is better for the shareholders
not to sell their shares and, as a result, the bid could fail even if it is the best thing for
the company as a whole. This is the "free-rider problem". Spatt considered this to be
a serious issue and, by examining the main research in this area, he was able to bind it
together to form a coherent consideration of this issue. He concluded that this
free-rider problem can be eliminated with the use of a two-tiered conditional offer.
The bidder makes an offer that is constructed in two parts. The first part offers one
price if the shares are sold during the acquisition whilst the second part values the
share at a lower price if they are sold after the bid has been completed. Once the
bidder has gained control of the target it is possible for the management to force the
shareholders to sell their shares by instituting an compulsory re-purchase of the
remaining stock. The fear of being "greenmailed" and having to accept this second,
considerably lower, offer persuades the shareholders to sell their shares during the
takeover thus eliminating the free-rider problem.
1.7.4 The Signalling Effect of Acquisitions
When an acquisition is launched this action releases information to the market.
_
Superficially, this information is concerned with the fact that one firm considers itself
to be in a position to purchase another company and the identity of that other firm
becomes public knowledge. This reveals certain things about the way that the
acquiring firm views the target and about the bidders plans for the future. These
factors are not the only information that can be gathered from an acquisition bid,
however, and the following articles discuss the information that is revealed in the
takeover process.
The bid can be used as a signalling device. In particular, the value of the
acquiring firm can be inferred from the composition of the offer that it makes in a
takeover attempt. Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel (1990) claimed that the true value
of the bidding firm is revealed by the mix of cash and securities used to pay for the
target. They stated that the bidder value is monotonically increasing and convex in the
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fraction of the total offer that consists of cash. The authors started by reviewing some
other relevant papers. Recent studies have shown that, in the absence of perfectly
efficient markets, the gains to target firms are significantly higher in all cash offers than
when stocks are exchanged. When asymmetric information is considered, the division
of the merger gains is a function of both the size of the bid and the medium of
exchange. For example, a large bid implies a high expected "overpayment cost" to the
bidder, as offers are accepted only if they equal or exceed the target's value.
Conversely, a low offer reduces the probability that the bid will be successful and
unsuccessful bids involve the cost of the lost synergy gain. As a result, low bids have a
high "lost synergy gain" cost. Eckbo et al allowed the bidder to explicitly select the
cash-security mix. This creates a signalling role for the cash portion of the offer. They
also assumed that bidder makes an offer so large that no target would reject it. All
agents are assumed to be risk neutral and the discount rate is zero. The final
equilibrium contained a strategy for the bidder and a strategy for the target. This paper
focused on pure strategies and identified an equilibrium as the situation in which the
bidder chooses offers that are acceptable to both high and low value targets. The
authors managed to establish that the equilibrium value of the bidders claim is a
function of the amount of cash on offer, the information available to the bidding
managers and the beliefs of the target's shareholders. The authors tested their
assertion empirically using data from to Canadian companies. The Department of
Consumer and Corporate Affairs compiles a Merger Register and the companies were
drawn from this list. To be included in the sample, the bid had to occur between
January 1964 and December 1982 and be made by a company that was listed on the
Toronto Stock Exchange at that time. In addition, the date of the first press
announcement could be identified in the Merger Register and the acquisition was for a
controlling interest in the target rather than a minority stake. In all of the acquisitions
involved in this sample, sufficient stock return data was available and the payment
method was either all cash, all stock or a combination of the two. Finally, the target
shareholders were not offered the option to select, on an individual basis, their
preferred combination of cash and stock. A total of one hundred and eighty-two
takeovers satisfied the selection criteria. In fifty-six the payment was a combination of
cash and stock, in ninety-two cases the offer was all cash and in thirty-four cases all
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stock. The results indicated that in an all cash offer there is no signalling as the target
value is common knowledge and there is no overpayment cost. All stock offers occur
when the bidder value is common knowledge and consequently any abnormal return
for the bidders reflects only the synergy term. In a separating equilibrium, however,
both components are involved in the calculation of the abnormal return, as in mixed
offers. Mixed offers result in the largest abnormal returns. However, the issue still
remains as to whether this gain represents an average signalling gain or a larger
synergy revaluation.
1.8 Acquisition Defences
There are a great many acquisition defences that can be used to try to defeat an
unwanted takeover attempt. Defensive measures really need to be put in place before
the acquisition is launched in order to ensure a speedy response to a takeover. If this is
not the case there will be a delay between the acquisition attempt being launched and
the company attempting to defend itself. This delay could greatly reduce the chances
of a successful defence. Acquisition defences can be split, broadly, into those
measures that require shareholder approval, section 1.8.1, and those measures that do
not, section 1.8.2.
1.8.1 Defences Requiring Shareholder Approval
Golden Parachutes
This acquisition defence has already been discussed in section 1.5 where it is
considered as a possible catalyst for acquisition activity. A golden parachute is a
compensation contract that will pay a manager a significant sum if they loose their job
for some reason. It is usual for the managers of an acquired firm to be sacked after the
takeover so these contracts are most frequently associated with acquisitions. The
problem arises when an unwelcome acquisition bid is made. The managers of the
target firm have to decide whether they are prepared to risk opposing the bid. If they
attempt to resist the acquisition and it is still successful then they have alienated the
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managers of the acquiring firm and are highly likely to be sacked. Alternatively, they
can choose not to resist the acquisition in the hope that they may be retained after the
purchase has been completed. It is possible, however, for an acquisition bid to be
made that is clearly not in the best interests of the target firm. In this situation the
managers of that firm have a very difficult decision to make and golden parachutes
were introduced to resolve this conflict of interests. With a compensation contract
already in place the managers are free to defend the company without worrying about
the consequences for their own future as, if the worse comes to the worse, they will
receive enough money to secure their future until they can find another job. However,
as Jensen (1988) noted, this type of contractual agreement is open to abuse by the
managers. Compensation contracts are very difficult to structure accurately and the
sums of money involved are growing steadily. The value of these contracts has now
reached a point where some managers may wish to be sacked in order to realise these
funds. Larcker (1992) found that shareholders thought that compensation contracts
removed any commitment that the managers had to work effectively. In other cases,
the bidding firms have been known to offer golden parachutes to the managers of
target firms in order to remove any objections that these managers might have to the
proposed acquisition. It is clear to see, however, why golden parachutes are very
popular with the managers of potential targets and they are rapidly becoming an
everyday part of remuneration packages despite their limited effectiveness.
Supermajority Amendments
Supermajority amendments alter to the minimum number of shares that the
bidder must obtain before assuming control of the company. It is possible to alter
these levels to some arbitrary value provided that the shareholders approve of the
change. For example, a supermajority amendment could specify that a potential
acquirer would need eighty percent of the shares to gain control of a firm rather than
the usual figure of just over fifty percent. Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) observed
that these provisions rarely stop a determined acquisition attempt, but at least ensure
that the offer premium is high enough to persuade a very large proportion of the
shareholders to sell. This is typical of many acquisition defences, particularly those
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requiring shareholder approval. In many cases these defences cannot prevent a
determined bid but they do ensure that the shareholders receive a good price for their
stock.
Fair Price Amendments
The next type of acquisition defence is the use of fair price amendments. This
applies particularly to two-tiered offers that are opposed by the management. It is
possible for a firm to define a value that is considered to be a "fair" price for the stock.
If an acquisition offer is made that does not exceed this value then the bid is
automatically rejected. However, an offer that is considered "fair" can be accepted by
the shareholders even if the managers are opposed. Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988)
found that this defence can do little more than increase the value of the offer bid. It
does not deter a resolute purchaser who is prepared to pay a reasonable sum for the
shares.
Dual Class Recapitalisation and Cumulative Voting Rights
These two techniques are very similar. A dual-class recapitalisation splits the
- ifirm's equity into two groups with different voting rights. The general idea is to ensure
that the current management and a select group of owners have a greater percentage of
the voting power than can ever be gained by the ordinary shareholders or another firm.
Cumulative voting rights also ensure that a small group of shareholders can control the
firm irrespective of the wishes of the majority of the owners as these shares represent
the majority of the voting stock although they do not represent, numerically, the
majority of the shares. In both of these cases it should be impossible for an
unwelcome potential acquirer to gain enough shares to take control of the target,
provided that the members of this select group of shareholders do not sell their voting
rights. Once again, Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) found that both of these
techniques were ineffective again a determined acquisition attempt as the shareholders
with the controlling stake in the firm can always be persuaded to sell their shares if the
offer price is high enough.
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In general it appears that these defences are unable to save the company from
a determined acquisition attempt but can ensure that the shareholders receive a
generous premium in the event that their company is the subject of a takeover.
1.8.1 Defences that do not Require Shareholder Approval
Litigation
In an unwanted acquisition attempt litigation by the target firm's mangers is one
of the defences that does not require shareholder approval. Litigation provides the
time necessary to prepare an alternative defence against the takeover attempt.
Jenkinson and Mayer (1994) observed that legal challenges in the UK in recent years
included a large number of appeals to regulatory bodies, such as the Office of Fair
Trading, the Takeover Panel and the Mergers and Monopolies Commission. In some
other cases, they noted that the target complained to either the Stock Exchange or the
courts claiming that the bid breached the accepted codes of practice or violated the law
concerning insider trading. During the ensuing delay other bidders may also appear
which benefits the target shareholders. Unfortunately, if the litigation prevents an offer
being made, the shareholders will loose the opportunity to accept and gain the
premium but the managers will have succeeded in preventing the threat to their control
of the target company.
Targeted Block Stock Repurchases (Greenmail)
Targeted block stock repurchases occur when the management of a company
institute a compulsory repurchase of shares. Under these circumstances the
shareholders have no choice and must surrender their shares, hence the popular name
of this process "Greenmail". As an acquisition defence this approach requires the
managers to buy back enough stock to make it impossible for another firm to gain
control. Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) quoted previous research in which it was
shown that greenmail can result in significant losses to the shareholders as the
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managers rarely pay more than the market price for the shares and often pay
considerably less. Despite the losses to the shareholders this technique can make it
impossible for an unwanted acquisition to take place. Jensen (1988) argued that that
greenmail has an undeservedly bad reputation. The only threat the greenmailer can
pose is to buy the stock at a price less than the current market value which, he
suggested, can be prevented if the managers introduce a policy so that all repurchases
must have majority board approval. If this sort of approval were required it would go
some way towards ensuring that the shareholders received a reasonable price for their
shares which may improve the reputation of this technique.
Pac-Man
The Pac-man defence is a retaliatory acquisition attempt by the target. When
an unwanted acquisition is launched the target responds by launching a takeover bid
against the bidder. The aim of this defence is to purchase enough of the bidding firms
stock to alarm the bidder enough to persuade this firm to drop the acquisition attempt.
This defensive strategy is only effective if the target firm can afford to buy large
quantities of shares in the bidder. It is a rarely used defence in the UK but was
recently used to great effect by Ranks Hovis McDougal (RHM) against The British
Sugar Corporation. British Sugar was effectively repelled without posing any real
threat to RHM. An interesting corollary to this tale came a few years later in 1981
when British Sugar became the target of an unwanted takeover attempt by the sugar
refining giant Berisfords. British Sugar appealed to the Office of Fair Trading and
managed to get the deal referred to the Mergers and Monopolies Commission (MMC)
in a classic example of the litigation defence. After a long inquiry by the MMC
Berisfords agreed to sell off some sugar retailing interests and the deal was allowed to
proceed in 1982. British Sugar continued to resist the acquisition attempt and the deal
finally closed in July 1982 with Berisfords just short gaining control. At this point
RHM decided to sell the British Sugar shares that it had gained in the earlier pac-man
defence to Berisfords. This sale gave Berisfords 50.64% of British Sugar which was,
just, a controlling interest.
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Poison Pills
One of the most effective acquisition defences is the use of a poison pill. These
measures involve imposing economic impediments on the bidder which can prevent the
takeover from being profitable. The poison pill works by suddenly altering the
financial demands faced by the target firm, for example allowing the shareholders to
purchase more shares or altering the re-payment patterns for the firm's debt.
According to Jensen (1988), poison pills are the most effective form of take-over
defence. They are designed to make the target financially "indigestible" to the bidder.
This is done by changing fundamental aspects of the corporation's rules that govern the
relationship between the shareholders, the managers and the board of directors. This
sort of measure can make the cost of the takeover several times greater than it was
previously which is a truly effective deterrent. The only disadvantage to measures like
this one is that it deprives the shareholders of the opportunity to realise a profit by
selling their shares in a takeover attempt.
White Knights and White Squires
This last acquisition defence takes place when the target manages to persuade a
friendly company to launch a takeover bid to contest the unwanted acquisition attempt.
The friendly firm is called a "white knight". The managers of the target company agree
to support the white knight's acquisition attempt and recommend that the shareholders
sell their stock to this firm. In return the white knight agrees to maintain the target
firm in a virtually unaltered condition after the acquisition and, in many cases, to retain
the incumbent management. This is a rarely used but quite effective defence. The
white knight tries to make an offer that is at least equivalent to the offer made by the
original bidder and, with the support of the target's managers, this takeover bid should
be successful. Failure in this type of defence can occur when the original bidder is
determined and keeps raising the offer price until the white knight cannot afford to
keep up. The problem with this type of defensive strategy, and the probable cause of
its recent decline, is the fact that white knights are not always as chivalrous as they
may appear and are not inclined to keep to the deal that they made with the target
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management before launching their takeover bid. In some cases, the white knight can
turn out to be far worse for the target firm than the original bidder would have been.
An effective compromise is the use of a white squire. Here the target sells
enough shares to an interested third party to make it impossible for the unwelcome
bidder to gain control. This is safer than the white knight as neither the bidder or the
white squire can gain enough shares to take total control of the target company. It is
possible that these two firms might eventually come to some compromise so that one
of them could gain total control of the target but the careful selection of the white
squire should make that unlikely. A suitable white squire is a firm that needs the target
in its current form and would loose out if the bidder gained control. If such a white
squire can be found this is a very effective acquisition defence.
1.9 Benefits Resulting From Successful Acquisitions
The benefits produced by a successful acquisition are one of the most
frequently discussed topics in the corporate control literature. The gains resulting
from the acquisition can be split into the benefits accrued by the acquired firm and the
benefits gained by the acquiring company. Stock price movements are often used to
illustrate the impact of a takeover on the performance of a company. In most cases the
deviation between the actual and the expected returns is used to calculate the
Abnormal Return (AR) and then the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR). A positive
CAR is indicative of efficiency gains and suggests that the takeover will create value
for the shareholders.
The impact on share price is not, however, the only issue concerning the
benefits of acquisition activity. Numerous studies have attempted to determine where
the benefits are derived from and to examine the impact that takeovers can have
outside the involved firms. The sub-sections here deal with the literature concerning
each of these issues in turn.
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1.9.1 Benefits to an Acquired Company
The main benefits of an acquisition are generally believed to go to the
shareholders of the acquired company. Schleifer and Vishny (1988) noted that this is
the conclusion drawn in the majority of recent studies. These results are generally
based on the analysis of how the share price is affected by the announcement of the
takeover. This view was shared by Dodd (1992). Here the author examined the share
prices of both bidding and target companies for fifty-three successful acquisition
attempts over a period of several years before the acquisition takes place. The
emphasis is placed upon the abnormal returns and how these change when the takeover
is announced. The author found that targets are firms that normally have negative
abnormal returns which become positive when the acquisition is announced. As such
the main beneficiaries of the takeover are the shareholders of the target firm. A similar
result can be found in the article by Holderness and Sheehan (1992). Again this paper
is based on the study of changes in the share price around the time of an acquisition.
The sample was composed of thirty-five companies that were acquired between 1977
and 1982. As with Dodd's paper, Holderness and Sheehan discovered that the
shareholders of the target firm were the main beneficiaries. In particular, they
examined takeovers involving a group of well-known American corporate raiders.
_
They discovered that the stock market reacts even more favourably than Usual when it
is announced that the bidding firm is a raider. As a result, the share price rises even
more than would be expected and the shareholders are able to benefit to a greater
degree.
In a recent article by Weston (1994) the variables that produce these abnormal
returns are evaluated. Weston believed that the type of activity, the method of
payment, the timing of the action and the number of bidders are all important. Weston
found that the positive abnormal returns to the acquired firms were considerable, up to
thirty-five percent. This represents a significant increase in the value of the
shareholders investment. Edwards (1994) and Jensen (1988, 1992) both found similar
results.
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The tax effects argument is applicable in the long term under the current UK
tax system. The shareholders of the target firm can get tax relief if the acquisition
meets four criteria. These are that the acquisition must take the form of an exchange
of shares, that the nature of the involved firm's business interests remain substantially
unchanged after the takeover, that the majority of the people involved in the business
also remain unchanged after the takeover and, finally, that the acquisition occurs for
some reason other than to gain tax relief. In the event that the acquisition is funded
with cash then capital gains tax is due on the proportion of the offer that is cash.
However, it is possible to get relief on this capital gains tax in some circumstances but
these are unique to each bid offer. Nevertheless, if the shareholders of the target firm
accept shares instead of cash it is possible for them to benefit in this way in addition to
the benefits that they receive through the increased value of the acquired firms stock.
It is generally considered that the managers of the acquired company do not
benefit in the acquisition process as they are usually sacked when the new owners take
control. Larcker (1992) pointed out that it is still possible for these people to benefit
to a considerable degree under certain conditions. In particular, he referred to the
presence of golden parachutes in the managers compensation contracts. Larcker even
suggested that there may be occasions when the value of the parachutes are so high
_
that the managers will actively seek the acquisition of the firm so that they can take
advantage of these contracts. The same opinion was held by Agrawal and Wallding
(1994) who examined the impact that acquisitions have on the employment of chief
executive officers (CEOs). They used data on three hundred and forty four acquisition
attempts that involved American firms on the Forbes 800 list. Using descriptive
statistics and regression models Agrawal and Walling found that acquisitions
occurred when the CEOs of the target firms have abnormal levels of compensation and
more than half were sacked after the firm was acquired. This concurred with Larcker's
idea that managers will seek to have their firms purchased in order to realise these
benefits. Furthermore, Agrawal and Walkling found that many of the sacked CEOs
remained unemployed for at least three years after the takeover. This suggests that,
whilst the financial compensation can be considerable, the impact that an acquisition
has on the reputation of the managers of the target firm is clearly negative.
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A recent paper that considered failed acquisition attempts is by Parkinson and
Dobbins (1993). Their sample was relatively small as they only examined
seventy-seven successfully defended acquisitions in the UK between 1975 and 1984.
By calculating abnormal returns Parkinson and Dobbins found that the returns to the
target firm stay abnormally high even when the bid fails. There are two possible
reasons for this. Firstly, when an acquisition is launched, the market is forced to
reconsider the value of the target and may discover that the target was previously
valued at rather less than its true worth. Alternatively, the fact that an acquisition was
attempted may persuade the managers of the target firm to work more effectively and
utilise the assets of their firm more efficiently. The high returns may be due to market
anticipation of this fact.
1.9.2 Benefits to an Acquiring Company
It is generally found that the shareholders of the acquiring firm do not benefit
from acquisition activity as the announcement of a takeover attempt is often followed
by a decrease in the value of that firm's shares. Cosh, Hughes, Lee & Singh (1989)
found that the returns to acquirers rose significantly just before the acquisition and
then deteriorated afterwards. In acquiring companies there are usually positive
abnormal returns in the years preceding the acquisition that exceed the cumulative
negative returns afterwards. Dodd (1992) found exactly the same result when he
examined the impact that an acquisition has upon the share prices of companies.
Weston (1994) evaluated these losses and found them to be between three and five
percent. This result is supported by many papers often in conjunction with the
observation that the managers of the acquiring firm benefit even when their
shareholders do not.
The managers of acquiring companies benefit through the increased size of
their firm that results from the purchase of another company. It is generally
acknowledged that there is greater prestige in managing a large firm compared to a
small company. An acquisition is one of the fastest ways to increase the size of a firm
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and this sort of activity is often rewarded in the managers bonus and increased size of
their remuneration package. There has not been any empirical work on this topic to
date, presumably because the managers are unwilling to reveal the extent of their
wages, and so it is not possible to determine the magnitude of the benefits that these
managers receive.
There are also positive gains to the acquiring firm as a whole. Studies that the
gains from an acquisition take the form of increased synergy. This was found by
Berkovitch and Khanna (1991), Myers (1992) and Achtmeyer (1994) whilst several
other authors mention it in conjunction with other gains. For example, Creehan and
Leger (1994) believed that an improved competitive position can be gained via an
acquisition and this could result in a considerable financial advantage to the acquiring
company. According to Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) the precise composition of
the acquisition benefits will depend on the motive behind the acquisition. The authors
related the sign of the total acquisition gains to the motive. Assuming that their
conclusions are correct, the acquiring firm's management will know in advance what to
expect, based on the nature of their motive. This hypothesis was not tested in this
paper, as it is a fundamental assumption on behalf of the authors and tends to over
simplify matters somewhat. It is undeniably true, however, that the managers of the
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acquiring firm may select to purchase another firm for some reason - that is not
immediately obvious to someone outside that company. Higson and Elliot (1994)
found increased profits and cash flows followed an acquisition when they examined the
results of three hundred and ten acquisitions that took place in the UK between 1976
and 1990. This result also appeared in Kim (1994) who examined one hundred and
seventy-seven pairs of companies that were involved in acquisitions between 1980 and
1986 and estimated the cumulative abnormal returns that resulted in each case. He
found that the highest acquisition returns occurred when companies with excess cash
were involved. The opposite is true, however, in the article by Sawyer and Shrieves
(1994) who examined just over four hundred takeovers which they sub-divided into
four groups depending on the size of the involved firms. By analysing the differences
in accounting ratios between firms in these groups they were able to declare that the
bidding firms with free cash lost more in an acquisition than other bidding firms.
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1.9.3 The Origins of Acquisition Benefits
It has been frequently observed that the shareholders of the target firm benefit
as their shares increase in value when an acquisition is announced. At the same time
the bidding company experiences a decrease in the value of its shares. These changes
represent some of the benefits generated by the acquisition process. Jarrell, Brickley
and Netter (1988) stated that there can be little doubt that the shareholders of target
firm benefit in an acquisition. They referred to other articles to support this claim and
noted that there is significant evidence which suggests that the target firms experience
a large increase in market price with the announcement of a takeover bid. They found
that the precise distribution of the gains was unique in each acquisition although there
are general points that can be made. The targets receive the majority of the value
produced by the combination of the firms and these gains do not appear to be offset by
losses to the acquirer. If the gains are not created by a transfer in value from the
bidder to the target then where do the gains come from ? The authors suggest there
are three possible answers. The first is short term myopia where corporations that
engage in long term strategies are frequently undervalued and become targets.
Presumably, Jarrell, Brickley and Netter believed that when these long term strategies
come to fruition they generate gains that account for the disparity between the value
lost by the bidder and the value gained by the target. This does not explain, however,
why the gains are virtually immediate whilst these strategies could require a longer
time period before any benefits would be realised. The second answer that the authors
suggested is the undervalued target theory. The bidders acquire undervalued firms by
offering the shareholders a price significantly above the current market price and make
a profit as the company is still worth more than they paid for it. The market may
review its opinion of the target when the acquisition is launched and may realise that
the target is undervalued. If the market then alters the value of the target to correct
this error it may add enough to the value of the target to create the gains that accrue in
a takeover. Lastly, there is the tax effects theory where the authors suggested that the
combined firms may have far more advantageous tax positions than either of the
involved firms had separately. As with the short term myopia theory, this tax effect
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idea may explain gains in the long term but the gains could not be realised quickly
enough to create the scale of gains that are seen within the duration of the bid. In this
relatively short period large gains are made by the target firm which these two theories
cannot account for. The second of these theories may offer an explanation for these
short term gains but it relies on the rather unlikely assumption that market
undervaluing every firm that is acquired.
Another article that attempts to identify the origins of the acquisition gains is
by Roll (1986). Roll believed that takeovers gains hardly ever exist and are
overestimated in the few cases when they genuinely do occur. He claimed that part of
the large increase in the value of the target shares is transferred from the bidder. In
other words, the value of the offer premium significantly overstates the increase in
economic value resulting from the combination of the firms. If there are no synergies
or other gains in the acquisition then Roll believed that the valuation can be considered
a random variable with a mean value equal to the current market price of the target. If
the value of this random variable exceeds the mean, then the bidder will make an offer
as this suggests that the target is currently undervalued. Potential bidders should know
that any offer in excess of the current market price represents a valuation error on their
part. However, simply because the market appears to behave rationally, it does not
necessarily mean that all the individual participants are rational. Roll claiMed that the
market is composed almost entirely of irrational investors whose behaviour cancels out
in aggregate to give the illusion of overall rationality. He continued to say that if it is
assumed that there are no gains in the takeover process, then the increase in the market
value of the target and the corresponding drop in the market value of the bidding firm
should even out to zero. Adding the cost of the takeover means that there is an
aggregate net loss created by the procedure. This implies that the price of the target
will rise on the announcement of the bid and fall back again when the bid fails. Under
these conditions Roll made the following three predictions about the pricing of the
bidder. Firstly, the share price will drop on the announcement of the takeover bid,
secondly, the share price will rise on the abandonment or failure of the bid and thirdly
that the share price drops again on the completion of a successful bid. Roll referred to
previous papers that examined the activity of the market price of acquisition targets in
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which the authors found that the target's price rose on the announcement of a takeover
bid and dropped again when the bid failed which is consistent with the predictions of
Roll's Hubris Hypothesis. The central prediction in Roll's theory is that the total gains
in an acquisition are negative. He selected a few examples from the previous literature
to illustrate the main points of this idea. The Hubris hypothesis also predicted a drop
in the value of the bidding firm. Roll used the results of previous studies which
suggested that the selection of the target and the subsequent bid signals a small
upwards revision in the market's estimate of the value of the bidders current assets
which is not offset by the prospect of overpaying for the target. Consequently, there is
a small downward revision in the bidders value as it becomes more and more obvious
that the target will be acquired at too high a price. This idea, that takeover benefits are
fictitious and exist only through erroneous valuations, is a radical stand-point in the
literature about acquisition gains. The majority of papers claim that there are gains in
terms of synergy or improved efficiency.
1.9.4 External Effects of Acquiring a Company
There are external effects generated by an acquisition that are rarely discussed
in the literature. One article that does consider the impact of a takeover on factors
other than share prices is by Hughes (1993). This paper included a section entitled
Post-Merger Performance in which the author listed and discussed several
consequences of an acquisition. Hughes offered no empirical analysis of his own but
referred to several other works which illustrate the relevant points.
Real Resource Effects
When examining real resource effects the principle comparison is between pre-
and post-merger efficiency. The results are broadly neutral with the observed gains
and losses generally cancelling each other out but it is possible that a horizontal
acquisition of sufficient size could have a detrimental impact on the concentration and
composition of the market in which these companies operate. This is the sort of
situation that results in an investigation by the Mergers and Monopolies Commission
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and in recent years this type of effect has been limited by prompt intervention by the
MMC. The acquisitions that Hughes referred to in this section, however, all occurred
in the 1960's when the regulations on competition were not so stringent. In the event
that the law in the UK changes with respect to acquisitions it is possible that this issue
could be promoted to considerable importance once again.
Investment Effects
The next effect is the impact on investment. Hughes quoted previous research
in this area in which the authors concluded that the link between mergers, investment
and improved relative productivity is more than coincidental. There is a positive
change in investments for the acquired and acquiring firms which is significant in
horizontal takeovers and non-significant in other acquisitions. From this result Hughes
was able to infer that horizontal acquisitions are a convenient manner in which
companies can gain access to sectors with profitable investment opportunities that
might not otherwise be available.
Technical Effects
Acquisitions have a positive association with investment performance, as
mentioned above, which suggests that they may also increase productivity via technical
changes. In large firms acquisitions enhance the process of technical improvement.
Hughes quoted the example of ICL. The formation of this company, in 1968, was
directly linked to an increase in the general level of research and development in the
whole country. It is certainly true that Research and Development departments are
one of the areas where synergistic benefits are thought to be at their largest and it is
often the case that large technological advances follow the combination of two firms
Regional Effects
There may be regional impacts following an acquisition. One of the criteria
considered by the Mergers and Monopolies Commission is the predicted impact that an
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acquisition will have on the regional balance of activity and employment. In the
short-term there is little or no effect but in the long term the results are unfavourable.
In particular, acquisitions are often linked to high closure rates and lower rates of
employment growth. This has been related to the transferral of control to a location
outside the region when a firm based in a certain area is purchased and becomes a
subsidiary of another company which is based elsewhere.
1.10 Regulation and Government Policy
Any acquisition activity must remain within the parameters imposed by the law
and the code of practice advocated by the regulators. To this end it is important to
review these rules and have an appreciation of what will happen if they are
contravened. There are two aspects of the law that are applicable to the study of
acquisitions in the UK. First there are the rules governing acquisitions as a whole
which are based on Government policy and the workings of the Mergers and
Monopolies Commission and secondly there are the Stock Exchange laws concerning
the dealing of shares on the market.
1.10.1 Government Policy and the Working of the Mergers and Monopolies
Commission
Fairburn (1993) aimed to give an overview of the history of acquisition law and
the relevant policies in the UK between 1965-1986. This is split chronologically into
several sections for clarity. Much of the same material was covered by Franks and
Harris (1993).
Inherited Institutions (Pre-1965)
The Mergers and Monopolies Commission (MMC) was created in 1948 and in
1965 the Mergers and Monopolies Act was passed which set down the terms under
which referrals could be made by the Board of Trade. Under the conditions of this act
the MMC had between six and nine months to decide what action, if any, should be
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taken concerning a referred takeover. In 1966 the Industrial Reorganisation
Corporation was established to promote business "rationalisation". The creation of
this body was a reaction to the feeling at the time that many UK firms were too small
to compete in the international arena and the IRC was formed to rectify this problem
by funding merger activity if it was felt that the resulting firm could successfully
participate internationally. This innovation was followed by a marked increase in the
level of acquisition activity in the UK.
Policy 1965-1983
In the first half of this period there were very few mergers that gave rise to
concerns about the public interest and so there were very few referrals at this time.
The majority of referrals involved horizontal acquisitions, although the first referrals of
conglomerate activity also occurred in this period. In 1973 the Fair Trading Act was
passed which established the Office of Fair Trading to oversee competition and protect
the interests of the consumers. The number of referrals and the types of mergers
involved grew throughout the latter part of this period
Policy 1984-1986
This period is notable for the publication of an internal Department of Trade
and Industry review of merger policy which concluded with a statement that has
become known as the "Tebbit Guide-lines". This stated that in the opinion of Norman
Tebbit, then Head of the Department of Trade and Industry, "my policy has been and
will continue to be to make references primarily on competition grounds" (Fairburn,
1993, page 250). This means that hostile conglomerate bids and vertical acquisitions
cannot be referred in the vast majority of cases. In fact this comment has resulted in an
almost total cessation of referrals for all except horizontal takeovers. To date this
statement remains the central tenet of acquisition policy in the UK. It is not, however,
the only factor that the MMC considers.
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Current MAIC Procedure
Referred mergers are considered with respect to both non-competition and
competition issues. The main non-competition issues are concerned with the impact
on the local regional economy and the problem of foreign ownership, which is
prohibited in some industries. The impact on competition is the clearest subject of
public policy concerns. The MiNIC has a set of market definitions devised in 1980
which assign the acceptable levels of market power for each industry. If a merger is
referred on competition grounds the market share of the post-acquisition firm is
computed and compared with the industry benchmarks. If the computed market share
exceeds the acceptable level the merger will be rejected on the grounds that it would
reduce competition to an unacceptable degree.
1.10.2 Stock Exchange Rules and Legal Issues Concerning Acquisitions
There are many laws that can be applied to acquisitions but the sections here
are limited to those legal issues that are directly linked to this process as these are the
most important aspects of the law in this case.
Rules Concerning the Disclosure of Holdings
The disclosure of holdings refers to the quantity of shares in a single company
owned by an individual or another firm. Holding certain proportions of the total
number of shares means that certain responses are required under the current UK legal
system. The first important level of holdings is just one percent of the total number of
shares. During a period of normal trading there are no obligations associated with this
level of investment. However, if the firm is the target of an acquisition attempt then
anyone gaining more than one percent of the total shares in that firm must publicly
declare this holding. This is to prevent outside parties interfering in the takeover bid
for reasons of their own and to prevent the share price of the target firm being falsely
inflated by excess buying during this period. When a firm is not involved in an
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acquisition, the identity of any individual or firm which gains more than five percent of
the total shares must be made public knowledge.
The largest stake that anyone can hold in an individual company before they are
legally obliged to launch a takeover bid is 29.99%. If any firm holds more than this
percentage of the total number of shares and does not want to attempt an acquisition
then they must sell the excess at the first available opportunity and reduce their stake
to not more than this figure. This can sometimes happen as a result of another
acquisition. The acquiring firm purchases another company and finds that both it and
the target firm own shares in a third company. If the combined number of shares in the
third firm exceeds this limit then the acquiring company must either sell the excess
stock or make a bid for control.
If a firm gains more than fifty percent of the shares in another company then it
has a controlling interest in that firm. The only exceptions to this are when the target
company has a supermajority amendment in its charter. This acquisition defence, as
explained earlier, alters the level of stock required to gain control of the firm to some
value in excess of fifty percent. In this case gaining a controlling interest will require a
larger percentage of the available shares.
If an individual or firm owns at least seventy-five percent of the shares in
another firm then they are entitled to pass special amendments without consulting the
rest of the owners. These special amendments could refer to changes in the firms
structure or even to altering the name under which it trades. When at least ninety
percent of the shares are owned by one person or company then it is possible to apply
merger accounting to the purchase. Merger accounting is only applicable when the
merger relief is available on the deal. This means that the premium paid on any shares
that were issued during the acquisition do not have to be included anywhere on the
acquiring company's accounts. Merger accounting means that the target firms assets
and liabilities are included at their book value which means that there is no increase in
the tax charge for depreciation. The shares used in the takeover are accounted for at
their nominal value and the accounts for both firms for the full financial year are used
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in the accounts after the purchase. Using this method of accounting means that there
is no increase in goodwill to be dealt with on the accounts and both the profits and
levels of return on investment for the acquiring firm appear artificially high for the year
in which the takeover occurred. Finally, it is possible for a firm or individual to gain
one hundred percent of the shares in another firm. If this happens then they have
complete control over that company and become the sole owner. This is very rare in
normal takeovers but does occur when a firm is taken private or the managers decide
to greenmail the shareholders so that they must sell their remaining shares.
Essential Documentation used in an Acquisition
There are also certain documents that must be issued in an acquisition attempt
three of which are of great importance. The first of these is the formal announcement
that the bidding firm intends to make an offer for another company which is sent
directly to the shareholders. The potential acquirer does not have to inform the
managers of the target company before they send this letter to the owners. This
notice usually contains no details about the proposed takeover or the offer that will be
made. This information comes in the second, and most important, of the essential
documents which is the Offer Document. This letter states the nature of the bid that is
being made, the value of the offer, the time scale that the shareholders have in which to
consider the bid and any conditions for acceptance that the bidding firm wishes to
impose. For example, if the bid is going to be two-tiered then the precise conditions of
both levels of the offer must be stated in this letter. It is possible for the shareholders
to receive several Offer Documents in the course of an acquisition attempt if there is
more than one bidder or if the offer is revised before the final closing date. Lastly,
there is the Form of Acceptance which is usually sent to the shareholders with the
Offer Document. This last letter is a form which is used by the target firms
shareholders to formally accept the bid that has been made. It also includes a section
in which the shareholders can state how they want to be paid in the event that the
bidding company offered them a choice.
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The Timing of an Acquisition
The form of acceptance must be returned to the purchasing company before the
offer period ends. The offer period is the length of time which the shareholders have
to decide their response to the offer. In the UK there are three criteria that must be
applied when deciding the length of this period which starts on the day that the Offer
Document is issued. Firstly, the offer period must be at least twenty-one days long.
Secondly, it must end after not more than sixty days although this criterion can be
waived if the bid is contested by another firm or referred to the Mergers and
Monopolies Commission. Finally, the offer can be revised any number of times within
the offer period provided that the shareholders have at least fourteen days to consider
each new offer and that there are at least fourteen days left between the revision of an
offer and the end of the offer period.
If any of these conditions concerning the declaration of holdings,
documentation or the timing of an offer are ignored then the acquisition can be
declared unlawful and the individuals responsible could be liable for prosecution.
When a litigation defence is used to prevent an unwanted acquisition bid the target
firm will often attempt to prove that the acquirer has breached one of these laws.
1.11 Acquisitions and Regulation in Other Countries
Acquisitions involving UK firms do not always remain within the borders of
this country and when they involve firms based in other countries there are many new
factors that need to be considered. The nature of acquisition activity varies from
country to country and the reasons for these different patterns of takeovers need to be
examined. There are also international regulations that need to be considered when
dealing with firms in other countries. Of particular relevance to UK firms are the
European Community regulations which need to be considered when attempting
acquisitions with companies based in other member states. Most cross-border
takeovers involving UK firms, either as targets or bidders, are with firms based in
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Europe, American or Japan. These are the countries considered in the literature
concerning international acquisition activity.
1.11.1 Acquisition Activity in Other Countries
There are considerable differences between acquisition activity in the UK and
some of the other European countries which were discussed in the paper by Franks and
Mayer (1993). The authors proposed to test the hypothesis that the integration of the
European capital markets will result in a UK style market for corporate control in the
rest of the European community. The authors used data on acquisitions provided by
the government statistical departments in the UK, France and Germany to compare the
recent trends in these three countries. The results clearly indicated that there is a far
more active market for corporate control in the UK than in either of the other two
countries. The most important distinction, however, is not the number of takeovers
but the nature of these activities. In the UK there is an active market in hostile
takeovers. In France this market is very small and in Germany hostile takeovers are
almost non-existent. Recently there has been an increase in the number of buy-outs,
buy-ins and spin-offs in each of these three countries. Franks and Mayer conducted an
analysis of the executive changes in the UK, France and Germany during the first six
months of 1988 based on information held on their own database. Their results
showed a high level of change in the UK and very low levels of change in France and
Germany. They believed that differences in the law between the countries are
responsible for this phenomena.
The main regulatory variations between France and Germany and the UK are
that the rights of employees, managers and shareholders in France and Germany are
strongly protected by the law. In the UK these individuals do not have anywhere near
as secure a position and do not have to be consulted about any changes to the control
of the company. These measures in France and Germany exist to protect the firms and
to maintain a degree of stability in the markets. The laws governing the behaviour of
institutions such as banks are also considerably stricter in France and Germany than in
the UK, again to create stability. Franks and Mayer noted that UK companies occupy
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a far more vulnerable position than their continental counter-parts which can be
directly linked to the more active and aggressive market for corporate control that
exists here. The authors claimed that there is a trade-off between correcting for
managerial failure (easily done in the UK) and encouraging investment (more often
seen in other countries). They believe that an equilibrium develops somewhere
between the two but precisely where depends on the individual country.
Another paper that contrasts behaviour across countries was by Geroslci and
Vlassopoulos (1993). In this article the authors contended that the full potential of the
internal European market has yet to be realised. The aim of their paper was to
describe corporate control activity within Europe and to contrast it with trans-Atlantic
activity. They believed that clear patterns of activity have existed from the early
1980's. As with the previous paper, this one starts with an examination of the activity
in Europe and the data in this section of the paper was provided by Coopers and
Lybrand. The most striking feature was the difference between the number of
takeovers in the different European countries. The vast majority take place in the UK,
France and Germany and most of these acquisitions involved firms based in the same
country. This paper also included data from the American journal Mergers and
Acquisitions which clearly showed that American and Canadian firms are active
acquirers of European firms and vice versa. These acquisitions are of "considerable
value compared to the trans-European activities. There is a particularly strong
relationship between the USA and UK in this respect. Cross-border takeovers
represent a small percentage of the total acquisition activity in the European
Community. The value of trans-Atlantic takeovers greatly exceeds the trans-European
acquisitions. The authors claimed that this is due to the open nature of the capital
markets in those two countries, but they did not discount the suggestion that cultural
and lingual similarities may also be a factor. From these results the authors inferred
that the European single market has had little effect on the behavioural trends
involving European companies.
The idea of investing in other countries was enthusiastically advocated by
Hannah (1993). Hannah claimed that past experience of foreign investment in Europe
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has been positive. The former West Germany was offered as an example of an
economy that had a high proportion of foreign investment (mostly American) and yet
suffered no financial distress or noticeable loss of sovereignty. From this starting point
Hannah went on to propose the "laissez-faire argument for free trade" (Hannah, 1992,
page 280). This is based on the argument that, since each country has different
resources, each should produce just the goods at which it is best. Assuming that each
country produces these items, it follows that there will be an active trade between them
to the benefit of all parties concerned. This is analogous with the idea of free
ownership as applied to companies. According to Hannah, free ownership could result
in mutual economic gains for all the participants in the same way as free-trade.
Increased competition between bidders would mean better returns for shareholders and
the free market could bring a wider range of managerial skills to the companies
involved. The author admitted that there are, however, some disadvantages to this
approach. Foreign ownership of strategic industries is inadvisable for security reasons
and there is also the issue of how to reconcile strict reciprocity with national regulatory
issues. Three arguments have been offered in recent years against the free-trade idea
or, more specifically, against the prospect of foreign ownership. Hannah explained
these objections and makes some suggestions about how they could be resolved.
The Strategic Industries Argument
The strategic industries argument states that in an age of rapidly advancing
technology it is vital that control of the defence industry does not pass out of the
country. Hannah pointed out that the government could protect these industries by
nationalising them or by actively discriminating against potential overseas buyers. He
argued that this does not seem an adequate reason to oppose a free market in
corporate control.
The Headquarters Effect Argument
The headquarters effect issue is concerned with the possibility that
multinational subsidiaries are used to make products that are conceived, managed and
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marketed elsewhere. This could have an adverse affect on the local economy around
the subsidiary. The problem with this objection is that it is impossible to judge what
would have happened if the firm had not been acquired by a foreign company.
The Reciprocity Argument
The reciprocity argument claims that strict reciprocity requires all countries
should be subject to the same treatment. If this were the case then acquisition activity
should be encouraged irrespective of the nationality of the involved firms as it would
increase the overall efficiency and profitability of companies in general. This could
create problems with regulating national bodies, for example national banking
regulation, but could be resolved in the same manner as the strategic industries
argument by altering Government policy to protect industries that are considered vital
to the economy.
Hannah concluded that there is no reason why free-trade in company
ownership should not flourish between different countries and manages to find answers
to all of the frequently raised problems with this issue. However, since it appears that
most companies prefer to deal with firms in their own country, according to Geroski
and Vlassopoulos, some of Hannah's points become irrelevant.
1.11.2 Acquisition Regulation in the Europe Community
The European Community regulations governing companies' behaviour in the
field of mergers and acquisitions were discussed by Bishop (1993). This article began
by explaining the significance of Articles 86 and 85, which were the basis of the old
merger regulations that operated in the EC. There was no mention of mergers and
acquisitions in the Community's founding document (The Treaty of Rome) which
created a severe problem before these articles were introduced. Articles 86 and 85
include references to unacceptable business practises and were used to form the basis
of merger regulation before 1990.
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Article 86 states that" any abuse ... of a dominant position within the Common
Market ... shall be prohibited as incompatible ... in so far that it may affect trade
between member states". (Bishop, 1993, page 298) This article was first applied to
the subject of mergers in 1972 but it relates only to the subject of market position and
alone could only have a limited effect on international business practises. Article 85
focuses specifically on anti-competitive agreements. Under this provision "all
agreements which may have as their objective ... the prevention or distortion of
competition [are] inconsistent with the Common Market". (Bishop, 1993, page 301)
To fall under this criteria the acquisition must result in a severe impact on the
commercial conduct of either of the parties involved. The combination of these two
articles made it impossible to vet acquisitions before the event and as a result greatly
increased the costs to the firms involved if an acquisition was ruled against. They were
also incapable of approving an acquisition, they could only fail to rule against it. This
informal system of regulation created a significant degree of inequality in the treatment
of acquisitions and as such was ineffective. There was also the problem of whether an
acquisition was subject to these rules or the laws of their countries. In 1990 new
regulations were introduced to rectify these problems.
The new rules make a clear distinction of responsibility between the EC and the
national bodies. The EC rules only apply if each involved company has a turnover in
the Community in excess of two hundred and fifty million Ecus. However, an
acquisition is exempt if either company generates over two-thirds of its total turnover
in one member state. When an acquisition is examined, the market position, economic
power and financial position of the firms are considered. Equally, the possibilities of
choice of suppliers and consumers and access to suppliers and markets are evaluated.
The structure of the markets with regard to both actual and potential domestic,
European and international competition must be examined and any barriers to market
entry and trends of supply or demand for goods or services concerned need to be
identified. The only problem Bishop found with these new regulations is that they split
the responsibilities for regulation between the EC and the countries at a time when he
felt that greater integration should be encouraged. It also appears that the majority of
cases are exempt and fall under national jurisdiction which results in considerable
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inconsistencies between the different countries. Nevertheless, international
acquisitions offer vast potential for the future and so these regulations are of
considerable importance.
1.12 Corporate Restructuring Alternatives
In the literature an acquisition is often regarded as an investment. This is
certainly one way to view this activity but a takeover can also be seen as just one
possible way of restructuring a corporation. There are times when this approach is not
necessarily the best one, a point that is often ignored in the literature. In order to put
acquisition activity in an appropriate place amongst the other corporate restructuring
alternatives it is essential to understand what these alternatives are and why they exist.
An extensive list of restructuring alternatives can be found in the article by
Sikora (1994). Here the decision to acquire or not to acquire was represented as the
"buy or build" decision. The acquirer has to decide whether their goals would better
be achieved via an acquisition or through internal development. The author pointed
out that in the majority of cases this greatly over-simplifies the decision process and
ignores the multitude of other restructuring devices that are available to the firm.
Sikora examined several of these possibilities in an attempt to illustrate the great
diversity of techniques that are available to the modern business.
Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures
The first alternative is a Strategic Alliance. These agreements defy precise
definition, but this is an umbrella under which the involved companies are able to
co-operate on a variety of projects that may span a considerable period of time. A
strategic alliance may lead to joint ventures at some point or remain nothing more than
an agreement that the firms will operate on friendly terms. A joint venture (JV) is one
of the more popular types of strategic alliance. In a joint venture two or more
companies combine their resources to produce a final result that greatly outweighs the
individual contributions. The disadvantage with this approach is that the profits have
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to be split in the same way. However this does enable companies to work together
when they need to without forcing them to remain in contact at other times when it
may no longer be to their advantage.
Minority Investments and Venture Capital
The next two alternatives involve investments options. A minority investment
is a technique whereby a large firm can invest in a limited capacity in a smaller one to
take advantage of technology or information that the second firm owns. The small
firm is given extra funding whilst the larger company is able to use technology or
information that is, perhaps, available only to the smaller company. The use of venture
capital is closely related to the concept of minority investment. The main difference is
that in this case the smaller firms have little or no track record or are using some new
technology or information. This makes the process rather riskier than many
commercial lenders would be prepared to support but the venture capitalist is prepared
to take the gamble hoping that the rewards will justify their faith in the developers.
Licensing Arrangements and Marketing Agreements
Next there is a licensing arrangement. Under a licensing arrangement a
company arranges to lease the technological expertise or research owned by another
firm. This saves the expense of developing the information independently and helps
the other company recover the cost of the research in a considerably reduced period of
time. Similarly, a marketing agreement shares the costs of publicising and marketing a
new product between several firms. It is possible that the firm that has developed the
product does not possess the skills to market it effectively. Another firm may possess
those talents but does not have an appropriate product, therefore, it is mutually
beneficial for them to work together.
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Franchising
Lastly, in this article, there is franchising. This is only really successful if the
parent company ensures that it sells franchises to people with the appropriate
experience and resources. The franchises are usually in highly specialised fields and
consequently need to be sold to individuals who understand those particular areas.
This article contained no empirical evidence or tests based on the use of these
techniques instead the paper was designed simply to describe these features and
suggest that they may be appropriate alternatives in some situations.
A similar approach is taken by Byrne and Willens (1994) who examined many
alternative ways of restructuring a corporation other than an acquisition. Some of
these alternatives have been discussed in the paper immediately above. The others are
explained below.
Minority Positions
This is the same as the minority investment discussed above but Byrne and
Willens consider it from the perspective of the purchasing firm rather than the selling
company. The sale of a minority position which is the purchase of a small stake in
another firm that can be later exchanged for control of a subsidiary of that firm. It
often transpires that the desire to gain control of the subsidiary was the purchasing
company's main objective all along and the minority position was simply a manner of
circumventing any opposition to the divestiture.
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP's)
An employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) is also a form of corporate
restructuring although it has already been briefly discussed as a method of funding an
acquisition. The funds held within the company pension scheme are a source of
available finance for the firm whilst control of the company is retained in the hands of
those individuals who have a vested interest in the future of that particular firm, namely
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the employees. There have been a number of recent scandals involving the misuse of
employee pension schemes, of which an ESOP, is just one kind, which emphasise the
advantages of this type of option. By exchanging shares for funds the company can
increase the level of available resources for investment and the employees will not
loose out.
Leveraged Buy-Outs (LBO 's)
Lastly, there are leveraged buy-outs (LBO's). An LBO is a form of buy-out
usually organised by the managers of the firm. The funds needed to purchase the
company are raised by securing loans against the assets of the firm. This means that
when the transaction is completed the funds can be repaid fairly easily from the
reserves of the firm. Provided that the company does not run into any serious
problems before it has replenished its reserves this is a safe investment for all parties
concerned. As with Sikora's article the authors made no recommendations about
which of these options is the best one to use or include any empirical work about these
techniques. They merely stated that all of these techniques have different strengths and
weaknesses that should be examined in light of the conditions in the corporations
under examination.
Thompson, Wright and Robbie (1992) started with the observation that it had
recently become fashionable to view the corporate acquisition as a sort of universal
cure for all the problems that companies can face. Instead, to gain a complete picture
of the uses of corporate acquisitions, it is more sensible to regard the takeover as just
one corporate restructuring option. In particular this article examines buy-outs,
divestments and the relationship these have with acquisitions. The authors maintained
that all of these alternative techniques have distinct similarities which prevent their
becoming substitutes for each other and strongly suggest their use in combination.
The first of these similarities is that buy-outs and buy-ins result in a split in company
ownership between the managers and the shareholders. This differs from an
acquisition but all three have the effect of removing the agency problems that are
believed to exist in many firms. Secondly, all of these restructuring deals result in
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financial incentives for the managers, shareholders and employees. These are
necessary to smooth the transition to the new firm structure. Finally, restructuring
deals frequently result in a high level of debt in the new firm irrespective of which
method is used. It has been suggested that there is a free market for company assets
that should result in the efficient allocation of these assets to prevent them changing
hands to the detriment of the current managers. This theory implies that the managers
of a firm will do everything in their power to ensure that the company prospers under
their control as this is directly related to their future. Thompson et al pointed out the
problems with this theory. Shareholders would sell their shares if a large enough
premium were offered irrespective of the current value of their investment but
managers are not likely to want an acquisition to go ahead without any form of
defence, especially if their jobs are at risk. This prevents a completely free market in
corporate control from developing. Consequently, the potential buyers cannot make
completely accurate estimations of the value of the asset that they are trying to
purchase. Lastly, the offer to buy shares may be motivated by some reason other than
the removal of an inefficient management. Thompson et al believed that the
weaknesses in the current capital market create the need for several corporate
restructuring techniques. The authors claimed that their results are supported by
research conducted in several other papers and that there is enough evidence to
_
support their claim that acquisitions should be treated as part of a much wider group of
actions rather than being viewed as a separate activity.
Divestments and Spin-Offs
One of the few articles in this area to incorporate new empirical work was the
paper by Wright, Chiplin and Thompson (1993) which started with authors research on
the trends in the use of divestments in the late 1980's. They studied ownership
alterations using the data provided by their own database (CMBOR, University of
Nottingham). Their research showed that only the value of independent acquisitions
exceeded divestments in this period. From the perspective of merger policy, the
direction of the divestiture relative to the main activities of the seller and the acquirer is
important. Wright, Chiplin and Thompson refer to research by Ravenscraft and
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Scherer (1991) in which is was stated that it is unusual for divested units to have a
vertically integrated relationship with the parent company. In fact, the available
evidence suggested that divested units are often originally acquired in horizontal
mergers and the recent growth in leveraged buy-outs has resulted in an increased
dumping of the unwanted parts of the firms. Wright, Chiplin and Thompson went on
to examine the results of this type of activity by referring to other papers instead of
undertaking their own analysis. The data on voluntary sell-offs is predominantly
American and the main results are that divested units are usually poor performers and
peripheral to the parent company's main activities. Furthermore, there are positive
announcement effects in divestitures when it is perceived that the parent is selling the
unit to improve overall corporate strategy and there are also significant positive returns
for the firms buying units under these circumstances. All the research about voluntary
spin-offs concludes that there are positive gains to shareholders through increased
efficiency and the creation of an extended opportunity set for investment. Wright et al
claimed that the development in the market for divestitures and spin-offs indicates a
new flexibility in the structure of the firm. It also suggests that firms are continually
attempting to find their optimal set of assets and responding to changing
circumstances.
Restructuring alternatives can also have different financial consequences for a
company. This was discussed by Weston (1994). Weston's data came from an
amalgamation of the results of other studies and he compared the returns generated by
these different approaches. Weston found that the gains generated by acquisition
activity clearly exceeded the returns generated by almost all the other types of
restructuring. The only exception to this is the case of leveraged buy outs where the
returns generated by the event can be as much as forty or fifty percent. Weston
pointed of that the level of returns is not, of course, a good reason for selecting one
method of restructuring over another as there will be other circumstances that may
make one type of restructuring preferable to another. The level of fit between the
firms objectives and the results of restructuring is the most important factor when
selecting a restructuring technique. The figures he quoted in this paper are merely
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illustrations of the sort of level of returns that can follow if the restructuring to carried
out using the appropriate method.
It is important to examine these potential alternatives to acquisitions, as they
should help to clarify the true importance of the acquisition in the current business
environment. In some of the papers in the previous sections corporate acquisitions are
treated as if they are the only way in which a company can alter its structure. This is
clearly untrue and the more realistic picture presented here is preferable.
1.13 The Prediction of Acquisition Targets
Before this section begins it should be noted that any econometric
methodologies in these articles will be reviewed in greater detail in the discussion of
methodological issues in the empirical chapters that will follow. This part of the
review will concentrate on the general approaches instead. The first article to consider
here is by Hughes (1993). In this article, Hughes outlined the characteristics that are
believed to differentiate potential acquisition targets from the rest of the companies in
the market place. The characteristics of the groups of acquiring and acquired firms
have been examined by many other authors and Hughes collated their work in this part
of the paper. The acquired companies are believed to have all or some of the following
features. They are below average size and profitability for their industry and have
below average growth rates. Acquired firms may also have differing market-to-book
values implying some degree of under-valuation by the stock market. Finally, there are
a few other suggested indicators, such as the value of P/E ratios, but these do not
appear in many of the papers and there is no consensus of opinion concerning their
importance.
The acquiring companies are dealt with rather more briefly. They are generally
agreed to be larger than their targets. The evidence on their profitability is less
definite. Many authors agree that they are more profitable, but some studies have had
inconclusive results. Whilst this article did not include any attempt to predict likely
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acquisition targets it is one of the few papers to incorporate such a complete list of
features pertaining to the companies that are involved in acquisition activity.
Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) suggested that any factor which increases the
future net present value of a firm will enhance the probability of that company
becoming the target of an acquisition attempt. This is the basis of the authors choice
of explanatory variables. They limited their sources to accounting variables only. All
other possible explanatory variables are assumed to be randomly distributed across the
potential target firms. It is also possible that the characteristics motivating mergers
vary in magnitude across industries and so Dietrich and Sorensen limited their data to
four pre-selected industries and represented the variables in terms of the relative
deviations from the industry average. The models in this paper are estimated using just
ten accounting variables. They believed that the factors motivating the acquisition are
the same irrespective of the method of exchange used in each individual case. The
results were estimated using twenty-four companies that merged between 1969 and
1973 and forty-seven non-merged companies which were selected at random for use in
the estimations. Dietrich and Sorensen found that the probability of a company
becoming an acquisition target increases when the company has a low asset turnover,
low payout ratio, low trading volume and low leverage. This probability is also
increased when the firms are below average size for the industry. These results
indicate that the bidding companies view a target as a source of cash and confirm the
popular view of a target firm as a struggling business. The methodology that was used
in this paper, logit models, will be explained in Chapter 4.
Soon after Dietrich and Sorensen produced their paper a similar approach was
taken by Palepu (1986). Much of this paper is concerned with methodological issues,
as Palepu addressed issues of sampling and model construction. The model Palepu
used is the same as Dietrich and Sorensen The variables for this model were selected
on the basis of several popular hypotheses. These include the inefficient managers
hypothesis, the size hypothesis, the market-to-book hypothesis and the price-earnings
hypothesis. Palepu's sample was composed of one hundred and sixty-four companies
that were acquired between 1971 and 1979, and two hundred and fifty-six firms that
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were non-targets as of 1979. The individuals in both groups of companies had to
belong to either the mining or manufacturing sectors, be quoted on either the New
York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange and have data available on the
COMPUSTAT tapes. The estimation results indicate that likely targets are small
companies with ample resources and plenty of investment opportunities, which is very
much as would be expected given the previous literature.
Palepu's paper was used as a starting point for Ambrose and Megginson
(1992). These authors claimed that the likelihood of a firm being acquired is not
determined by accountancy factors alone and that the level of insider (managerial) and
institutional shareholdings is important, as is the type of defence mechanism and the
proportion of fixed assets in the total asset structure. The firms used in this study were
randomly selected from the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock
Exchange on the 1st January 1981 and had data available on the COMPUSTAT tapes.
The sample involved one hundred and sixty-seven target firms, two hundred and
sixty-seven non-targets and thirty-nine liquidated or otherwise delisted firms, that
never became targets. The logit model computed by Ambrose and Megginson involves
three sets of explanatory variables. The first set of variables are the accountancy
variables that Palepu used, the second group of variables are the ownership structure
variables which measure the levels of managerial and institutional ownership of the
targets. Finally, eight different types of take-over defence techniques were
incorporated in the model. This results of these tests suggested that targets are
significantly smaller than non-targets and in the quarter before the take-over bid is
announced the targets have a smaller net increase in institutional shareholdings than the
non-targets. The only significant asset structure term was a dummy variable
representing the proportion of tangible assets to total assets which suggests that
takeovers are not motivated by the desire to acquire firms with many growth options
or a noticeable growth / resource mismatch. The authors suggested that this result
could be a proxy for the greater debt capacity of target firms. However, this theory is
contradicted by the lack of any appreciable difference between the leverage of the
targets and non-targets in this sample. The idea that acquirers look for targets with a
high proportion of fixed assets is consistent with the "operating synergy" argument,
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suggesting that economies of scale in production are a primary factor in selecting
acquisition targets. The presence of some type of voting rights defence appears to
increase the probability that a firm will become a target. These are generally
considered to be weak forms of take-over defence and cannot withstand a determined
acquisition attempt, as discussed previously. Preferred stock authorisations, on the
other hand, reduce the probability of becoming a take-over target as they could make
in impossible for an acquisition attempt to be successful.
In these articles there are some results that appear consistently. This will be of
particular relevance in the later chapters when analysis of the firms that take part in
takeovers is carried out. The methodologies that are used in some of these papers will
also be applied here although there are some improvements that can be made which
will be introduced in Chapter 4.
Conclusion
This chapter was designed to present a thorough examination of the wide
variety of the topics examined in the merger and acquisitions literature. It should also
highlight the major issues within each of these sections and some potential areas for
future research. There are too many areas for research to be contained in a single
thesis as the market for corporate control is such a diverse area as this chapter has
illustrated. The literature on this subject covers a wide range of areas and includes
topics that stretch from the motives for acquisitions to the legal aspects of the
disclosure of share holdings. It is also a most complex subject as it is possible for a
single factor to appear in several different and seemingly incompatible areas. For
example, it is possible for an acquisition defence to increase the probability of a
takeover occurring in certain circumstances. It is the diversity of topics and issues that
makes this area ideal for research.
Previous literature covers a great many subjects but there are some areas which
are incomplete. Several of these stand out from the literature. Firstly, the issue of
merger waves and the level of acquisition activity remains a puzzle. Research has
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suggested that there is a link between acquisitions and the economy but has failed to
produce a coherent model that can be applied in many different time periods.
Furthermore, this issue has been neglected in the UK in recent years which is a
lamentable gap in the existing research. Secondly, a great many of the suggested
motives for takeovers do not have empirical backing and there has been no clear
analysis that determines which of these factors are really important in practice and
which are not. Given the high number of different motives that exist in the literature it
is essential that some sort of discrimination should be applied.
A third important shortfall in the previous literature exists in the papers
concerning the identification of firms that are likely to become involved in acquisitions.
This research has been limited in the past to examining the acquired firms and has
neglected the acquiring. A far more complete picture of takeover activity could be
created if such analysis could be extended to incorporate these companies as well. In
addition, these articles ignore the links between acquisition activity and the economy
that almost certainly exist although, as discussed above, a coherent theory for
acquisition activity does not yet exist.
Finally, a similar bias exists in the articles concerning the benefits of acquisition
activity. Once again, the majority of research concentrates on the acquired companies
and ignores the acquiring. There is also no comparison between these firms and
similar companies that are not involved in takeovers. Such a comparison would make
the true benefits of acquisition activity clearer than they have been in the past. For
example, it may appear that the returns to acquired firms increase considerably when
an acquisition bid is launched but this does not include information about the behaviour
of other firms at the same time. A sudden shock to the stock market could produce a
general increase in share values which would have nothing to do with the takeover bid.
To include this perspective in the analysis of takeovers would make the calculation of
the benefits considerably more accurate.
These areas are not the only ones within the study of mergers and acquisitions
that required more work but they are some of the most obvious ones. The following
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chapters of this thesis will attempt to tackles these issues and provide a more
comprehensive analysis of the current condition of the market for corporate control.
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Chapter 2. Merger Waves and Macro-Economics
Introduction
The corporate control market operates continually as companies grow and
evolve. It appears to move in a cyclical manner with levels of increasing and
decreasing activity. Every so often there is a period during which the level of activity
rises to an unprecedented degree that is unmatched by the surrounding economic
conditions. Such phenomena are known as merger waves. This chapter is designed to
analyse the behaviour of the corporate control market in the UK during a period that
incorporates the last period of excessive acquisition activity to take place in this
country.
The uses of such a study are wide-spread. There are several different groups
involved in the acquisition process who would find this sort of information useful.
Firstly, there are the banks and venture capitalists. These individuals have a finite
amount of money to lend and knowing the approximate number of acquisitions that
will take place in the future would enable them to plan their business strategy with
more accuracy. It is impossible to evaluate how each of these individuals would view
the prospect of lending money for a takeover, but it is likely that their willingness to
lend would be based upon the expected outcome of that deal. If the predicted number
of takeovers for the next few periods is higher than previously, these lenders may wish
to refrain from lending money for the riskier purchases in order to invest funds in the
safer takeovers that are also likely to occur. Alternatively, the merchant banks may
wish to start preparing themselves to manage the greater number of deals that are
expected to take place in the near future. If the banks know that their work level is
likely to increase sharply in the future, then they can start preparing in advance and be
better placed to cope with the increased volume of business.
The second group of interested parties are the firms that are considering
undertaking an acquisition in the near future. If the number of acquisitions is due to
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rise sharply this is likely to have an impact on the issue of funding, which may affect
the probability of such a company attempting to purchase another firm. Furthermore,
if the number of acquisitions is expected to rise significantly there may be more
competition for the more choice target companies. Under these circumstances, a
potential bidding firm may wish to pre-empt the rest of the market and accelerate its
plans for the purchase accordingly.
Finally, there are the companies who may be considering instituting some form
of acquisition defence. If a company has come to the conclusion that it is vulnerable to
a takeover then knowing how many acquisitions are likely to transpire in the future
may provide them with more information about whether or not they wish to develop a
defensive strategy. Acquisition defences are often expensive to set up and the cost
may be unnecessary if the expected level of future takeovers is low. However, if the
expected number of acquisitions is high, the risk of becoming a target will also be
greater and the firm may decide to institute a takeover defence as soon as possible.
Previous research in this area has focused on two issues. Firstly, there is still
some debate about whether or not the level of activity in this market can be predicted
at all. Some authors, for example Shugart and Tollison (1984), have claimed that the
market for corporate control moves randomly and, therefore, it is completely
unpredictable. However, the majority of articles, as typified by Golbe and White's
paper (1988), have been based on the assumption that the market is driven by the
economic conditions that surround it and, as a result, have attempted to predict the
level of takeover activity in these terms. This leads to the main issue in this area of
study; so far it has proved impossible to find a single theory that can precisely explain
the behaviour of this market at any time. The problem is further exacerbated by the
existence of merger waves. These occasional periods of excessive activity have also
defied prediction whilst simultaneously increasing the difficulty inherent in the
successful prediction of the manner in which this market behaves.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.1 examines the current
theories concerning the behaviour of the corporate control market and reviews the
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existing empirical evidence about these ideas, presenting a brief review of the material
covered in Chapter 1. Section 2.2 presents the methodology and data used in this
chapter before presenting and analysing the empirical results. Finally, there is the
conclusion.
2.1 Theories and Evidence
The first article to consider supports the hypothesis that the market for
corporate control behaves in a random manner. Shugart and Tollison (1984) found
that the behaviour of the market for corporate control defied analysis. They examined
the number of acquisitions that occurred in America in each of two periods, 1895 to
1920 and 1947 to 1979. The conclusion of their study was that the behaviour of the
corporate control market is best described by a white noise process and cannot be
linked to the behaviour of the economy. This result provides the first hypothesis that
will be tested in the empirical section of this chapter, that acquisition numbers are
random. If this hypothesis is rejected then the level of acquisition activity can be
deemed to be predictable as the majority of articles on this subject found. In
particular, these papers linked the number of acquisitions to the economic
environment.
The "economic cycle" theory of merger activity suggests that the behaviour of
the corporate control market is directly related to the economic situation in the country
under examination. One of the first papers to examine this link was by Gort (1969).
He proposed that changes in the economic cycle would alter the manner in which
companies were viewed by the stock market. Specifically, Gort was interested in the
way that changes in economic conditions could alter the expected value of a firm. He
considered roughly 600 American acquisitions that occurred between 1951 and 1959
and attempted to show that these acquisitions took place because the economic
conditions changed in such a manner that the values of the firms were significantly
altered. He demonstrated, in general terms, that there does seem to be a link between
the level of acquisition activity and the behaviour of the economy.
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Following this idea, there have been many other papers that attempted to link
the level of activity in the corporate control market to specific macro-economic
factors. In 1975 Steiner used multivariate regression to model the number of
acquisitions that occurred between 1949 and 1971 using economic cycle variables. His
results suggested that a positive link existed between both stock prices and GNP and
the number of takeovers. This study incorporated other terms such as the interest rate,
but none of these proved to be significant. Melicher, Ledolter and D'Antonio (1983)
examined acquisitions that took place in the mining and manufacturing industries in the
USA between 1947 and 1977. They call their hypothesis the "merger activity -
economic prosperity" theory. (Melicher, Ledolter and D'Antonio, 1983, page 424).
This theory states that changes in the expected level of economic growth and the
capital market conditions can generate conditions where the financing of an acquisition
is far simpler than in other periods. Consequently, these factors can be linked to the
level of acquisition activity and the authors attempted to demonstrate this result using
multivariate regression models. Their results supported the supposition concerning the
link between capital markets and acquisition numbers but was inconclusive on the
relationship between the level of expected economic growth and the number of
takeovers.
More recently Golbe and White (1988) demonstrated that the behaviour of the
acquisition market is not random and then proceeded to use regression models to
analyse the link between the level of takeovers in America and the economic situation.
The data used in this article covers mergers and acquisitions during a period from the
middle of the 1940's to 1985. The results suggested that there is a positive link
between GDP and acquisition levels whilst a negative relationship exists between the
number of takeovers and interest rates.
Another paper on this topic was written by Rock (1994). This article
contained no empirical evidence but presented a discussion of the factors that can have
an impact on the market for corporate control. These factors are presented as six
points. The first of these is the economic outlook which Rock claimed affects public
attitudes and, consequently, can have an impact on the ease with which shares change
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hands. The second and third points are the financing alternatives for both the
purchasers and the sellers in the takeover. If either of these individuals can see
promising alternatives elsewhere acquisitions will reduce in number as lower risk
options will be more attractive. Rock's next factor was price expectations which again
has an impact on the ease with which the shares will be transferred. The penultimate
point refers the strategic challenges and opportunities faced by the purchasing
companies and centres on the position that these firms occupy, which makes the
proposed acquisition appear to be an appropriate next step. Finally, Rock discussed
the reputation of acquisitions in the public eye which can also have an impact on the
level of acquisition activity. Although these factors were not clearly specified in this
paper, it is clear that Rock believed that the economy has a considerable influence on
the number and type of acquisitions that take place.
In addition to the articles mentioned above, which specifically referred to the
corporate control market, there are other papers that have examined the sorts of
variables that have an impact on the stock market and the economic cycle. Chen, Roll
and Ross (1986) tested innovations in economic conditions between 1953 and 1983
and attempted to determine whether these factors generate a response in the stock
market. The factors that they used included measures of the interest rates, industrial
production and oil prices and these terms may provide a guide to the types of variables
that could be used here to represent the economic conditions surrounding acquisitions.
Finally, Beenstock and Chan (1988) attempted to test the Arbitrage Pricing
Theory (APT) using returns on two hundred and twenty securities in the period from
1961 to 1981. Again they selected economic factors to measure the economic
condition in the UK. Similarly, Priestley (1994) offered another list of factors that
seem appropriate to the testing of the APT for the UK market.
The majority of work concerned with the prediction of the behaviour of the
market for corporate control has come to the same conclusion that there is a link
between the economic cycle and the number of acquisitions. However, the problem
with the empirical analysis of the acquisition market to date is that, whilst many of the
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results exhibit some resemblance to each other, none of the proposed models works
particularly well over more than one time period. Each of these results contains
variables that do not appear to be important during other times, which reduces the
explanatory power of the models considerably. The number of economic factors that
appear in these papers is somewhat limited and it may be possible to generate an
effective model by combining these variables with the economic factors that are used in
the testing of the APT. These factors that can generate a response from the stock
market and might, therefore, be reasonably used to represent the economic condition in
the testing of the hypothesis that the number of acquisitions is related to the behaviour
of the economy.
Even using macro-economic variables it may transpire that it might not be
possible to produce a good model for the number of acquisitions when the behaviour
of the market for corporate control deviates from the economic cycle. None of the
results that appear in the literature to date are able to model the number of acquisitions
over all time periods for some reason that remains a mystery. One possible reason
could be the presence of merger waves. For example, consider the number of
acquisitions in the UK. During the last merger wave the level of takeover activity
grew to a height that was unprecedented given the level to which the economic cycle
rose at that time. It may be that these peaks of activity are not predictable using the
economic cycle and may be due to another factor. Specifically, they could be some
sort of bubble. During a period of higher acquisition activity it may become easier for
companies to complete takeovers as the banks and stock market become accustomed
to the idea of frequent changes in the control of a company. Under these
circumstances, the managers of the acquiring firm may decide that the potential gains
associated with the acquisition outweigh the possibility that the bubble will burst and
the acquisition become harder, or even impossible, to complete. With this rationale, it
is possible to see how the acquisitions market may start to behave as a bubble and this
could provide a reason why it has been impossible to produce a model that can
accurately predict levels of acquisition activity. If merger waves are a bubble, this will
not facilitate their prediction but it could offer an explanation for the absence of one
model that can predict all acquisition activity.
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2.2 Methodology and Empirical Results
2.2.1 Methodology
Testing for Random Behaviour in a Sequence of Numbers
The first hypothesis that needs to be tested in this chapter is the notion that the
behaviour of the acquisition market is random. There are two ways that this can be
tested. Random behaviour in a sequence of numbers is easily identified by the absence
of any link between consecutive terms in that series. The first test for random
behaviour in the acquisition market to be undertaken is the Run Test 1 . This test
involves the regression of the number of acquisitions against a simple time trend. The
residuals of this estimation are the important feature. If the residuals come in runs of
positive and negative terms then this means that the behaviour of the acquisitions
market is cyclic and not random.
Based on the same premise, a simple Box-Jenkins procedure will provide a
second way to test this hypothesis. The methodology for time series identification that
Box and Jenkins devised uses four steps to identify the nature of the data under
examination. The first step is to make the series stationary, usually by taking
differences of the series. Then the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions
for the stationary series can be used to make a tentative identification of the nature of
the sequence of numbers. The basic premise is that the number of significant terms in
these functions will give the order of the moving average and autoregressive parts of
the equation, respectively. Once the provisional identification has been made it is
possible to simulate the procedure using the data under examination and see whether
or not the selected time series is genuinely suitable by checking that the ensuing model
is well-specified. To ascertain this fact, Q statistics are used to establish that the
residuals from the chosen model are random. Randomly distributed residuals are a
prerequisite of a well-specified model. Applying this methodology to the number of
1	 This test appears in the paper by Golbe and White (1988)
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acquisitions it should be possible to determine whether the series of acquisition
numbers is random or not.
Rejection of the random activity hypothesis will mean that the activity of the
acquisitions market is predictable. To this end, macro-economic variables will be used
and their accuracy investigated. The selection of these variables is based on the
articles that have already approached this issue, such as Golbe and White (1988) and
Melicher, Ledolter and D'Antonio (1983). In addition to these factors there are also
the macro-economic variables that are known to have an impact on the stock market as
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) found. The variables that will be used in the creation of
this model will be discussed in section 2.2.2 below.
The Construction of Regression Models Using the General to Specific Methodology
The models will be created using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
methodology in conjunction with the general to specific methodology popularised by
the work of the London School of Economics.
General to specific modelling can be defined as "the formulation of a fairly
unrestricted dynamic model which is subsequently tested, transformed and reduced in
size by performing a number of tests for restrictions." (Charemza and Deadman, 1997,
Page 58) This process begins with the estimation of the general model which must
satisfy the following four criteria, which can be found-in Hendry (1995).
-1 The general model does not need to be generalised further as it already contains all
of the relevant variables.
-2 The parameters of the general model can be estimated from the available data
-3 The general model must be identifiable so that the variables of interest can be
identified
-LI The general model must characterise the joint distribution of all of the variables
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The general model can be represented by an autoregressive distributed lag
(ADL) model. Equation 2.1 represents the general form of this model.
	
yr =oc+E 13,yt_,+Iyixr_f+ur	 (2.1)
1=1	
.m3
where, in the empirical work that follows in this chapter,
yr represents the dependent variable in the regression model, here the acquisition
series,
Y t-i represents previous values of the dependent variable, here these are previous
values of the acquisition series and
xt_j represents the independent variables, the macro-economic variables that are
thought to lead acquisition activity
The desired form of the specific model must be known before the reduction
process can be started to ensure that the correct restrictions are imposed and the
appropriate statistical tests are performed to check the validity of the restrictions. In
this case, the specific model should be a "dead start" model where all of the included
variables are lagged, as equation 2.2 shows. The purpose of this model is to predict
acquisition numbers ahead of these takeovers occurring and, as a consequence, the
dead start model is the appropriate form for the specific model- as it _contains no
contemporaneous terms.
	
yr = a+ 13,y1_4 + I	 + t	 (2.2)
1=1	 J=1
The general model is then reduced to the specific model by repeatedly
restricting the model and testing each time that the restriction is valid. For the creation
of a dead start model the restrictions are fairly simple to impose and test. According
to both Cuthbertson, Hall and Taylor (1992) and Charemza and Deadman (1997)
either the Students t-test or the F-test will suffice for the restrictions that are imposed
upon the ADL model. The F-test will be used in the empirical work that follows. The
null and alternative hypotheses for this test are :
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Ho : the coefficient of the variable under consideration is equal to zero
HA : the coefficient of the variable under consideration is not equal to zero
The F-test is calculated using the formulae given in equation 2.3.
(RRSS — URSS )
q 
F(q'n-k)	 ( (IRS'S )
n — k )
where
q is the number of restrictions that are being tested,
n is the number of observations,
k is the number of independent regressors in the model,
RRSS is the residual sum of squares from the unrestricted model and
URSS is the residual sum of squares from the restricted model.
The general model should be systematically restricted until it has the desired
specific form and the last valid restriction has been reached. This is the point at which
a specific model has been created that has the desired, pre-defined, form and represents
all of the relevant information held in the more general forms of the model. This model
must be correctly specified and satisfy the standard misspecification tests for an OLS
regression model. Once this model has been defined it is sufficient to report this model
instead of the general one. The general to specific methodology has several
advantages over other modelling approaches most importantly "...that model
construction proceeds form a very general model in a structured, orderly (statistically
valid) fashion" (Charemza and Deadman, 1997, Page 78) and that it is "a flexible tool
which allows a complex interaction of theory and time series data so that both theory
coherence and data coherence can be achieved." (Cuthbertson, Hall and Taylor, 1992,
Page 127) This approach is particularly useful when modelling variables where the
previous research has failed to clarify the important independent variables and, instead,
offers a large number of potential regressors. This is the case when examining levels
of acquisition activity as Table 2.1, below, will demonstrate. Under these
circumstances the general to specific methodology allows for the identification, in a
(2.3)
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scientific manner, of the important terms from a large list of potential explanatory
variables.
Testing for a Bubble in a Sequence of Numbers
Lastly, there remains the question of merger waves. Merger waves are
seemingly unpredictable even using macro-economic factors. In the event that the
random activity hypothesis is rejected the economic factors above will be used in an
attempt to predict the behaviour of the acquisition market. If these terms cannot
predict the level of acquisition activity that occurs during the merger wave period, then
a third hypothesis will need to be tested. This suggests that the merger waves are a
form of bubble that grows from the economic cycle at certain times possibly prompted
by the fact that takeover numbers are increasing. When acquisition activity increases
some managers may feel that they must attempt a takeover simply because so many
other firms are doing the same. This may be to protect the firm or simply to join in
with a currently popular and, potentially, profitable investment. If this is the case, then
merger waves may be a sort of bubble created by insecurity.
The theory associated with rational bubbles can be expressed in the following
simple form. The fundamental value of any series is the expected value for that term
given the underlying factors that drive the market under consideration. However, if
the value of the series in question differs from the fundamental value then this
inconsistency could be due to a bubble factor which promotes the value of the series
above the fundamental level for some time. In order to explain the behaviour of the
series it is necessary to examine the bubble factor.
There are two possible outcomes for a rational bubble, either the bubble effect
ends and the series reverts to its fundamental value or the bubble continues for another
period. The equations below represent the bubble factor in each of these cases and the
probabilities associated with these two outcomes are 1 — n and IC respectively.
b H-1= ao	 (2.4)
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(1 + r t+i)b r	 1 — ic
b (+1 = ao
TC	 TC
where
b+1 is the bubble factor
ao is the initial value of the bubble factor
r1+1 is the expected value of the series in the period under examination
Under equation 2.5 the bubble grows by the amount necessary to compensate
the involved parties for the risk inherent in the probability that the bubble might burst.
In other words, the probability of the bubble continuing must exceed one half The
probability of a negative change in the growth of the bubble decreases as the duration
of the bubble increases. In other words, the probability of the bubble bursting
decreases with the length of time over which it has already existed. The bubble
continues to grow until an abnormally large negative innovation occurs and it bursts.
The rational nature of these bubbles allows for them to restart, which fits neatly with
the idea that merger waves repeat.
There is a traditional test for a bubble that is very simple as there are three
criteria, which are discussed in the papers by McQueen and Thorley (1994) and in
Blanchard and Watson (1982). The first of these criteria refers to the original series,
whilst the other criteria refer to the series of innovations which are the differences
between the fundamental and actual values of the series in question. These are :
•1 The process should be autoregressive
•2 The innovations should have excessive kurtosis
.3 The innovations should be skewed and contain runs of positive valued terms
The autoregressive condition refers to the fact that a bubble is a feature in
which the consecutive terms are related to each other and the behaviour is
non-random. It also fits with the rational expectations theory that underpins the
speculative bubble. The skewness and kurtosis features are characteristics that always
occur in rational speculative bubbles. These criteria refer to the innovations in the
series rather than to the series itself. The innovation is the part of the series' behaviour
(2.5)
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that cannot be predicted by examining the fundamental value of the item under
consideration.
A rational speculative bubble is a string of positive innovations followed by a
crash as the bubble bursts. The Runs Test should identify the string of positive
innovations and the crash should have a distinctive impact on the distribution of the
innovations. In precise terms, the crash should produce large outliers which should
give the distribution fat tails, the kurtosis listed as one of the characteristics of a
bubble. It is easy to visualise how the distribution of the innovations tails off sharply
after the bubble bursts thus producing this characteristic. The presence of skewness
will not help identify a potential bubble alone, but it is essential for the occurrence of
runs which are always present in a speculative bubble. Runs, as explained by
Blanchard and Watson, are sequences of innovations with the same sign and a
sequence of positive innovations could indicate the presence of a bubble in the data.
2.2.2 Data
The total number of acquisitions is recorded by the Central Statistical Office
and quarterly figures can be found in the HMSO publication "Financial Statistics".
Acquisition numbers were analysed for a twenty year period from the beginning of
1974 to the end of 1994. All of the macro-economic factors were collected from
Datastream for the same twenty year period and with the same quarterly frequency.
In the previous research concerned with the analysis of acquisition activity as a
whole a great many different macro-economic variables have been used. This section
is designed to discuss the potential links between these variables and the various
theories that exist to explain total acquisition activity and to decide which variables
should be used in the following empirical work. Table 2.1 lists the variables used in
previous papers that have attempted to predict the level of acquisition activity. This
table also references the authors of each paper and gives a brief explanation of the
rational that each author gave for using that variable.
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The first variable is the number of takeovers in the previous period. This term
is included in the previous research as it appears that the current level of acquisition
activity is linked to takeover numbers in the previous periods. A typical paper
including this variable was by Golbe and White (1988) who found that takeover
numbers were autoregressive and important in the prediction of future levels of
takeover activity.
The behaviour of the stock market is also frequently seen in empirical work
concerning the level of acquisition activity. The rationale given for using these terms
is, generally, that increases in share prices tend to be followed by an increase in
acquisition activity presumably due to the increased value of the acquiring firms which
enables them to afford to attempt the purchase of another company. Steiner (1975),
Melicher, Ledolter and D'Antonio (1983) and Golbe and White (1988) all featured this
variable in their empirical work. Golbe and White also used a measure of the disparity
between the market value of a firm and the replacement cost of that firms assets as a
measure of the accuracy with which the stock market values companies. They claimed
that that the target firm must be a bargain or there would be little point in the bidding
company attempting the purchase. Golbe and White also attempted to include a
measure of the level of variety of analysts opinions in their model for takeover
_
numbers. They argued that when there are more opinions about the value of firms in
the market place there will be more takeovers as companies will attempt to take
advantage of this divergence of opinion and acquire a firm that they consider to be
undervalued which also agrees with their thoughts on the bargain aspect of target
selection.
There are several variables in the previous literature that refer to the impact of
overseas markets and exchange rates on asset prices. Rock (1994) believed that
opportunities in international markets could provide an alternative to acquisition
activity whilst Beenstock and Chan (1988) and Priestley (1994) both contended that
overseas competitiveness will have an impact on domestic share prices. Retail prices
and the volume of retail sales are also important factors in determining the level of
share prices, as Beenstock and Chan (1988) and Priestley (1994) stated. Any factor
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that can alter asset prices could also have an impact on acquisition activity as the value
of the involved firms alters.
A very popular variable in previous analysis of acquisition numbers is the
interest rate. This term was used by Steiner (1975), Golbe and White (1988) and Rock
(1994) as well as appearing in several articles related to asset pricing. It is thought
that the interest rate will influence the amount of money that firms can borrow which
will influence their ability to purchase another firm. In all of the previous empirical
work on the level of takeover activity interest rates have been negatively linked to
acquisition numbers and it is expected to be the same here. The rate of inflation
appears in papers by both Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) and Priestley (1994) as a factor
that may alter asset prices and it was also referred to by Rock (1994) as a potential
indicator of future expectations for economic performance which, he argued, can have
an impact on takeover levels in the future.
Industrial production appears in every paper reviewed here. Gort (1969),
Steiner (1975), Melicher, Ledolter and D'Antonio (1983), Golbe and White (1988) and
Rock (1994) all found that this factor was positively linked to takeover numbers whilst
Beenstock and Chan (1988) and Priestley (1994) both found that it influenced asset
prices as high levels of industrial production are linked to higher sales which, in turn,
produce high profits and increase share prices. Increased profits means that funding an
acquisition may be easier and increased share prices will assist the purchasing firms if
they need to borrow the remainder of the money to pay for the purchase. There are
also some related terms that represent issues connected with production such as
manufacturing and labour costs which appear in the previous empirical work on asset
pricing and takeover levels. These factors could have a detrimental affect on
acquisition numbers as they will reduce the available funds that could be used to pay
for takeovers and they can also influence market expectations for the future, as Rock
(1994) claimed. If the stock market expects circumstances to improve then individuals
will be less likely to sell their shares at the current time as they will expect the value of
their stock to rise in the future. Such an assumption will reduce the level of future
takeover activity.
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In some situations acquisitions are essential if a firm is to continue to grow and
develop or even, in more drastic situations, to survive. Fairburn and Geroslci (1993)
used their "structure - conduct - performance" theory to explain just such a situation.
They argued that when the composition of an industry changes this will have an impact
on the performance of all the other firms in that industry which will, ultimately, alter
the behaviour of those firms. Changes in industry composition can, therefore, create
situations were it is necessary for firms to attempt an acquisition for their own
continued well-being. Fairburn and Geroski also pointed out that one of the most
radical ways that the structure of an industry can be altered is due to an acquisition
creating a situation in which past acquisition activity will be the direct cause of future
takeovers. Fairburn and Gerosld (1993) and Gort (1969) both used measures of
industry concentration to examine acquisition levels in previous empirical work and
both expected that increased concentration would increase the number of takeovers as
firms attempt to retain their market share and maintain a strong position for the future.
Golbe and White (1988) attempted to include dummy variables in their model
of acquisition activity that measured tax laws. Their dummy variables indicated
changes in the tax laws that took place within the period that their _sample dealt with.
The rationale for including this term was that tax laws could alter the benefits created
by acquisition activity and would, therefore, alter the number of takeovers in the
following months. Golbe and White were not able, however, to predict the signs that
these dummy variables would have, nor did they appear significant in the authors
empirical results. Another unusual variable was used by Gort (1969) in his disturbance
theory of merger activity. Gort argued that technical change would influence the
number of takeovers that took place in the following months as it would alter firms
competitiveness in their chosen markets. In order to represent this factor in his
empirical work Gort used the ratio of technical to non-technical personnel as one of his
independent variables.
Changes in risk premia can alter the value of asset prices, according to Chen,
Roll and Ross (1986) and Priestley (1994) who included a measure of this factor in
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their empirical analysis of asset prices. Weston, Chung and Hoag (1990) also claimed
that any factor which alters the condition of the capital markets would influence levels
of acquisition activity. For the same reasons Beenstock and Chan (1988) and Priestley
(1994) both examined the impact of money supply on asset prices. Beenstock and
Chan also used treasury bills in their empirical analysis for exactly the same reason. If
any of these factors can alter asset prices then it is possible that they could also
influence takeovers by altering funding opportunities for companies wishing to buy
another firm.
The next term to consider is the price of oil. Chen, Roll and Ross (1986)
stated that this term should be included in any list of factors that influenced share
prices although they went on to note that oil prices only become significant in their
empirical results after the 1970's and the rise of OPEC. If, as these authors claimed,
the price of oil can have an impact on share prices then it may also have an affect on
the level of acquisition activity as it is possible that some firms will not be able to pass
on the full cost of any increase in oil prices to their customers and, as a result, this
would leave them will less money to spend on the purchase of another company and
vice versa.
Finally, the previous research on acquisition numbers also considered other
markets that are thought to influence the behaviour of the stock market. Melicher,
Ledolter and D'Antonio (1983) and Weston, Chung and Hoag (1990) investigated the
influence of bonds on the level of acquisition activity. The rational for this was the
same in both of these papers; changes in other capital markets will have an impact on
the funding opportunities necessary for the successful acquisition of another company.
Priestley (1994) examined the influence of commodities markets on the stock market
for exactly the same reason and found that the behaviour of these two markets were
linked and that they each responded to alterations in the others value.
Table 2.2 demonstrates the wide variety of variables that have been used in the
past to examine acquisition activity and asset prices. There is little consistency
between previous papers which means that there are few precedents to follow.
105
a)
re
4.,
0
•5
a)
a)
0
CP
CJ
co-t
0
Tu
• 0
a)
S...
4.)
...0
(3.4
0
-
=
clJ
a.
U
cl)
74
e0
....,
Q
„,
4.0
'CE
-0
E-..
'8
=
c.)
1 ÷',)':
.m be. ,...,
1.g o
- >
§ 1
, 0
=	 ril0 8
*.=	 I..cq 0
0 .5
...›	 00
0 "a
....,
z	 c.,o 0
co= 0
D 8z
u6- 0in 0
•- ,
A b2:1
4 1/43
,
-.9. g
'e
''Cl
=03
48	 .....
,..	 '0
tri	 C.)
..-
-4 E5 0=
2' RR 45
-,
0 \
'•0
c‘
--,
......
0
C.)
"atn
„
1...
,...0 	a--.4.-..	 0
--o	 E
0a °
'''	 -o
rn...,	 Q)
r,	 =0 7:i
. e
•	 0.-' 	a)0 'Si
120 =
=
.,...	 08-,
 0t)
.
0 -
4)	 i.-..)0
00 2
7,6	 ...,0.	 a.
0) E
a)
-0 -0e' En00
to 'n0
*6 g
..=
0 ri)
u 'E
''..C/7	 8'
a-, cc
_E
0c-o'
oo
0 \
,...•
a)
g
1 1
=CO
2
8
4
EIJ
. 
w
.6
05
V)5
,-
14-1g3
oi.0
4
E0
$...
,,,
:-.g
1
00
•	 ..
rt,
.3
D
1:,
80,
c z
u,
.0'
..te
''''
......
--a-C'.
aN
....
...."
8
c4
t). a
a) 7;
1...
`8 0
8 00 .0
co	 1.
= 0
.0
0 .-
t 04.1
a, 	.....
tO(1.)	 ct ._
e „,-.
...	 ,0 -U
>	
,...0 0fn .5
.7c1 .2
4
.	 8
.45 g
c 0
ra• %
-S -
v7 .-
-
..-.
.3 !
47.
CL)
0 •-•
..z -0
' c
.......
-a-
a,ON
..-,
,..../
8
o4
rj
'C
o
4.i
E
.„
.....77,
4.1
0.
.
CLI
C.)
.-
E
0
0
0u
W
tll
.0
En
8.
()o
..0
•
&I
5
00
a)i.0
E
ell
1
E
.0
=al
oo0
..e.0
,4
v,
2I.C.)0
8
4
0
0,4-4
C.)
--
E0
=
8
44
Co
-e
.....
0,
0
a
c
-6
n.D
E
Z
.0
g
P5:
.=
C-)COEn
v
0 ..4
•	 .-.	 4.)
 ..e.,
.0 ct
0 5
6
at °
=0
4
06.
-,
.56.z0
VI
c
. 0
.
.-
.`410
..,0
<4
I..	 g
0 0co-•	
..o
'..	 s
.4=
= -
a)	 'nv, >V)	 0.
a)	 a)
,,,	 =
a)	 v,
..'g ...e'
"5
o 8
04 1.,fa.0 0
'0	 •-n
c	 ra.
ce E
V)	 ED
.-, z
...q 	Ct
cn	 ti2
4-  E2 =
ElJ	 En4:1	 cc;
..0----. 	a)
a.)	 *
-I E,
CA E
a) 4)to 0
c c0
.=0	 •....
•	 ..	 tn
E '52 0-
0 .‹U0
764 ) 	. .
,..
to
c t
LI
g=
.e,
'C8
=
&O
. Uti
a.,
e
0
E2
00
,,,Q
u
e
o
0
C
o-I
c.)
E
o
00
w
0,
E u,
o 6.0	 CL)
a)	 t»
4 c z
.0til	 o
L'Z
= ta.
i...
a) 05 .=
...-0 0VI
....	 0
cct	 •n•••
•E =
0 0
Ls)	 • Ft'
VI	 to
8
.c .0
a. -011 EEn
'CO)	 8
. .8
to
az •=1I ....:;
c-)	 a)
c	 '-'
8 'V)
u) 0
0 ..cr
.4= =
,...	 mgt
•	 v	 -
tr). 	'ci
--.,,,	 9...,
0 rry
.e
i 1
o
w
,
5
.=
:a.
.-.
'Cr:
•-.
UEn
......
0
=
=
.,-,
>,
a)
''''0VI 
4)1...00
''".
..
0
0
>
740)
..2
c,2
2
.6
a
7 ).
,0
4
a)
E
E
,....,
41.4
t
'C.
8
.
4.,)00
00pa
U
.
C.)
..cL.CI
vo
c''
ell)0
.1
jg
=
a)
t
t
'a,
0
,,..
0
.0
...
._,0
En
Et.=I.
o
0
0
:10
...n
Lz.,
°-2.
-g
. o
.P•o E
'5 0
co	 En
9 2
""'	 a.)I-.
.5 '
-5
4 ;)e(1)	 "Cl
7" " E
= S.0
•.-. .0
,
8 v)
tz.1
o	 trit " °2 75
...,
E 
-4L0 *-0
1. 04.)
'''''	 0
,L,	 r.„
,...2 o
 
0 .,
o - 7,
cr.
c.)
CZ
'A 0
1:3	 0g
.,-,
.5 6
u2 --4so
to E
A .--2=C.) F.,
0.,8
"8
S.
2
E a)
v)
1 'u f)
C	 $Z1'0 0,
-50	 .._al -cl, 0
a cn
g =
0 ca
c,>. 	o
= .4"
= r.5 .2
4) oLlt
tu. '5
>i.	 =1
°
e u.., ..s
3 to
.•
Ca)
c.,	 .....
o aa
c4-•	 ..-•
0 cn$..,
= a)0.
.= g1 ..-
8	 -r-
•0E.-
6,	 f:14(3)	 0
....	 1.
-Fd 1=3
1/2	 .1
67).	 .
..,4i.	 V)
c 1.E	 a)>
5' 8
1=3
oj
.'.	 c4-1et 0
e	 ,..CU	 a)
.....	 .0
= ,
a a)
.2 .5
cn	 En0 0
5 >
..Z0
'0 0
g r)
.""8
. c	 ›,
"a g
t= E0 Ell
0.0 2
'CS
	 4.)
to-I
' A	 1 --.a)
t3130	 '15
,32,	 a)
azE
f, a
0 0To tCJ >
17,,	 g
(/) 1
I.Ol
g"
an
4...0
.--.ce
C
..=
0
..s
t0
u
.=
il
0
o
..r.:
es
E
c
ie...0
..
.....
......r
-,...-
`-"
.--n
....,
=
I)
v)
o
o
..,
11:11
-cig
ct	 ,•-n
n-•	 cn0 00
0	 ......
.4
..,
,...-0
..00
ls
oo
ON
,--.
....,0
''-':a
-c
g
a)
.1Z
0
c
000or)
as
^,
•-•0
.0
"0
=
0
.8
-6
L.,
":7"C*N
cn
.-.
.-...
804
PI
ON
...-i
.......,
CIL.CU
0
a
.....C cl
aN
c.
.--i
,.....,
:a0u.,0
r ,-,
'0Ft
§
.1g
cf..
ONON
..1
s....,
00p4
..--..
-a-CTC \
,
s....0
C..)0gx
t
a)
4'1E.'
cu
c.,
0
at
..co1..,
a
WI
•A
.0
i
ci°
o
c.)
44
oa.,
.0F
CA
o=
.-0
.....
ot.
0
CI
a.)
om
a...
a)
•	
>
-tt
QN?i
Z
....
o00
7.7.c1
a+
=
o..
c)
IX
a
8
1-1=0
.,..
i
c
=
c
‘4
W
..c
[-.
m
00
.z..ii
0©
u
U
E
o0
U
w
C 7..
a-.
.-LICU
r4
I-
ow
"a
44
5 t.
Q .
.
1	 .0
r..,
'
4-.c.)
0)
110I.
u
m
o0
g
=
.
s..,
.c.j 	t.E.Cl.)
0 .=
cc E.<
co
0
.,0)
:4
CIft
..=
U
;)
52
*:-
rA
.-
=Cr
v
-,c
cs.
o
t"
o
c.)
=
E-‘
0
'eelEU)1...
et
AO
V)6
u
Tu.
cn
L.
oI...
.
.e.d
›.
5
ECJ
..7,-
et)0
75
10co
c
a
0o
•	 .n•
:0
.
-0Cr
C.0
'et
I.
v
=
,..6
4..
=.0
E
oI-
1:10
.0
o
...=
Ur,
"5
-`4
0
cl.)
.0
E.0
a)u
c
ed
g
C
0
t,L0
t
rd0
-a
0
o(.?
10 j
I.
.E0
aiz
co,
s...
a)
a,
0
r:ra
6
o4.
.a)
. a
VI
ECIJ
.71
ek
0_
u
0COCo
a
.,,
a,
'....,
•-0
0
=.
c.0
- 0
0att
VI
U
01)
=
a.,
Co
. 0
C.)
CJ
to
.4)
-...0
rn
106
The theories for acquisition levels are all related to the economic conditions in
some way. All of these theories are based on the belief that the condition of the
economy alters firm behaviour which, in turn, alters the level of acquisition activity.
The theories can be split into several broad groups. The first group represents theories
that relate economic changes to the expectations held by both shareholders and the
market as a whole. Changes in expectations can lead to differing opinions concerning
the value of shares and this disparity can increase the number of acquisitions as
potential bidding firms believe that they can identify suitable firms for acquisition that
the market has currently undervalued. This theory was used by Gort (1969) in his
economic disturbance theory, Golbe and White (1988) as part of their idea that
different opinions create acquisition opportunities and Rock (1994) who used it as part
of his theory that expectations for future economic performance will alter takeover
levels in the immediate future.
The second group of theories are the economic prosperity theories. These
theories suggest that economic prosperity increases the available funds that firms have
for investment which will lead to an increase in takeovers as companies use these funds
for the purchase of another firm. Melicher, Ledolter and D'Antonio (1983) and Golbe
and White (1988) both believed that this explanation represented a potential link
_
_
between economic conditions and the number of takeovers in the following periods,
although neither of the models that they created proved particularly good at predicting
takeover levels. The third group of theories refer to the influence that economic
conditions can have on the value of shares. It is believed that the price of shares will
dictate the number of acquisitions and, as a result, the economic factors that alter asset
prices will ultimately control the number of takeovers. Golbe and White (1988) used
this theory, amongst others, in their investigation of acquisition numbers and Rock
(1994) claimed that economic expectations could be represented by the value of the
stock market and that this factor would alter takeover levels depending on whether the
market was expected to rise or fall in the future. If the stock market was expected to
rise then acquisition numbers would decrease as shareholders would hold on to their
shares in the hope that future share prices would elevate the value of their investment
beyond the value of the current bid. Finally there are the market change theories that
107
state that alterations in market structure can alter acquisition levels. This can apply to
the capital markets, as Rock (1994) suggested, where changes will alter the value of
shares and will also change the number of financing opportunities available to potential
bidding companies which will change the level of acquisition activity in the future.
Alternatively these changes could be within industrial groups as Fairburn and Geroslci
(1993) discussed in their "structure - conduct - performance" theory. Here is was
argued that alterations in industry composition will affect the performance of all of the
firms within that industry. This change will, in turn, alter the future behaviour of these
firms as they react to the changed circumstances. These changes in behaviour could
lead to an increase in takeover activity as firms attempt to secure their position and
strengthen their future situation. Fairburn and Geroski also pointed out that one of the
most radical ways that the composition of an industry can be changed is through an
acquisition so this theory introduces the idea that an increase in the number of
acquisitions in the past can prompt an increase in the number of acquisitions taking
place in the future. Allied to this theory, there is also the idea that an increase in
acquisition activity may lead to a further increase in the future as managers start to
copy each others behaviour. It is possible that managers may feel that, if other firms in
their industry are involved in takeovers, that they must attempt an acquisition to
protect themselves and prevent their firm becoming a target, as Palepu (1986)
_
suggested.
These theories represent the current ideas about the level of takeover activity
and the economic factors that may be appropriate leading indicators to consider in the
empirical work that follows. The table below, Table 2.3, lists the variables that will be
used in the empirical section of this chapter and relates them to both the terms that
have been used in previous papers and the theories discussed above. This should
demonstrate that each of the variables has been used previously or is directly linked to
one of the theoretical papers that exists on this subject.
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The first term to consider is the number of acquisitions which has been used in
previous empirical work by Shugart and Tollison (1984), Golbe and White (1988) and
Fairburn and Geroslci (1993). The reasons for including this term are varied. Golbe
and White simply declared that the acquisition numbers they investigated were clearly
autoregressive, whilst Hughes (1993) discussed the clear patterns in takeover numbers
that exist in the UK. This term can also be linked to several different aspects of the
theory concerning the level of acquisition activity. Fairburn and Geroski's "structure -
conduct - performance" theory (1993) stated that acquisitions can alter the
composition of an industry which can make it essential for other firms within that
industry to attempt further takeovers in the near future. This is similar to an argument
in Palepu (1986) in which the author claimed that increased takeover activity may
prompt other firms to acquire as a way of defending themselves against unwanted
takeover bids.
The second variable is the level of business confidence, constructed from the
results of the CBI surveys in the UK. This term will be used to represent to
expectations that exist for the future performance of the economy. Rock (1994)
argued that high expectations for the future should lead to a decrease in acquisition
numbers as shareholders will be less willing to sell their shares at the current price if
they feel that this could be exceeded by the future performance of their stock.
Alternatively, Melicher, Ledolter and D'Antonio (1983) argued that increased
confidence will lead to an increase in acquisitions as managers feel that the economic
conditions are good enough for them to attempt risky investments such as the purchase
of another firm. It remains to see which of these theories is supported by the empirical
evidence.
The effective exchange rate was used by Priestley (1994) as one of the factors
that can alter the value of asset prices. This variable is also referred to in several of the
theoretical papers on acquisition numbers. Rock (1994) claimed that the relative
competitiveness of firms internationally will influence acquisition activity and could
also alter the level of funding available for takeovers. If the exchange rate is such that
UK firms are highly competitive internationally then there may be a decrease in
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takeover activity as firms concentrate on international markets rather than domestic
takeovers. To this end the exchange rate is expected to be negatively related to the
future level of takeovers. The converse is true of the industrial production variable,
here gross domestic product. This appears in every paper that has attempted to model
acquisition numbers using economic indicators and in almost all of the papers that
examined factors that can change asset prices. In every case there is a positive link
between increased industrial production and increased acquisition activity in the
periods that follow. This relationship relates to the theory that economic prosperity
increases the funding opportunities that are essential for takeovers and also to the
theory that an increase in expectations for future economic performance will herald an
increase in takeover numbers as firms feel that greater prosperity means that they can
attempt riskier projects such as the purchase of another firm.
Another popular term in the previous papers is the interest rate. Here the one
year Interbank rate is used following results in the previous papers that suggest that
terms referring to longer time periods are better indicators of takeover activity. In all
of these papers this term is found to be negatively related to the level of acquisition
activity although it is not always significantly in the final models. The importance of
this term is the close link between interest rates and funding opportunities, as Steiner
(1975), Melicher, Ledolter and D'Antonio (1983) and Rock (1994) all observed.
Successfully raising the necessary finding is a pre-requisite for acquisition activity and
many firms need to turn to commercial lenders to manage this. When interest rates
increase some companies may find that they simply cannot afford to purchase another
firm and the overall level of takeover activity will decrease.
The next term in the data set is the price of North Sea oil. According to Chen,
Roll and Ross (1986) this term should be included as an important economic factor
that can influence share prices. They observed that oil prices have only become
important since the 1970's when OPEC become a major force in the world economy.
Changes in oil prices may affect acquisition numbers by reducing the level of funds that
firms have available for investing. Increases in oil prices may be passed along to the
customers but this can take time and, until these extra expenses can be recouped, firms
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may find that they have to halt some of their planned investments. To this end oil
prices are expected to be negatively linked to acquisition numbers.
Treasury bills are represented by the return on three month t-bills. Beenstock
and Chan (1988) used this as an alternative measure of changes in the capital markets,
which could alter future asset prices. This corresponds to the theories for acquisition
activity used by both Steiner (1975) and Rock (1994) who both claimed that capital
market changes can influence acquisition numbers by altering the potential funding
opportunities that exist. If the available funding is reduced then acquisition numbers
will decrease as companies can no longer raise the necessary funds for a proposed
takeover and vice versa.
The next term is the level of the stock market. This is another term that was
very popular in the previous papers that attempted to link economic factors to
acquisition numbers and it was often significant in the previous empirical work. There
is some disagreement, however, as to the sign that this term should have. Authors
such as Steiner (1975) and Melicher, Ledolter and D'Antonio (1983) expected this
term to be positive as this would represent economic prosperity and business
confidence which should be linked to increase funding which would lead to an increase
in the level of acquisition activity in the future. Alternatively, in the empirical work by
Golbe and White (1988) and the theory of economic expectations propounded by
Rock (1994) this term should be negatively related to acquisition numbers. According
the Golbe and White, when share prices are relatively low some firms will be
undervalued by a significant margin and will represent a bargain for potential acquirers
which should be followed by an increase in takeover activity. Rock argued that stock
prices are indicative of the markets expectations for future economic performance and,
if market expectations are high, takeovers will decrease as shareholders are advised not
to sell as the value of their stock is expected to increase considerably in the future.
The last two terms in the data sets represent economic indicators series. The
first of these is the CSO short run indicator series which represents the expected level
of the UK economic cycle in the next quarter of the year. This can be simply linked to
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the economic prosperity theory for takeovers that was advocated by, amongst others,
Steiner (1975), Melicher, Ledolter and D'Antonio (1983) and Golbe and White (1988).
Last of all there is the OECD world markets series that represents the conditions of the
international markets as advocated by both Rock (1994) and Priestley (1994).
Priestley claimed that international conditions would influence asset prices in the UK
which, in turn, could alters the level takeovers. This is supported by the theory that
positive economic conditions lead to increased takeover activity as was used by Steiner
(1975), Melicher, Ledolter and D'Antonio (1983) and Golbe and White (1988).
Conversely, Rock argued that such terms are important in the examination of
acquisition activity as the level of alternative strategic challenges open to firms will be
negatively related to the level of takeover activity. When there are many possible other
projects to consider then takeover numbers will decrease and when there are few
alternative investments then acquisitions will increase. Again this means that there is
no clear precedent to indicate the sign that this term should have in the following
empirical work.
Correlation Coefficients Between the Number of Acquisitions and the
Macro-Economic Variables
It is possible that some of these terms will be highly correlated and including
such variables in an econometric model could create problems with multicollinearity.
The following two tables, Tables 2.4 and 2.5, represent the correlation matrices for
these variables. Table 2.4 represents the data in its original form and Table 2.5
represents the stationary terms that will be used in the modelling procedure. Where
the terms are highly correlated in this second table only one of the correlated variables
will be included to prevent the issue of multicollinearity arising in the results.
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2.2.3 Empirical Results
There are several hypotheses that require testing in this section each depending
on the results of the previous one. The first hypothesis to be tested will determine
whether acquisition activity is random or not. If the random hypothesis is rejected then
it will be possible to attempt to model takeover numbers against macro-economic
factors. In the event that a suitable model cannot be found then a third hypothesis,
investigating the nature of the merger wave, will be investigated. Each of these
hypotheses will be explained in detail in the appropriate part of the empirical results
that follow.
Testing for the Random Nature of the Market for Corporate Control
This is the first hypothesis that requires testing. The null and alternative
hypotheses can be expressed in the following manner.
Hol : the behaviour of the acquisition market is random
HAI : the behaviour of the acquisition market is not random
Testing the first hypothesis can be done it two ways as way explained
previously. The first test is the regression of the number of acquisitions against a time
trend as suggested by Golbe and White (1988). Table 2.6, below, contains the
residuals for this regression equation and the pattern of positive and negative runs is
clear. As Golbe and White observed, if the behaviour of the acquisitions market was
truly random then the residuals would not appear in runs. There are eighty four
observations in the acquisitions data used here but the residuals generated by this
process form just twelve runs of positive and negative numbers. This result suggests
that the random activity hypothesis could be rejected for the number of acquisitions
that occur in the UK.
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Table 2.6 Runs of Positive and Negative Residuals of the Regression of Acquisition
Numbers Against a Time Trend
Run length Number of
positive
Number of
negative
Total Expected
total for
random
sequence
84 Observations
1 2 2 4 21
2 2 0 2 10.5
3 0 0 0 5.25
4 0 0 0 2.63
5 0 0 0 1.3
6 0 1 1 0.66
7 0 0 0 0.34
8 1 0 1 0.16
9 0 0 0 0.08
10 0 0 0 0.04
11 0 0 0 0.02
12 0 1 1 0.01
13 0 0 0 0.0005
0.06314 0 0 0
15 1 0 1 0.001
16 0 0 0 0.0006
17 0 1 1 0.0003
18 0 1 1 0
Total 6 6 12 @42
The second test for the validity of this hypothesis is a Box-Jenkins procedure
on the series of acquisition numbers. This should facilitate the identification of the
time series process that best fits the number of acquisitions and further confirm
whether or not there is a link between the terms in this series. The series representing
the number of acquisitions is non-stationary until a first difference is taken. Now that
the degree of integration is known, examining the graphs of the autocorrelation
function and the partial autocorrelation function yields a tentative identification of the
series that best represents the data. In the graph of the autocorrelation function none
of the lags are significant, suggesting that the data does not incorporate a moving
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average component. The partial autocorrelation function has just one significant lag
suggesting that there is just one likely option for this data, an ARIMA(1,1,0) process.
The Q-statistics associated with this model verify this supposition, as the model is
correctly specified. In simple terms that means that the best predictor of the number of
acquisitions that will take place in any period is the number of takeovers that occurred
in the previous period. Given this result it is possible to reject the null hypothesis that
the behaviour of the acquisition market is random. Furthermore, these results suggest
a cyclic pattern of behaviour in the activity of the corporate control market which
corresponds to the results in Golbe and White (1988). This leads on to the second
hypothesis in this chapter.
Testing for a Relationship Between Macro-Economic Conditions and the Market for
Corporate Control
As with the section immediately above, it is possible to state a null and
alternative hypothesis that defines the empirical work in this section. Here they are as
follows :
H02 : acquisition numbers can be predicted using macro-economic terms
_
11A2
 : acquisition numbers cannot be predicted using macro-economic terms
To test this supposition an OLS regression models can be created to model the
relationship between the number of acquisitions and the macro-economic factors that
were introduced earlier. Each of the variables has been made stationary and any highly
correlated terms have been identified in Table 2.5 above. There are very few highly
correlated terms when the variables are stationary but, when such relationships do exist
only one of the terms will be included in the model. As was explained in Section 2.2.1,
this model will be created using the general to specific methodology.
Melicher, Ledolter and D'Antonio (1983) observed that acquisitions are
normally planned in the two quarters immediately before the launch of the bid. Using
this to limit the number of lags, the general model is created using the first and second
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lags of each of the independent variables. The resulting model is well-specified
although several terms are not statistically significant. Applying the general to specific
methodology, as explained in the methodology section, these terms can be removed to
create the specific model which represents all of the important information in the
model in a more concise and coherent manner. The specific model appears in Table
2.7, below. It contains only statistically significant terms and is well-specified.
Table 2.7 OLS Regression Result, Specific Model
Variable Coefficient 2
Constant -0.04
(-1.01)
Acquisition Numbers (-1) 0.41
(3.19) *
Effective foreign exchange rate (-1) -1.74
(-1.72) ***
Total industrial production (-1) 4.34
(2) ***
Interest rate (-2) -0.64
(-1.69) ***
North Sea oil price (-1) -0.39
(-2.58) **
FT-All share index (-1) 0.68
( 1.7) *** -
Adjusted R2 = 0.48
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.004
Diagnostic Tests
Serial Correlation (Godfrey's LAI Test)
X2(4) = 3.76	 F(4,36) = 0.78
Functional Form (Ramsey's RESET Test)
X20) = 0.25	 F(1,39) = 0.21
Normality (Jarque - Bera's Test)
x2(2) = 0.96	 F-test is inapplicable
Heteroscedasticity (Koenker's Test)	
.
X2(1) = 0.93	 F(1,45) = 0.91
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
1	 Lags are given in parentheses
2	 T statistics are in parentheses
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The first term to consider in this specific model is the acquisition numbers
series which is positively related to the dependent variable. This terms was included in
this model following the previous work by authors such as Golbe and White (1988)
and Fairburn and Geroslci (1993). The previous papers that examined this term nearly
all concluded that acquisition numbers are strongly autoregressive and, as a result, this
term would be highly informative when predicting acquisition numbers in the future.
The autoregressive nature of takeover numbers was confirmed in the first empirical
section here where the random activity theory was rejected after it was demonstrated
that there is a clear link between consecutive terms in the series of acquisition
numbers. The importance of this term also supports the theory that an increase in
acquisition numbers can lead to a further increase in takeover activity in the following
periods. Palepu (1986) suggested that when takeover numbers increase other firms
may also attempt an acquisition as a means of protecting themselves from unwanted
takeover bids by quickly increasing the size of the company. Fairburn and Geroski
(1993) used a similar argument in their "structure - conduct - performance" theory.
Here it was argued that changes in industry composition will alter the performance of
all of the firms operating within that industry and this change can force these firms to
change their behaviour in the future. Specifically, Fairburn and Gerosld claimed that
the remaining firms would be forced to attempt acquisitions in order to defend their
market share and protect themselves from any potential difficulties that might have
been created by the alterations in their industry. The authors noted that the most
radical changes in industry composition are invariably brought about by takeovers
which can drastically alter the composition of an industry by changing the number and
construction of the firms in that industry. As a result, Fairburn and Gerosld were able
to demonstrate how it is possible that previous acquisition activity will prompt further
acquisition activity in the future, as the result in this model shows.
The effective exchange rate is negatively related to the level of takeover
activity and this finding corresponds with the idea that acquisitions may increase if the
value of Sterling decreases as this change in the exchange rate may make it inadvisable
to invest overseas. If firms are forced to change their plans and look for an alternative
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investment within the UK then this could well lead to an increase in takeover numbers.
This supports Rock's theory that the level of alternative strategic challenges will alter
takeover numbers. Rock (1994) claimed that takeover activity will increase if there are
few alternative opportunities for investment and he suggested that examining the
competitiveness of firms in overseas markets would be one possible way of
determining whether other projects exist. Gort (1969) and Golbe and White (1988)
both suggested that exchange rates would be appropriate indicators of economic
changes that could alter acquisition numbers by changing expectations for future
performance and forcing firms to look for alternative investment opportunities, such as
takeovers.
A positive sign is allocated to the industrial production term which corresponds
to the findings in all of the papers reviewed previously where the authors attempted to
identify economic factors that have an impact on the level of takeover activity. Steiner
(1975), Melicher, Ledolter and D'Antonio (1983), Golbe and White (1988) and Rock
(1994) all agreed that increased industrial production would be followed by an increase
in takeover numbers. An increase in industrial production leads to an increase in the
profits of the involved companies. This increase in profits means that firms will be able
to invest more and, as a result, an increase in industrial production could be expected
to herald an increase in the overall level of activity in the corporate control market.
This is the economic prosperity theory for acquisition numbers that can be seen in
Table 2.2, above.
Interest rates are negatively related to acquisition numbers. The negative result
is consistent with the articles by Steiner (1975), Melicher, Ledolter and D'Antonio
(1983) and Golbe and White (1988) and reflects the fact that low interest rates will
make it easier for the bidding companies to borrow the funds that they will require to
purchase another firm and the two period lag suggests that this is one of the first issues
to be considered when companies start to consider an acquisition. Since relatively few
companies exist that can finance an acquisition without borrowing at least some of the
funds necessary for the purchase it is clear how important low interest rates can be. If
the cost of borrowing funds for the acquisitions is too high then the takeover is
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unlikely to proceed and the converse is true in periods of low interest rates. Oil prices
are also negatively linked to the number of acquisitions as was predicted earlier. Chen,
Roll and Ross (1986) used oil prices in their study as a factor that could elicit a
response from the stock market and it is clear from these results that an increase in the
price of oil can also reduce the number of acquisitions that follow. When oil prices
increase most companies would simply pass the increase on to their customers and,
presumably, this would limit the impact of such an alteration. However for some
companies, for example those that use oil and oil derivatives as raw materials, an
increase in the price of oil could dramatically increase the firms production costs and,
consequently, reduce the profits that that company can generate. This appears to be
the case here as an increase in the price of oil is negatively linked to the number of
takeovers. Again, this result emphasises the great importance of funding in
acquisition planning, as did the term referring to interest rates. If a potential bidder
firm cannot afford the takeover then, irrespective of how important it may be for that
firm to attempt the purchase, the acquisition will not go ahead.
Finally, there is the stock price variable which is positively linked to the number
of acquisitions. This mirrors the findings of Gort (1969), Steiner (1975), Melicher,
Ledolter and D'Antonio (1983) and Golbe and White (1988) who all found that terms
representing the stock market were positively related to the number of acquisitions in
their studies. Again this can be linked to the economic prosperity theory for takeovers
which suggests that periods of economic well-being will prompt an increase on
takeover activity. In the previous literature on this subject high share prices are linked
to higher profitability, greater funding opportunities and increased confidence in the
economy. All of these factors can induce an increase in acquisition numbers.
This model is well-specified and the variables included in the model behave
exactly as they are expected to which corresponds to the finding of previous research
in many ways. It is surprising then that the model has such a low R.' value. The 112
value measures the accuracy of the model and suggests that the model can only predict
forty-eight percent of the changes in acquisition numbers correctly. To understand
why this is the case, the period that the model covers needs to be examined. The total
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number of acquisitions in the years covered by this data set changes greatly. In
particular, the years 1986 to 1990 represent the last merger wave to take place in the
UK and the takeover numbers are very high in this period. Figure 2.1, below,
represent the total number of acquisitions in the years covered by this data set.
Figure 2.1 Total Acquisition Numbers in the UK For the Years 1974 to 1994
It seems likely that the great increase in acquisition numbers that occurred
during the years 1986 to 1990 is the reason why the model created here is relatively
inaccurate. None of the macro-economic terms that were used in the model behaved
in the same extreme manner as the level of acquisition activity and this could be the
reason for the disappointing performance of an otherwise very well-specified model.
To see if this supposition is correct the residuals of the model need to be examined.
Table 2.8, below, contains summary statistics for the residuals over the total period,
which are then subdivided into the merger wave years and the remaining years. The
final column contains the ratio of the values for the merger wave years and the
non-wave years.
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Table 2.8 Summary Statistics for the Residuals of the Specific OLS Model
Statistic All Years Merger Wave
Years
Non-Wave
Years
Ratio of
Merger Wave
to Non-Wave
Years
Mean 5.5E-08 0.014 -0.0073 -1.9286
Standard Error 0.0331 0.0587 0.0271 2.1675
Standard Deviation 0.2268 0.2625 0.1682 1.8655
Variance 0.0514 0.0689 0.0283 2.431
Range 0.9951 0.9951 0.6557 1.5176
Minimum Value -0.4539 -0.4539 -0.3072 1.4776
Maximum Value 0.5413 0.5413 0.3485 1.5529
Sum 2.6E-06 0.2809 -0.1967 -1.4286
These summary statistics demonstrate that the residuals in the merger wave
years are much larger than in the other years covered by the sample period. This
suggests that the merger wave is a feature that cannot be predicted by the
macro-economic factors that were used in the model, although those terms are
sufficient to create a well-specified model that appears to be fairly accurate in the other
years covered by the data. The phenomena of the merger wave cannot, it seems, be
predicted by using the same economic factors that are related to acquisition levels at
other times. During these years the level of acquisition activity rises to unprecedented
heights and the macro-economic factors cannot determine these numbers. This could
be an extreme form of Fairburn and Geroski's (1993) theory that high levels of
acquisition activity can prompt even higher takeover numbers in the future. This may
represent a period of irrational behaviour amongst managers of bidding firms as it
seems to be highly unlikely that all of the firms who became acquirers during the
merger wave would have needed to attempt an acquisition to counteract some changes
that have occurred in their industry. A certain proportion of these acquisitions must be
prompted by the fact that there were, at that time, a great many takeovers occurring.
Managers may feel that, if so many other firms are involved in the corporate control
market, they should be doing the same to prevent themselves looking inactive,
vulnerable or simply inefficient. This means that acquisition numbers in a merger wave
will be unpredictable to a certain degree as there is no suitable independent variable
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that could be used to reflect how the current level of activity will influence managers
and whether they will feel that they must enter the corporate control market because so
many other firms are already involved in takeovers. This means that periods of
excessive acquisition activity seem to incorporate a unpredictable element that could
require further investigation. The last section of this empirical work will investigate
the merger wave feature and, in particular, will investigate the possibility that it is a
speculative bubble created by the influence that high levels of acquisition activity can
have on the managers of uninvolved firms.
Testing for a Speculative Bubble in the Market for Corporate Control
The null and alternative hypotheses in this section are :
H03 : merger waves are speculative bubbles
HA3 : mergers waves are not speculative bubbles
A bubble is created by the presence in a series of a sequence of positive
abnormal innovations that move the series away from its fundamental value. The first
step in testing for a bubble is to determine the value of these innovations. To do this it
is essential to identify the fundamental series that drives the behaviour of the
acquisition market under normal circumstances. Usually, this sort of test is carried out
on data where there is some form of equation that will enable the calculation of the
expected value of the series. Once this term has been estimated, the innovations can be
created by subtracting this calculated value from the actual value of the series. In the
case of acquisition numbers this type of equation is missing and another term needs to
be identified instead. The fundamental series will need to behave in the way that the
acquisition numbers are expected to act in the absence of any bubbles or other
unexpected tendencies in the data. It has been possible to identify a link between the
behaviour of the economic cycle and the number of acquisitions in the previous
sections. The earlier results suggest that, with the exception of the merger wave that
occurred between 1986 and the end of 1990, the macro-economic variables that appear
in the OLS result represent the fundamental series that drives the activity in the
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corporate control market. Unfortunately, some of the terms that appear in that model
are not available as far back as would be needed to use this model as the fundamental
series. However, this result makes it clear that there is a link between the level of
acquisition activity and the economic cycle. Consequently, an economic cycle
indicator can be used to provide the fundamental series in this case. The Central
Statistical Office produce several series that are designed to replicate the behaviour of
the economic cycle in the UK. For simplicity the short indicator series, that has
already been used in this chapter, can be used to represent the economic cycle. The
terms used to create this series include virtually all of the variables that appeared in the
specific model reported earlier in this chapter which enhances the suitability of this
series. The problem with using this series is that it has been smoothed which will
reduce its accuracy somewhat and that it is designed to have a mean value of one
hundred whilst the number of acquisitions has no such constraints placed upon it. This
second issue can be rectified fairly simply. It is easy enough to scale the CSO series so
that it has the same mean value as the acquisition series, but this would still be wrong.
If the mean value of the acquisition series is calculated using all of the data the
resulting value would be artificially inflated by the presence of the merger wave and the
re-scaled indicator series would be too high, again creating erroneous innovations.
What is required is a series that represents the activity of the acquisitions market
without the presence of any unusual features. Consequently, it is necessary to identify
the mean value of the acquisitions series in the absence of the merger wave and scale
the CSO indicator series to match this value. The merger wave occurred between
1986 and 1990. If this period is eliminated the mean of the remaining values is 117.11
as opposed to 157.14 over the whole sample. The CSO indicator is scaled to match
this mean value and it is an acceptable proxy for the behaviour of the acquisition
market in the absence of unusual features. Figure 2.2 represents the total acquisition
numbers for the years 1974 to 1994. Superimposed on this figure is the CSO short
indicator series scaled to represent the fundamental series used in the following bubble
tests.
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Figure 2.2 Acquisition Numbers and the Economic Cycle as the Fundamental Series
By calculating the differences between these two series the innovations can be
calculated and the remaining tests for a bubble can be completed. The first criteria is
the autoregressive nature of the series. In the investigation of the first hypothesis, it
was clearly suggested that there was a link between the consecutive _numbers of
acquisitions, in other words that it is autoregressive. The remaining tests for a bubble
refer to the innovations series.
The first factor is the presence of kurtosis. The following equation should be
equal to zero if there is no kurtosis in the series.
E,11 (x, 
_)4
n Kurtosis =	 , 3En (x,— .i) 2 1-1	 i=i 
n
where x t is the variable under investigation and n represents the number of
observations
(2.6)
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In this case the value of the statistic is 2.83 which confirms that there are large
outliers in the data as would be expected in the event that a bubble was present. The
presence of skewness also needs to be identified so that a test can be done to identify
the presence of runs in this series. The statistic for skewness, equation 2.7, should be
zero if this feature is absent from the series of innovations.
where the components of the equation are the same as in equation 2.6.
The calculated value of this equation is 1.82 confirming that the series is not
symmetrical. This means that it is now possible to test for the presence of runs in the
data. The runs test uses exactly the same methodology as appears in the article by
Blanchard and Watson. The innovations series is split into two sections representing
the positive and negative innovations. The length of the runs in both of these sections
are then examined to see if they are substantially different from a random spread. If
the acquisitions series does not vary significantly from the underlying fundamental
series, then the innovations should be random and split approximately equally between
the positive and negative signs. However, "the runs for the bubble innovation will
[then] tend to be longer than for a purely random sequence, making the total number
of runs over the sample smaller." (Blanchard and Watson, 1982, page 310). Table 2.6
holds the results of this analysis, including the expected totals for each of the run
lengths.
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Table 2.9 Runs of Positive and Negative Innovations in the Acquisitions Series
Run Length Number of
positive
Number of
negative
Total Expected
total for
random
sequence
84 Observations
1 2 5 7 21
2 4 3 7 10.5
3 2 2 4 5.25
4 0 0 0 2.63
5 1 0 1 1.31
6 0 0 0 0.66
7 1 0 1 0.33
8 1 0 1 0.16
9 0 0 0 0.08
10 0 0 0 0.04
11 0 0 0 0.02
12 0 1 1 0.01
13 0 0 0 0.005
14 0 0 0 0.003
15 0 0 0 0.0013
16 0 0 0 0.0006
17 0 0 0 -	 0.00032
18 0 0 0 0.00016
19 1 0 1 0.00008
Total 12 11 23 @42
This result strongly suggests that there are runs in the innovations series for the
number of acquisitions. This implies that acquisition activity follows a cyclical pattern
capped, periodically, by a rational bubble. The economic cycle drives the level of
takeover activity most of the time and provides the fundamental series from which the
bubble grows. If this theory is correct, it also explains why it has proved impossible to
accurately predict the timing of merger waves in the past. Any model that can
accurately follow the cyclic behaviour of the usual pattern of behaviour will fail to
predict the bubble effect, however accurately it models acquisitions in other periods.
However, it is important to note that these tests do not prove definitively that there is a
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bubble in the number of acquisitions as each of these features, whilst always present in
a bubble, are not created exclusively by speculative bubbles and could be due to other
factors. Consequently the null hypothesis in this section cannot be conclusively
accepted at this point although there are strong indications that it is correct.
Conclusion
This chapter aimed to investigate the behaviour of the market for corporate
control in the UK. Specifically it was concerned with the testing of three hypotheses.
The first of these was that the level of acquisition activity is random. If this notion is
correct it could explain the absence of a single theory capable of predicting the
number of acquisitions over more than one time period. This supposition was tested
by examining the link between consecutive terms in the series and determining whether
or not any link existed and was more than just coincidental. By examining the number
of acquisitions against a time trend and then subjecting the series to a Box-Jenkins
procedure it became clear that there was a distinct relationship that linked these items
and so the hypothesis of random behaviour could be rejected.
Once the first hypothesis was eliminated, it became necessary to test the second
one. This is the idea that the level of acquisition activity can be predicted by examining
the economic conditions. Several articles exist on this subject and these studies,
together with other papers concerning the behaviour of the economy, suggest a set of
variables that are capable of representing many of the important aspects of the UK
economic system. By applying the general to specific methodology to this data it was
possible to devise an OLS model representing the level of acquisition activity in terms
of some of these macro-economic factors. The most important ones are the previous
number of acquisitions, exchange rates, industrial production, interest rates, oil prices
and the stock market indices. These terms are all significantly related to the number of
acquisitions that occur within the next quarter and, on the whole, these findings
correspond to the results in the articles that already exist on this topic.
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There is, however, the issue of the low R 2 value associated with this result.
This problem seems to be caused by the excessive acquisition activity of the period
1986 to 1990, the last UK merger wave. Here the OLS model cannot predict the
extreme levels of activity that take place in the corporate control market. Instead there
is some suggestion that this phenomena may be a speculative bubble that diverges from
the usual acquisition activity at this time. Although it is not possible to definitely
accept this hypothesis on the strength of the tests given here it does imply that such a
result is possible for the number of acquisitions in the UK. This is a possible area for
further research if more data could be found concerning the level of acquisition activity
in the UK.
The implications of this study are clear. The level of acquisition activity can be
linked to the economic situation in the months preceding it and this result lends weight
to the idea that economic variables may prove to be important in the identification of
companies that are likely to become involved in the takeover process. In the other
empirical chapters that follow this one the emphasis will be upon the identification of
firms that have a high probability of being involved in the takeover process in the near
future and in one of those chapters macro-economic terms will be included since it
seems to be clear that there is a relationship between the number of acquisitions and
the condition of the economy.
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Chapter 3. Sampling Theory and Data Collection
Introduction
This chapter has two purposes both connected with the data sets used in
Chapters 4 and 5. The first of these is to analyse the various approaches to sample
construction whilst the second intention is to introduce the data. In particular, the
second section of the chapter will explain the links between the theories for acquisition
activity and the variables that are chosen for inclusion in the data sets and provide a
simple preliminary analysis of the information that is contained in the data sets.
Previous research in this area can be split into two categories. There are the
papers that have attempted to explain the motives that generate acquisition activity and
the articles that have investigated the characteristics of the firms that become involved
in these takeovers. In many cases the articles concerning the motives for acquisition
activity did not attempt to relate these ideas to specific variables whilst the second area
of previous research tends to relate the characteristics to a very limited number of
motives. This means that there are a limited number of precedents in this area and
some of the theories that will be examined here have not been previously incorporated
in an empirical investigation of the characteristics of companies that take part in
acquisitions.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 is divided into two
sections. Section 3.1.1 is concerned with sampling theory as it relates to the analysis
of acquisitions and the types of empirical models that will be used in the later chapters.
Section 3.2 goes on to consider the selection of the variables and their links to both
previous empirical work and the motives for acquisition activity before examining the
data used and, employing some simple statistical tests, to demonstrate that there are
some significant differences between both the acquired and acquiring firms and the two
sets of companies that are not involved in acquisition activity. This section also
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includes correlation matrices for the data sets that will be used in the following two
chapters and, finally, there is the conclusion.
3.1 Theories and Evidence
3.1.1. Sampling Theory
The construction of the data sets is of considerable importance as the factor of
interest in this thesis, acquisitions activity, does not apply to all of the individual firms
in the population. If every firm in the UK was involved in acquisition activity the
design of the sample would be far simpler than it is here. Furthermore, the number of
companies that become involved in the acquisition process is relatively low compared
to the total number of firms. Since this small group of firms is of particular interest it
seems logical to construct the data sets in such a manner so that the maximum quantity
of information can be gained about these firms. Consequently, there are certain issues
that arise concerning the construction of the sample that need to be dealt with. To
tackle these issues requires some consideration of the fundamentals of sampling theory.
In particular there are some methods of selecting a sample that will deal appropriately
with this situation whilst other approaches are less effective.
The central concept in sampling theory is the construction of a data set that
enables the examination of some characteristic of the population from which the
sample is drawn. The analysis of this characteristic should be, preferably, unbiased,
efficient and encompass an acceptable degree of accuracy. The only way to guarantee
that there is absolutely no bias in the sample selection would be to use the entire
population of interest as the sample. Since this is almost certainly impossible due to
the excessive size of most populations and the difficulty in finding complete
information about all of the individuals, the only practical response is to gather the
most representative and accurate sample possible accounting for the costs of gathering
this data. This is done, fundamentally, by carefully defining the population of interest
and drawing the data in a manner appropriate to the analysis that will follow. The cost
of gathering a sample is almost irrelevant here as the only cost is in time. Instead, this
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section will concentrate in the advantages and disadvantages in each of the sampling
methods.
Simple Random Sampling
The most frequently used method of constructing a sample is the technique
known as simple random sampling. This technique also forms the basis of several of
the more complicated sampling methodologies that can be used. As the name suggests
it is the idea of drawing the sample elements from the population without any
endogenous selection process. It is usual to undertake the selection process without
replacement and the individual elements are assumed to have the same probability of
being chosen. Furthermore, each of the possible combinations of elements has the
same probability of being selected as any other combination. This means there are a
total number of combinations of NC in which a sample of n can be selected from
population of N.
A sample created in this way would be representative of a population in which
all the individuals have the same fundamental characteristics and there are no divisions
that split the sample into distinct sub-populations. In the event, however, that some
partition does exist that can be applied to the entire population then this type of sample
may prove to be inappropriate. If the distinctions between these sub-populations are
important in the analysis then there is a very serious potential problem, as it would be
possible to select a sample randomly that did not include any individuals from one of
the sub-populations. This is particularly likely if one of the sub-populations is small
compared to the rest of the population or other sub-populations. This would make any
ensuing analysis difficult or, at the very least, dubious. Such a situation is likely to
arise when examining company acquisitions. The number of acquired and acquiring
companies is much smaller than the number of firms that do not enter the acquisition
process yet these are the firms that are of most interest and so they must be included in
the sample. Under these circumstances, the use of a randomly selected sample is
clearly inappropriate and another approach must be used.
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,Y tratified Random Sampling
In the situation where the population is divided and the nature of the partition
is important, it is often sensible to use a stratified random sampling approach. This
technique is based on several assumptions. Firstly, that it is possible to split the entire
population into several groups without any exceptions. Secondly, that these
sub-populations, or strata, are completely distinct meaning that it is not possible for
any individual to be placed in more than one of these groups at any one time. Lastly, it
is assumed that the individuals within each of these strata are homogeneous and
heterogeneous with the elements in the other strata with respect to the dividing
variable. According to Barnett (1991), if the sample is stratified to enable a certain
population characteristic to be modelled more accurately, the necessary homogeneity
should follow naturally from the selection of a sensible set of strata.
Once the strata have been defined it should be possible to select a sample that
involves elements from each of these strata. The process of stratified simple random
sampling works by selecting a given number of observations from each of the
individual strata and then pooling these terms to create the total sample for use in the
estimations. This approach has the advantage that it facilitates_ the modelling of
subdivisions within the data which may be analytically important and this added detail
can often result in an overall increase in the precision of the resulting estimations. It is
often the case that there is far less variation within the strata than across the population
as a whole, which also increases the accuracy of any estimations.
These arguments seem to lead to the conclusion that a sample collected using
the stratified random sampling technique will be more appropriate for the data on
companies involved in acquisitions than will the simple random sampling methodology.
In order to successfully model acquisition activity, it will be necessary to acknowledge
the fact that the population of companies is split into sub-populations based on
whether or not a company is involved in the acquisition process. When examining
company takeovers it is important to distinguish between those firms that have been
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acquired and those that have not and so it seems sensible to partition the population in
this way.
The next step in the stratified random sampling technique involves deciding
how much of the sample is to be drawn from each of the sub-populations. There are
two popular approaches to this issue based on the concepts of proportional and
optimum sampling. Proportional sampling is the simpler of these two concepts and
requires little information about the individual strata. Weights are assigned to each of
the strata depending on the percentage of the total population that each one represents.
The weights are calculated by dividing the size of the relevant stratum by the size of
the population as a whole. This relationship, that the sample sizes are directly related
to the stratum sizes across the entire population, leads to the proportional name given
to this method of selection. The technique is very simple provided that the weights can
be calculated and that there are no other hindrances to the collection of data. In the
event that there are practical problems in collecting the data, then the technique of
optimum allocation should be used. This methodology calculates the best way in
which the sample should be allocated across the strata, taking into consideration any
costs inherent in the data gathering and any differences in the variances between the
strata. The basic approach in the optimum sampling technique is to minimise the
variance for a given cost or, conversely, to minimise the cost of the collection process
whilst gathering a sample that remains within a pre-determined range of variances. In
this study, the costs of collecting the data are not important and so this technique has
little importance in this context.
In seems, then, that proportional stratified sampling is a better approach to take
when examining corporate control, than is the approach based on the concept of
simple random sampling. It ensures that the sample will involve terms from all of the
strata which cannot be guaranteed with completely random sampling. However, the
impact of a stratified sample on the efficiency of the following estimations needs to be
addressed. This potential problem is examined in some detail by Barnett (1991) who
compared the efficiency of the estimators for the mean value of the population as
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computed using both the proportional stratified and simple random methods of data
selection.
The variances of the two estimators indicate the relative efficiency of the
respective approaches. The variances of these two types of sample can be simply
expressed. Equations 3.1 and 3.2 represent the variances of the simple random sample
and the stratified sample respectively.
(1 --j)S2 
	
Varg) =	 n	 (3.1)
	
Varg st) = (1	 L52
	(3.2)n	
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where
N represents the total number of items in the population from which the sample has
been drawn
N, represents the number if items in the i th stratum in the population (i= 1, 2, ..., k),
which is involved in the sampling methodology
S2 represents the variance of the entire population from which the sample has been
drawn
f represents the sampling fraction which can otherwise be expressed in the form nIN
and
n represents the sample size.
To determine which of these estimators is the more efficient Barnett suggests
subtracting one from the other, as in equation 3.3. It is then necessary to examine the
circumstances under which the result is either positive or negative.
_	
—  (,2	 ±N1s2)VarCy) Var(y sr) = n	
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The first step in this process requires the substitution of an alternative way of
expressing the population variance into equation 3.3. This alternative expression is
given as equation 3.4, below.
(3.3)
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where Y1 and Y respectively denote the estimates of the population mean in the i th
stratum and in total.
There are now two cases to consider, depending on the sizes of the
sub-populations. If the following expression, equation 3.5, is true then the stratum
sizes can be called large.
N, —1	 N,
N —1 = N— 1
In this case the variance of the population can be re-expressed in the form of
equation 3.6.
k
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This substitution means that the difference between the variances can be written in the
form of the following equation.
—.I)
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From this result Barnett inferred that the stratified sample mean is more
efficient that the simple random sample mean, as this equation is consistently positive,
unless all the mean values within each of the strata are the same. Furthermore, he
concluded that the difference between these two terms is related to the variation in the
stratum mean values. This result, however, only applies to the case of large sample
sizes.
When the stratum sizes are small the subtraction equation, number 3.3 above,
takes the following form
(3.4)
(3.5)
(3.6)
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which, as Barnett observed, is not necessarily positive. For the stratified estimator to
be more effective that the equivalent simple random term the following inequality must
hold.
)2	 k
N,(Y,—Y >—X(N—Ni)S
i=1
	
N i=i
When equation 3.9 is rearranged to find an expression for the variance Barnett
claimed that it is possible to draw the same conclusion as in the large stratum case; the
stratified estimator will be more efficient if the variance within the stratum is small
compared to the variance between the strata although he does not specify why this
result holds. This result means that the stratified sampling approach is preferable to
the purely random sampling technique provided that the strata are carefiilly and
appropriately selected.
However, there is still a problem with this type of sampling technique when
examining acquisition activity. The number of acquisitions is so small compared to the
total population, in this case the number of companies in the UK, that" any sample
gathered from this section of the population, using the proportional technique
advocated here, could prove to be too small to provide any meaningful information.
Under these circumstances the stratified sampling technique needs to be refined still
further, removing virtually all traces of random selection from the process.
Choice-based Sampling
The last type of sampling approach to be considered is the choice-based
sampling technique. Here the probability of an individual being selected for inclusion
in the sample is subject to which stratum it occupies at that particular point in time.
This allows one or more of the strata to be deliberately over-sampled at the discretion
of the person drawing the sample, to greatly increase the quantity of information that
(3.9)
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can be gathered from the members of that particular section of the population. This is
particularly relevant in the case of acquisitions where the number of acquired
companies is very small compared to the total number of firms. This technique makes
it possible to select terms for inclusion in the data sets that are paired, should this be
desirable. For example, a sample could be selected that included all the companies that
were acquired in a certain period and these could all be paired with the firms that
acquired them which would be ideal for the purposes of the study of takeover activity.
This does, however, result in a sample that is a significantly distorted version of
the population and it is essential to make sure that any methods of estimation applied
are either capable of coping with this feature or that the degree if error is quantifiable
and correctable. In particular many methods of estimation, for example the usual form
of the maximum likelihood estimator, assume that the sample has been gathered
randomly and as such any results will be heavily biased. It would seem most
appropriate, then, to examine the applicability of choice-based samples against the
fundamental types of models that will be used later on, logit models and Cox's
proportional hazard function models.
Palepu (1986) examined this potential problem for logit models. He considered
_
a choice-based sample which is created by pairing together the acquired firms with the
non-involved companies that he was considering. Considering an individual company,
Palepu assigned two probabilities to this firm; firstly the probability that the firm is a
target and secondly the probability that this same individual is selected from the sample
and correctly identified as a target. It is possible to express the second of these
probabilities as a conditional expression, equation 3.10 below.
where
p is the probability that the firm under examination is a target in the population of all
companies
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p' is the probability that the firm under examination is a target in the sample that has
been created using choice-based sampling
n 1 is the total number of targets in the sample of firms that has been created using
choice-based sampling
nz is the total number of non-targets in the sample of firms that has been created using
choice-based sampling
N1 is the total number of target firms in the population of all companies from which
the sample is drawn
N2 is the total number of non-target firms in the population of all companies from
which the sample is drawn
It is clear that p" is clearly not the same as p. The normal version of the
maximum likelihood method implicitly assumes that the sample has been selected
randomly, in other words that these probabilities are the same. This immediately
creates a bias which can be expressed in terms of the difference between these two
probabilities. After a little simplification, this can be written in the form of equation
3.11, below.
Pi —12=
P(1-4( 11L) — ( 121- )1Ni	 N2
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When considering acquisition activity it is normal to select a sample in which
the strata are of very similar, if not identical, sizes as this enables acquired and
acquiring companies to be examined together. In the population of all companies the
strata containing both the acquired and acquiring firms are both considerably smaller
than the stratum containing the firms that are not involved in acquisition activity.
Applying these factors to the expression above it soon becomes apparent that it will
always be positive. In other words, a logit model calculated using the usual maximum
likelihood methodology over a choice-based sample will significantly overestimate the
probability of firm being acquired, for example. This bias has a very distinctive effect
on the outcomes produced by this type of estimation, as Palepu explained. Consider a
sample involving acquired firms and companies that were not involved in acquisition
activity. If the sample were created using the random sampling technique and a logit
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model estimated using the usual maximum likelihood estimator the four possible results
would be as follows.
•1 A target firm is correctly classified
.2 A non-target is wrongly classified as a target (A Type II Error)
.3 A non-target firm is correctly classified
4 A target is wrongly classified as a non-target (A Type I Error)
When the sample is choice-based and the same methodology is used to estimate
the models, the bias inherent in this estimation method means that the four outcomes
are now.
•1 As Previously
•2 As Previously
.3 As outcome 2, increasing the number of type II errors
4 As outcome 1, eliminating some of the type I errors
This clearly illustrates the problem that can be created when using a sample and
estimation method that are incompatible. It is clear that this bias cannot be left
uncorrected. There are several ways of dealing with this problem. The simplest
solution is to calculate the size of the bias, using Palepu's formula, and adjust the
predicted values accordingly. This is the manner in which this problem will be dealt
with in the later chapters.
It is now important to find out whether the same problem exists for the hazard
function models that will also be estimated. This question was dealt with by Cosslett
(1993) who concentrated on semi-parametric discrete choice models that have binary
outcomes. Cox's proportional hazard function model is a semi-parametric discrete
choice model and the binary version of this equation will be used in Chapters 4 and 5,
which makes Cosslett's scenario precisely the situation that will arise in the empirical
work that follows. Cosslett examined the relative effectiveness of the maximum
likelihood estimator for a semi-parametric discrete choice model on both a randomly
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selected sample and a choice-based sample. This enabled Cosslett to state that "a
likelihood-based semi-parametric estimator that works for random sampling can be
used without modification when the sample is choice based." (Cosslett, 1993, page 39)
This means that the selection of a choice-based sample, essential to maximise the
information gained from a relatively small section of the population, can be used
without bias in a normally estimated proportional hazard model. It appears, then, that
there is little loss of efficiency or precision in using a choice based sample compared to
a randomly selected one and the facility to deliberately over-sample one small section
of the population will almost certainly improve the results gained in the study of
acquisitions when compared to a random sample.
Finally, all that remains to discuss on the subject of sampling theory are the
types of errors that can arise via poor sampling. Some of these can apply in the
creation of samples that consider acquisition activity and these issues can be
summarised in the following points.
•1 Coverage Errors. It is rarely possible to sample the entire population and so there
may be some features of the population that are not represented in the sample. In
the case of acquisition activity this error may well be present in the sample.
_
However, it is very difficult to detect and so it is equally difficult to determine how
much of a problem this actually is.
•2 Non-response Errors. Some of the individuals in the sample may not reveal all the
required pieces of information about themselves and these gaps reduce the
effectiveness of the sample.
•3 Intrinsic Errors. As in point 1, it is highly unlikely that the sample and the
population will be the same. There may be variations and trends in the population
that the sample fails to replicate because it does not include the relevant
observations. This error is virtually impossible to avoid to some degree although,
as with the coverage error, it is difficult to detect or quantify.
•4 Processing Errors. It is possible that initial manipulation of the data may result in
the creation of minor errors. For example, values might be rounded rather than
used in the original and more accurate form.
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These flaws are present in virtually every sample irrespective of how carefully
the sample is drawn and irrespective of the technique that is used to create the sample.
Careful selection and manipulation can minimise them to a considerable extent but it is
virtually impossible to remove them entirely.
This concludes this discussion of the basics of sampling theory. It is quite
acceptable to use a choice-based sample for the analysis of takeovers. Using this
sampling technique it is possible to create a data set that maximises the quantity of
information that can be gathered on a relatively small section of the population of
companies, namely the firms that become involved in acquisition activity. Whilst there
is a potential problem if this type of sample is used for the estimation of the logit
models, the resulting bias is quantifiable and the predicted values can be adjusted to
rectify this flaw. In the case of the hazard function models no such problem arises.
3.2 Methodology and Summary Statistics
3.2.1 Methodology
The sampling methodology that will be used in the creation of these data sets is
the choice-based approach that was explained in the previous section. This technique
enables the samples to be created using a large number of firms that have been
involved in acquisition activity, despite the fact that these companies make up a small
proportion of the entire population of companies. Any other sampling approach would
result in data sets that contained, at most, just enough of these firms to represent the
proportion of the population that these companies represent. In the UK case that
would be approximately fifteen percent. This low proportion would result in the
creation of uninformative data sets and, accordingly, poor results. To avoid this
outcome the choice-based approach will be used.
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3.2.2 Data
In the Chapter 1, the literature review, it became clear that there are a great
many motives for acquisition activity. Before collecting the data sets it is important to
decide which of the available pieces of information concerning the firms are relevant
and which of the prevailing theories each of these terms represents. It may transpire
that some of the theories for acquisition activity can be reflected by more than one of
the variables or it may not be possible to link all of the theories to the available
information in a convincing and informative manner. This section is designed to
discuss these potential links and decide which variables should be used in the following
chapters. It is also important to ensure that the characteristics of involved firms, as
they appear in some of the recent articles, are also included in these data sets. Table
3.1 lists the variables used in previous papers that have attempted to predict acquisition
activity. This table also references the authors of each paper and gives a brief
explanation of the rational that each author gave for using that variable.
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The first group of variables are the efficiency terms. These have been featured
in previous papers to represent the manner in which the target firms assets are used
and to monitor the performance of the managers of the acquired firms prior to the
takeover. It is expected that the acquired firms will be less efficiently run than other
companies whilst bidding companies are more effectively managed than the average
firm in their industry. The second group of variables are the profitability terms. Once
again it has been observed in previous studies that the target firms are less profitable
than the average firm in their industry, whilst the acquiring companies are thought to
be more profitable. Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) observed that the analysis of a firms
profits to provide some indicators about the future cash flows of that firm, which can
have an impact on the desirability of that company as a target. This can also be linked
to the notion of managerial efficiency as Palepu (1986) observed.
The third group of variables are the investment terms which are used for a
variety of different reasons. Terms such as dividend per share and dividend yield have
been used to indicate the level of investment that the current managers can find for
their firm. If the level of dividends is high, then the shareholders will be content but
the managers may be relatively ineffective as they are failing to utilise the firms
earnings to fund new projects. Variables such as the p/e ratio reflect the value of the
_
firm on the stock market which can have a strong bearing on the probability that the
company will be acquired. Firms that are relative undervalued will be more suitable
acquisition targets that correctly or overvalued companies as authors such as Dietrich
and Sorensen (1984) and Ambrose and Megginson (1992) observed. Conversely, the
bidding firms may be relatively overvalued which would allow them access to a greater
variety of funding opportunities which would also increase the likelihood that they
would become involved in acquisition activity.
Some measure of gearing appears in nearly all of the previous papers that have
attempted to analyse the characteristics of firms that take part in acquisitions. This
term is usually included to denoting the unutilised debt capacity of the firm but it can
also act as a proxy for the level of available financial resources as Palepu (1986)
observed. Liquidity variables are a very widely used group of term in the previous
151
empirical papers on this subject. The reasons given for including some measures of
liquidity in these previous papers are not linked to specific motives for acquisition
activity but instead are used to indicate the financial health of the firms and the
prospects that they have for future investments. Next there are the variables referring
to the size and rate of growth in the companies that take part in takeovers. Target
firms are thought to be smaller than their industry average whilst the bidding firms are
thought to be larger. This difference enables the acquiring firm to minimise the cost of
the acquisition as firm size is often directly related to the value of its shares. Finally,
there are two terms that appear in a great many theoretical papers but rarely feature in
empirical estimations. The first of these is the idea that an acquiring firm may purchase
another company in order to expand and diversify often appears in the previous
literature. Lecraw (1984) wrote a paper concerning the probability that a firm will
diversify and analysed this phenomena empirically. The second of these rarely seen
empirical variables is some measure of the potential tax gains that may be created by an
acquisition. This is a frequently mentioned motives but again it has not been the
subject of empirical analysis in the past. Auerbach and Reishus (1988) estimated the
expected tax gain in an acquisition and, although their variable cannot be duplicated
exactly here owing to differences in the data that is available some measure of tax
should be included in the empirical examination of takeovers.
It is interesting to note the very diverse collection of variables that occur in
these previous papers and the differing definitions that they have. There is no
consensus of opinion about which variables should be used or how many of them are
important instead each paper uses its own mix of terms. By analysing several of these
options, as will be done here, it may be possible to determine which of the various
possibilities is the most effective indicator in each section. The next table, Table 3.2,
draws together all of the motives for acquisition activity that are given on the previous
literature. The motives are grouped together based on the broad subject areas that
they refer to. In each case, the authors name is given and a brief rationale of the
motive is given as presented in each of their papers.
152
=0
•
..
.5
,...o
8
g
a)
=
9
...
to
2
g
0
 cn
-0
g
a)
'Ci
.n15
>•.,
g•
g
.6
E
v)
"Cl
'
,
°
..v.(1)
:5
o
00
...=
08,
CI1
a)
..=
.g
cn
s...0
•/:$0
=
E.'
.
..=
°
..,,Q.13
e
E
s_.
tZ
tx
=
:45
cn
"...754
e
.....
c.)0
-5.
C.
"0
CA
t.
o
 .
.
'Li
-cr
•-•
-0
.,f Z,
g
t
..
..-+
t...
o
,...,
I,-
t
..,
4
„1..,.
1...
a)
.0
"".0
..=CL)I-.
0)
...0
4./.2
›,
CZrz,
L.,0
cn
=
Ft 700.0
L.
0
.4
°1-A
0
=
g
2
. • - '
ocn
. 5
c..
=
CCI
.5
-0
00
cz
0,
e 11 " .EC,tr)
cel
=
__,
. 59
E
c..)
=
ow
r)
..
-4
6-.
320
4
0
-...` ,I: )
-
et
g
CI.°
E0
0
=
h i)
-1-.
.5(1)
z
Gm-
cl)tnLn
tn
oi
op
cn
00
c ‘ 70
E
=
0
•-o
E
En
4)''''
1:4EZ
=
E
.5
_0
0cu..
et1
At4
•
.4
U
En0c1
t.i.-.
0
0
V)
0.)
.5
>8
.g
cn
>.°)
.
>
a)
.1
0.
E
0o
'E
•	 ....
tti'
s....
0
a)
C.)
8.,
•	 :.-.1
.0
o
4-.
0)
.c.,1
=
1-
.4-,
r
as
>.
0
0
to,
0
a.)
a)
75,
4)
()I
0CA
at
2
0
.....
›,C)
o
tg
oi)
4
'45
7'
0
.-
1‘1.)
0
EZ.
s...
ozM
,,°-•0
-18
---.
•-•
•	 ,-'
6"
to0
. E
-
Tn.
•	 ..o
En
--.
"ms
as
.0
M4)
7.5-
0)
;-n
a
F.;
m
1
=
a)
0
.1),
c)
El
ca
a)
b"
0
75-(..
=0
...=
°0
--)
•E
o
tr:2,
4-,
2
S
„
-.2
,..
cn
r.)
=
a.)
CD
Ta
E
"
tg
0
.t
=
"Cl0
cd
4
mP.,
eu
g
0
t
t
't•a,
E
a)
3=•cd
0
".
2
(1)
g
E
En
);
g
2(-)
t
.-
cn
0
Ct
•	
0
a)3
..2
.--.
U
at
0
.0
U
a
IC)
0
g
°
6)CO
o
e,
e
0
.....°
,
_cc
.=
'S
-0
.
0.,
E
.0
o
',5)
0
c,
..=
3
g
E
C))
Et...
tz.,
.
-4or)
cn
.6
"0
-
°
.g
'0
=co
t1.0g
u
4)t
...,
0
.0^
,e,
I-•
vg
-czE
0
.g
-•-•())CO
00
czg
E
>
I..
co^.
et
8
7-'%1
'..=8
...
,.
c0
c.
o1....
-'a.
0
-cc
=c.)
,..
co
.=
mu'
= 0
..o
. oo
e
....-1
8.
E0
c.)
tn
CO
' v3
411
5,
.
=
•	 -.
.''''
. n.
„,
1-.CL)
4:9
i4
•	 •
8
[..1
w-
1.1.
=
CO
=
crl.
E
°
7g
g
--.
....
ca.
U
.9.
0NI
-.%).
1.=
lot
0
,..
0,...,
,.....o
. O
Lo..
=
•	 --
12
f421)
e,
o0
' ""
„
A
cy,
al
/•5
4-1
•
I.0
0)
R
E
6
..g
E
00>
6
"g
t
a
...,
r
0
,2
r4
„,
a.)
..e.,
u)
8
.6it.
.....
,...
=
.;,u,,
CL)
g
.2
rt.
0
.0p..,
.-,
,,„=
-
-0
-s0
..0
-„,
I-,
>
8
P.,'
.
o
L<
=
a
0 I )
...,
G.)>
I
......
0
(1)
,t0
.-
..
'CS
•	 -
>,
az
"CSL.,
cz.
E
I-
"0
ca
r/3
c4.)CO
=
ul2
.0
=
. V
cd
E
0
to
=;--.
.C4-4
0
0
c....
05
co
*E
03
.=
8
E.'.crj
cnI-.
E°>'Rig
=
E
,
>o
E
a.)1-.
I.
o
a)
.•g
'-'e3
-
13
..=
• E
0Q,
a,
.0
•
g3...
bA
cd
=
0.
E
.--.
›-ct
E
1.5
>
o
°
4...1
tO
=-
-=
44
°
2
E
0
"
6,
CO
V)
'.=
•-n
. u),-.
=
0
''''
us
2
(1)
a)
cn
m1-.4.)
0
CO
;...
8
o0
08
.1.,
,5
t,
cd
=
..-.
.--o
0 et ••n• .3
g
... 1... 1•-• cn;-. (1 ,) '..= CO •174 g ..w° •
.0
E
E--•
et
'
±c3
co
U
.
0
el° g0: CI)to
0E-•
C4-I
o
.-•
C.L.
-W8
cu
E-'
c0
o
',,-..)
..0
E-•
0)
>0
-4
E_,
a
cz
=tt
8
1
E-,
cn
°
z
.°
cam
1"
E_,
Ec..,t •A
*C
,-...
..-- .
en '67) ooo
''" ••••••. CIF;
A'F
omCO
=
...
rnoo
cr.
oo
OCc7"
-. •-•
en
CA
..
.......
ON
'"
....,,,.
g ...•-n
00
.--in-•
1--
......
 ..o-
co
"
g2
,.• ,CT
.
\""'
cn
cr.
cr.
1n1
`......0
00
cr.
,-,N.....,
..-,
0000CT ,....,
0\
.
,
•-•,..., CA ,-,, et
CD)g.
ea
4....
o
c...
.=
15
vnI
....,
„,
eci
.0
=
-00
cts
0
U
g
......,
o..b
En
' '-'
>
g
1...
,-
.9.
Ci")
rsiONCT
00^000,
'-'
=
g
/1CNI
cr%
,...
.....,
,_,
751_,
at
..-
(NIONCT
-,
,.
Cn
.5
4
al
=g
00m0
"5..4
cz
fa.
ea.
-
g
2
-
o
..h4
....0
fil
C41c"
CT
g‘:)
-
-0
M0
g
CU
=
0)
Z
7)
%
›,0
.r
C a
-
...--,
=
tn
g0
o
VD
..sz0
.=
. (E)
f)
a
e,
10
.00
A
-00
at
=02
,....1
CO
n.0000,
-,
-
-E
,,
".'
CO
0C0
rg
X
"c3g
..=
.2.
o
..).
.
rq
.000
cp..,
....,
z
ra.4-)
et
0-.
0
g
•
"el
=0
g
.c
0
E
E
0a
,...1
,....,
g4
.4
'›
'"-
.0
g
at1_,
a?
ti.)
•^'
())
,..j
. .CfN
"'"00
0;CA
-
•---
g(1)(I)
0)
1-,
v.,
=
. ,..,cn
-cc
q
CZI
el00-4
-
..=
0.0
=
-F„
o
0,
• E
co
Z
2
,,
4
=
cz
rt,
.-I%.....•
1....;
q,
. 
.0
,,,g
g
u)
-a
a)
....,
0,
ON
s...,
oz,
..-
CAr.4
"0
g
al
•	 Zi;
(XI
U
c.)
.01 -
.
.0
I=
a)
....
C.)
0
L.
Ill
>.UCO
sus
00
0.0
..w
.....
c.)
a)
--..,0
s.
Ai
0
1...
s...
s.
;r4
1.7..
c...
a)
01-0
CO
---I.
w
to
0
a.)
.=
0
•
*C
o
o.o0
'0
=
©.0to
COCO
>
t
>
-
'C
a)
to
CO
=
to
CO
T
CCE'
CO
CO
CO
X
-0
to
CO
E-4
om0
T.:4)0 u s..1..
o
153
0
.c
0
cd
.c
E-1
03
.S.
'.....
C
-
cz1
0
-
0
•
•
=0
0
..0
. E7
a
•	
0
al
2
OA
•
5
=
'P
criE
=
Iii>
1...
00
'4.".7,1
-
0
t
c4.,
o
••-•
(131)
5c
cc
2
-
•
ti.)
E
2
-c
0
••=
v
c
E
,
.,,A
--
 is0
=
E--.
cu
ct
--.
-Ca
>
'''
•
1
0
=
•	
En
....,
4
••,,,OL)
tO1-.
•S
CU
.6
...,
E
.0
c
o
.0
ea
,...,
c
•G
, 
ri-
,,,
.5
1..•
•
=
E-.
a>bA5
g>
1:3
''''
• pw
=
0,_
5
Ill
u.
=
5
,„
ct'
71")
'CII
=
40
._
...
E
.0
-5
ct
,...0
E
w
o
...5
r)73
'0
.0
a)
..=
E--.
E4-40
0(0)
U
.0	 0..)
(.3	 ek0
0.)	ct
.5 g
= E0
.6	 ..,'
.1..)	 80
=Er:1
•	 ..z.	 (I)
..g .E
4.)	 CL)
:••2 g
-5 5
.--.	 ••••5	 I-.
o o
"0
i..	 °C.) MIto 8
2CCI	 d.)
E	 Icr3
1".E 0>
....r	 80 .4
.e. 5
co	 ..5 b.,
...,
a-.-
.0 ' c,
ri E
a a )0 -
>, '.0
.--•,_,
(5
.
s.0
-crs
'2
aa
P.
.-
4
8
0
m
=
,0
•	
=
R.
"n
ct
>,
.0
I..0
c,.4._.
0
•a
''
=
"c-t;
--
,-.u
0
'''''
4')>
8
1
E-1
..,
u
6.,
g
a)
76
a
a)
5
'0
g
E
,..4
0
ct)
›.
I-••
1:1'E
•••••c
05
tO
,,,
°
=
,-,
>
••••-•""8
- 
5
,
-
o o5
•.0
c
.g
-17.1
y.,g t
cz 3E
CA
•
D.
e
8
,
. 
>
R
"0
0
ct
.5
cn
-*
111:1
3
0
u
g
-
2
E
as
tg
0c
"
>
1-.
.
=
.5
01)
g
tr.
ob
=
_,'-'
.,-.), .
-°4,
.5
••-•r
t•••
S
.
r)5
'5
,
a
8
=
--
0
-v
0
0
e
CI)
...
1...
Cri
E
„,-
5
,,t.
.0
C.)6,
(03
=
al
0
-0
S
'0
c
as
00
..g
0
,...t-
.r.
!0
g)
,o,
0
,
to
..."
CU
•.e.
c,
Cl)
ocn
on
ea
'C
0
•
=
o
a5
a
1.1
W
.0
=
es
c
.471
tr.
...)Imi
h
..E.
Z.:CI)
kt ,
0
4
a)
15
..)
5
EL.,
•t,g
czto
=
•	 •-n
CA
CCS
.0
0
,
>,
-°
cn
-•-•
°
"',..,d
E
m
c...
cu000
••-•0
:c-i
•	 -
u)8
cs.
>,
=0
<A
.....
-",,,
a)
'f)
5
o
C/I
15...
EA
En
81..
c
,....U5
°w
,,,
CU()00
,.
>
...0
,-,
76
-0
0CZ
tg
m
°
.:.i.,
:7-..:
.0
cz
En
g0
=
.0
1740
54-
...
'''
r)
.,.?;
0
•	
o
••5
•-•CI)
...0
c)it
c4 .
.r.0p,
L0[.../
_.
L)
..S..)0
°
'''..4,
cn
:;•••-
--.
a
cu
5
0
co
0
'-'475:
-•
>b
,0
°
• 0
..c0ii
0
..
„V
ai
'V,
....
0
8t=
E
w
,..
(A
..,_,
-..,00
=
0
1-•
•'-'
-0
ccl
-
5
C.)
=
...'n
•-•
a)
r<CU
a)
..i..
5
I-,0
-S'
2
...(2a
0 .7,.,C).
a.0
Ti
''..
-0
•00
CZ
,....,-:
....I.
00
tt"
1..
a)
>
;0
o
Cn
I.=
tft
a)
V.,
0
0
CSI.
4,u
g
,,,
x
‘.te,
E
.5
tA
=
0
.0CC7C..)
tr.,7,
tri>
..
"0
I.
0
=
In0
c7
5-
a)
,.=
iza
=2
..=
.1-o
le)
0
,,,to
2
0
at0
I-
05.
4-•1.1
a,
15
0
•.=
•	n
'50.
el)
00
41713
00
=
.1;
5
' c-iito
0
..0
=
cp
0C)
tp-
.....
=
V
1:3at
-.=
..=
a
z
n-•0
c)
.ci
0)
1.4
.....
0
cr
U00
.I:)
.9
>,
73
,..
-
•--,
En
...
(1)
w
t.=
I.
a.)
OD
5
.4
cA
CU
.r
8
4:1F
,..'*.,...
16
a)
=
En
151
0
4-4
o
00
*0
ct:
c
.0-
5
0
"IS
>-n
..c
cll
...•
8
5.F.'
•a
•E
84CZ.
o
cCS
•,...0
P''0
2
';,"
••0
to)1-•
C1)
›•8
1
00
›,
74
2
.....
U]
-a$_.
05
a'
1E1
c
2
.0
=
cci
E
‘•••
00
•	 -
-c)E
C.)
2
2
17;
,,,
a)
5
u)
...
.
>
g
j
,_,
c:-.,4-1
CU
..,...cz
>
•,z
0
E
.c
"
==
a7)
.,-,0
a.
...
01-
=
et0
0
cz2
0
0
•	 •-•1.0
0>
o
zz
...
--
P
C4-I
...
'5
c ii
'-'
u)
.
=
to
.5
m1-.
,,,,
5.
r>
-t.
=
0
--•
.CCS
o
c
2
i.7."
N0,
•;..",'
V ases
.....
•-n-•
,s
00
ON
.-..,
N./
(1)1
=
-0
05
.cct
CiS
•
,
en
ON
co.
..
CA
=
az
2
I-1
=
_
cz
=
oci,c
...t.
CSA.
.--../...-,
0
.1
....,
p
X
"cl0
,
1
'''40
c 0
ce
0,
-.
‘.-.•
1...
1-.,I,
..=
0
En
c......4
ON0,
••nn
06
co
-.
......
=0
cn
c
RI.
C:h,..
`-''
?_.
....i
(2,`
00
C\
lc
,1.)
fa.
00
00(7,
,_,
,
,...
U
0
Z
-0
t,
.Td
-ccc,
^
.-.
CICNONi.-n
`sr'
00
0
=
1:3
,.,bi)
5
.5
u
.
o=
6
•et
01
c:A
1.1n-••
.2
-.
ZC1
al
.V.
>
-0
A
0
''c
c.)
0.-n0
t.--.c,
-
E
ct
w
1
01
,4
•••-•
...00c,
-
>0
,-.1
"0
g
.ts
=
1
rqc.,
c,
-4,-...
>
.4
-
,..,
CACN
72,
:n
to5
x
a
cr%0,
•-n
••n.,
b•O
c. 0
=
.0
c
c'l
=
,g
0
e
2
CA
d)
e....
'tON
a,
 ,.
el)CO
:2.1
5
a
.0
8
.-
U
°°CT
.-.
'.1-.)
as
a-.
E70'
00
0\
vl
"0
g
-.•.,
a)
cz
.'",
cU
al
...
,-...goo
,.
`•-•.'
,„
5....
mI
g
,2
- 
074,
0CID
•••0
e-,
 ,F0
,--n
et()
g
'0
g
5
-=c..)
e
,0ci.)
0
tr,
0ON
ai
-4.1
a
>1CJ
=
gal
CL)
..%
,..
..
6
cc
't)
a)0
.
"0
c
co5
-...
a)
la
6
c
....4
40
4
o4.
t.4.
c
o
--
....
u
=
.0cu
a
a
"0c
at
=0
''e-iic.,
I.:
'721..
to
4
c0
•..7,
FA0fli
cIS
t
...
.i.e)
c
E
0
C.)
"0
=
CO
a)S.
=I
.0Cl)
....
cl.)
,...
m
eu
u0CL)
ad
I=L.0,
....
.Cl)n
01)
=I
.-
rnCC
cUL.
a)
S
•••••n
a)
oC.)
CII	 a)
4-	 CIO
0	 CO
wl	 ra.
a),..
0	 >0	 o
0	 -00	 0C..)	 0
.,g
t2	 81.	 0
ao	 ......
=
Cl)
154
0cc
ttl)
0
CA
>0
C)
1:1
C) cc
0
8 • —
8.
gr
cc cc
6
.e
a)
0
cc
8
CZ
CA
a)
cc
8
0.
a)
CZ
cc
•a
cis
0
to
•c
1..
cc
0
CA
>
8
0
cc
r.
©
.••••n
CON
ON
CO
r")
ON
ON
C0
cc "tt
ON
ON
•nn
es1
ON
ON
•••n,
cc
C0
8
cc
azt
cc
cc
cc
cn
cn
a)
L.1.4
155
1.4
a.)
c00
-o
cc
cc
ct)
3
0.
The managerial motives cover a diverse set of theories. The managerial
ambition motive is very popular in previous literature and is concerned with the notion
that in most firms the shareholders cannot control the managers who attempt
acquisitions to increase their own prestige and their financial remuneration irrespective
of the best interests of the company's owners. The majority of theories state that the
shareholders are powerless to prevent the managers from doing whatever they want.
A slight variation on this theme is provided by Jensen (1988, 1992) in his "Free Cash
Flow" theory. Here he suggested that companies could pay debt to the shareholders in
place of dividends and use the retained funds for a takeover. The issuing of debt
would pacify the shareholders as they would know that the firm would ultimately have
to pay them. A second very popular theory concerning the managers is the theory that
acquisitions correct for managerial inefficiency by eliminating poor managers. A badly
managed company will have a low share price and the firm then becomes a takeover
target. If this attempt is successful, then the managers of the acquired company will
probably be fired thus removing them from the market. This is very similar to one of
the informational motives. This group of theories are al concerned with the idea that
the are informational disparities between firms and the market. This can lead to
inaccurate pricing which can make some firms likely targets. For example, if the
bidding company believe that they know something about the target firm that the
market does not know then they may consider the target to be undervalued and launch
a takeover attempt. All of the theories in this section assume that the Efficient
Markets Hypothesis does not hold and that share prices are based on incomplete
information. This failure makes the acquisitions market essential as a mechanism is
needed to allow firms to increase efficiency and to grow and develop, as both Scherer
(1988) and Jensen (1988, 1992) claimed. Companies can also use acquisitions are a
method of entering a new market or diversifying as in the next group of theories.
McCardle and Viswanathan (1994) observed that it is sometimes not possible to enter
certain markets because of the barriers that exist around it. These barriers can be legal,
as is often the case with industries that are important for national security, or practical,
as in cases where research and development is highly expensive or the market is close
to saturation point. Under these circumstances the barriers to market entry can
sometimes be circumvented by purchasing a firm within that field. Similarly, an
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acquisition can allow the bidding firm to diversify or expand in order to reduce risk and
its exposure to one market area or country. A takeover is an expensive way of
attaining these goals but it is much faster than internal development which explains the
continuing popularity of such motives.
One of the most popular motives of all is the synergy theory. Here it is
suggested that there can be benefit resulting from the combination of two or more
firms. Economies of scale can increase profits and efficiency on many different areas
of the firm such as production, marketing and research and development and,
according to Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), synergy is responsible for almost
seventy-five percent of all acquisitions. Another way in which a firm can improve
profits and efficiency is through restructuring and the motives dealing with this issue
are the penultimate group in Table 3.2. Restructuring can take many different forms
and occur in many different parts of a firm and is often in the best interests of the
target firm as Holdemess and Sheehan (1992) observed. If these firms are performing
poorly it may be due to some inefficiency in their structure and altering the
composition of that firm could eliminate the problem and create significant benefits.
Finally, there are the tax motives. It is often mentioned that there may be tax gains in
an acquisition but papers rarely specify exactly how these benefits will manifest
themselves. This is almost certainly due to the different tax laws that exist in each
country. In the UK it is possible to make gains in Corporation Tax, as Jarrell, Brickley
and Netter observed, and in Capital Gains Tax after selling shares, as Higson (1991)
noted. These gains are rarely very large, as Auerbach and Reishus (1988) commented,
and so they may be a secondary motive for acquisition activity rather than the primary
cause for a bid. Table 3.3, below, listed the variables that will be used in Chapters 4
and 5 and links them to the contents of the previous two tables to demonstrate that all
of the terms have a clear link to the previous empirical work and the theories
concerning the motives for acquisition activity. As in the previous empirical papers
there is often more than one term in a given section and, by analysing several terms, it
is possible that the empirical work in the following chapters will provide a clearer
definition of which of the variables in each of these sections are the most informative
ones to use in this context.
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The first four variables in the data sets refer to firm efficiency. The ratio of
turnover to assets employed was used by Spindt, Tarhan and Sung (1996) to measure
changes in firm performance whilst Altman (1984) used the same term to indicate
financial distress, which may sometimes be the condition of an acquired firm. This
term represents the effectiveness with which the firm is handling it business and the
link between performance in the market place and efficiency. The second variable is
the ratio of turnover to fixed assets which Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) used to
measure the efficiency with which the firms assets are being used and to represent the
potential cash flows of the firm. The efficient use of fixed assets are very important in
the analysis of acquisitions as they are a constant source of funds for the bidding firm
who can always sell off any unutilised factory space or other buildings after the
takeover. The remaining two variables in this section both represent the operational
efficiency of the firm. Kim (1994) declared that poor operating efficiency leads to
financial slack which can ultimately alter the financing of a takeover bid. The ratio of
sales per employee measures the effectiveness of the firms manufacturing processes
whilst the stock ratio measures the companies ability to balance supply and demand for
its product. These terms can be linked to five aspects of the theory concerning the
motives for acquisition activity. These motives deal with the ambitions of the bidding
firms managers, the influence that takeovers can have on total market efficiency, the
correction of poor managerial performance, the expected synergy gains resulting form
a takeover and the impact that takeover bids can have on the performance of a firm
irrespective of the outcome of the acquisition attempt. These four terms each
represent efficiency in slightly different ways and analysing all of these terms will,
hopefully, determine which aspect of efficiency is the most informative.
The second group of terms are the profitability terms. The first term is the
return on capital employed which was used previously by Cosh and Hughes (1995) and
referred to, although undefined, by Cosh, Hughes, Lee and Singh (1989). In these
papers this variable was used to investigate the supposition that acquired firms are less
profitable than average whilst bidding companies are more profitable than average.
This term also represents the efficiency with which the firms managers are using its
assets to produce profits and this measure of operating efficiency can be directly linked
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to the inefficient managers theory for acquisition activity. The second term in this set
is the return on shareholders equity which appeared in papers by Palepu (1986),
Agrawal and Walkling (1994), Sawyer and Shrieves (1994) and Spindt, Tarhan and
Sung (1996). This term measures the different profitability levels that the acquired and
acquiring firms display but can also be an indicator of the ability with which the target
company's managers are investing the funds at their disposal. In papers concerning the
motives for takeovers it is often noted that the target firms may have available funds
but the managers cannot find appropriate projects for the company to invest in. This
variable should reveal information about this particular aspect of the theory. The
remaining two terms are both profit margins. The pre-tax profit margin was used
previously by Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) as an indictor of future cash flows and by
Cosh, Hughes, Lee and Singh (1989) as a measure of profitability. The net profit
margin was used by Cosh and Hughes (1995) to represent firm profitability. These
two terms are very similar but they should both be examined to help investigate the
importance of tax in the decision making processes used by the bidding firms in the
selection of an acquisition target. The creation of tax benefits is a popular motive in
recent literature but has not been subjected to a great deal of empirical analysis. The
creation of any such gains will rely on the target and bidding firms having tax positions
that complement each other. If the bidding firm is interested in this issue then the
pre-tax profit margin should be more informative than the net profit margin and vice
versa. These terms can be linked to a large number of the motives for acquisition
activity as Table 3.3 demonstrates. These motives range from the ambition of the
acquiring firms managers and the removal of the ineffective target company managers
to the issue of market myopia and the potential synergy gains that could be created in a
takeover. These profitability terms, although superficially quite similar in definition, all
reveal slightly different aspects of the firms profits and, as with the efficiency terms,
examining several of them should clarify which of these terms are the most informative
as there is not clear precedent for their selection in the previous empirical work on this
subject.
The investment ratios represent two different aspects of the firms composition.
Firstly, these terms can reveal information about the potential that a company has for
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investment in the future and secondly they can represent the value of the firm on the
stock market. The first term to do this is the dividends per share which was used by
Bagwall and Shoven (1988) to indicate shareholders contentment with the policies
adopted by the firms managers. These authors argued that as long as dividends appear
to be reasonable generous the shareholders would not concern themselves with trying
to control the managers of their firm. This can be directly related to the agency
problem and the idea that managers would prefer to increase their remuneration and
bonuses via an acquisition than increase the dividends. This can also be linked to
Jensen's (1988, 1992) "free cash flow" theory for takeovers as well as the disciplinary
motive for acquisition activity. The second term in this group is the value of earnings
per share. This term was used by Levine and Aaronovitch (1981) to distinguish
between bidders and targets in one of the first papers to attempt this sort of analysis.
The remaining two variables in this section can be used to represent the value of the
firm on the stock market which can be an important influence on acquisition activity as
it dictates the cost of the takeover. The dividend yield term was used by Sawyer and
Shrieves (1994) as an indicator of the types of financing options that are available to
the bidding firm in a takeover. They observed that larger firm dividends make it harder
for a company to afford a takeover as this can limit the financing options that are
available. The final variable in this set is the p/e ratio. This appears in several previous
_
papers by such authors as Levine and Aaronovitch (1981), Dietrich and Sorensen
(1984), Palepu (1986) and Ambrose and Megginson (1992). In these papers this term
is used to represent the value of the target firm which is important in the takeover
decision as no company will attempt to purchase a firm that it cannot afford. Equally,
high value bidders may be able to take advantage of financing that is not available to
lower value companies. These terms can be associated with a wide group of theories
of acquisition activity. Ambitious managers will select a target firm with the potential
to perform well in the future if they can find such a target, as Jensen (1988, 1992) and
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) pointed out. Gianunarino and Heinkel (1986) and
Cosh, Hughes, Lee and Singh (1989) claimed that low market value would identify
firms with ineffective managers whilst Palepu (1986), Jarrell, Brickley and Netter
(1988) and Weston, Chung and Hoag (1990) all noted that cheaper firm are more
likely to be purchased than the more expensive alternatives. Finally Berkovitch and
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Narayanan (1993) and Jenkinson and Mayer (1994) suggested that the synergistic
gains created by a takeover could lead to the more effective allocation of funds and
assets in the future. The number of theories connected with these terms males it clear
that such variables must be include but ,a gain, there is no precedent to indicate which
of these terms will be the most important and so analysing several within the general to
specific framework should identify the most important one.
The gearing ratio appears in a great many of the previous empirical studies on
this subject and for a great many different reasons. Levine and Aaronovitch (1981),
Sawyer and Shrieves (1994) and Cosh and Hughes (1995) all simply stated that the
level of gearing could distinguish bidding and target firms, whilst Dietrich and
Sorensen (1984) viewed this item as a proxy for unused debt capacity in an acquired
firm. Palepu (1986) and Ambrose and Megginson (1992) viewed gearing as a measure
of the available funds in the firms under examination. This is very clearly linked to the
financial restructuring motive for acquisition activity which Franks and Mayer (1993)
claimed was an acquisition motive in its own right and Thompson, Wright and Robbie
(1992) said could be used to correct other problems within the firm. It is also possible
to connect gearing with the idea of managerial efficiency and managerial ambition. If
the firm has unused debt capacity then this may be an indicator that the managers are
not using the firms assets in the best possible manner and deserve to be replaced in a
takeover. Alternatively, the managers of the bidding firm may look for a target with
unused debt capacity as this suggests that the acquired firm could invest more actively
in the future which would enhance their standing. Next there are the liquidity terms.
These variables also appear in a great many previous papers concerning the
characteristics of firms that take part in acquisitions. The first term is the current ratio
which was used by Levine and Aaronovitch (1981) who said that this term could be
used to distinguish target and bidders, Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) who claimed that
excess liquidity indicates potential for future investment, managerial inefficiency and
unused debt capacity. Auerbach and Reishus (1988) used the current ratio to indicate
a firm potential for the future whilst Cosh and Hughes (1995) believed this value
would be distinctly different for acquired and acquiring firms. In addition Sawyer and
Shrieves (1994) referred to the importance of liquidity but did not clarify which
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variable they used in their analysis. A second measure of short term liquidity is the
acid test ratio which also appears in a great many papers. Levine and Aaronovitch
(1981) used this term as an alternative way of separating bidders and targets, Palepu
(1986) and Ambrose and Megginson (1992) claimed it was a proxy for financial
resources whilst Cosh and Hughes (1995) used it as one of several liquidity measures
that they considered. Cosh and Hughes (1995) used more than one liquidity measure
for the same reason that is applied here; since no precedent exists in the previous work
to suggest which term is more informative analysing more than one of these terms may
indicate which is the most useful. There are relatively few measures of long term
liquidity in the previous literature although Higson and Elliot (1994) used measures of
debt and credit to indicate investigate financial restructuring via a takeover.
Furthermore, Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1995) felt that long term debt ratios were
important but failed to indicate exactly which ones they meant. These financial ratios
can be linked to the managerial inefficiency motive for takeovers if it is presumed that
poor liquidity is indicative of ineffective managers as Giammarino and Heinkel (1986),
Jensen (1988, 1992) and Franks and Harris (1993) all thought. Equally, Weston,
Chung and Hoag (1990), Lev (1992) and Linunack (1994) all thought that economies
of scale could improve the financial prospects for a firm which are often represented
empirically by liquidity ratios. Finally, Lev (1992) and Larcker (1992) both observed
that target firms are often thought to have potential to invest more heavily and
effectively in the future and liquidity, as Palepu (1986) noted can be used as a proxy
for financial resources.
The issue of size is used in virtually every paper that attempts some empirical
analysis of the characteristics of firms that take part in takeover activity as Table 3.1
demonstrates. In virtually all of these papers the same rationale is given for including
these terms. Target companies are thought to be smaller than the industry average
whilst acquiring firms are larger which would have a direct impact on the price of the
target and determine whether the bidder could afford to attempt the purchase. There
are three motives for takeover activity that are related to this variable. Firstly,
increasing the size of the bidding firm is likely to have a positive impact on the wages
and bonuses of its managers and a takeover, whilst expensive and risky, is the fastest
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way to achieve this goal as Jensen and Ruback (1985), Larcker (1992), Lev (1992) and
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) all observed. Secondly smaller firms are cheaper to
purchase which echoes the reasons given in the empirical articles and, finally, Palepu
(1986) noted that increasing firm size is also a way of securing a company against
becoming the target of an unwelcome takeover attempt itself All of these reasons
make some measure of size, here the value of total sales, an important variable to
include in the empirical chapters that follow.
The penultimate term in these data sets represent the probability that a firm will
diversify in the near future. Lecraw (1984) stated that firms with a high number of
managers will diversify. Some of the managers will feel that their positions are not
secure if they do not have a great deal to do and so these individuals will elect to
purchase another firm in order to provide themselves with something to do. Lecraw
used the ratio of managers to employees to measure this probability and this is the term
that is used here. Diversification is a frequently mentioned motive in the theoretical
papers where it is used for a variety of reasons. McCardle and Viswanathan (1994)
observed that a takeover is sometimes the only way to gain entry to a certain market if
there are barriers to prevent new firms entering that field for some reason. Lev (1992)
observed that the managers influence is increased if their firm diversifies into different
,
markets or geographical areas which is clearly linked to the managerial ambition
motive. Levy and Sarnat (1970) and Creehan and Leger (1994) claimed that
diversifying via a takeover can increase market power and give a firm a clear
competitive edge of its competitors if the acquisition is appropriately selected. It is
difficult to create a measure of the probability that a firm will diversify via an
acquisition so the variable given by Lecraw (1984) will be used as the only workable
alternative. Lastly, there is the tax term which is also difficult to represent empirically.
There is little doubt that the potential for tax benefits is a popular motive for
acquisition activity as it is discussed by Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) and Higson
(1991) amongst many others. The effective management of tax can also be used as an
indicator of managerial efficiency in the target firms and could be linked to the financial
restructuring motives in addition to its other uses. It is clearly an important factor to
consider and must be included in the data sets. On the basis of these various factors
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that are thought to influence acquisition activity and the manner in which they can be
linked to the accounting data that is discussed above and represented in Table 3.1 to
3.3 it is now possible to create the data sets ensuring that all of these important factors
are reflected in the information that is gathered.
The data used in the following empirical chapters is split into three sets. The
first of these involves firms that were acquired in the period from January 1987 to
December 1994 and the companies that acquired them. It is hoped that the analysis of
these companies will shed some light on the motives that exist in the corporate control
market, by analysing the decisions that are taken in the selection of an acquisition
target. The second combination of firms pairs companies that did not take part in
takeovers with the targets of acquisitions activity. Lastly, the third combination pairs
companies that were not involved in the corporate control market with the acquiring
firms. In both the second and third combinations the companies are paired according
to their market value. The analysis of these three sets of data should reveal whether
the firms that are active in the corporate control market are really substantially
different from the rest of these industries, as popular theory suggests. Each of these
combinations of firms are considered in each of the five years before the date of the
acquisition resulting in a total of fifteen data sets.
The firms that are included in the data sets must all conform to the following
criteria.
•1 The required data for the firm must be available on Datastream for five years
before the acquisition took place.
.2 The equivalent values for the industry average must also be available via
Datastream for the same periods.
•3 The date at which the firm was floated on the Stock Exchange can be found in one
of the Stock Exchange Year books.
In total it was possible to gather data on two hundred and seventy-seven
acquisitions subject to these conditions and form control samples of the same
dimensions. The data in all of these samples is paired, on consecutive rows, so that the
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data on the companies can be compared in the most straightforward manner. It has
been suggested that the manner in which a company behaves in the market for
corporate control is closely related to the industry in which it operates and, more
precisely, the performance of the firm relative to the average for that specific industry
is particularly important. This means that it is necessary to have access to the industry
averages for all of the terms that have been chosen for inclusion in the data set, so that
the terms can be represented as percentage deviations from the industry average as in
Dietrich and Sorensen (1984). A complete list of the companies that are included in
these data sets can be found in Appendix I.
3.2.3 Summary Statistics
Once the data has been gathered and the data sets constructed it is possible to
create some summary statistics for the items that have been gathered. A simple
examination of these terms may reveal some interesting features of the data sets.
The first step in composing descriptive statistics associated with the data sets is
to subdivide them depending on the value of the binary term associated with each one.
This means that the acquiring firms are separated from the acquired companies and
both sets of firms are separated from the control samples where appropriate. These
sub-samples can then be used to provide some summary statistics for each of the
groups of companies that they represent. The examination of these subgroups will
provide some indication of whether or not there are significant differences between the
batches of companies which is an essential pre-requisite if well-specified logit and
hazard function models are to be created for these firms. As there are five data sets for
each of the combinations of firms there are fifteen data sets to consider, each one
corresponding to one of the three combinations of firms in one of the five years before
the acquisition. The following T-statistics are based on the mean values of each of the
variables in the data sets and, at this point, it is sufficient to begin with to demonstrate
that there are significant differences between the data for the various types of firms
that appear in the data sets. In the three tables that follow the null and alternative
hypothesis are always as below :
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H0' : the two groups of firms are drawn from the same population and
there is no difference between the mean values
HA' : the two groups of firms are not drawn from the same population
and the mean values are different
Table 3.4, below, gives the calculated values for the acquired and acquiring
firms and denotes, by means of asterisks when the null hypothesis can be rejected and
an what level for each of the variables. The results confirm that there are significant
differences between the acquired and acquiring firms as the null hypothesis is generally
rejected in favour of the alternative implying that it should be possible to create
well-specified logit and hazard function models for these data sets.
Table 3.4 T-Statistics for the Differences Between Acquired and Acquiring Firms
Variable Number of Years before Acquisition
I ri m iv v
Turnover to assets employed 3.2* 6.48* 2.78* 7.19* 4.84*
Turnover to fixed assets 2.25** 2.02** 2.89* 7.39* 3.19*
Sales per employee 1.68*** 1.62 2.56** 2.95* 2.61*
Stock ratio 2.72* 4.75* 7.76* 7.21* 2.92*
Return on capital employed 3.32* 6.63* 8.38* 5.08* 3.18*
Return on s'holders equity 1.98** 4.26* 3.32* 3.18* 3.16*
Pre-tax profit margin 1.73*** 6.17* 6.86* 4.66* 3•9*
Net profit margin 1.98** 9.28* 9.51* 3.58* 8.34*
Dividends per share 3.17* 5.25* 5.22* 6.87* 3.81*
Earnings per share 1.57 6.74* 8.33* 1.68*** 3.18*
Dividend yield 2.39** 2.53** 1.02 4.79* 1.97**
P/e ratio 3.08* 5.1* 4.56* 2.65* 1.55
Capital gearing 6.39* 3.96* 4.67* 3.41* 3.51*
Current ratio 2.84* 3.59* 4.16* 9.16* 6.5*
Acid test ratio 2.64* 2.52** 2.89* 7.46* 2.2**
Debtor days 4.24* 3.62* 3.25* 4.24* 4.29*
Creditor days 8.32* 5•37* 6.26* 5.11* 3.84*
Total sales 1.41 1.65*** 1.86*** 1.88*** 1.99**
Manager/employee ratio 1.88*** 3* 2.36** 1.49 2.14**
Total tax charge 3.03* 1.25 1.44 1.68*** 1.22
Reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is equal to zero at 1% *,
5% **, 10% ***
169
The second table, Table 3.5, represents the same statistics for the acquired
firms and the non-involved companies with which they are paired. As before, the
results represent the calculated values for the T-tests and whether or not the null
hypothesis can be rejected and at what level is indicated for each term in the table. The
result here is the same as in the previous table and suggests that there are clear
differences between the acquired firms and the companies in the control sample which
means that it should be possible to analyse this data using the logit and hazard function
methodologies.
Table 3.5 T-Statistics for the Differences Between Acquired and Non-involved Firms
Variable Number of Years before Acquisition
I II III IV V
Turnover to assets employed 1.26 1.84*** 5.64* 6.12* 9.14*
Turnover to fixed assets 1.13 1.06 3.64* 8.98* 3.77*
Sales per employee 2.17** 4•03* 5•97* 7.5* 2.71*
Stock ratio 3.18* 3.19* 3.16* 3.2* 3.14*
Return on capital employed 8.79* 5.61* 1.28 7.26* 5.24*
Return on slolders equity 3.25* 2.23** 6.72* 3.18* 7.06*
Pre-tax profit margin 7•53* 6.06* 5.57* 3.71* 8.77*
Net profit margin 9•37* 1.65*** 8.99* 4.04* 5.45*
Dividends per share 2.07** 9.6* 3.48* 3.36* 3.91*
Earnings per share 4•95* 9.98* 1.9*** 4.57* 3.63*
Dividend yield 1.29 6.1* 8.38* 9.61* 2.26**
P/e ratio 2.57* 1.66*** 7.6* 3.41* 6.34*
Capital gearing 9•55* 3.27* 2.44** 5.24* 7.93*
Current ratio 4.21* 5.43* 1.1 1.1 1.7***
Acid test ratio 5•54* 2.88* 6.38* 1.41 1.86***
Debtor days 1.51 5•47* 7.77* 3.84* 1.17
Creditor days 9.13* 9.27* 5•43* 4•79* 8.19*
Total sales 1.5 1.66*** 1.7*** 2.17** 3.12*
Manager/employee ratio 1.03 5.02* 1.2 1.45 1.34
Total tax charge 4.41* 7•03* 9.81* 1.86*** 2.64*
Reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is equal to zero at 1% *,
5% **, 10% ***
170
The third table tests the mean values for the acquiring firms and the
non-involved companies with which they are paired. The null and alternative
hypotheses are the same as in the previous two tables. Once again the results suggest
that the bidding firms are distinctly different from companies of a similar size with
which they are paired indicating that it will be possible to model these firms using the
two methodologies that will be introduced in Chapter 4.
Table 3.6 T-Statistics for the Differences Between Acquiring and Non-involved Firms
Variable Number of Years before Acquisition
I II III IV V
Turnover to assets employed 3.17* 3•7* 3.46* 7.92* 4.81*
Turnover to fixed assets 3.2* 1.79*** .	 3.36* 4.03* 3.2*
Sales per employee 3.32* 1.82*** 1.46 0.88 1.28
Stock ratio 2.46** 2.27** 1.92*** 1.93*** 1.29
Return on capital employed 2.46** 1.07 5.67* 8.39* 3.18*
Return on s'holders equity 1.66*** 3.85* 8.14* 9.69* 3.15*
Pre-tax profit margin 1.77*** 1.65*** 9•7* 1.11 3.75*
Net profit margin 3.16* 6.72* 6.74* 8.24* 7.19*
Dividends per share 5•33* 6.49* 7.35* 6.4* 3.05*
Earnings per share 8.33* 3.59* 2.53** 6.45* 8.26*
Dividend yield 1.34 3•49* 3.11* 3.36* 1.45
P/e ratio 2.83* 7.8* 3.71* 6.26* 5.21*
Capital gearing 1.94*** 1.66*** 1.42 3* 1.76***
Current ratio 1.06 1.4 1.2 1.24 1.81***
Acid test ratio 1.45 1.61 1.75*** 9.52* 2.2**
Debtor days 2.54** 4.61* 7.23* 4•37* 3.67*
Creditor days 9.81* 9.08* 5.51* 8.81* 4•33*
Total sales 1.7*** 1.9*** 2** 1.8** 2.4**
Manager/employee ratio 1.16 1.12 1.14 1.84*** 1.36
Total tax charge 7•47* 7•77* 8.6* 1.97** 1.3
Reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is equal to zero at 1% *,
5% **, 10% ***
The results given in these three table strongly suggests that the firms in the data
sets are drawn from distinctly different sub-populations. In the theory concerning the
logit and hazard function models there is a fundamental assumption that the firms in
the samples should demonstrate clear differences between themselves. This is
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definitely the case in these data sets which removes a potential cause of difficulty in the
estimation of the empirical models that will take place in Chapters 4 and 5.
Correlation Matrices for the Variables in the Data Sets
The next issue to consider is any relationships that may exist between the
variables in each of the data sets. The variables that have been chosen all have firm
empirical and theoretical backing for their inclusion and, by examining several terms in
each area, should clarify precisely which terms are the most informative when
examining the companies that take part in acquisition activity. This section includes
the correlation matrices for each of the fifteen data sets which will be used in Chapter 4
and the six data sets that will feature in Chapter 6. If there are high correlation
coefficients between any of the variables in these data sets then the potential problems
caused by multicollinearity will be avoided by using just one of the group of closely
linked variables.
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Conclusion
This chapter had two purposes. Firstly, it was necessary to discuss the various
different sampling techniques that could be used in the construction of the data sets
and explain the final selection of a choice-based sample and secondly, this chapter
introduced the variable that will be included in the data sets and contained summary
statistics to give a brief overview of the nature of the data.
There are three possible sampling techniques that appeared, at least
superficially, to be suitable for the construction of the data sets. The random sampling
technique is ineffective as it could result in a sample that does not contain any of the
acquired or acquiring firms. This may sound implausible, but it is possible as the
number of these companies is relatively low compared to the total number of
companies in the stock market. The logical alternative approach is to create a
proportionally stratified sample. This is done by dividing the entire population into
strata based on some factor that can be applied to all of the firms. In this case, the
divisions could be based on whether the firm had been acquired, had acquired another
company or had never been involved in acquisition activity during the period under
examination. Once this has been done, the sample is then drawn randomly from these
sub-populations. However, the number of firms that can be taken from each of these
sub-populations is set so that is replicates the proportion of the total population that
each of the strata represent. This would ensure that there would be both acquired and
acquiring companies in the data sets, but the number of these firms would be relatively
low as the number of firms that take part in acquisition activity represent
approximately fifteen percent of the total population of firms. The study of companies
that take part in acquisition activity is the main part of this thesis and as a result it is
desirable to maximise the quantity of information that these firms can contribute to the
data sets, which means that the stratified sampling technique is not the best approach.
An alternative approach is the choice-based sampling technique. This approach
removes all elements of random selection from the construction of the data sets and
makes it possible to create data sets that ignore the proportions of different types of
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firms that exist in reality. This allows the firms to be picked in such a manner that the
acquired and acquiring firms can be deliberately over-sampled to a large degree which
maximises the amount of information that can be gathered from their study. This
results in the construction of data sets that have very little resemblance to the
population from which they are drawn, but makes it much easier to investigate
phenomena that apply to only a small percentage of the firms in the UK. Since the
resulting data sets are a considerable distortion of reality, it is important to ensure that
any estimations based on this information sets will produce acceptable results. The use
of a maximum likelihood estimator with such a data set generates biased results as this
approach is based on the assumption that the proportions in the data sets mirror the
proportions in the original population. In this case the resulting bias in the estimated
models will over-state the possibility that a firm comes from the over-sampled section
of the population. It is possible, however, to calculate the size of this bias and alter the
predicted values accordingly. This is likely to be a problem with the logit models in
the later chapters as these estimations are generally produced using this particular
method of iteration, but the bias can be quantified and the predicted values adjusted
accordingly. In the case of the hazard function models, however, this problem does
not arise. Cox's proportional hazard function is estimated using a form of likelihood
function that is specific to this type of model. This function is not based on any
_
_
assumptions concerning the construction of the sample, the cause of the problem with
the maximum likelihood estimator, and is unaffected by the nature of the sample.
There are many theories concerning acquisition activity and the nature of the
firms that become involved in this sort of behaviour. It is important to select variables
for inclusion in the data sets that can be related to these theories before attempting to
collect the data. There are a great many theories and it is necessary to select enough
variables to be sure of representing them all in the estimated models. Tables 3.1 to 3.3
demonstrate this wealth of information and how the twenty variables that will be
included in the data sets have been chosen. In the previous literature there is
consensus of opinion concerning which terms are the most informative and so,
following Cosh and Hughes (1995) the data sets sometimes contains more than one
variables representing a given area. By analysing these terms together it may be
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possible to determine which ones are the most informative. These terms can be
grouped, broadly, into efficiency terms, profitability terms, investment ratios, leverage
terms, liquidity terms and a group of three miscellaneous terms that represent size,
diversification and the tax situation of the firms in the data set. The selection of these
terms means that the data sets can be gathered at this point and once the data sets have
been constructed it is possible to analyse the information that they contain. It is
important to determine that there are substantial differences between the data as it is
applied to the different groups of firms. There is a fundamental assumption in the
construction of binary choice models that states that the data should fall into distinct
groups before the models are estimated. If this is not the case then it could prove
impossible to create these models with any degree of accuracy or to ensure that they
are well-specified. By considering the mean values of the data in the samples that have
been drawn, it is possible to determine that there are significant differences between
the various groups of firms that are used in the data sets. This means that there is no
hindrance to the estimation of these models, as the data sets have now been created so
that they represent the prevailing theories concerning the firms that take part in
acquisition activity. Furthermore, the data satisfies the important assumption that
there should be significant differences between the firms which is of vital importance.
Finally, this chapter included correlation matrices for the data sets that will be
used in the following two chapters. Where the terms are highly correlated only one
will be used to avoid any potential multicollinearity problems. It is now possible to
begin the empirical work that makes up the main contribution that this thesis makes to
the current knowledge concerning acquisition activity in the UK and, specifically, to
the current understanding of the characteristics of the firms that become involved in
takeovers and their motives for doing so.
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Chapter 4. Logit Models and Cox's Proportional
Hazard Function in the Prediction of Acquisitions 1
Introduction
This chapter has two distinct purposes. The first of these serves to utilise a
methodology that has not been used previously in the analysis of companies that
become either bidders or targets in acquisition activity. The hazard function has some
advantages over the alternative methodology, that of binary choice models such as
logit and probit. Specifically, the hazard function looks at the timing of the event and
incorporates this factor into the estimation of a conditional probability. This adds an
element of timing into an essentially cross-sectional procedure which enables the age of
companies to be taken into account in the modelling procedure.
The second intention in this chapter is to try to provide a superior definition of
the motives that prompt acquisition activity and the characteristics of the involved
companies. To do this the acquisitions are modelled three times. Firstly, using the
acquired and acquiring companies to infer the characteristics that prompted the
selection of these targets and the motives behind the instigation of the takeover
process in the first place. Once this has been completed both the bidders and targets
will be modelled against companies that were not involved in takeovers during the
sample period. These last two sets of results may help to clarify the characteristics of
the firms that take part in the acquisition process and distinguish them from the rest of
the population of companies.
This sort of information would have a wide range of uses. Many companies
would be interested to know whether they have a high risk of becoming an acquisition
target as this could influence their future behaviour. Alternatively, other firms may
wish to use this type of technique to determine how appropriate it would be for them
1	 The results in this chapter were presented at the BAA-ICAEW Doctoral
Colloquium held at Lancaster University, 9 - 11 July 1996.
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to attempt a takeover in the near future. Lastly, banks might wish to know the chances
of a company becoming an acquisition target before they consider lending funds to that
company for other projects.
The recent empirical work in the literature on this subject centres on the use of
binary choice approaches and are, therefore, unable to incorporate an element of
timing in the analysis. For example, Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) used logit models to
examine the types of companies that become acquisition targets compared to firms that
were not involved in the takeover process.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 examines the
current theories and literature concerning the nature of companies that become
involved in acquisitions activity and the methods of analysing this process that have
been used in the recent papers. Section 4.2 contains the methodology used in this
chapter as well discussing the data and the empirical results. Finally there is the
conclusion.
4.1 Theories and Evidence
There are many articles that aim to identify either the motives for acquisition
activity or the characteristics of the firms that take part in this process. These papers
employ a wide variety of techniques ranging from simple observation to empirical
examination. These articles and the points that they raise have been discussed at length
in an earlier chapter so it is only necessary to recall, briefly, the important points. One
of the most frequently mentioned motives for acquisitions is synergy. This is the idea
that the combined firm which results from the acquisition will be able to achieve
objectives that neither of the original firms could have managed separately. These
synergistic gains can appear in virtually any area of the business and this variety makes
it a popular motive in the literature. This theory was discussed in papers by Lev
(1992) and Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) amongst many others.
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The next motive is managerial ambition. The financial rewards and the prestige
attached to managing a large company usually exceeds that given to the managers of
smaller firms. One of the fastest ways in which a firm can increase in size is via a
takeover. Consequently, it is possible that an acquisition could be prompted solely by
the managers desires to advance themselves as Jensen suggested (1988, 1992).
Another issue that relates to the managers' behaviour is managerial inefficiency. If the
managers of a certain firm are viewed as being inefficient and are not utilising the firms
assets in the best possible way, then that firm could well be the target for a takeover
attempt. The management of the bidding firm could view this as an ideal opportunity
to acquire control of another set of assets which could then be used more effectively.
Similarly if one firm is considered to be significantly undervalued by the market then it
could be acquired by a company whose managers consider themselves to have a more
realistic picture of that firms true value. There is a clear link with managerial
inefficiency; if the market considers that the firm's managers are inefficient then the
share price will often drop and the company may become seriously undervalued.
The tax issue is another popular motive in the recent literature. Firms may find
themselves in the situation where they will loose beneficial tax conditions unless they
acquire a firm with a different tax position. For example, a firm may be too small to
qualify for a certain tax level but by acquiring another company could qualify. This
motive appeared in the article by Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) amongst others.
The tax motive is really a sub-set of the restructuring idea. Here it is suggested that
the bidding firm wishes to undertake some form of radical restructuring and an
acquisition can sometimes be the fastest and most convenient manner in which to do
this. For example, a company may find it has reached its maximum possible debt
capacity and yet it may wish to further increase this. It may transpire that this change
is not possible or may take too long by internal means. By acquiring a company with
an excess of debt capacity this goal may be achieved.
Finally, there is the diversification motive, mentioned by Hughes (1993). A
firm will purchase another company that operates in a different geographical area or
market to facilitate a swift entry into that specific market. In particular, this approach
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saves the acquiring company both the time and expense of developing a new product
as the acquired firm will have already completed this task. Furthermore a takeover is
sometimes the only way to enter a particular market as there are insurmountable
barriers to entry by any other route.
Whilst the previous points have been supported as possible motives for
acquisition the recent literature has also provided a list of characteristics that could be
used to identify companies that are involved in acquisition activity compared to the rest
of the firms in their industries. The first of these features is the size factor as discussed
by Lev (1992) and Dietrich and Sorensen (1984). It is often claimed that the target
firms are smaller than the average company in their industry. Conversely, the bidding
firms are held to be larger. The small size of a target firm is, presumably, designed to
reduce the cost of purchasing it as far as is possible, whilst the large size of the bidding
company is supposedly indicative of its ability to raise the sort of money that a
takeover requires. It is also possible that the smaller firms find it harder to defend
themselves against a concerted acquisition attempt than larger companies. This
concept may be valid in general but it seems to ignore the possibility that a small firm
would want to acquire a larger one and equally ignores the effect of differing economic
conditions on the probability of a firm raising the necessary funds. _
A similar characteristic concerns the profits of the involved companies. The
target firms are thought to be less profitable than the industry average whilst the
acquiring firms are more profitable. There can be little doubt that a company has to be
in a stable financial position before they can embark upon an acquisition as such an
activity can impose considerable monetary strains on the finn and there is always the
possibility that the integration of the acquired firm will cost more than was originally
planned. This does not necessarily mean that the target firms are less profitable than
the average company in their industry, however. Nevertheless, a less profitable
company may have a lower share price which would reduce the cost of the takeover
but this is a separate point and has already been discussed.
200
The motives and characteristics that have been discussed here are summarised
in table 4.1, below. However, it is important to remember that a firm does not acquire
another company simply because that company is undervalued, for example, as this
factor represents no guarantee that the target company could be effectively integrated
into the purchasing firm which is essential in the completion of a profitable takeover.
There has to be another clear advantage for the acquirer. In other words, the selection
process for a target is a two stage process. First, the bidder selects firms that meet the
requirements specified by the particular acquisition motive that has prompted the
takeover. Once these firms have been identified then the acquiring firm can consider
such factors as minimising the cost of the acquisition by finding the smallest of the
potential targets or one that is undervalued for some reason.
Table 4.1 The Characteristics of Companies Involved in Acquisition Activity Based on
the Recent Literature
Acquiring Companies Acquired Companies
Ambitious management Inefficient management
Diversifying / Expanding
Occupying a complementary
position	 _
Requiring to restructure
Possessing unused tax
advantages
Possibly overvalued Undervalued
Performing better than
average
Under-performing
Larger than average Smaller than average
Above averagely profitable Less than averagely profitable
Possessing potential
The literature on the subject of takeovers also includes articles that consider the
identification of the companies that are involved in the market for corporate control
from a practical perspective and attempt to identify the features that distinguish
companies that are involved in the acquisition process from the firms that remain
uninvolved. The first of these papers to consider was by Dietrich and Sorensen
(1984). Here the authors used the logit methodology on a sample of merged and
non-merged American firms. This paper considered acquisitions as investments that
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would increase the total net present value of the bidding company, which is one of the
more popular ways of viewing the takeover process. Later Palepu (1986) also used
the logit methodology to identify the basic characteristics of the companies that are
purchased in acquisitions. Similarly, Ambrose and Megginson (1992) extended
Palepu's paper to include information on the ownership structure of the target firms
and the nature of any defence mechanism that these companies might use to protect
themselves against an unwanted takeover attempt. Their results demonstrated that the
majority of acquisition defences do not work against a determined takeover attempt
and the ownership structure, particularly with respect to institutional investors, makes
no difference to the probability that a company will become involved in takeover
activity.
More recently the hazard function methodology has started to appear in papers
of this sort. To date it does not appear that anyone has attempted to apply this
approach to acquisitions but it has been used for the analysis of some similar events.
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1991) used this technique to evaluate the probability of a
company divesting parts of itself The authors chose this methodology as they
considered that the logit approach, with its lack of a time element, was inferior to the
hazard function technique. Lastly, Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) used hazard
functions to examine the survival rates of companies within the first ten Years of their
existence. Again, the importance of the timing element makes this approach superior
to the logit model for the analysis of this phenomenon.
The motives and characteristics that define the companies that become involved
in acquisition activity drive the selection of the variables that will appear in the model
estimated in this chapter. Combining these with the methodologies that appear in the
papers mentioned above sets the framework for the empirical analysis that constitutes
the rest of this chapter.
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(4.1)
(4.2)
4.2 Methodology and Empirical Results
4.2.1 Methodology
The first type of probability model to consider is a simple binary response
model, of which the logit model is a good example. Once these models have been
examined it is relatively simple to extend the methodology to Hazard function models.
Binary Responses and Logit Models
The derivation of the binary logit model starts with the assumption that there
can only be two possible outcomes for the event under consideration to which are
assigned appropriate probabilities. The outcomes are usually denoted 0 and 1 and
given the following probabilities.
P(Yi
 =0) = 1 —1Ci
P(Y 1)= ir=
In most investigations there are several observed variables that are deemed to
alter the condition of the response variable. These are usually represented as a vector
of covariates x. It is possible to state that "the principle objective of statistical
analysis, therefore, is to investigate the relationship between the response probability
it = n(x) and the explanatory variables x = (r1 , . , xp) ." (McCullagh and Nelder, 1983,
page 98)
A linear regression model is a convenient, albeit simple, first order
approximation for any phenomena under investigation, as Hastie and Tibshirani (1994)
noted. To produce better results an additive model can be derived that generalises the
linear estimation into something rather more meaningful by replacing the single
explanatory variable with a vector of several terms. An example is given in equation
4.3
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11 = ao +E
	
(4.3)
where
ri represents the alteration in the probability ir generated by a change in the vector xu,
the explanatory variables, and
13) represents a vector of coefficients
The problem with this expression is that it can take any value on the whole real
line unless the coefficient terms are restricted in some manner. Since all probabilities
must lie between zero and one this expression is contrary to the most fundamental laws
of probability and cannot be accepted.
This problem can be avoided by using a transformation g(rc), called the link
function, that maps the output from this equation onto the unit interval, the range from
zero to one without imposing any constraints on the coefficients. A wide range of link
functions are available. The logistic link function is given in equation 4.4, below, and
takes the form of the log odds ratio.
g(n) = log {	 }
- 7C
Combining the link function with the general linear model, gives the iolloviing
equation for the logit model.
log
 {—I
7C 
= ao + xy13.,
- /C	 j=1
Equation 4.6 below, illustrates how the logit model relates a change in the
explanatory variables on the probability of an firm having the outcome denoted 1.
exp (oco + xypi)
1 + expia0±XXY13.1)
(4.4)
(4.5)
IC = (4.6)
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With any methodology, however effective it may appear, there are likely to be
some disadvantages. The first problem is that the logit model does not involve any
terms that represent how long each firm occupies their first state before the event
occurs, as can been seen from equations 4.5 and 4.6. For virtually every company the
takeover occurs at a different time within their life cycle. The logit model is incapable
of reflecting this difference and implicitly assumes that the sample is homogenous in
this respect. Clearly this statement is not true and, in addition, each different time
could be subject to a distinct set of circumstances, which should also be reflected in the
analysis. Another problem linked to the absence of time is the fact that the probability
of the event occurring may alter with time. As an illustration, consider the age of a
company. It is often suggested that older companies have less chance of being
acquired than young firms. It is reasonable, therefore, to want to include some
measure of time in the model. There is also the problem of censoring. It is not
possible to produce a sample that contains every company or covers all possible times;
practicality ensures that the sample is of a finite size. This means that, without some
measure of time, the calculations come to an abrupt end at the end of the sample
period. This creates the impression that the entire life of the companies used in the
estimations is contained within the sample period and that nothing can change beyond
that time. This is obviously not true and is another problem associated with this
-
methodology.
The last problem with this methodology is the choice of estimation process
when used with certain types of data sets. This point has previously been discussed in
the sampling section of Chapter 3. The logit model is usually estimated using the
maximum likelihood approach. This approach is based on the assumption that the
sample is randomly selected and is representative of the population. In other words,
that the proportion of acquired companies in the sample, for example, is representative
of the proportion of the total population that are also targets. If this assumption is
violated the results of the estimation are biased. In the case of a choice based sample,
such as the one here, this bias would result in the over-prediction of the part of the
sample that was over-sampled and a corresponding under-prediction of the remaining
companies. In all of the data sets that will be used in this chapter there is deliberate
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over-sampling of one or both sets of firms and so this problem will continually arise.
However, following Palepu's paper it is possible to evaluate the size of the sampling
bias as was demonstrated in Chapter 3. However, this still leaves one problem with
the logit model; the absence of any timing effects. It is not possible to add this term to
the logit methodology so the obvious response is to identify a type of model that does
involve an element of timing. This leads from binary response models to survival
models.
Survival Models
After the binary choice models discussed above the simplest type of models
that can incorporate a time feature are the survival models. The fundamental concept
here is the notion of survival time. This is the length of time up to the point at which
the event occurs. In early studies this methodology was predominantly used in clinical
studies and the event was often the patient's death, hence the name.
The study of survival data centres on the individuals in a homogenous
population each of which has a distinct failure time. In other words, this is the
examination of "a single non-negative random variable, T" (Cox and Oakes, 1994,
page 13) which represents the length of time up to that point. Ai the authors point
out, it is essential to have a clearly defined origin and a consistent time increment for
measuring this factor. The survivor function of T has the density function /(t). The
corresponding distribution function can be expressed in equation 4.8 and represents the
fraction of the population that dies by time t.
F(t)= f(s)ds	 (4.8)
Survival models are designed to measure the rates of failure for the firms within
a given sample and concern themselves solely with the distribution of the survival time
for each individual. In order to relate this change in state to other terms it is necessary
to extend the survival methodology to form a probability model; one such type of
model is the hazard function model which relates the conditional probability that a firm
will be acquired to a given set of variables.
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fit) h(t) =
1 — F(t) (4.15)
Hazard Function Models
The hazard function measures the probability that a firm will exit from the
sample within the next small time interval, given that this firm has survived to the
current time. In other words it represents the probability that a firm will be the subject
of a takeover bid in the near future given the fact that the company in question has not
yet been acquired. It can be represented as a conditional probability :
P(t  T < t +StIt  7)
h(t)= lim
8r-KH-	 St
where T is the survival time.
Equation 4.9 can also be represented in terms of the survivor function. The
expression above can be re-expressed in the form of several conditional probability
statements which are then translated into terms of the survival time and the associated
functions as stated by McCullagh and Nelder (1994) .
P(Survival to t+&) = P (Surviv al to 0.P(Survival for Oti Survival to t) 	 (4.10)
1 — F(t + St) = {1 — F(t)}.{1 —h(t)&}	 (4.11)
1 — F(t + St) = 1 —F(t) — h(t)& + F(t)h(t)St	 (4.12)
F(t)— F(t + St) = h(t)&[F(t) — 1]
	
(4.13)
—StFi (t) = h(t)&[F(t) — 1]
	
(4.14)
(4.9)
where 1 —F(t) is the probability of survival to time t; the point in time which is of
interest
h(t) is the probability of a firm exiting, being acquired, during the next small time
period
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At) is the density function for the survival time as introduced in the section considering
survival models and
F(t) is the distribution function also corresponding to the survival time
Expressing the hazard function in this form clearly illustrates the importance of
both the survivor function and the timing element. It should be recalled that the
absence of this factor was considered to be the main problem with the logit model, so
this may imply that the hazard function is preferable when modelling phenomena in
which timing is important.
It is easy to include the vector of explanatory terms, or covariates, into the
probability expression for this function, equation 4.9. The hazard function is simply
re-written so that it is conditional on the vector of explanatory variables x.
h(t;x) = Ern P(t  T<t+Stl t  T,x)
at-A)	 8t (4.16)
There are, however, two difficulties inherent in the use of this model. The first
problem deals with the data. The exiting and censored individuals, the acquired and
non-involved firms, are assumed to lie in distinct groups. In addition, they are
assumed to be subject to the same level of risk within each of the groups, but the
groups themselves are held to be different. This assumption of homogeneity within the
groups is fundamental in the estimation of the hazard function and the violation of such
an assumption could result in a model that simply cannot differentiate effectively
between the possible outcomes.
The second potential problem with the hazard model refers to the estimation of
the likelihood function. The precise form of the likelihood function is the summation
of two separate likelihood functions which reflect the contributions of both the exiting
and the censored individuals in the sample. The functional forms of these two parts of
the likelihood function are defined by the distribution of the data. It may not be
possible to accurately identify this distribution, which could be a problem. If the
wrong distribution is used, the results will be erroneous.
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The alternative approach to this problem is to find a manner of estimating the
model that does not require the distributions to be identified when estimating the
likelihood function. This leads to the use of the proportional form of the hazard model
devised by Cox (1972).
Cox's Proportional Hazard Function Model
As Cox (1972) observed it is usual to have additional information concerning
the firms in the sample, the explanatory variables a = x i , ...,xp say, where some of the
terms may be functions of time. In the ensuing hazard function the main issue is the
relationship between the vector of explanatory terms and the distribution of the failure
time. He suggested representing this relationship by a model in which the hazard is
h(t;x) = y(xfS)ho (t)	 (4.17)
where 13 is a vector of unknown parameters and ho is an unknown function, called the
"baseline hazard function" which represents the hazard function for the standard set of
conditions a = 0. Identifying the form of the data is the first step in estimating the
values of the vector of coefficients. Cox claims that there are several ways to analyse
this model and the simplest of these approaches is to assume that the underlying
distribution, here denoted y, is exponential. The resulting equation -, 4.18, is the most
usual form of Cox's proportional hazard function.
h(t; a) = exp (xii)ho (t)	 (4.18)
The real importance of Cox's model is that it is easy to use and circumvents the
problems raised by the specification of the underlying distribution and the complexity
of the likelihood expressions that are inherent in the first form of the hazard model,
equation 4.16. In particular there are three good reasons for using this form of the
model. Firstly, the most usual form of the model is the exponential equation, 4.18
above. The use of the exponential prevents the hazard function from ever taking a
negative value which would be meaningless as there is no such thing as negative risk.
Secondly, the addition of another covariate can be simply interpreted as the
multiplication of the hazard rate by a constant factor. Lastly, the technical problems of
statistical inference have a simple solution when ho(t) is arbitrary, as it is allowed to be
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in this model. This means that the baseline hazard function does not need to be
rigorously identified before the hazard function can be estimated. For an explanation
of this last point, we need to explain how this model is estimated. This is the real
strength of Cox's model compared to the other forms of hazard function. It is
relatively simple to evaluate the proportional model using the partial likelihood
function also devised by Cox. A concise explanation of this function appears in the
article by Kiefer (1988). Assuming that the model takes the general form, equation
4.18 above, the contribution that each short duration makes to the total partial
likelihood can be calculated independently. The total log-likelihood is generated as the
product of these individual contributions, as follows :
logL(P) = fx,P — ln[i exp (xj f3)]}	 (4.19)
1=1
This means that Cox's version of the proportional hazards model is only semi
parametric, as the baseline function is not modelled as a smooth function of the
survival time. Instead this function is allowed to take arbitrary values and is irrelevant
in the estimation of the process as it does not effect the evaluation of the partial
likelihood expression, above. This is further clarified by the expression below.
Let al be the covariate vector for a firm that is acquired at a given time in the
sample period. The probability that the firm selected as the acquired firm is the same
as the firm which is observed to be the acquired firm is
ho mexp (x,o)  =  exp
 (4) 
ho wexp (x, p)	 exp
 (xii3)
(4.20)
where the summation extends over the entire set of companies that have not been
acquired. From this expression it is easy to see that the baseline function is not
involved in these estimations and consequently Cox's model has circumvented the
potential difficulty of correctly identifying the form of this function. Using Cox's
model has the advantages that it is simple to estimate and interpret. However, it does
require a considerable simplification of the hazard function in order to facilitate the
easier estimation of the models. Efron (1977) examined whether it is really acceptable
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to use Cox's models instead of more complex forms of the hazard function for just this
reason. He examined Cox's model both theoretically and empirically and concluded
that the proportional hazard model is as efficient an estimator of 13 as any of the
parametric forms of the model. The relative efficiency of Cox's model was also
examined by Oakes (1977). He examined the amount of information lost when the
exact nature of the underlying hazard function is unknown, as in Cox's form of the
Hazard function. Oakes found that, although Cox's model is fully efficient only in very
precise circumstances, the informational loss is not great enough to justify the extra
dimension of difficulty required in the estimation of a more precise form of the hazard
function. Cox's model has achieved great popularity in recent years and, as Portugal
and Addison (1995) observed, it is by far the most popular model of this type used in
the analysis of life time data. It seems, then, that Cox's form of the Hazard function
model is an acceptable next step after the use of the logit methodology.
Using Cox's Proportional Hazard Function in Practice
The theory behind the proportional hazard function is discussed above. This
does not, however, explain how this model is used in practice. The theory uses the
explanatory variables to identify the survival time for an individual whilst, in practice,
the opposite is true. Here the survival time and the outcome are -akeady knaws far
each firm in the sample and this information is used to estimate the coefficients of the
covariates.
Consider the equation below which is the usual form of Cox's Proportional
Hazard function. This equation appears previously as 4.18 but is repeated here for
convenience as equation 4.21.
h(t; x) = exp (x)ho (t)	 (4.21)
The left hand side of this equation is the probability of a firm exiting, here being
acquired, which is already known for every firm in the sample as this factor has already
been observed. The right hand side of this equation represents the explanatory
variables that are thought to distinguish the two sets of firms in the data set from each
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other. These terms have already been picked by examining the empirical work and the
theories concerning the motives for acquisition activity that appear in the previous
literature. The only unknown in this equation is the vector of coefficients, 0, and in
the empirical work that follows the estimations are used to identify the value of this
term. In the tables of results that follow, the significant coefficients are presented as
these are the terms that can be used to characterise the two types of firms used in the
samples.
The covariates selected for use in the model can be any set of terms thought to
distinguish the two groups of firms in the data sets and these variables can be of any
magnitude. The model is a cross-sectional one in which a single element of time is
important; the duration variable. Furthermore, there is no reason why the time origin
for the duration variable should match the point at which the sample period started as
Cox and Oakes (1994) observed. It is often the case that the most sensible duration
variable predates the collection of data which makes it impossible to match the
duration variable to the data set. This is particularly the case when the age of the
individual or firm is thought to be the most suitable duration variable, as in this thesis.
Since this is a cross-sectional model there is also no reason why the covariates
should match the duration variable either. Covariates can be any terms that are
thought to distinguish the groups of individuals in the sample and it is possible that
some of these terms have no relationship to time at all. Equally, since the time of the
observation is irrelevant the terms can be related to time but may not have the same
time scale as the duration variable. There are many precedents and examples of this in
previous literature. Lancaster (1979) examined the probability of an individual finding
a job and used the length of time of unemployment, in weeks, the age of the individual,
in years, and the current value of wages, undated, in his analysis. Ravenscraft and
Scherer (1991) examined factors that make a company divest one of its divisions after
an acquisitions by using accountancy data from the year after the divestiture and other
factors that have no date attached to them such as changes in CEO's. More recently,
Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) examined the failure of small firms and used a
combination of variables that referred to the firms itself and the industry in which it
operated. The data here demonstrates the cross-sectional nature of the proportional
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hazard function model as it is drawn from several different years. For example, the
rate of technological change is measured six years after the firm was started, but the
size of the firm is measured in the year it began trading. In the same year, Portugal and
Addison (1995) used a mixture of undated and dated variables in a proportional hazard
function to examine the factors that relate to unemployment. Their covariates included
the age and educational background of the individual, both measured in years, with the
value of wages, gender, and reasons for unemployment, all of which have no date
attached to them. These terms were used with the observed duration of employment
to estimate the values of the coefficients attached to these variables.
In economics and financial papers it has recently become fashionable to use a
panel of data when using lifetime data models. Again, there is no particular reason
why this should be the case. In some situations it may be far more informative to
consider the data in separate years rather than creating a panel. Barniv and Raveh
(1989) investigated financial distress using accounting data from the years before the
firm went bankrupt. They produced results for one and three years before bankruptcy
to demonstrate that the significance of the terms can alter with the proximity of the
firm's failure and also to determine which year is the most informative one when
attempting to identify firms with a high probability of going bankrupt. If firms can be
identified some years before they find themselves in financial distress then it would help
potential investors to decide whether they really wish to put their funds in to this
company.
A similar approach was used by Hendricks and Porter (1996) in their hazard
function analysis of exploratory oil drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. Their study was
designed to identify the factors that make firms start drilling once they have purchased
the lease for a certain tract of land. The lease lasts for five years and ownership of the
land reverts to the Government at the end of that time unless drilling has already been
started. Drilling is expensive and there is no guarantee that oil will be found so firms
will not automatically begin drilling once they have purchased the lease. Hendricks
and Porter used factors concerned with the condition of the firm and the outcome of
other drilling to determine why the firms decide to start drilling. They contended that
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these factors would change as the lease matured and so they estimated the factors in
each of the five , years after the lease was bought. As they predicted the significant
variables changed over the five years and they were able to produce results that
described the changes in the firms in each of these years. The authors of this papers
felt that this approach was very informative as it enabled them to see the way that the
firms grew and developed over these five years and to observe the differing influences
that became important as time passed.
In the analysis of companies that take part in takeovers it will also be more
informative to observe how the firms change and develop in the years before an
acquisition. Following a similar approach to Hendricks and Porter (1996) the data
here will be arranged in five data sets each one representing one of the Eve years
before the takeover took place. This will create results that show how the firm alters
as the years pass and how it evolves from a company that is not likely to become
involved in the acquisition process to a firm that does become involved in the market
for corporate control. This approach will be considerably more informative, when
considering the changing nature of companies involved in acquisition activity, than
creating a panel of data.
Creating Empirical Models Using the General to Specific Methodology
The models features in the following empirical section are all created using the
general to specific methodology introduced in Chapter 2. This is used because the
previous literature and previous empirical studies suggest a great many potential
explanatory variables that might be used in this empirical study. This results in the
creation of a relatively large data set. This large number of variables is reduced to just
the most important terms by examining the t-statistics of the individual terms and
selecting the least significant term for removal. Using Likelihood ratio tests the
validity of this restriction can be confirmed and this procedure is repeated until the
specific model is derived.
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There are also some precedents for the use of general to specific modelling
with lifetime data models. Barniv and Raveh (1989) began their analysis of financial
distress with twenty variables and reduced their models until just four terms were left.
These remaining variables, they argued, represented all the important information that
was required to analyse bankruptcy using their model.
Measures of Model Specification and Goodness of Fit
When estimating any empirical model it is important to know whether the
model is correctly specified. In the previous empirical chapter, Chapter 2, OLS models
were used in which it is relatively simple to check for correct specification. In the case
of logit and proportional hazard function models it is not quite as straight forward.
Simple specification tests such as the Gauss-Markov conditions do not apply in these
cases and so other measures have to be used. The first of these is the likelihood ratio
test which measures the joint significance of the variables within the models. As in
Chapter 2, the general to specific methodology will be used to reduce the relatively
large number of explanatory terms, all suggested by previous research and theory, to a
more concise specific model which is easier and clearer to interpret. Once the specific
model has been identified a likelihood ratio test will confirm that the variables within
the model are all significant and the reduction that was used to create that model is
justified. For this test the null and alternative hypotheses are :
Ho : the coefficients of the variables left in the model are equal to zero
HA : the coefficients of the variables left in the model are not equal to zero
If the model has been correctly formed then the null hypothesis should be
rejected implying that the model is well specified and contains only the important terms
from the general model. Using this test was suggested by Kiefer (1988) and can be
applied to both the logit and proportional hazard function estimations which makes it a
very suitable test of specification in the following empirical work.
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An alternative measure of the suitability of the model is a test of the goodness
of fit. Maddala (1996) defines the goodness of fit as "a summary statistic indicating
the accuracy with which a model approximates the observed data." (Maddala, 1996.
Page 37) In an ordinary OLS regression model this would be the R2 value. When it is
not appropriate to calculate the conventional IZ 2 value, for example in a logit model or
in the proportional hazard function model, it is possible to use the accuracy of
prediction as a proxy for the R.' value. In the empirical work that follows the values
for the predictive accuracy of the logit and hazard function models will be given with
respect to both the sets of firms in the data sets in the tables of results.
4.2.2 Data
The data used in this chapter is drawn from three sources. In the first instance
it was necessary to identify the names of companies that were involved in acquisition
activity and the dates of each of the takeovers. For this purpose the weekly
publication the "Investors Chronicle" was used. This journal prints a table of current
acquisitions every week. Once companies were identified the Stock Exchange
yearbooks were used to identify the year when each firm was first quoted, so that the
duration can be calculated, and the industry in which the majority of its bilSi22t53 takes
place. Once these details have been established for each of the companies, Datastream
was used to access the appropriate accounting data. All of these variables are
considered in detail in Chapter 3.
As has been previously mentioned, the data is used to form three groups.
Initially, the analysis will centre on the companies that are directly involved in the
takeover; the acquiring and acquired firm. Once this has been completed, the data on
these two sets of companies are split apart and each is paired with a set of companies
that were not involved in acquisition activity. These companies are paired with the
bidders and target by matching the total market values of the firms as closely as
possible. This leads to the construction of a further two sets of data. For each of the
three sets of companies, the data is considered for five years before the acquisitions
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took place. Each of these years are considered separately. This results in a total of
fifteen different data sets that will be used in the empirical analysis.
For each of the companies twenty variables are examined. The selection of
these terms is based on the prevailing theories on acquisition activity and the
characteristics that are held to identify the companies that are involved in acquisitions,
see Table 4.1 and Chapter 3 for more detail. As far as possible, variables have been
selected for use in the empirical sections that are likely to be informative about one or
more of these concepts. Some of the theories are more difficult to translate into
accounting variables than others and, conversely, some of these ideas can be
represented by more than one of the terms. The variables can be split into those
representing the efficiency, profitability, investment and liquidity aspects of the firm.
Added to these groups of variables there are also some terms that are included to
measure certain other aspects of acquisition activity that are considered important in
terms of takeovers but do not fit within one of the other groups of covariates.
Correlations within the Data Sets
In this chapter there are fifteen six data sets that represent the three groups of
_
companies in each of the five years before the acquisition took plac- e. Before
beginning the empirical analysis it is important to know whether any of the variables
are highly correlated. Any highly correlated terms need to be separated before
attempting to create the empirical models. In the case of the hazard fimction
methodology the misspecification caused by leaving highly correlated terms together
could result in the estimation of standard errors for the parameters that are much
greater than they should be (Cox and Oakes, 1994, pages 89-90) and the specification
tests applicable to these types of models, likelihood ratio tests, cannot indicate the
presence of this problem. To prevent this situation arising the correlations between the
variables need to be calculated in advance and any highly correlated terms split up so
that only one appears in the data set. The correlation matrices for these data sets
appear as Tables 3.7 to 3.21 in Chapter 3.
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Biases Created by the Use of Choice Based Samples
This is the last task that needs to be completed before the empirical work can
begin. As was explained earlier, in section 3.1.1., there is a bias created by the use of a
logit model on a choice based sample. It is possible to evaluate the magnitude of this
bias with a simple calculation; the formula in equation 4.7. Using the numbers of
companies involved in acquisitions, available on Datastream, the corresponding
number of companies registered on the Stock Exchange and knowing the composition
of the data sets, it is possible to calculate the size of this bias for each of the data sets
that will be examined. For the acquired firms, when modelled against companies that
were not involved in the takeover process, the value of this bias is 24.32%. During the
period used in this sample, 1987 to 1994, there are more acquired firms than acquiring
companies in the period that has been used here. As a result, the bias that is created by
the over-sampling of these individuals is even larger. In fact the bias generated in this
way is 29.82%. These biases are easy to deal with when the data refers to one of these
over-sampled groups of companies, compared to the non-involved firms, but in the
first instance they are combined to facilitate the examination of the acquired and
acquiring companies. The biases created by these two sets of over-sampled individuals
will each affect the results in the opposite manner leading to a_ certain degree of
cancelling out. However, since the two biases are not equal in magnitude there will be
a residual effect that remains. The difference between the sizes of the two biases is
5.5%. As the larger bias is generated by the acquiring firms, this 5.5% bias will be
associated with that side of the data set. This means that the results will overestimate
the probability of a chosen firm being a bidding firm by this amount.
4.2.3 Empirical Results
The empirical results can be split into three groups reflecting the three ways
that the companies have been considered in the data sets. The first group of results are
concerned with the modelling of the acquired firms against the acquiring companies.
Secondly there are the acquired companies modelled against firms that were not
involved in the market for corporate control during in the sample period and, lastly,
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there are the results for the models involving the acquiring firms and an equivalent
number of companies that were also not involved in acquisitions between January 1987
and December 1994.
Acquiring and Acquired Companies
In the data sets representing just the acquired and acquiring firms both types of
companies have been deliberately over-sampled, as discussed previously. This will
result in a 5.5% bias in the results of the logit models which will have the effect of
over-estimating the probability of a firm being an acquirer in these samples. The
selection of a choice-based sample does not create any sort of bias in the hazard
function results as these are estimated using the partial likelihood estimator devised by
Cox which makes no assumptions about the construction of the sample relative to the
composition of the population of companies.
The first table of results, table 4.6, represent the logit models for these data
sets. For each of the data sets several models were estimated to ensure that the highly
correlated terms were separated, as explained in section 4.2.2. Each of the models in
the table is representative of the results generated for that particular year as the
significant variables tend to remain the same irrespective of which combination of
variables is used in the estimation.
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Table 4.2 Logit Results for Acquired and Acquiring Companies
Variable Number of Years before Acquisition
I II In Iv v
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets 0.32***
(1.69)
0,28
(1.47)
Sales per employee 0.49
(1.49)
1.45*
(2.8)
Stock ratio 0.13
(1.17)
0.23
(1.46)
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin -0.43
(-1.38)
Dividends per share
Earnings per share -0.12
(-1.36)
Dividend yield 0.42
(1.38)
0.93*
(3.6)
0.45**
(1.97)
-0.83**
(-2.45)
P/e ratio -0.4
(-1.3)
0.84*
(2.59)
Capital gearing -0.47
(-1.16)
Current ratio
Acid test ratio 1.56*
(3.1)
Debtor days 0.7***
(1.79)
Creditor days -1.46*
(-2.7)
Total sales -0.06***
(-1.92)
-1.09*
(-3.43)
-1.26*
(-3.29)
-1.26*
(-3.04)
Manager/employee ratio -0.07
(-1.46)
Total tax charge -0.11**
(-1.82)
-0.12
(-1.34)
0.25**
(-2.18)
Likelihood ratio test 16.78** 41.49* 21.33* 25.16* 21.3*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Acquiring Firms
42
52
40
42
42
38
42
36
30
44
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
220
The first terms to consider are the efficiency variables. In the years closest to
the takeover these terms are positively linked to the probability of a firm becoming a
target, but in the periods further away from the acquisition these terms are not
significantly different from the values for the rest of the firms in the sample. The
positive sign is contrary to the motives in the current literature which suggest that a
target firm will be less effectively run than the purchasing company, as Jensen (1988,
1992) and others suggested. A more typical result can be found in the investment
ratios that appear in these models. These terms suggest that the target firms are in a
sound financial position, as the positive dividend yield terms imply. This means that
the acquired companies have the potential to invest in future projects should
appropriate investments be found for them. The notion that a target company should
have potential for the future is both a characteristic of acquired firms in the recent
literature and a factor that provides support for some of the other motives. For
example, if these firms have unused potential then they may be attractive to an
ambitious management who are looking for companies that they can expand and
improve in the future, as Jensen (1988, 1992) notes. This could also be linked to the
inefficient managers motive for corporate acquisitions. If the firms that are acquired
have the potential to do better in the future, then the incumbent managers are clearly
not capable of finding projects for the company to invest in, hence the unused assets at
the firms disposal.
It is possible to predict the value of the logit model for each of the firms in the
sample. These values represent the probability of a given company being either a
bidder or a target at the time of estimation. These logit models can predict somewhere
around forty-five percent of the acquiring companies correctly but, after accounting for
the 5.5% sampling bias, can only accurately identify forty percent of the acquired
companies. On closer examination of these predicted values it is apparent that the
majority of the terms lie close to the 0.5 cut-off point. This raises two interesting
points about these predicted values. Firstly, it is usual to use 0.5 as a cut-off point
when differentiating between companies that are predicted to be bidding firms and
those that are thought to be the targets but there is no justification for selecting this
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point. It is impossible to know at which value the decision to acquire another firm is
taken, on a scale of zero to one, and it is quite likely that acquiring companies will not
be concerned with more than one or two desirable features when selecting a target.
The second point is the distribution of the predicted values; very few of the companies
in the sample are clearly bidders or targets. The vast majority of the firms have the
sort of characteristics that mean they could be either a bidder or a target. Given the
somewhat unusual period that these takeovers are drawn from, when there was an
economic boom, the deregulation of the financial markets and a merger wave, the
uncertain nature of the firms in the sample is hardly surprising.
The next table, 4.7, represents the proportional hazard models for the acquiring
and acquired companies. The models given here are, again, representative of the types
of results that were estimated using these data sets. On first inspection it may appear
that these results are very different from the logit results for the same data sets.
Nevertheless, they are consistent with the earlier results as is demonstrated in
Appendix II.
The first terms in these models represent the efficiency of the acquired
companies when compared to the acquiring firms. The results here, for example the
terms representing the ratio of turnover to fixed assets and the level of sales per
employee, all suggest that the target companies are less effectively run than their
purchasing counterparts as these terms are negatively linked to the probability of a
company becoming an acquisition target. This holds for all of the data sets except the
one representing the firms five years before the acquisition when the efficiency of the
acquired firms is not significantly different from that of the purchasing companies. If
the firm is producing relatively few sales, for example, compared to the number of
people that it employs then it has more chance of becoming the target of an acquisition
attempt. This is a clear indicator of reduced efficiency. The removal of an ineffective
managerial team is one of the frequently mentioned motives for a takeover as Lev
(1992) and Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) both observed. In a fully efficient
market these managers would be eliminated as their firms would go bankrupt. Since
this clearly does not happen the corporate control market is necessary to redress the
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balance and remove these ineffectual managers by making their companies acquisition
targets. This means that the acquisition would increase the overall efficiency of the
market according to Scherer (1988). This can also be linked to the managerial
ambition theory. Managerial ambition in the acquiring company is another very
frequently mentioned motive for initiating a takeover as Jensen (1988, 1992) noted.
This is the notion that the managers of the purchasing company want to acquire
another company to increase their own prestige and financial remuneration. These two
managerial theories can be linked together fairly easily. If an ambitious management
are looking for a potential takeover target they may well decide to choose a firm that
appears to be ineffectively managed at the moment. By purchasing such a company
the new managers may feel that they would be able to generate a swift improvement in
the acquired company simply by correcting a few of the existing mistakes.
The profitability if these firms is both positively and negatively linked to the
probability of the company becoming a takeover target. These terms only appear in
two of the results suggesting that the profitability of acquired firms is not generally
different from the profitability of the bidding companies. The theories concerning the
motives for acquisition activity, for example see Lev (1992), state that the target
companies are generally significantly less profitable than the purchasing firms, which is
not the case here. This means that the acquired companies are not in financial
difficulty despite displaying inefficiencies. It is possible for a company to be relatively
inefficient and still be profitable, although long term ineptitude would eventually have
an impact on the profitability of the firm. The inefficiencies displayed by these
companies are either relatively unconnected to their main lines of business or,
alternatively, the acquired firms are doing so well that their inefficiency has not yet had
an effect on their profits.
The investment ratios are both positively and negatively linked to the
probability of a firm becoming and acquisition target in the same way as the
profitability terms although there are considerably more investment terms in the results.
These terms represent both the potential that the firms have for future investment and
the value of the shares on the market. The terms that are positively linked to the
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probability of a company becoming an acquisition target are, on the whole, those items
that refer to the company's dividends. A company that can pay high dividends
compared to the purchasing firms has a greater chance of becoming an acquisition
target than a company that does not. This is probably due to the fact that dividends
can be retained to fund new investments in the future, thus implying that the target
firms have the potential to perform better in the future with a new and more dynamic
management. In contrast the p/e ratio is negatively linked to the probability of a firm
becoming an acquisition target, whenever it appears in these results, suggesting that
the target firms' shares may be undervalued relative to the earnings of that company.
This links these results to one of the characteristics given for acquired firms in the
recent literature, that these companies are relatively under-valued. This has the dual
advantages of minimising the costs of the purchase as far as possible and ensuring that
the acquiring firm makes a purchase that can be regarded as good value for money as
Palepu (1986) noted. The pie ratio does not appear in all of these results perhaps
reflecting the fact that a firm may not be a good acquisition target just because it is
relatively under-valued. This characteristic alone does not mean that the acquired firm
will be easily incorporated into the purchasing company or that it will make a valuable
contribution to the bidding firms overall business plan for the future. The fact that the
target is relatively cheap is merely an added bonus in the event that a suitable target
firm can be found for some other reason.
The capital structure variable only appears once in these results, four years
before the acquisition. Here it is positively linked to the probability of a firm becoming
the target of an acquisition attempt. This is an indicator of the firms' financial structure
with respect to both debt and equity and gives some indication of the cost of capital for
that company. This term can be linked to the restructuring motive for acquisitions
which suggests that the purchasing firms are using the acquisition as a way to bring
about some significant alteration to the financial composition of that company.
However, the infrequency with which it occurs suggests that there is little difference
between the leverage ratios for the acquired and acquiring companies which greatly
reduces the weight that can be given to this motive at this juncture.
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Table 4.3 Hazard Function Results for Acquired and Acquiring Companies
Variable Number of Years before Acquisition
I II III IV V
Turnover to assets employed 0.32
(1.47)
Turnover to fixed assets -0.19**
(-2.23)
-0.06
(-1.45)
-0.04
(-1.25)
Sales per employee -0.36
(-1.54)
0.57**
(-2.57)
0.41***
(-2.09)
Stock ratio 0.35*
(2.89)
Return on capital employed 0.66***
(1.92)
Return on s'holders equity -0.22
(-1.6)
0.41***
(1.76)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share 0.17
(1.35)
-0.12
(-1.12)
Earnings per share 0.2**
(2.07)
0.07
(1.23)
Dividend yield -0.03***
(-1.74)
0.22
(1.29)
0.87*
(3.82)
Pie ratio 0.24***
(-1.67)
0.51**
(-2.53)
Capital gearing 0.41
(1.58)
Current ratio 0.84**
(-2.05)
0.29***
(-1.89)
0.81**
(-2.39)
Acid test ratio
Debtor days 0.53
(1.43)
0.62*
(-2.97)
1.1***
(1.82)
Creditor days -1.37**
(-2.16)
Total sales 0.86*
(5.02)
1.08*
(4.01)
1.07*
(4.04)
Manager/employee ratio 0•4**
(2.55)
0.06
(1.41)
Total tax charge -0.03
(-1.06)
0.08
(1.08)
0.24
(1.28)
Likelihood ratio test 33.51* 34.64* 42.36* 43.65* 56.19*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Acquiring Firms
72
66
70
66
66
62
60
56
52
48
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
225
The liquidity variables refer to the ease with which a firm can meet its financial
commitments. In the short term this can be represented by factors such as the current
and acid test ratios, whilst the debtor days and creditor days ratios are better indicators
of the long term condition. Here it appears that acquired firms are less liquid than the
acquiring companies in the short term as the negative signs on the current ratio terms
imply. In contrast the long term indicators are positively linked to the acquisition
probability. Again this implies that the target companies could have a problem with
their liquidity as these terms represent the length of time that the companies need to
collect payments due to them and to pay moneys that they owe in turn. A problem of
this sort in the long term implies "slack management practises" (Helfert, 1994, page
140) and could also present the incoming management with an area where
improvements could be made in a short period of time. Alternatively, these liquidity
terms could be linked to the financial restructuring motive introduced above. If the
target firm occupies a complementary position to the purchasing company then the
combination of the two firms could result in the creation of a company with the desired
structure.
The last group of variables refer to those features of acquired firms that cannot
be placed in one of the other groups. The total sales variable can be used as a
indicator of the size of the firms in the data set. Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) hold
that the target firms should be smaller than the bidding ones but here this term is
consistently positive, contrary to the theory. This could be a reflection of the period
that these data sets cover. The years between 1987 and 1990, which make up more
than half of this data set, are also the time of the last merger wave. During these years,
takeovers took place that could not have been contemplated in a more typical time and
this could be responsible for the unusual result that appears here. The second term in
this group of variables is the ratio of managers to employees in the firms. This term is
supposed to measure a given company's propensity to diversify, see Lecraw (1984),
and as such is more likely to refer to the acquiring firms than the targets. In this
context, however, it can also be viewed as an alternative measure of company
efficiency. A positive value for this term, as here, means that the company has a larger
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number of managers per employee than the purchasing firms. A large number of
managers could be indicative of an inefficient firm as it may not be strictly necessary to
have so many people controlling one company.
In the case of hazard function models it is possible to produce a value of the
survival function for each of the firms in the sample. This term measures the
probability of each company surviving for the next time period. These estimations can
correctly identify almost seventy percent of the companies close to the takeover but
this drops to approximately half as the number of years before the acquisition
increases. As with the logit models, they seem to group the majority of the firms
around the central point rather than in the tails of the distribution.
Overall the results of this section are informative. The logit models contain
fewer variables than the proportional hazard function results and are correspondingly
less informative. The latter type of models are able to produce results that correspond
to both the motives for acquisitions and the characteristics of the companies that are
involved in this process. In short, these findings are as follows. The acquired
companies appear to be less effectively run than their acquiring counterparts. This is
indicated by the continued presence of such terms as the ratio of sales per employee
and the turnover to fixed assets ratio which are negatively linked to the Probability of
the firm being an acquisition target. This can be linked to the managerial inefficiently
theory for corporate acquisitions as well as the ambitious managers motive. The
profitability terms, like the capital gearing ratio are less important than the recent
literature would suggest as there is little or no difference between these terms as they
apply to the acquired and acquiring companies. The investment ratios measure the
future potential for the target companies and consistently suggest that the firms have
the potential to perform much better in the future, especially if more suitable projects
could be identified for them. There is also a suggestion that the target firms may be
undervalued compared to their performance and potential as the p/e ratio is negatively
linked to the probability of the company becoming an acquisition target. Finally, the
size variable implies that the purchased companies are large compared to the bidding
firms. This is contrary to the characteristics of acquired firms as they have appeared in
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recent papers. A small target is usually cheaper than a large one, although this is not
always the case. In these results the targets appear to be larger firms that are
undervalued relative to the purchasing companies.
Acquired and Non-involved Companies
In this section the data sets are composed of the acquired firms and companies
that were not involved in the acquisition process during the sample period. It was not
possible to create models using the data drawn from five years before the acquisition
using either the logit or hazard fiinction methodologies as there were too many missing
observations in the data set to produce acceptable results. Using these data sets it is
important to recall that the target companies are over-sampled producing a bias in the
results of the logit models which will over-estimate the probability of a firm being the
target of an acquisition attempt by 24.32%. The table below details the logit models
estimated using the five data sets in this section.
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Table 4.4 Logit Results for Acquired and Non-involved Companies
Variable
.
Number of Years before Acquisition
I H III IV V
.
Turnover to assets employed 1.98*
(4.57)
0.96
(1.53)
1.69*
(2.82)
Turnover to fixed assets 0.86**
(1.99)
0.61**
(2.0)
Sales per employee -0.99**
(-2.33)
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed -1.41*
(2.93)
-1.72*
(-2.61)
-1.45**
(-2.0)
Return on s'holders equity 0.27
(1.31)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share -0.33**
(2.2)
Dividend yield 0.64***
(1.67)
0.43**
(1.98)
Pie ratio -0.6
(-1.65)
0.34**
(1.78)
0.28
(1.37)
Capital gearing
Current ratio
Acid test ratio -1.59**
(-2.27)
Debtor days 0.39
(1.27)
Creditor days 0.7
(1.22)
..0.9***
(-1.87)
0.57
(0.89)
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio 0.75*
(-4.8)
0.24*
(-3.07)
Total tax charge 0.06**
(1.87)
Constant 0.06***
(1.87)
-0.13
(-1.2)
Likelihood ratio test 89.19* 25.48* 21.09* 30.86*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Non-Involved Firms
30
66
30
66
27
66
23
63
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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As in the previous section the informational content of these results is limited
by the relatively low number of variables that appear to be important in the results.
Nevertheless there are some features in these models that are worth discussing. The
first of these comes in the profitability terms. The majority of these variables are
negatively linked to the probability of a company becoming an acquisition target, as the
return on capital employed variable shows. This implies that the acquired companies
are less profitable than the firms that did not become involved in takeovers during the
sample period. Such a result corresponds to the characteristics of acquired companies
as they appear in papers such as Lev's (1992). The investment ratios also provide
some interesting information about the companies that become the targets of
acquisition attempts. The positive investment terms, for example the dividend yield
variable, imply that the target companies may have more potential for future
investment than the companies that did not become involved in the corporate control
market. The pie ratio is another interesting term in this section which is negative
immediately before the acquisition but is positive in the years further removed from the
takeover. This could be indicative of the change in the value of the acquired firms as
they become relatively under-valued compared to the rest of the companies on the
stock market. An undervalued target is often mentioned in papers like Lev's (1992)
_
and Dietrich and Sorensen's (1984) and it is held to be important as it enables the
purchasing company to reduce the costs of the purchase as far as possible.
The last interesting characteristic of the target companies that can be seen in
these results comes from the liquidity variables. As in the preceding hazard function
models this result implies that the acquired firms may be less liquid than the companies
that are not involved in the takeover process. This sort of finding can be most
obviously linked to the managerial inefficiency motive. It is also possible to see how
this feature might attract purchasing firms that have ambitious managers or companies
that wish to attempt some form of financial restructuring via the takeover. It is not
possible to infer which of these motives might be more important in this context as the
rest of the logit model does not incorporate enough variables to enable any more
inferences to be drawn about the driving impulses behind these purchases.
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The predictive abilities of these logit models are rather poor when the sample
bias is taken into account. They are only capable of identifying approximately thirty
percent of the acquired firms and place all of the remainder in the non-involved
category. The hazard function models, however, prove more interesting.
As in the previous data set these results offer much more information than the
equivalent logit models. The first significant terms in these results refer to the
efficiency variables. These ratios are consistently negatively linked to the probability
that a firm will be the subject of an acquisition attempt. Once again this is strongly
suggestive of the theory concerning the removal of a target company's inefficient
managers as a motive for acquisition activity. The elimination of an inefficient
managerial team may also have a positive impact on the level of efficiency in the entire
market as Scherer (1988) suggested. In addition, these areas of relatively poor
performance might also attract a potential bidding firm that has an ambitious
management who are looking to advance their own standing by expanding their firm
and have chosen a takeover as the best way of achieving this end. This motive is
explained and discussed in detail by Jensen (1988, 1992).
The majority of the profitability terms that appear in these model 's imply that
the target companies are less profitable than the firms in the population that are not
involved in the market for corporate control. Again this is one of the characteristics of
an acquired firm in the recent literature on the subject, as typified by Lev (1992). In
the periods further away from the acquisition these terms become less statistically
significant suggesting that the profitability of the acquired companies is no different to
the profitability of the rest of the companies in the population. It may be that this
progression from average profitability to lower than average profitability is one of the
factors that makes certain companies into targets whilst others are never involved in
the market for corporate control. Again, this finding can be linked to the possibility
that the acquired firm has a managerial team that is under-performing and the company
might benefit from the removal of these people and the arrival of another set of
managers after the acquisition.
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Table 4.5 Hazard Function Results for Acquired and Non-involved Companies
Variable Number of Years before Acquisition
I II III IV V
Turnover to assets employed -0.36***
(-1.79)
-0.68*
(-3.12)
-0.31
(-1.11)
-0.24
(-1.31)
Turnover to fixed assets -0.23*
(-3.01)
-0.05
(-1.15)
Sales per employee
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed 1.22*
(2.96)
Return on s tholders equity -0.17
(-1.64)
-0.19
(-1.46)
-0.03***
(-1.74)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin -0.29
(-1.52)
0.07*
(3.88)
Dividends per share 0.15
(1.28)
0.27*
(2.98)
0.11
(1.35)
Earnings per share 0.22***
(1.92)
Dividend yield 0.23
(1.26)
Pie ratio -0.26
(-1.63)
-0.41*
(-2.85)
-0.05
(-1.27)
Capital gearing
Current ratio
_
Acid test ratio
Debtor days 2.57*
(3.55)
-0.58*
(-2.76)
2.71*
(6.06)
Creditor days -1.97*
(-2.98)
1.62*
(5.14)
-1.92*
(-4.9)
Total sales 0.33
(1.35)
Manager/employee ratio 0.07*
(5.7)
Total tax charge -0.05**
(-2.5)
-0.09*
(-4.09)
Likelihood ratio test 49•39* 35.09* 37.19* 36.6*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Non-Involved Firms
72
66
75
66
66
62
58
52
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
232
The investment ratios support the supposition that acquired firms seem to have
the potential to perform more effectively under new managers. With the exception of
the p/e ratio, these variables are all positive. This means that the probability that of a
company becoming an acquisition target increases as the level of dividends per share,
for example, goes up. These terms imply that the acquired firms are in a better
position to attempt extensive new investments in the future than the companies which
remain uninvolved in the market for corporate control. Again, this corresponds to the
characteristics of takeover targets as they are observed in papers such as Dietrich and
Sorensen's (1984). Such a result also implies that the acquired companies are in a
relatively secure financial position as they can afford to pay dividends that are higher
than the average of the non-involved companies. The negative values for the p/e ratio
also correspond to another of the observed characteristics of target companies, that
they are relatively low in value. The p/e ratio indicates the value of a company on the
market compared to the earnings generated by that firm is a good measure of whether
or not the company is accurately valued. This terms appears in the predictive papers
written by Dietrich and Sorensen (1984), Palepu (1986) and Ambrose and Megginson
(1992) and is always expected to be negative, as here.
In these models it is interesting to note that the short term liquidity variables
are inconsequential in the results. This suggests that the values of the current and acid
test ratios are not significantly different from those of the companies that were not
acquired during the sample period. The long term liquidity variables, however, are
important in all of the results. It is particularly revealing to see these two terms
appear together as they do in the results for both one year and four years before the
acquisition. The values of both of these terms are very different from the equivalent
values for the companies that were not acquired during the same period which makes
this finding highly suggestive. This combination suggests that the long term liquidity
of the acquired firms is very different to that of the non-involved companies and the
combination of the two variables may imply that these firms have a potentially very
severe liquidity problem. These results could mean that the acquired firms display a
clear disparity between the length of time that they have to collect payments owed to
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them and pay the debts that they owe in turn. Such a result can be clearly linked to the
motive of managerial inefficiency and provide an area of easy improvement for the new
managers after takeover.
Lastly, there are the variables that represent the size, tax position and managers
to employees ratios for the acquired firms as compared to the companies that were not
involved in the takeover process. Of these three terms the tax charge variable is the
only one that appears in more than one instance. Here the total tax charge is
negatively linked to the probability that a company will become an acquisition target
suggesting that target firms have lower published tax commitments than the firms that
do not become involved in the corporate control market. This result neither supports
or opposes the tax motive for corporate takeovers. This motive, as Jarrell, Brickley
and Netter (1988) explain, states that target firms are selected to enable to acquirer to
take advantage of beneficial tax conditions that they are not otherwise able to use. The
fact that the target companies have low tax commitments merely suggests that the
purchasing companies do not want to buy a firm that is managing its tax ineffectively.
This decision could be as much about company efficiency as it is about taxation and
these results do not reveal any further facts about this issue.
These results are fairly good at correctly identifying which of the firms are
acquisition targets and which are not involved in the takeover process. Using the data
from the years closest to the acquisition somewhere between sixty-six and seventy-five
percent of the firms are correctly allocated into these groups. In the data set
representing four years before the takeover the accuracy of the models drops to around
fifty percent and, it should be recalled, it was not possible to create models for the final
year in this section as there are too many gaps in the available data.
Again, the hazard function results are highly informative concerning the nature
and characteristics of the companies that become acquisition targets. The efficiency
ratios show that these firms are consistently less effective than the rest of the
companies in the sample which offers clear support for the inefficient managers motive
for corporate takeovers. This concept, as authors such as Lev (1992) and Dodd
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(1992) noted, states that the acquisition process exists to remove managerial teams
that are under-performing and replace these people with more effective ones. This
result is further supported by the liquidity ratios which imply that the acquired
companies could have some problems meeting their financial obligations if the disparity
that exists between their debtor days and creditor days is not resolved. This difference
means that the companies have very different time scales to receive and pay their debts
which could, if left uncorrected, create a situation where the firm cannot meet its
financial requirements.
The investment terms in these results make two points about the differences
between the acquired firms and the companies that were not involved in the acquisition
market. The first point indicates that the acquired companies appear to have the
potential to invest substantially in future investments as they are able to pay higher
dividends than the rest of the firms in the sample, which are all companies of equivalent
size to the targets. These funds could be retained to pay for new projects which would
minimise the amounts that the companies would have to borrow to complete any such
plans. This would make the acquired firms more attractive to potential bidders then
companies that have lower pay-outs. The second informative point that can be drawn
from the investment ratios is that the acquired firms appear to be under-valued on the
stock market compared to the companies that did not enter into the corporate control
market at the same time. This is one of the most frequently mentioned characteristics
for companies that become the subject of acquisition attempts, as Dodd (1992) , Lev
(1992) and Palepu (1986) all observed.
Finally, there is the total tax charge. In these results this term is negatively
linked to the probability that a company will become a acquisition target. The only
conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the acquired firms have lower tax
commitments than the companies that were not involved in takeovers. This could be
linked to the managerial efficiency motive, but it is impossible to draw any inferences
about the tax motive from this single result. Overall, these results create the
impression that the acquired firms are inefficiently managed companies that are
relatively under-valued but have the potential to attempt new investment in the future.
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Acquiring and Non-involved Companies
In this, the last section of empirical work in this chapter, the data sets are
concerned with the modelling of the acquiring companies against firms of comparable
size that were not involved in the market for corporate control during the sample
period used here. As in the previous section, the use of a choice based sample means
that the logit results will be biased in favour of the acquired firms. This bias has
already been quantified and is equal to 29.82%. The table below contains the logit
model results for this data set.
The efficiency variables are the first set of terms to be considered. These
variables are split between those with positive links with the probability of a company
becoming an acquisition bidder and those terms that are negatively linked to this
likelihood. The positive terms are more consistent than the others as they are all
associated with the same variable, the ratio of turnover to fixed assets, and appear in
consecutive years of data. The continued presence of this term indicates that the
bidding companies are more efficient than the firms that do not become involved in
takeovers. The idea that bidding companies are more effective than other companies
appears in articles such as Lev's (1992) and could be linked to several of the motives
for acquisitions. For example, an efficient company could be looking for synergistic
benefits in a takeover as Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) observed or it could be
attempting to diversify into new markets as Hughes discussed (1993). Equally, such a
firm could be looking to maximise its tax advantages through the purchase of another
entity. The profitability variables in these models all suggest that there is no significant
difference between profits for the bidding companies and the earnings of the firms that
do not become involved in the corporate control market. The investment ratios in
these logit results appear to suggest that the bidding companies have lower levels of
funds available for investment than the firms that do not take part in the acquisition
process. This is inconsistent with any of the theories concerning the nature of bidding
companies which suggest that these companies are in the position to expand and
advance when they decide to attempt the purchase of another firm.
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Table 4.6 Logit Results for Acquiring and Non-involved Companies
Variable Number of Years before Acquisition
I II III IV V
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets 0.76*
(3.06)
0.91**
(2.1)
1.1*
(2.86)
Sales per employee -1.09*
(-2.79)
Stock ratio -0.15***
(-1.71)
-0.35*
(-2.63)
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity -0.19
(-1.33)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share 0.45*
(-2.63)
Earnings per share -0.19***
(-1.74)
Dividend yield 0.42***
(-1.85)
0.47
(1.31)
P/e ratio 0.52**
(-2.28)
-0.8**
(-2.33)
Capital gearing
Current ratio -1.16**
(-2.55)
Acid test ratio -3.83*
(-2.76)
Debtor days 4.28*
(3.05)
Creditor days
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio 0.15*
(-2.73)
0.29*
(-2.98)
0.09***
(-1.82)
0.11**
(-2.02)
0.14**
(-2.12)
Total tax charge 0.06
(1.37)
0.05
(1.45)
0.07
(1.61)
0.13***
(1.72)
0.11
(1.54)
Constant
(-1.7)
Likelihood ratio test 37.11* 37.64* 29.63* 59.36* 35.99*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquiring firms
Non-Involved Firms
30
56
32
54
28
60
30
60
37
60
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10-3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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These logit models are poor predictors of the nature of the firm in the sample.
After correcting for the bias in the results, which comes to almost thirty percent, it
becomes apparent that they are very poor at identifying the companies that become
bidders in the acquisition process but perform rather better when identifying the
non-involved firms in the sample. This could be symptomatic of the weakness of this
methodology and in particular of its inability to incorporate an element of timing into
the estimations of these results.
The last table in this section contains the proportional hazard function results
for the companies that become bidders when modelled against the firms that do not
become involved in the market for corporate control. Here the efficiency variables in
these results have both positive and negative links with the probability that a firm will
become the bidder in an acquisition. The positive links suggest that the acquiring firms
are more effectively run than the companies that do not take part in the takeover
process. This is consistent with the idea of Dodd (1992) and Lev (1992) amongst
others. This characteristic could also be linked to the ambitious managers theory for
acquisitions which states that the managers of the acquiring company are looking for
another firm to acquire as such a manoeuvre will enhance their own standing and
financial position. The negative terms that also appear in these_ results create the
converse impression but are not totally incompatible with the motives for acquisitions
and the characteristics of involved companies as they appear in the recent literature.
The synergy motive for corporate acquisitions is one of the most frequently mentioned
motives for takeovers, as Lev (1992) and Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) explain.
Here is it suggested that takeovers occur because the company that is created as the
result of the combination of the bidding and target firms can achieve ends that neither
of the original companies could have reached on its own. It is possible that the
inefficiencies that still exist in the bidding companies cannot be removed by a process
of internal alteration. As a result, the purchase of another company that occupies a
complementary position could be the only way that this situation can be rectified. This
reasoning could also be applied to the restructuring motive for takeovers. Again this
may be the only way in which these inefficiencies can be removed from the bidding
company.
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Table 4.7 Hazard Function Results for Acquiring and Non-involved Companies
Variable Number of Years before Acquisition
I II III IV V
Turnover to assets employed 0.82***
(-1.73)
-0.16
(-0.68)
-0.45
(-1.37)
Turnover to fixed assets 0.44
(1.62)
-0.24
(-1.57)
-0.51*
(-2.68)
Sales per employee 0.53**
(2.05)
0.46**
(2.22)
0.18
(1.04)
Stock ratio 0.23*
(2.79)
Return on capital employed 0.1**
(2.04)
0.5**
(2.0)
0.92***
(1.88)
Return on s'holders equity 0.09***
(1.77)
Pre-tax profit margin 0.72**
(-2.28)
-0.94*
(-2.85)
0.28
(1.2)
Net profit margin 0.33
(1.04)
Dividends per share 0.33*
(2.7)
0.6*
(4.68)
0.14
(1.61)
Earnings per share 0.17**
(1.97)
Dividend yield 0.39**
(2.43)
P/e ratio 0.24***
(1.7)
0.27
(1.65)
0.32**
(2.02)
Capital gearing 0.62**
(2.35)
0.41
(1.12)
Current ratio 0.83**
(2.28)
0.69**
(2.12)
_
'
0.58
(1.34)
Acid test ratio 0.93**
(2.13)
Debtor days 0.4***
(1.73)
-0.79
(-1.39)
Creditor days -1.01**
(-2.37)
Total sales 0.01***
(-1.9)
-0.03**
(-2.18)
Manager/employee ratio 0.16**
(2.04)
0.05
(1.11)
0.08**
(2.33)
0.09**
(2.04)
Total tax charge -0.05*
(-3.57)
0.06**
(-2.29)
-0.04
(-1.52)
0.04**
(-2.26)
Likelihood ratio test 57.49* 65.59* 63.45* 89.69* 77.68*
Predictive Accuracy (%). Acquiring
firms
Non-Involved Finns
72
66
70
68
64
60
62
58
54
50
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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In the group of profitability ratios the majority of the terms are positively
related to the probability that the company will become the acquirer in a takeover.
This corresponds to the idea that the acquiring companies are more profitable than the
average company on the stock market as suggested in the literature. Such a result
supports the idea that the purchasing companies in the market for corporate control
are in a stable and successful financial position before they select to purchase another
firm. It is interesting to note that these terms are not significantly different from the
rest of the firms in the sample in the year furthest away from the takeover but gain
importance as the acquisition gets closer. It may be that the bidding companies growth
over time means that they progress from being average firms to occupy a position
where they are able to consider entering the corporate control market. Such an idea
can be linked to the ambitious management theory for acquisitions as well as the theory
that some firms select an acquisition as a method of expanding and increasing market
share, as has been discussed previously.
The investment ratios support the idea that the bidding companies have
excessive dividends that can be retained and used for the purchase of other companies.
This is Jensen's Control Hypothesis of Debt (1988, 1992) in which the author presents
the idea that the managers of bidding companies should issue debts to their
shareholders in place of dividends and then use the retained funds to purchase other
firms. The issuing of debt in this scenario ensures that the shareholders will receive, at
some time in the future, the dividends that have been withheld or they could sue the
firm into bankruptcy. This enables the dividends to the diverted into other areas,
notably the purchasing of another company. This scenario fits precisely with the
positive signs allocated to all of the investment terms in these results which imply that
the bidding companies are paying higher dividends than the companies that do not
enter the market for corporate control. It is also interesting to note that, whilst these
terms are important in the years further away from the acquisition most of them are not
significantly different from the equivalent values for the rest of the sample in the year
immediately before the takeover. It is possible that this is because these companies are
retaining their dividends in that year for precisely this reason and this may be evidence
of Jensen's theory in practice. Another interesting feature in this group of terms is the
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presence of a positive p/e ratio in several of the years. This suggests that the bidding
companies are relatively over-valued by the stock market which is an idea that also
appears in some of the recent articles on the attributes of the companies that become
acquirers.
The next group of terms to consider are the liquidity ratios. Here the majority
of the terms are positively related to the probability that a company will become the
bidder in a future acquisition attempt. This would seem to suggest that the bidding
companies have no problems with liquidity and are, as a result, in a sound financial
position. It is not possible to relate this result specifically to any of the motives for
acquisition activity that appear in the literature on this subject. Neither is liquidity
specifically mentioned as a characteristic of these companies. However, it is unlikely
that any firm would attempt an acquisition if they were not in a sound fiscal position as
the purchase of another company is an expensive investment and could inflict severe
financial difficulty on the purchaser if it is not handled properly. Consequently, whilst
good liquidity is not mentioned explicitly in the literature, this section of the results can
be linked directly to the notion that the purchasing firms are held to be profitable.
The variable representing the managers to employees ratio appears in the
results for virtually every year and is consistently positively related to the Probability of
a company becoming the bidder in an acquisition. Lecraw (1984) uses this term to
measure a companies propensity to diversify. If a firm has a large number of managers
compared to the number of other employees then it is possible that some of these
managers will be under-utilised. In order to create more work for these people the
company may attempt to create extra areas within the firm where they might be used.
Notably diversification into a new geographical area or market is a popular choice
under these circumstances. Thus, if the acquisitions in this data set were used as a
method of diversification then this variable should be positively linked to the likelihood
of a company becoming a bidder in a takeover, as it is here. Diversification is a motive
for corporate acquisitions that has not featured prominently in the earlier tables of
results but appears in the literature as typified by Hughes' paper (1993). A company
may use an acquisition as a way of entering new markets or geographical area as this
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has several advantages compared to internal growth. In the first place, this approach is
far faster as the purchasing firm does not have to research the market and develop new
products as the target will have already completed these tasks. Similarly, the bidding
firm will be buying established factories and a known brand name which also reduces
the costs of entering a new business area. Finally, there are some market areas where
there are barriers to entry that would make it virtually impossible for a new company
to start trading in this field. By acquiring a firm that already operates in the area of
interest it is possible for the bidding firm to circumvent this issue and gain a place in
the market of its choice.
Finally, there is the tax variable. This term is continually negatively related to
the likelihood that a company becomes a bidder in the future and features prominently
in four of the five results in the table. Such a result means that the bidding companies
are managing their tax situation efficiently and are managing to minimise their charges
in this manner. This could be linked to the tax motive the takeovers which states that
the bidding firms use acquisitions to maintain or gain favourable tax conditions for the
future. These firms may be attempting an acquisition in order to retain these low tax
levels in the future, as Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) hypothesised. Alternatively,
these terms can be used to add extra emphasis to the facts that these firms are
effectively managed and are in a secure financial position. These last two factors can
be linked to the ambitious managers motive for takeovers as well as the tax motive.
The predictive abilities of these models are fairly good. They are capable of
correctly allocating the survival functions of these two groups of firms between
seventy and fifty percent of the time although the accuracy of the results decreases
when the data is taken from years further away from the event.
In these results it is possible to distinguish some patterns that develop over
time as can be seen in both the profitability and investment terms. As has been
mentioned above this could be symptomatic of some form of change in the bidding
companies that changes them from ordinary companies to firms that are able to attempt
an acquisition. Furthermore, the changes that result from this stage in the bidding
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companies life-span may also make the prospect of an acquisition not only a possible
investment but also a sound one. Irrespective of whether this supposition is true or not
there are some clear facts about the results in this section. Once again the proportional
hazard function models are more informative than the logit models and correspond
more closely with the theories and characteristics concerning companies that become
acquirers in the literature. These firms appear to be profitable companies with great
investment potential, especially when their dividends are retained. In addition to these
features, the acquiring companies are in a secure financial position with respect to both
their liquidity and tax charges.
Conclusion
This chapter had two clearly defined objectives; to compare the theoretically
superior hazard function methodology to logit models which have already been used in
the study of acquisitions and to identify the characteristics of the companies that
become bidders and targets in the takeover process as compared to each other and to
firms that do not enter this market. These uninvolved firms form two distinct data sets
that are paired with the bidders and targets.
The hazard function models continually out-perform the logit results when the
accuracy of the models is considered. In addition, they are always more closely linked
with the theories for acquisition activity and the characteristics of the firms that
become involved in the market for corporate control. The main findings of this chapter
can be simply summarised. It is important to remember that these findings are all
relative and represent the differences between the two sets of firms that are being
examined at that time. The tables given here include one result from each year of data.
There are more results for each year than just this one, although it is representative of
all of the findings. A complete set of all of these results can be found in Appendix III.
The acquired firms were examined twice, firstly against the companies that
attempted to acquired them and secondly against firms of a comparable size that were
not involved in the takeover process during the sample period. On the whole, the
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characteristics of the acquired companies were the same for these two sets of results.
The efficiency variables show that these firms are less effectively managed than either
the bidding companies or the firms that are not involved in the acquisition process.
This clearly supports the managerial inefficiency theory for takeovers, as suggested by
many authors including Dodd (1992) and Lev (1992), as these firms are displaying
uncorrected flaws over several years. The managers of another firm could view this as
an ideal opportunity for a takeover, which also links this finding to the managerial
ambition motive for takeovers that applies to the acquiring companies. The acquiring
firms have efficiency terms that are both positively and negatively linked to the
probability that a company will become a bidder in the future. The positive terms
correspond to the literature on this subject and suggest that the acquiring firms are
effectively managed which may be an alternative link to the ambitious managers theory
for takeovers. If the firm is doing well, managers may be looking for an acquisition to
provide themselves with another challenge and, simultaneously, to increase their own
standing and financial remuneration. However, some of these terms are also negatively
linked to the probability that a company will become a bidder in the future which is
contrary to the position taken in the recent literature. It may be that the correction of
these flaws is not possible within the bidding firm before the takeover and that
acquisition takes place to create conditions where it is possible for the company to
rectify these problems. This brings the restructuring and synergy motives to
importance as possible motivations for the takeovers. Sometimes acquisitions take
place to generate synergistic benefits which result from the pooling of the resources
available to two or more companies. On other occasions acquisitions serve to enable
the bidding company to complete some form of radical restructuring that cannot be
carried out internally. Either of these motives could be linked to the removal of
inefficiencies in the bidding companies and can, therefore, be linked to the negative
efficiency terms that appear in table 4.11.
The profitability variables when the acquired firms are modelled against the
acquiring companies are generally insignificant suggesting that there is little of no
difference between the values of these terms. This is contrary to the prevailing notions
concerning the nature of target companies, which are held to be less profitable than the
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average firm. However, when the acquired firms are modelled against the companies
that were not involved in the takeover process the expected result appears. The terms
here are nearly all negatively associated with the probability that a company will be
acquired which is suggestive of poor managerial techniques and consequently poor
profitability. Once again, these results can be linked to the motive concerned with the
removal of an inefficient management via the acquisition process. The acquiring
companies appear to be considerably more profitable than the firms that do not take
part in the acquisition process. In this case it is possible to related the results to the
ambitious management theory for acquisition activity and the idea that the acquiring
companies may be using the purchase of another firm as a method of expansion.
The investment ratios for the acquired firms convey the same impression about
these companies in both sets of results concerning the target companies. The terms
that refer to the dividends paid by these companies are continually positively linked to
the probability that the firms will be acquired whilst the p/e ratio is negatively linked to
the likelihood of this event occurring. The positive terms imply that the target firms
have the potential to perform well in the future and could afford to invest in new
opportunities, should these openings arise, and that these investments could be paid for
by retaining the firm's dividends. Having the potential to do well in the future is
_
another of the characteristics that are ascribed to acquired companies in the recent
literature. Equally, the targets of acquisition activity are often observed to be relatively
under-valued compared to their true worth. The negatively signed p/e ratio that
appears in these results is an indicator of this very fact and suggests that the market
value of the acquired companies in an under-estimation. By purchasing an
under-valued firm, the acquirer can reduce the costs of the takeover and be certain of
getting a good deal. Even if the target firm cannot be effectively incorporated into the
parent company, the acquirer can often make a profit by dismembering the acquired
firm and selling the individual parts. Similarly, the investment ratios for the acquiring
companies suggest that they are also in the position where they can finance
investments by retaining dividends. In fact Jensen (1988, 1992) advocates this as a
method of funding acquisition activity. The p/e ratios for these firms are higher than
those of the companies that do not take part in the takeover process. According to
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Dodd (1992) and Lev (1992) this means that the acquiring firms are relatively
over-valued which may make it easier for them to raise the funding necessary for the
purchase of another firm.
The liquidity of the acquired companies is poor in the results generated using
both the acquiring and the non-involved companies. When the bidders are used in the
models both the short term and long term liquidity variables suggest that the target
companies have lower than average liquidity. This could be symptomatic of an
inefficient management and suggests that the targets could have problems in meeting
their financial obligations. When the results are created using the companies that were
not involved in the takeover process the short term liquidity variables are no longer
significant in the results but the long term variables remain important and convey the
same impression about the financial condition of the targets. It may also be possible to
relate this result to the financial restructuring motive where the acquiring company
occupies a position that is complementary to that of the bidder so that the acquisition
will enable the acquirer to achieve some form of alteration in its structure that cannot
be accomplished through internal growth. The acquiring companies have good
liquidity compared to the firms that are not involved in the market for corporate
control which also implies that these firms are in a sound financial position. Such a
result is difficult to relate directly to any of the motives for acquisition activity that
appear in the literature or to any of the characteristics that are thought to identify the
companies that become bidders but a secure financial position is a prerequisite for a
company that wishes to successfully attempt a takeover in the future.
Finally there are the variables that describe those features of companies that are
involved in acquisition activity that cannot be represented by the variables in any of the
previous groups; the size, tax position and propensity for diversification of these firms.
When the acquired firms are modelled against the acquiring companies, the size
variable becomes significant. In the literature it is often observed that the targets of
acquisition activity are smaller than the bidders. This is not the case here. The size of
the acquired firms is not significant in all of the data sets, but when it does appear it is
positive which implies that the larger companies have a high probability of becoming
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the target of an acquisition. This unexpected result could be due to the period which
the sample covers; 1987 to 1994. During these years there were several atypical
factors that could make it possible for large companies to become the targets of
acquisition activity when they would normally be safe from takeover attempts. For
example, the UK economy was in a boom during part of this period which also
coincided with the last merger wave to occur in this country. In addition to these
features there was the de-regulation of the financial markets which made it easier for
companies to raise finances should they wish to. The combination of these factors
could well have made it possible for potential bidding companies to attempt to acquire
firms that were larger than themselves by providing a situation where the appropriate
level of funding could be raised.
When the acquired firms are modelled against the companies that did not enter
the corporate control market, the tax variable becomes significant. Here this variable
is continually negatively linked to the probability that a company will be the subject of
an acquisition attempt. It is not possible to draw any clear inferences about the nature
of the target companies or the motives that might initiate a takeover from this result
although there are two possible links. The first of these is the tax advantages motive
which states that acquisitions occur to preserve or create advantageous tax
concessions for the purchasing company. The second notion is that the bidding
companies are unlikely to select a takeover target that has a large tax burden as this
could be expensive to deal with. When the acquirers are modelled a similar result
appears. The tax charge for these terms is also negative. Again this could be related
to the tax advantages motive as the bidders could be attempting the takeover in order
to preserve their low tax payments in some way, or it could be symptomatic of the
sound financial position that these firms appear to occupy before the acquisition and
their effective dealing with such issues. The last variable to be considered is the
managers to employees ratio which is continually positive in the models featuring the
acquiring companies and the firms that were not involved in the takeovers. A positive
sign here suggests that the acquiring companies have a higher ratio of managers to
employees than other firms of the same size. According to Lecraw (1984) this is an
indictor that these firms are likely to diversify in the near future as some of these
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managers will be under-employed and the purchase of another company would give
them something to do. Diversifying acquisitions are presently popular as the current
policy position of the Mergers and Monopolies Commission means that such takeovers
are unlikely to be referred or stopped by the Commission and the same holds for the
sample period used here.
The last point that needs to be made here is a note of the improvements that
will be made in the next chapter. Here no distinction is made between the different
economic conditions that apply at the time of these acquisitions. The models estimated
here are based on data from the entire period 1987 to 1994. If these models are
estimated over the boom and recession data sets separately they produce very different
results, as the last table in Appendix III shows. These differences suggest that splitting
the data sets in this manner may produce more detailed results about acquisitions in
different economic conditions. Furthermore, adding some macro-economic indicators
the models should be able to incorporate information into the estimations concerning
the precise conditions of the economy which may improve the overall abilities of these
models and increase the level of information that they convey on the subject of
acquisitions.
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Chapter 5. The Prediction of Acquisitions Using
Macro-Economic Data with Logit Models and Cox's
Proportional Hazard Function
Introduction
This chapter will investigate the possibility of adding macro-economic variables
in the estimation of the logit and proportional hazard models that were introduced
previously. In Chapter 2 it was demonstrated that the condition of the economy can
have an impact on the level of acquisition activity in the months that follow.
Furthermore, in Chapter 4, the firms that are involved in takeovers were examined in
order to discover which characteristics separate these firms from each other and from
the companies that do not become involved in the corporate control market. As a
result of the findings in these chapters it would be interesting to combine these two
types of information and to examine whether or not the addition of macro-economic
factors can enhance the quantity of information that can be gleaned about the firms that
become involved in acquisition activity. In particular there may be distinct differences
between the factors that drive acquisition activity under different economic conditions,
for example in boom and bust periods. By including some form of macro-economic
indicators and differentiating between periods it may be possible to determine whether
or not acquisitions activity is propelled by different factors at different times at the firm
level rather than considering the total activity in this field.
Previous research does not seem to have considered the combination of macro-
and micro economic information in the analysis of acquisition activity. Earlier work on
this subject is split between the papers that consider the corporate control market as a
whole, for example Golbe and White (1988), and the articles that examine the
individual companies that enter the market, as Palepu (1986) did. Consequently the
precedents for this sort of examination are virtually non-existent and there is little
available information on how this problem might be tackled.
249
If it can be shown that the companies that are involved in acquisition activity
differ depending on the economic conditions, then companies that are considering
attempting an acquisition might find this information very useful. It may be that the
economic situation can alter conditions so that companies become potential acquirers
when they would not otherwise be able to attempt to purchase another firm.
Conversely, some firms may become targets during certain times when they are
immune from acquisition attempts in other periods. This may be particularly true of
large and powerful companies that should be safe from acquisition attempts most of
the time. To this end it will be interesting to see whether or not it is possible to
effectively add macro-economic information into logit and hazard function models and
to ascertain the impact that these variables have on the analysis of the nature of the
firms that take part in the takeover process.
This chapter is organised in the following manner. Section 5.1 will centre on
the theories and evidence in previous research that are applicable to this topic. Section
5.2 contains three sub-sections. The first of these considers the methodologies that
will be used, the second one deals with the data and the last one contains the empirical
results of these estimations. Finally there is the conclusion.
5.1 Theories and Evidence
There does not appear to be any previous research that involves the use of
macro-economic factors in combination with accounting data in the analysis of the
types of companies that become involved in acquisition activity. Nevertheless, there
are some areas of the previous work that can be applied to this issue. The literature
concerning the motives that drive acquisition activity are still applicable here, as they
were in the previous chapter. The fact that macro-economic considerations are also
involved in these models will not alter the fundamental factors that impel companies to
attempt to purchase another firm. Equally, the characteristics of the companies that
become involved in takeovers are also relevant here, as they were in Chapter 4. The
literature concerning these two areas of previous research can be seen in detail in both
the literature review and, more briefly, in the preceding chapter. Equally, there is a
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considerable body of research that has attempted to identify the link between the
macro-economic conditions and the level of acquisition activity as a whole. The
previous literature in this area has been reviewed in Chapter 2 and the same factors
that were important there will be used in this chapter.
The only reference that is important in this chapter that has not been previously
reviewed is the paper by Wadhwani (1986). This article investigated the possible link
between firm bankruptcy and the level of inflation in the UK. This offers a precedent
for the use of macro-economic variables in investigating factors that have an impact on
company activities. In addition, Wadhwani multiplied inflation into his equations in the
same way that macro-economic principal component terms will be multiplied by
accounting terms in order to make it possible to apply these terms in logit and hazard
function models. It is unfortunate that there are no more references that can be used
to guide the development of this chapter, but this development is unique to this study
and has not been applied previously.
5.2 Methodology and Empirical Results
5.2.1 Methodology
The methodology that will be used here is the same as in the previous chapter;
logit models and proportional hazard function models. These models are both treated
in their binary forms where they are concerned with the identification of characteristics
that differentiate between just two possible outcomes. The methodology section of
Chapter 4 discusses these two models in considerable detail and so it is unnecessary to
re-examine them here in any depth. The logit and hazard function models can be
represented in the following manner, equations 5.1 and 5.2, which reveals the
fundamental differences between the two approaches, in particular the absence of a
time element in the logit model and the conditional nature of the hazard function
probability. The logit model, equation 5.1, is a generalisation of the ordinary least
squares method that uses a link function, the log-odds ratio, to ensure that the
outcome remains within the acceptable limits for a probability. In contrast the hazard
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function, equation 5.2, estimates a conditional probability concerning the likelihood of
an event happening given that it has not already taken place. This, albeit very brief,
discussion illustrates the fundamental differences between these two approaches.
log
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There is, however, one new methodological approach that will be used in this
chapter. In the data sets there will be several new terms that are created using
principal components analysis. This technique is used to reduce many items of data to
a few terms or one variable that represents as much of the volatility displayed by the
original terms as is possible.
Principal component analysis centres on identifying a single term that
represents the behaviour of a much larger group of variables. There can be more than
one of these principal component terms and they are created in such a manner that they
are a linear combination of the original data and they are uncorrelated. The first
principal component represents the maximum possible level of volatility in the original
terms, whilst the second principal component represents the next highest possible level
of volatility that is possible whilst being uncorrelated with the first component and so
on. In the creation of principal components it is unnecessary to have any hypotheses
referring to the original data as it is only necessary to have the means and variances of
these terms. In the following empirical work the groups of terms will be reduced to
single terms and so it is only necessary to consider the construction of the first
principal component.
Suppose that the original data under examination is represented by a vector and
that the covariance matrix associated with these terms is also known. Furthermore,
suppose that the eigenvalues associated with the covariance matrix are known and are
arranged in descending order of magnitude. In the equations that follow these three
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terms are denoted x =x 1 , ...,xp , I and S i , ..., Sp respectively. It is then possible to
express the covariance matrix in the manner demonstrated in equation 5.3
z= rm./	 (5.3)
where r is an orthogonal matrix of order p and A represents a diagonal matrix whose
diagonal elements are the eigenvalues associated with the covariance matrix. A new
set of variables, y =y i , ...,y,, that represent the principal components are introduced
and defined by equation 5.4, below.
y = Tix 	(5.4)
When the covariance matrix relating to these new terms is estimated, below, it
shows that these terms are uncorrelated as the covariance matrix is equal to the
diagonal matrix of eigenvalues that was introduced earlier.
E(yyi) =E(FixxiT) = nrenr =A	 (5.5)
Finally, it remains to demonstrate that the first principal component is the linear
combination of the original terms with the maximum variance. This linear combination
can be expressed as ciy = cirix where c, a vector of scalars, is such that cic = 1. This
means that it is possible to estimate the variance of the principal -components. The
variance can be expressed in the form of equation 5.6 which is maximised when c 1 = 1
and c2 = ...cp
P 2E C J
 81+E
	 81)
f=1
This demonstrates that the first principal component represents the maximum
variance for any data set. Since this is the only term that will be estimated in this
chapter it is not necessary to investigate this methodology any further. The use of
principal components will make it possible to incorporate a great deal of
macro-economic information in the data sets without adding a lot of extra terms.
(5.6)
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5.2.2 Data
Two innovations are made in this chapter. The first of these concerns the
behaviour of the economic cycle within the sample period. The sample starts in an
economic boom, coinciding with a merger wave, passes through a severe recession and
ends in a period of slow recovery. It will be interesting to see whether or not these
periods alter the characteristics of companies that become involved in acquisition
activity. In Chapter 2 it was demonstrated that there is a strong link between the level
of economic activity and the number of acquisitions that take place at any time, so it is
not unreasonable to expect that the different economic periods will have a differing
impact on the outcome of the estimation of either logit or hazard function models. To
investigate this notion the sample period is split into three distinct parts. These
sub-samples represent the boom, recession and recovery periods that can be seen
within the sample period. The precise placing of the splits in the sample are based on
the short run indicator series produced by the Central Statistical Office which was
introduced in Chapter 2. The composition of this series matches the macro-economic
data used in Chapter 2 far more closely than any of the other indicator terms and many
of those same terms will feature in this chapter. The CSO series is designed to have a
mean value of one hundred which makes it simple to distinguish when it moves from a
boom period to a recession and vice versa. The graph below, Figure 5.1 -, shows this
series with the mean marked upon it as a horizontal line and the divisions of the period
denoted with vertical lines.
This means that the data sets will be split into three sub-samples of different
sizes. The boom period, 1987 - 1990, accounts for three hundred and eighty of the
original five hundred and fifty-four companies whilst the bust period, 1991 - 1993,
involves one hundred and fifty companies from the original sample. Finally the
recovery period, the year 1994, incorporates twenty-four firms. This last sub-section
of the data is too small to use in the estimation of either logit or hazard function
models and instead will be used to test the predictive abilities of the models created
using the other data sub-periods. The data used here is drawn from two years before
the acquisition occurred as this appeared to be the most informative period in the
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results of the previous chapter. In the previous chapter this data set consistently gave
the most informative results and so it seems appropriate to use it again here.
Figure 5.1 Divisions of the Sample Period Using the CSO Short Run Indicator Series
The second innovation is concerned with the data that will be .used in the
estimation of the empirical models. As before the data concerning the bidding and
target companies will be used, as will information on those firms that were not
involved in acquisition activity during the sample period. In this chapter, however,
there will be more variables included in the data sets as a set of conditioning variables
that combine macro-economic factors with accounting terms will be added. These are
added in a two stage process. Firstly, the macro-economic factors are combined into
six principal component terms representing different aspects of the economic cycle that
might have an impact on acquisition activity. The second stage involves the
combination of these terms with accounting variables. This is done in order to ensure
that there is a difference between the macro-economic factors for the zeros and ones in
the sample. This is essential as both of the methodologies used in this chapter are
designed to investigate the differences between the firms in the sample. In particular, it
is a fundamental assumption inherent in the construction of a hazard function model
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that the firms must lie in homogenous groups. If the macro-economic factors were
added to the data sets simply as stationary variables there would be no difference
between the values of these terms, as they apply to the zeros and ones which breaches
this condition and would make it impossible to estimate the models correctly.
Consequently, it is essential to link the macro-economic factors to the accounting
variables in order to maintain heterogeneity between the individuals in the sample.
Principal Components of Macro-Economic Factors
There is a considerable number of macro-economic factors that are going to be
used in the models based on the findings of Chapter 2 and previous research. In order
to simplify the process of adding these terms to the data sets, they are going to be
grouped together according to the value of their correlation coefficients. Each of these
groups will then be made into a single principal component. This results in the
construction of six principal component variables. The macro-economic factors that
go into each of these groups can be seen in the first column of the table below. In
addition, Table 5.1 includes the weights that each of these terms has in the principal
component and the cumulative le value for that component. This last term measures
how much of the total volatility demonstrated by the original terms is captured in each
_
of the principal component series. As Table 5.1 demonstrated these principal
component series are all reasonably good representations of the terms from which they
are composed as illustrated by the 112 values. The graphs below illustrate the extent to
which the principal components are related to the underlying variables that were used
in their creation. It is clear that the correspondence between these terms is close and,
as a consequence, the principal components can be used as an adequate substitute for
the macro-economic variables.
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Table 5.1 Division of Macro-Economic Factors Based on Correlation Coefficients
Terms Weights	 . Cumulative 1Z2
Inflation 0.33 0.69
Gilts 0.99
Treasury bills 0.99
MO 0.86 0.73
Term structure of interest rates 0.86
Return on the FTA 0.85 0.72
Return on the S&P500 0.85
GDP 0.94 0.74
Unemployment -0.83
Total retail sales 0.95
Commodities 0.80
Trade balance -0.76
Dollar : Sterling exchange rate 0.91 0.92
Effective exchange rate 0.97
Volume of exports -0.97
CBI confidence survey 0.86 0.74
Number of house-building starts 0.86
Figure 5.2 Principal Component 1
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Figure 5.7 Principal Component 6
Creating Variables that Combine Macro-Economic Data with Accountancy Terms
At the beginning of this section it was explained that the macro-economic
factors cannot be added to the data sets in their current form. The macro-economic
data, now in the form of six principal components, needs to be treated in such a
manner that will ensure that the macro-economic effect can be identified. This will be
done by multiplying the macro-economic terms with accounting variables to create
terms that are unique for each individual in the sample and make it possible for the
models to be estimated. There are virtually no precedents in the literature concerning
which accounting terms should be combined with the principal components and so the
selection of these terms is based on analysing the variables that were important in the
previous chapter and attempting to link these terms with the macro-economic variables
in a logical manner.
The first principal component is composed of three terms. These are the rate
of inflation and the rates for both gilts and three-month treasury bills. These terms
refer to factors that have an impact on the value of a firms' funds. Wadhwani (1986)
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investigated bankruptcy and linked this event to inflation. Furthermore, the inflation
term was multiplied into Wadhwani's equations in the same way that the principal
components are going to be multiplied with the accounting terms here. Wadhwani
suggested that inflation has an impact on liquidity and, thus, on the likelihood of a firm
going broke. Following this rationale it seems appropriate to link this principal
component to some measure of liquidity in the firm. In the previous chapter, liquidity
variables were often important in the empirical results and, more particularly, the terms
representing the creditor and debtor days appear significant in nearly all of the results.
To this end it appears that the most suitable variable to combine with the first principal
component is related to these terms. However, neither of these variables represents
the overall liquidity of the firm and in order to represent the total liquidity of a
company it is more appropriate to consider the difference between these terms; the
value of the creditor days less the debtor days. As a result the first macro-economic
variable, named Macro 1, is created by multiplying the first macro-economic principal
component by the difference between the creditor days and the debtor days for each
firm in the sample.
A similar rationale can be applied to the second of the macro-economic
principal component series. This variable is constructed from the money supply
variable, MO, and the term structure of interest rates. Again, these are factors that
could have an impact on the liquidity of the company and, consequently, it may be
appropriate to link this term to another measure of liquidity. The accounting terms
used in the creation of the previous macro-economic variable refer to the longer-term
liquidity of the firm and so it is sensible to consider the short-term condition in the
construction of this variable. In Chapter 4 the short term liquidity of the company was
represented by the current and acid test ratios. In the results, the current ratio
appeared significant far more often than the acid test term and as a consequence it is
appropriate to use this item here. Thus, the second macro-economic variable, Macro2,
is constructed by multiplying the second principal component by the current ratio for
the firm.
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The third macro-economic principal component is constructed from two terms
that represent the returns on the FT-All share index and the American Standard and
Poor's 500 index. Such a term represents the value of equity on the national and
international markets. It seems logical to combine such a term with an accounting item
that also reflects the value of the firm, the p/e ratio for example. However, the data
sets used here are constructed from quoted companies and so the value of the FTA
index already incorporates some information concerning the value of each of the firms.
Consequently, there would be an overlap between these two items which means that
this choice of accounting ratio may be debatable. Instead, the term representing
capital gearing will be used. The value of the leverage ratio for the firms in the data
sets appears significant in several of the results given in the previous chapter and the
resulting variable is called Macro3. The next new variable is Macro4. The principal
component here involves more variables than any of the other terms. These items
represent GDP, the level of unemployment, the volume of retail sales, the commodities
index and the UK trade balance. These terms are all connected with production and
the ability of each firm to meet demand. This suggests that the accounting term should
be connected with this side of the firm's behaviour as well. Consequently, Macro4 is
constructed by multiplying this principal component by the company's total sales.
The penultimate macro-economic term, Macro5, involves -a principal
component series that consists of the exchange rate between Sterling and the Dollar,
the effective exchange rate and the volume of exports leaving the UK. These terms
reflect the condition of overseas markets which will have an impact on any of the firms
in the data set that deal internationally. Alterations in the state of these international
factors could have an impact on the available funds that a company has for
investments, including acquisition activity. Such factors will be most clearly shown in
the early stages of a company's accounts and, as a result, the best variable to combine
with this principal component is the gross profit margin term. Finally, there is the sixth
macro-economic principal component. This is constructed from two series. The first
of these refers to the findings of the CBI survey on business confidence and the second
term reflects the number of house-building starts in the UK. The level of confidence,
for both businesses and consumers, can be directly linked to the level of investment
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that a company undertakes. Furthermore, the efficiency with which a company is
managed can also have an impact on that firm's facility for future investment. This
suggests that it is possible to link confidence and efficiency to the level of investment
and, consequently, it may be appropriate to use one of the efficiency terms in this
context. The term representing the ratio of turnover to assets employed appears in
many of the empirical results given in the previous chapter and will be used here in the
construction of the final macro-economic variable, Macro6.
Correlations within the Data Sets
In this chapter there are just six data sets that will be used in the construction
of the empirical models that are dealt with. These represent the three groups of
companies in this data set for both the boom and bust periods. As in the previous
chapter, it is important to know the value of the correlation coefficients between the
terms in each of these data sets. The correlation matrices for these data are included in
Chapter 3 as Tables 3.22 to 3.27 and, as before, this will make it possible to avoid the
potential problem of multicollinearity. If some of the terms in the data sets are very
highly correlated then only one of these variables will be used in the empirical analysis.
In the estimation of discrete choice and lifetime data models it is important to avoid
highly correlated groups of terms as these can result in the creation of excessively large
standard errors in the results.
Biases Created By the Use of Choice Based Samples
In the Chapter 3 it was explained that the use of logit models with a
choice-based sample could create a bias if the usual maximum likelihood ratio
estimator was employed. The equation for the bias was given, following Palepu
(1986) and it was demonstrated that the bias is created because there is a difference
between the probability of selecting an acquired firm in the sample and the probability
of selecting an acquired firm in the population, which are assumed to be the same
under the usual maximum likelihood estimator approach. Since the samples used here
are paired, it is essential to know the impact that this bias will have. To start with,
consider the data sets that refer to the acquired companies when they are modelled
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against the firms that are not involved in acquisition activity. Here the bias will result
in the over-estimation of the probability that a company will be acquired. In the boom
period the bias is 20.39%. In the bust period the bias increases to 33.43%, but shrinks
to just 18.53% in the test period that will be used to examine the predictive abilities of
these results. Next, consider the three data sets that refer to the modelling of the
acquiring companies against the non-involved firms. There are fewer acquiring
companies than there are acquired firms and so the biases are larger as the degree of
over-sampling becomes greater. In the boom period the bias is 27.79% which rises to
35.74% in the bust period. In the test period the bias is 23.35%. Finally there are the
data sets that incorporate the acquired and acquiring firms together. Here both types
of company are over-sampled and both will introduce biases into the estimations.
However, the biases will affect the results in opposite directions which will lead to a
certain degree of cancelling out. Since the biases are not equal in magnitude, however,
there will be a residual effect that will still need to be taken into account. The biases
associated with the acquiring companies are consistently larger in these data sets and
so the remaining bias in the logit results will generate an over-estimation of the
purchasing firms. In the boom period this bias is 7.4%. This is also the only time that
the bias in the bust period is smaller than the other biases and here it is equal to 2.31%.
The last data set of all is the test data set in which there is a bias of 4.82%. In order to
gain accurate estimations of the abilities of these models it is necessaly to. ad.ust the
predicted probabilities by the appropriate amount.
5.2.3 Empirical Results
As before, the empirical models are estimated using a two stage process,
following the general to specific methodology that was explained in Chapter 4. The
variables are eliminated one by one, starting with the least significant term, until the
variables that remain are all individually significant. At each step a likelihood ratio test
is estimated to confirm that the variable can be removed without impairing the overall
significance of the model. Once all of the insignificant variables have been removed
another likelihood ratio test is used to ensure that the remaining terms are jointly
significant in the model. In the table of results that follow, a result will be given for
264
both the boom and bust periods for each of the types of model under examination.
Naturally, each of the data sets generates more than one result, but in the majority of
cases the significant variables that appear in the resulting model are unaffected when
the combinations of highly correlated terms are changed and so the model given is
representative of all of the results in that section. A complete set of the results that
were created here can be found in Appendix IV. At the bottom of each table there are
calculated values for the likelihood ratio tests that examine the joint significance of the
remaining terms in the model. The null and alternative hypotheses here are :
Ho' : the coefficients of the remaining terms are equal to zero
HA' : the coefficients of the remaining terms are not equal to zero
These tables also include the predictive accuracy figures for each of the model
and for each type of firm within the data set. These values represent the percentage of
firms in the data sets which the model correctly identified. This figure serves as a
proxy for the R2 value that is often seen in regression models. It is not possible to
estimate a R2 term here and so, following the rationale offered Maddala (1996) which
was explained in detail in the methodology section of Chapter 4, this value is used
instead. It is also important to recall that when a term is not included in the results,
this means that there is no significant difference between the values of that variable as
applied to the two groups of firms in that particular data set. Furthermore, all of these
results are relative and reflect the differences between the two groups of companies
that are under consideration in each section of the results.
Acquiring and Acquired Companies
The firms in these data sets have been deliberately over-sampled which will
introduce a bias into any predictions generated using the logit methodology. The
acquired firms are over-sampled to a greater degree than the acquiring companies in
these samples and as a result the remaining bias will over-estimate the probability of a
firm becoming a bidder rather than a target firm as was explained in Section 5.2.2 and,
in greater detail in the previous chapter, Chapter 4, which introduced the
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methodologies that will be used here. Table 5.2 below illustrates the results of the
logit model estimations for both the boom and bust periods.
The first term in this result is one of the efficiency variables which appears in
the boom period result. This term is positive which is contrary to the theories
concerning the efficiency of acquired firms. Target companies are thought to be less
effective than other firms. This applies to both their bidding counter-parts and the
companies that do not become involved in acquisition activity. It is possible that more
efficient firms are acquired in a boom when bidders can take advantage of more
funding opportunities than at other times. The liquidity term representing the current
ratio appears in both the boom and bust period models. In both of these cases this
term is positively linked to the probability that a firm will become the target of an
acquisition attempt. This term can be related to the general financial condition of a
company and this result suggests that targets are in a reasonably secure financial
position, which is again contrary to the theories concerning takeover activity. The first
result in either of these models that corresponds with any of the theories concerning
acquisition activity is the total sales term that appears in the boom period result. This
term is negatively linked to the probability of a firm becoming an acquisition target,
which suggests that acquired firms are smaller than the bidding companies. Lev (1992)
and several other authors suggested that target firms are relatively small, which
reduces the costs of the purchase. The last accounting term in these models is the tax
charge variable which appears in the bust period model. This term is negatively linked
to the probability that a firm will become the target of an acquisition attempt, which
means that firms with low published tax charges are more likely to become the target
of acquisition activity that companies with high tax charges. However it is difficult to
link these results directly to the tax benefits motive for acquisition activity.
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Table 5.2 Logit Model Results for Acquired and Acquiring Companies
Variable Period
Boom Bust
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee 2.14*
(2.6)
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield
Pie ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio 2.93
(1.16)
2.47***
(1.74)
Acid test ratio
Debtor days
Creditor days
Total sales -0.51
(-1.62)
Manager/employee ratio -0.07
(-1.33) -
Total tax charge -0.24
(-1.55)
Macrol -2.33
(-1.61)
Macro2
Macro3 -4.26
(-1.59)
Macro4
Macro5 0.69***
(1.92)
Macro6
Likelihood ratio test 22.24* 15.54*
Predictive Accuracy (%). Acquired firms
Acquiring Firms
63
52
63
60
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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Three of the macro-economic terms appear in these logit model results. The
first one, Macro 1, represents the combination of the level of firm liquidity with terms
that represent the rate of inflation and the level of gilts and treasury bills. These
macro-economic variables can alter the value of a firm's funds. Wadhwani (1986)
suggested that inflation can be linked to financial distress as it has an impact on the
level of liquidity in the company. In turn this can have an impact on the potential that a
firm has for future investment, which could reduce the probability that the firm will
become the target of an acquisition attempt, as this result suggests. The first
macro-economic term to appear in the boom period models is Macro3. This variable
reflects the impact that the stock markets in the UK and America have on acquisition
activity. If the return on the stock market drops, as the negative sign in this result
implies, then the probability that a company becomes a target in a takeover will
increase. This could be a reflection of the fact that target companies are supposed to
be relatively under-valued before the acquisition, as Lev (1992) and Berkovitch and
Narayanan (1993) supposed. The last term is Macro5 which appears in the bust period
model. This variable relates the condition of the foreign exchange markets and
overseas trade to the probability that a company will become the target of an
acquisition attempt. It is possible that acquisitions activity is related to a devaluation
of Sterling on the foreign exchange markets, as was suggested in Chapter 2, but this
_
implies that this term would be negatively linked to the probability that a firm is
acquired, which is contrary to the result here. This positive link is difficult to explain
in the light of the previous results in this thesis. As might be expected these logit
models are not particularly good predictors when used on the test period as the figures
in the table suggest. Both of the models correctly identifies just over half of the firms
in the sample.
The hazard function models given in Table 5.3 are more informative than the
corresponding logit results. These results contain more terms, which makes it possible
to infer considerably more about the nature of the companies that become involved in
acquisitions activity. The first term in these results appears in the model referring to
the boom period and the result for the bust period. It represents the efficiency of the
target companies compared to the bidding firms. This term is negatively linked to the
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probability that a company will become the target of an acquisition attempt, suggesting
that the acquired firms are less efficient compared to the bidding companies. Low
efficiency frequently appears in the literature concerning the characteristics of
companies that are the subject of acquisition activity. This result can be linked to the
idea that the managers of acquired firms are less effective than their counterparts in the
bidding company as both Lev (1992) and Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) suggested.
It is possible that this trait could also make the company attractive to another company
in which the managers are ambitious and are seeking to enhance their own standing by
attempting to purchase another company, as Jensen (1988, 1992) suggested. The
profitability terms do not appear in the boom period model, which suggests that there
is no significant difference between the profitability of the acquired and acquiring
companies during the boom period. Nevertheless, this is contrary to the previous
literature which suggests that target firms should be less profitable than their bidding
counter-parts. In the bust period result, however, there is a profitability variable. This
term is negatively linked to the probability that a company will become the target of an
acquisition attempt as the previous literature suggests that it should, see Lev (1992)
for example. This can be linked to both the inefficient managers idea and the fact that
acquired firms are thought to be relatively under-valued by the stock market. If a firm
is under-performing then this is likely to be reflected in the share price which will make
_
it a more attractive target than a highly valued firm. The profitability terms were also
found to be negatively linked to the probability that a firm becomes the target of an
acquisition attempt in Chapter 4.
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Table 5.3 Hazard Function Results for Acquired and Acquiring Companies
Variable Period
Boom Bust
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee -0.31**
(-2.2)
-0.31
(-1.23)
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity -0.11
(-1.27)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share 0.11
(1.25)
0.25
(1.47)
Dividend yield 0.46
(1.4)
P e ratio -0.2
(-1.24)
1.37
(1.86)
Capital gearing
Current ratio -0.41*
(-2.35)
Acid test ratio -2.26**
(-2.2)
Debtor days
Creditor days
Total sales 0.63**
(2.38)
1:75
(1.63)	 -
Manager employee ratio 0.05***
(1.8)
-0.04
(-1.26)
Total tax charge
Macro!
(-1.99)
Macro2
Macro3 1.49**
(2.52)
Macro4 -0.66
(-1.61)
Macro5
Macro6
Likelihood ratio test 27.59* 16.18**
Predictive Accuracy (°o). Acquired
Acquiring Firms
75
50
83
66
All coefficients are in thousands (x lir), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1°0*, 5°0", 10°0***
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The next group of terms represent the investment variables. The terms that
refer to the ability that a firm has to invest in future projects, for example the level of
earnings per share, are positive in both results, which corresponds to the idea that the
target of an acquisition attempt should have the potential to perform more activity in
the future when, it is presumed, the new managers will attempt a more dynamic
program of investments and new projects. The p/e ratio is negatively linked to the
probability that a company will become an acquisition target in the boom period result,
which is the desired outcome as it is widely held in the literature for the target
company to be relatively under-valued by the stock market. The p/e ratio in the bust
period model, however, is positively linked to the probability that a firm will be the
target of an acquisition attempt. In a bust period, the selection of acquisition targets
may tend towards less risky firms as the companies must be successfully integrated.
To this end, the selection of firms that are relatively over-valued may reflect this more
cautious attitude. Rock, Rock and Sikora (1994) noted that there was a trend toward
conservative acquisitions during the recession period and it is possible that this is the
reason for this unexpected finding.
The liquidity of a company in not mentioned directly in any of the literature on
this subject. Nevertheless, it likely that the condition of a company with respect to this
_
factor will be an indicator of general financial well-being and the effectiveness with
which it is run. In this case it is probable that the liquidity of an acquired firm will be
lower than that of an acquiring company, as the current and acid test ratios suggest in
these results. Such a finding can be linked, as above, with the idea that the managers
of the acquisition targets are ineffective and failing to ensure that the company is in a
sound financial position. The next groups of variables in this model represent those
factors that are thought to be related to acquisition activity but do not come into one
of the previous categories. For example, the size of a company may have an impact on
the probability that the firm under examination will be acquired in the future. Both the
boom and bust period models suggest that the purchased firms are large compared to
the purchasing companies, which is contrary to the recent literature. It is held that the
size of a firm is directly linked to the cost of purchasing it, as larger firms tend to have
higher share prices than small companies, as Lev (1992) commented. However, the
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first of these models is based on acquisitions that took place in the boom period in the
UK economy, which also corresponded with a very large merger wave. During this
time, acquisitions took place that did involve small bidders attempting to buy much
larger target firms. This was made possible by the joint impact of financial
deregulation and the buoyant stock market which conspired to make it possible for
firms to raise very large sums of money for new investment. The positive sign
allocated to this term in the bust model may be another indicator of cautious
purchasing, as was mentioned above. The last accounting term to appear in these
results is the ratio of the managers to employees. This term was included, following
Lecraw (1984), to measure the likelihood that a firm will diversify: Lecraw suggested
that a firm with a large number of managers compared to the total number of
employees would be more likely to diversify because some of these managers would be
looking to create more work for themselves in order to justify remaining in their
current positions. However, in the context of this research, this variable can only
determine the probability that a firm will diversify if the bidding firms are the group of
companies under examination. Consequently, this variable could also be viewed as an
alternative measure of managerial efficiency. If there are a great many managers it is
quite likely that some of them will be surplus to requirements and could be eliminated
without having any adverse impact on the company. This is certainly the impression
that this term creates in the boom period model, when it is positively linked to the
probability that a firm will be acquired in the near future. Conversely, this term is
negatively linked to the acquisition likelihood in the bust period result. It is difficult to
explain this result unless it can be linked, once again, to a period of more careful
selection of takeover targets as the recession makes the bidders more cautious and,
therefore, more selective.
The last group of terms are the macro-economic indicators. In the boom
period result two of these terms demonstrate a significant difference between the
acquired and acquiring companies. The first of these is Macrol which is negatively
linked to the probability that a company will become the subject of an acquisition. The
macro-economic terms in this variable refer to inflation and the value of both gilts and
treasury bills. These factors can have an impact on the value of funds held by a firm
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which, in turn, can alter the potential that a company has for further investment as well
as having an impact on the liquidity of the company, as Wadhwani (1986) suggested.
These terms are negatively related to the probability that a company will become an
acquisition target, so it appears that the impact of macro-economic factors on the
value of money is related to a firms opportunities for future investment. Acquired
firms are supposed to have the potential to invest in other projects after the takeover
and as a result it is logical to presume that low inflation, for example, would enhance
these prospects and, consequently increase the likelihood of an acquisition occurring.
The last term in this model is Macro3 which is positively linked to the probability that a
company will be acquired. This variable represents the impact of the stock markets,
both national and international, on acquisitions activity. An acquisition is, simply, just
a way of transferring shares from one set of shareholders to another. Consequently, it
would be expected that this term would have considerable importance. In the boom
period the stock market moves upwards which is reflected in a general increase in
stock prices. This might be expected to result in a reduction in acquisitions activity as
the cost of the purchase increases, but it appears that this is not the case. This increase
in the value of equity will apply to the bidding firms as much as the targets and, as with
the size factor, the conditions may make it possible for acquisitions to take place in
which the target firm is valued highly. It has been noted already that the merger wave
that took place during the time period that this data set represents encouraged small
firms to purchase larger ones and the same is also true of firms with low market values.
If the funding conditions make it possible to raise the necessary finance, then this will
provide an ideal opportunity for bidding companies to attempt to purchase highly
valued targets, as appears to be the case here.
In the bust period result there is just one macro-economic variable, Macro4.
This term is negatively linked to the probability that a firm will be an acquisition target
and it is the only one of these terms that demonstrates a significant difference between
the bidding and target firms in this period. The economic parts of this term refer to the
level of industrial production and trade in the UK. It suggests that, as industrial
production and employment go down, relative to the acquiring company's industry, the
likelihood of a firm becoming an acquisition target increases. This implies that the
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bidding firms are examining the performance of the industry as a whole before
selecting a target for an acquisition attempt. If these factors decrease this may also
have the effect of reducing the cost of the purchase. This could mean that a recession
period is the best time for a bidding firm to attempt to enter new markets if the relative
performance of those markets is low or to take advantage of low performance in its
own industry to depress prices before attempting a horizontal acquisition. The hazard
function results given here are not much better predictors than the logit models in this
section. The boom period model can accurately place between seventy-five percent of
the acquired firms and fifty percent of the bidding firms in the data sets whilst the bust
period model correctly identifies eighty-three percent of the target companies and
sixty-six percent of the bidding firms. In using this sample, however, the predictive
results may be somewhat misleading. The models are estimated using the boom and
bust period in the data and then tested over the remaining year of data. The CSO
indicator series suggests that this year is part of an upwards movement in the economic
cycle but the economy is nowhere near the heights that it reached during the boom
period. As a result, the test period is not really suited to either of the estimation
periods that are used here; it is definitely not a recession period but it is a far less
buoyant period than any part of the boom period. Consequently, the predictions may
reflect unfairly on the estimated logit and hazard function models.
The fundamental characteristics that distinguish the acquired firms from their
acquiring counter-parts remain, broadly, unchanged from boom to bust period,
according to these results. The target firms are generally less effectively managed
companies with liquidity problems, but retaining the potential to perform far better in
the future. The main difference between the boom and recession period results lie in
the macro-economic variables that are important in these models. In the boom period
the factors are concerned with funding opportunities which will enable opportunistic
firms to enter the market for corporate control and select targets that might otherwise
be immune from takeover attempts. In a recession, however, the emphasis shifts to
productivity and the relative levels of industrial production. This means that there is a
distinct difference in the nature of takeover activity at different times and that these
changes are related to economic conditions.
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Acquired and Non-involved Companies
The models in this section reflect the differences between the acquired
companies and the firms that are not involved in acquisition activity during the sample
period. The acquired firms are considerably over-sampled in these data sets and the
resulting bias in the logit results will over-estimate the probability that a company will
be acquired. Table 5.4, below, contains the results of these logit models.
In both of these models there is a single efficiency term. In both cases this term
is positively linked to the probability that a firm will become the subject of an
acquisition attempt. Once again, the logit models have produced a result that opposes
the theories concerning the nature of acquisition targets. In the theory concerning
these firms it is suggested that the target companies are less efficient than other firms
and, as Scherer (1988) suggested, the acquisition serves to increase the overall level of
efficiency in the market as well as in the individual company. There is also one
profitability term in each of these models. In the boom result it is negatively linked to
the probability that a firm becomes the target of an acquisition attempt. In contrast,
the variable in the bust period has a positive sign. The negative term, here the return
on capital employed, corresponds to the theory in the previous literature where it is
suggested that purchased firms are less profitable than the average company in their
industry. The positive sign on the profitability variable in the bust period result, the
pre-tax profit margin, does not agree with this theory and is difficult to explain. The
liquidity variables are another group of terms that have different signs depending on
which period the models refer to. The bust period liquidity ratio is negative which
corresponds to the notion that target companies are less liquid than non-involved firms.
However, the boom period model includes a positive liquidity variable. This is
contrary to the expected result for this type of variable but it is possible that these
firms have excess liquidity. Available resources of this type could be utilised in the
future by a more dynamic management, particularly in a boom period when many firms
are actively seeking to expand their interests.
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Table 5.4 Logit Model Results for Acquired and Non-involved Companies
Variable Period
Boom Bust
Turnover to assets employed 2.2*
(2.89)
Turnover to fixed assets 0.84***
(1.71)
Sales per employee
Stock ratio 1.11
(1.62)
Return on capital employed -4.54*
(-3.2)
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin 8.01**
(2.17)
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield
P/e ratio
Capital gearing -0.17
(-1.48)
Current ratio
Acid test ratio -11.45*
(-2.72)
Debtor days
Creditor days 1.25
(1.43)
-
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio
Total tax charge
Macrol
Macro2
Macro3 1.78**
(1.97)
Macro4
Macro5 1.52**
(2.41)
Macro6
Likelihood ratio test 22.17* 21.11*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Non-Involved Firms
66
42
66
50
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -3 ), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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In these logit models there are just two macro-economic variables. Macro3
appears in the boom period model with a positive sign. The influence of the stock
markets on acquisition activity is well-known, as much of the previous literature
incorporates the notion that acquired firms should be under-valued. However, this
result suggests quite the opposite. Nevertheless, this factor could be a reflection of the
increased stock prices in the boom period. An increase in the value of equity could
bring with it easier financial options for the firms which could make it possible for
more companies to attempt the purchase of another firm. The term Macro5 appears in
the bust period model and this variable also has a positive sign associated with it. It
would be expected that this relationship would be negative as acquisition activity
seems to follow a devaluation of Sterling on the foreign exchange markets, as was
demonstrated in Chapter 2. The predictive abilities of these models, when adjusted to
remove the sampling bias, are fairly poor. Both the boom and bust models can identify
sixty-five percent of the acquired firms but, they are incapable of correctly placing
more than forty or fifty percent of the companies that were not involved in the
acquisition process. Thus, the overall performance of these models is rather poor.
Table 5.5 contains the hazard function results concerning the acquired firms
and the companies that were not involved in acquisition activity once again contain
more information than the equivalent logit results. The first terms that appear in these
results are the efficiency variables. In both the boom and bust period models these
terms are negatively linked to the probability that a firm will become the subject of an
acquisition attempt. This result corresponds to the previous research on this topic in
which it was stated that targets of takeover attempts are less effectively managed than
other companies and under-perform relative to the industry average, see Lev (1992)
and Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993). The same is also said of the profitability of the
acquired firms in the previous literature. In the bust model, the profitability terms
behave exactly as would be expected. Again, this can be linked to the notion that
acquired firms are less effectively run than other companies which relates to the idea
that acquisitions can increase the efficiency of both a single firm and the market as a
whole, as Lev (1992) and Scherer (1988) suggested. However, in the boom period
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model the profitability terms appear considerably less frequently and are positive which
is contrary to the previous literature. This implies that the profitability of acquired
firms is higher than that of companies that do not become involved in the acquisition
process during the boom period. It is possible that acquisitions in periods of
considerable economic prosperity diverge away from the results in the literature, as the
purchasing companies take advantage of the buoyant economic conditions to fund the
acquisition of companies that would be immune to acquisition attempts at other times;
companies that are larger than average and that are not under-performing in the
manner that would be expected. These takeovers have a higher cost but the funding
opportunities that exist in a boom enable the bidding firms to raise the money.
The majority of the investment ratios are insignificant in these models. The
only one that appears is the dividends per share term, which is positively related to the
probability that a firm will become the subject of an acquisition attempt in both the
boom and bust period results. This corresponds to the prevailing theories in the
literature on the subject of acquisition activity. In these articles it is suggested that the
target companies have the potential to perform far better in the future. This can also
be linked to the idea that the incumbent managers are ineffective and, when these
people are sacked, the new managers will institute a more dynamic investment strategy
that will make far better use of the company's resources. The next group of variables
in these results are the liquidity variables. The only terms that appear in these results
are the long-term liquidity variables, the debtor days and the creditor days ratios. In
the boom model the debtor days term is negatively linked to the probability that a
company will become the target of a takeover attempt. This corresponds to the notion
that the acquired firms are ineffectively managed and are in a relatively poor financial
position. Conversely, the creditor days variable appears in the bust period model and it
is positively related to the probability that a firm will be the subject of an acquisition
attempt which is contrary to the recent research in this area. It is difficult to say why
this result should have occurred at this point unless it is a reflection of a shift to less
risky takeovers in a recession, which would represent a sensible response to the less
profitable economic conditions.
278
Table 5.5 Hazard Function Model Results for Acquired and Non-involved Companies
Variable Period
Boom Bust
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets 0.79*
(-2.61)
Sales per employee -0.03
(-1.23)
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed 3.01*
(3.21)
-1.43**
(-2.22)
Return on s'holders equity -1.14
(-1.32)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin -2.78
(-1.41)
Dividends per share 0.16
(1.11)
0.39
(1.51)
Earnings per share
Dividend yield
P e ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio
Acid test ratio
Debtor days -1.44*
(-3.16)
Creditor days 4.9**
(2.14)
Total sales
-
Manager employee ratio 0.06*
(3.12)
Total tax charge
Macrol -1.32*
(-2.99)
Macro2 1.19
(1.28)
Macro3 -0.89
(-1.13)
0.53
(1.11)
Macro4
klacro5 -0.68***
(-1.78)
Macro6
Likelihood ratio test 26.09* 19**
Predictive Accuracy (°0). Acquired
Non-Involved Firms
75
66
70
54
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1 0
 o *, 5 0 0**, 1000***
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The ratio of managers to employees appears in the boom period model where it
is positively linked to the acquisition probability. This suggests that the acquired firms
are ineffectively managed as they have a greater ratio of managers to employees than
the non-involved companies. If a firm has a large number of managers it is probable
that some of them are unnecessary and the firm is unlikely to derive any benefit from
their presence. This finding supports the inferences made about the efficiency variables
that appear earlier in this model.
The first two macro-economic variables only appear in the boom period model.
The first of these, Macro 1, is negatively linked to the probability that a firm will
become the target of an acquisition attempt, whilst the second variable is positively
related to the same factor. The same comments about Macro] apply here as in the
previous section when this term appeared in the models involving the acquired and
acquiring companies. In briet the factors that constitute this variable can alter the
value of funds held by the company under consideration. This alteration then has an
impact on the potential that the firm has to invest in the future. There is a negative
relationship between this and the probability that a company will be acquired in the
near future. This suggests that the potential that a company has for investing in new
projects after it has been acquired is of considerable importance and so any external
factors that can reduce this potential will also reduce the probability that t- he firm will
become a takeover target. The same is true of the term Macro2. This variable
involves the term structure of interest rates and the money supply MO. If the supply of
money is increasing, for example, firms may find that they have more available to
invest in new projects including the purchase of another firm.
The term Macro3 appears in both the hazard function results in this section. In
the boom period model it is negatively linked to the probability that a company will be
acquired, whilst it is positively related to this probability in the bust period estimations.
This term involves the return on both the FT-All share index and Standard and Poor's
American index of the top 500 companies. The negative result in the first instance is
surprising given the fact that the stock market is particularly buoyant during a boom.
A lower stock price would reduce the cost of an acquisition and it may transpire that
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the acquired firms may be under-valued compared to the companies that are not
involved in the takeover process as previous research suggests. The positive sign for
the bust period is also unexpected. An increase in the value of equity will make the
acquisition more expensive but a more expensive company may be in a more stable
financial position which could suggest that bust period acquisitions are designed in a
more conservative manner than the boom period takeovers. The last term in these
results appears in the bust period result. The variable Macro5 represents an
amalgamation of terms that reflect the condition of the foreign exchange market and
the conditions of international trade. In a recession it is not unreasonable for these
terms to alter in such a manner as to make the prospect of foreign investment
unappealing. If this is the case, then companies may elect to attempt an acquisition in
the UK instead of investing in an international project. There are no references to
these types of factors in the previous research, but in Chapter 2 the foreign exchange
terms were consistently negatively related to acquisition activity in the same way as
this variable is inversely linked to the probability that a company will become the target
of an acquisition attempt. As with the equivalent logit models these hazard function
results are capable of identifying the majority of the acquired firms, seventy-Eve
percent with the boom period model and seventy percent with the recession result, but
perform poorly on the non-involved companies. The best prediction for the
non-involved companies is only correct in sixty-six percent of cases.
Once again these results imply that the basic characteristics of firms that
become the targets of acquisition activity are unchanged across the boom and
recession periods. As before, the targets are relatively inefficient, but possess the
potential to perform better in the future. This can be directly linked to the inefficient
managers motive for acquisition activity. The main differences between the boom and
bust results are linked to the macro-economic factors. In the boom period the factors
are all concerned with the funding aspects of investment suggesting that these factors
can drive takeovers when there are beneficial financing options. In contrast, the bust
period models are more concerned with the maintenance of markets and trade
conditions. This could reflect a preoccupation with protecting the firm from poor
economic conditions rather than aggressive investment strategies.
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Acquiring and Non-involved Companies
The results in this section are based on modelling the acquired firms against
companies that did not take part in takeovers during the years from 1987 to 1994. In
these data sets the acquiring firms are deliberately over-sampled and this will create the
bias in the logit models. The table below, Table 5.6, contains the logit model
estimations for the acquiring and non-involved companies.
The first term that appears in these logit model results is a profitability variable
that is negatively linked to the probability that a company will become a bidder in an
acquisition attempt during the boom period. This suggests that acquiring firms are less
profitable than the average firm that is not involved in acquisition activity. This is
contrary to the theory concerning the characteristics of an acquiring company which is
thought to be more profitable than other firms. Lev (1992) and Berkovitch and
Narayanan (1993) both found that this was the case and it is difficult to see how an
unprofitable firm could afford to attempt a takeover. The same is true for the dividend
yield term which appears in the bust period results. Bidding firms need to be in a
sound financial position if they are to attempt new investments, including the purchase
of another firm. As a result these terms should be positively linked to the probability
that a company will become the bidder in an acquisition, but in these results the
investment term is negatively related to this likelihood which is inexplicable.
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Table 5.6 Logit Model Results for Acquiring and Non-involved Companies
Variable Period
Boom Bust
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin -1.03
(-1.61)
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield -1.01
(-1.37)
P/e ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio 4.4**
(-2.32)
-7.04***
(-1.9)
Acid test ratio
Debtor days 2.03**
(2.02)
Creditor days 5.32***
(1.91)
Total sales
-
Manager/employee ratio 0.37*
(-2.66)
-1.03**
(-2.52)
Total tax charge
Macrol
Macro2
Macro3 3.68**
(2.12)
Macro4
Macro5
Macro6 2.16
(1.54)
Likelihood ratio test 24.58* 37.55*
Predictive Accuracy (%). Acquiring Firms
Non-Involved Firms
66
51
42
25
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -3) t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
283
The first terms that appear in both of these models refer to the liquidity of the
firms. Once again, the short term liquidity variables in these logit model results are
contrary to the theories in the literature. Although, liquidity is not specifically
mentioned in any of these papers, it is associated with the financial stability of the
firms. Consequently, it is expected that the liquidity of these firms would be better
than the non-involved firms. The values of the debtor and creditor days variables in
these models are positively linked to the probability that a firm will become the
purchaser in an acquisition, which is the result that would be expected. The last
accountancy term in these results is the ratio of managers to employees which appears
negatively in both the boom and bust period results. A low number of managers could
be indicative of higher efficiency which would correspond to the idea that acquiring
companies are more effectively managed than other firms. This could be linked to the
managerial ambition motive for acquisitions where the managers of an efficient and
profitable company are seeking to use a takeover to increase their own standing by
increasing the size of their firm.
The last term in the boom period model is the variable Macro3. This is
positively linked to the probability that a firm will become the purchaser in an
acquisition. This term represents the influence that the stock markets, both in the UK
and in America, can have on acquisitions. In the boom period there is an increase in
the value of most shares. This will also increase the value of the bidding firms and, as
Scherer (1988) suggested, the stock market can create bidders by increasing the value
of certain firms beyond their true worth making it possible for them to fund an
acquisition. The last term in the bust model is Macro6. This links the level of business
confidence to the probability that a firm will become a bidder in the future. When
confidence is high, firms will invest more and may select riskier projects. This can be
directly linked to the probability that a firm will acquire and can be related to the
ambitious managers motive. The bidding companies can be correctly identified
sixty-six percent of the time using the boom period model but only forty-two percent
of the time using the recession results. In comparison the non-involved companies are
placed in the right groups between fifty-one and twenty-five percent of the time. The
hazard function results for the same data sets can be seen in the table below.
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Table 5.7 Hazard Function Results for Acquiring and Non-involved Companies
Variable Period
Boom Bust
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee
.
-0.77
(-1.26)
Stock ratio 0.22
(1.51)
Return on capital employed
Return on slolders equity 0.73
(1.4)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share 0.16
(1.4)
0.89*
(2.65)
Earnings per share -0.17
(-1.65)
Dividend yield
Pie ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio 1.89**
(2.37)
Acid test ratio
Debtor days
Creditor days -0.42
(-1.51)
Total sales
_
Manager employee ratio 0.21*
(2.71)
0.79*
(2.76)
Total tax charge
Macrol
Macro2 1.9*
(3.17)
Macro3 -1.18**
(-2.24)
-1.71**
(-2.13)
Macro4 0.02*
(-2.96)
11,facro5
Macro6 -0.45
(-1.3)
Likelihood ratio test 30.74* 46.97*
Predictive Accuracy (°o).
Acquiring Firms
Non-Involved Firms
75
83
75
66
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1°0*, S o o**, 100 0 ***
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The last table of empirical results in this chapter contains two very different
models. The efficiency variables are not significant in the boom period model,
although they do appear in the bust model. Here the terms are both positive and
negative, but a consistent inference can still be drawn. The term that refers to the
turnover of these firms suggests that acquired firms have lower turnover than average,
suggesting that the firms are producing more than they can sell when compared to
firms that do not become involved in acquisitions. The same impression is created by
the presence of a positive stock ratio variable. It may transpire that these bidding firms
have reached a position where they cannot continue to expand and grow in their
current areas of interest and are attempting to acquire another firm in order to expand
their sales and enter new markets. This is consistent with the notion that some
acquisitions are prompted by the desire to increase market share or to enter new
markets, as Hughes (1993) suggested. It is also possible that these firms cannot
remove these inefficiencies without restructuring themselves in some manner. Another
possible motive for acquisition activity is the restructuring motive, which states that a
firm may be in a position where it needs to alter itself radically to continue making a
profit. The fastest way that a firm can change itself is to purchase another company
that occupies a complementary position. The combination of these two firms should
have the desired structure. The idea that the acquirers may need to find a new market
or product is enhanced by the presence of a positive profitability variable in the same
bust period model. This variable corresponds more closely with the type of feature
that is held to denote an acquiring company in the recent literature. Bidding firms have
higher than average profitability which enables them to fund the takeover with
minimum recourse to one of the commercial lenders. This also corresponds with the
notion that the bidding companies are capable of performing far better than the average
firm in their industry.
The investment ratios provide additional support for this idea. This is the first
time that there is a term in the boom period result. In both results the investment
terms are positively linked to the probability that a company will become a bidder in a
future acquisition. This factor can be linked, as the profitability term was, to the ability
that a company has to fund the purchase without having to borrow the money. If the
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acquisition can be funded internally this creates a better impression and reflects
positively on both the managers and the firm as a whole. This could be linked to both
the managerial ambition motive for acquisition activity and the idea that the managers
are seeking to purchase another firm in order to increase their own standing and
financial reward.
The next group of variables refers to the liquidity of the acquiring companies.
In the boom period results this term is negatively linked to the likelihood that a firm
will become an acquirer, whilst the converse appears to be true in the bust period
estimations. The fact that the bidding firms are illiquid in the boom period could be
another reference to the restructuring motive for takeovers and may reflect the fact
that the bidders cannot alter their financial structure effectively without buying another
company. The positive sign in the bust result is yet another reference to the idea that
there are more ways of raising finance in a boom than in a bust period. In times of
recession, it is far more likely that the bidding company will fund the purchase from its
reserves or by retaining dividends. In the recession this may be the only way that the
required funds can be raised, which results in the fact that the only companies that can
afford to attempt an acquisition are those firms that are in a sound financial position
and do not need to borrow the funds for this investment. Again this corresponds to
the ideas of Lev (1992) and Jensen (1988, 1992) who stated that acquiring companies
occupy a sound financial position and have more available funds for investment than
their contemporaries who do not become involved in acquisition activity.
The last of the accounting terms is the ratio of managers to employees in the
bidding companies. In both the boom and bust period models this term is significant
and positively related to the probability that a company will become an acquirer in the
future. This suggests that the bidding firms have a high probability of diversifying, as
Lecraw (1984) suggested. If a company has a relatively high number of managers
compared to the total number of employees then, Lecraw claimed, the managers will
be under-employed and will want the firm to diversify in order to provide them with
more to do, thus justifying their positions. One of the motives for acquisition activity
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is the desire to expand and diversify the interests of the purchasing company and it is
easy to see how these two factors could be related.
The remaining variables in these results are all concerned with the
macro-economic factors. The first of these terms is the variable Macro2 which
appears in the boom model. This term represents the money supply and the term
structure of interest rates which can have an impact on the level of liquidity of a firm.
The positive relationship that appears in this result implies that the probability of a firm
attempting an acquisition increases as the value of this term rises. This may be related
to the availability of funds for new investments, including the purchase of another
company. The term Macro3 appears in both of these results and in both cases it is
negatively related to the probability that a company will attempt an acquisition.
Macro3 represents the influence of the return on the national and international stock
markets on the probability that a firm will attempt a takeover. The negative link
suggests that, when this item increases in value, the probability that a firm will attempt
a takeover decreases. If the value of equity decreases, this may make the proposed
acquisition a more affordable prospect. Lev (1992) and several other authors suggest
that bidding firms will look for under-valued targets when selecting a company to
purchase and so a general decrease in the value of equity could be related to this
_
factor, although this is unexpected in a boom period.
The remaining two terms appear in the bust period model but neither of these
appear in the boom result. Macro4 represents the level of industrial productivity whilst
Macro6 is created by combining the level of business confidence and the number of
house-building starts. Both of these terms are negatively related to the probability that
a company will become a bidding firm in a bust period. These two terms could both be
representative of similar factors in the determinants of acquisition activity. If the level
of industrial production is reduced and business confidence is low then both of these
factors are likely to have an impact on the future prosperity of companies. It is
possible that the bidding firms decide to diversify into new markets in order to
maintain a greater spread of business interests and reduce the impact that a single
industry can have on their profitability. The fastest way that this could be done is
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through an acquisition and so the link between these factors and the likelihood of a
firm becoming the bidder in an acquisition is clear. Furthermore, this result
corresponds with the previous findings which support the notion that bidding firms
may be seeking a way to maintain their profitability through diversification and
expansion. The predictive abilities of these models are a little better than the
equivalent logit models. Both the boom and bust models can correctly identify the
acquiring companies in the test sample seventy-five percent of the time. The
non-involved companies are also correctly placed in between eighty-three and sixty-six
percent of cases. The overall predictive abilities of the hazard models are better than
the equivalent logit results. Nevertheless, the test sample is rather unsuited to either of
the two data sets that are involved in the creation of the models which, doubtless, has
the effect of making both the logit and hazard function models appear less effective
than they really are.
The results created here display more variation between the boom and
recession periods that the models in either of the earlier groups. Nevertheless, the
fundamental characteristics remain consistent; acquiring companies are firms with
available funds to invest in new projects and with a high probability of diversifying into
new markets and areas. As in the earlier sections, the macro-economic terms are split
industrialbetween the funding terms, which appear in the boom results, and the ndustrial terms
that are significant in the recession period models. The impression that these terms
create is that potential bidding firms take advantage of the increased funding options
that exist in a boom and use these factors to pay for the acquisitions which can be
linked to the managerial ambition motive for takeovers. In the bust period, however,
the acquiring firms are far more concerned with maintaining a secure position and
diversifying to reduce risk and spread their product base. This links these findings to
the diversification and restructuring motives as well as the managerial ambition motive
for takeover activity.
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Conclusion
This chapter had two distinct, although not unrelated, objectives. The first of
these was to determine whether there are differences between the types of companies
that are involved in takeovers in boom and recession periods. The second objective
was to add macro-economic factors into the models to determine if these conditions
can enhance the information that is revealed by the modelling procedures. There are
difficulties in adding macro-economic variables into these models as it is essential that
the terms relating to each of the groups of firms lie in distinct bands. This makes it
impossible to add the macro-economic principal components to the data sets without
combining them with accounting terms to ensure that this criterion is satisfied. The
selection of the accounting terms is, doubtless, a controversial issue and there are no
precedents in previous research that can be applied directly to this issue. More
detailed investigation of these options would be an area for further research.
Nevertheless, the results in this chapter are informative and the macro-economic
variables appear as important factors in all of the results.
The logit and hazard function models given here often look quite different.
The results included in this chapter, as in Chapter 4 are very stringent . results and
involve only those variables that are significant. Nevertheless, the results are
consistent in the more general forms of the models. In the second appendix this point
is explained and an example given. The first point that becomes apparent about these
results is that the basic characteristics of acquired and acquiring firms remain the same
irrespective of the economic conditions. The target companies are inefficiently run
compared to the bidding firms and the companies that do not take part in takeovers.
They are also generally illiquid, but possess the potential to invest heavily in the future
if new projects and opportunities can be identified. All of these factors appear in the
previous literature concerning the characteristics of acquired firms. Furthermore, these
findings imply that the managerial inefficiency motive may be important in driving
acquisition activity. Equally, the accounting terms in the models of the bidding firms
create a familiar picture. These companies are more profitable than other firms, they
have considerable funds available for investment and demonstrate a high probability of
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diversifying via the purchase of another company. These models can be directly linked
to the managerial ambition motive, the diversification motive and the company
restructuring motive for acquisitions.
The new information in these results comes from the macro-economic
variables. These fall into two groups depending on the period that the models refers
to. In the boom period the important terms refer to the value of equity and other
factors that can alter the value of money. This suggest that takeovers which take place
in a boom period are of a more opportunistic nature than acquisitions that happen at
other times. This is probably due to the wider variety of funding options that become
available during a boom and, consequently, it is possible for companies to attempt
acquisitions which they could not afford at a different time. Equally, these conditions
make it possible for bidding companies to select targets that are larger, perhaps, or
more profitable and the funding possibilities make it possible for acquirers to purchase
these firms that they could not afford under other circumstances.
The macro-economic variables that are important in the bust period results are
all connected with production, sales and business confidence. These terms seem to
suggest that the acquiring firms, in a recession, use takeovers as a means of preserving
their situation and diversifying into new areas as a method of reducing risk and
developing new markets. It appears that the acquiring firms are selecting relatively
low risk targets during this period. This could be another reference to the acquiring
firms' desire to maintain their current strong position by purchasing a firm in good
condition rather than a struggling and inefficient company as the literature would
suggest. These results imply that the addition of macro-economic variables can add to
the level of information that is revealed in the logit and hazard function model results.
Furthermore, it is clear that there are some differences between firms that enter the
market for corporate control during different phases of the economic cycle.
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Chapter 6. The Benefits of Acquisition Activity
Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the benefits that are generated by the acquisition
process. There must be significant benefits for the acquiring company in the purchase
of another firm or there would be no point in attempting a takeover. It is generally
believed that the gains in acquisitions are split between the managers of the acquiring
company and the shareholders of the target firm. The shareholders of the acquiring
firm and the managers of the target company are not thought to benefit and may even
suffer in the aftermath of a takeover. This chapter is concerned with the impact that a
takeover has on the share prices of the involved companies and, specifically, on the
value of returns in those shares. Alterations on the returns on a share represent the
benefits that accrue to the shareholders of that firm and by examining the changes
created by a takeover should make it possible to determine whether an acquisition can
benefit the owners of either of the involved firms.
This is important in this thesis for three reasons. Firstly, it is an area where
there has been a lot of research in the past and to ignore it would be inappropriate and
would leave this thesis incomplete. Secondly, this chapter, and the event study
methodology that it incorporates, complete the progression of methodologies that runs
throughout the empirical work. In the first empirical chapter, Chapter 2, time series
methodologies were used to examine the behaviour of the acquisition market and to
analyse its behaviour with respect to the economic conditions in the preceding months.
The majority of the empirical work in this thesis comes in the analysis of the individual
firms that take part in takeovers and here there is a clear progression in the types of
methodologies that are used from cross-sectional approaches through cross-sectional
models that incorporate information about time to time series. This begins in Chapter
4 where the approach in both the logit and hazard function models is cross-sectional.
Chapter 5 augments the results of Chapter 4 with information from the findings of
Chapter 2 and the involvement of macro-economic factors adds an element of time into
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the estimations. Continuing this progression leads to the time series methodologies
applied here. These event studies complete this examination of the individual
companies that take part in takeovers and finally uses purely time-series techniques to
examine the impact that takeovers can have on the share prices of the involved firms.
The third reason is, perhaps, the most important of all. This analysis of the
benefits created by the takeover process offers empirical support for the results of the
previous two chapters by clarifying exactly who benefits and to what extent. This will
add further support to the motives that were identified in Chapters 4 and 5. In
particular, it will examine the role played by managerial ambition in the takeover
process. In Chapters 4 and 5 the results continuously suggested that the target firms
were poorly managed companies that were purchased because the managers of the
bidding companies wished to expand their sphere of influence and increase their own
prestige. In principle, however, the managers of the bidding firm should be aiming to
maximise the value of their shareholders investment and it is unusual for a risky
project, such as the purchase of another firm, to be in the shareholders interests. The
agency issue that arises as a result of this divergence of priorities is well documented in
previous literature and is discussed in section 1.4.2 of Chapter 1. It is not possible to
analyse the impact that a takeover has on the managers of the bidding company
directly as most managers are very unwilling to make public the details of their
compensation packages but it is possible to determine whether an acquisition is in their
benefit or in the interests of the firm by examining the reaction of the market to the
announcement of a takeover. If the market reacts adversely, then it is reasonable to
assume that the acquisition is not in the best interests of the shareholders and to
determine that the purchase is motivated by managerial ambition. Alternatively, if the
takeover is a natural next step for the purchasing company then the stock market
should appreciate this fact and will react positively to the news. It is possible,
however, that the stock market will react erroneously to the announcement of a
takeover bid in some cases but even partial market efficiency should ensure that the
reaction is correct in the majority of cases. The empirical analysis here will confirm
whether this motive is as influential as it appeared to be in the results of the previous
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two chapters and will offer empirical support for this motive in recent acquisition
activity.
The recent articles concerning the benefits of acquisition activity tend to
consider the gains that accrue to the shareholders by examining the share prices.
Franks and Harris (1993) studied the impact of acquisitions on shareholders in the UK
in referred acquisitions whilst Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) did the same for the
USA. Nearly all of the papers on this subject employ the market model to estimate the
risk adjusted return on a company's share price. This technique, in the most simple
form, can produce erroneous results as it fails to account for any fundamental
alterations in the level of risk that a company is subject to.
An additional omission from the previous work in this area is that there does
not appear to be any comparison between the gains received by the firms that are
involved in the acquisition process and the returns that companies of a similar size who
are not involved in takeovers are receiving at the same time. This oversight means that
the picture of acquisition benefits given in these articles is incomplete.
There are two distinct innovations in this chapter compared to the previous
work in this area. In the first instance the market model will be used to 'estimate the
benefits created by the acquisitions that were examined in the previous chapters. This
provides a benchmark against which other results can be examined. The first
innovation takes place when the estimations of the benefits created by the takeovers
are recalculated using an extension of the market model. This time the market model
will be estimated using a GARCH models to create a time varying coefficient which
should improve the accuracy of the results as this will enable the model to account for
variations in the level of risk that each company is subject to. Ferson, Kandel and
Stambaugh (1987) used time-varying coefficients in the calculation of asset prices
because, as the authors claim, there is evidence to suggest that the level of risk that a
company is subject to can alter with time. The possibility that such a change will take
place must be included in estimations of asset values with necessitates the estimation of
a risk adjusted return. The next innovation is the comparison of the estimation of the
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returns that are generated by the involved firms with the returns on the firms in the
control samples. This will give a more complete picture of the effect that acquisition
activity has on the firms that are involved as it will provide a contrast with the
performance of other firms of a similar size.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 reviews the
theories and evidence in the recent articles. Section 6.2 deals with the methodology,
data and empirical results. Finally, there is the conclusion.
6.1 Theories and Evidence
The literature concerning the benefits of acquisition activity is extensive
although there are surprisingly few different methodologies employed in the empirical
work. The literature considers the impact of acquisition activity on the managers of
the involved firms, the shareholders of these companies and the market as a whole.
The benefits of acquisition activity for each of these groups is quite different and is
best dealt with in separate sections.
6.1.1 Benefits to Managers Resulting from Acquisition Activity -
Benefits to the Managers of the Acquiring Companies
The managers of the bidding firm are believed to benefit greatly from the
successful purchase of another company. Firstly, there is greater prestige attributed to
managing a large company, rather than a small one, and the size of the firm is often
linked to the remuneration that the managerial team receive. This provides an
incentive for acquisition activity that could have considerable appeal for managerial
teams seeking to expand their sphere of influence. The purchase of another firm is the
fastest way that a company can restructure itself although it is not without risk. This
could mean entering new markets or geographical areas or diversifying to reduce the
risk faced by the firm. This could result in a profitable and secure future for the
acquiring firm which would, again, benefit the managers of that firm. The evidence
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concerning the benefits of acquisition activity for the managers of the acquiring
company in the previous articles on this subject is mostly anecdotal. This is probably
because the managers are unwilling to reveal the details of their remuneration packages
and, without a change in the law, there is no way to gather data on managerial salaries
in the UK.
Benefits to the Managers of the Acquired Companies
The benefits to the managers of the acquired firms in the recent research is also
often anecdotal. Previous articles, such as Lev (1992) and Agrawal and Wallding
(1994), suggest that there are no gains to these individuals in an acquisition as they are
often dismissed after the completion of the deal. In many cases this happens because it
is no longer necessary to retain two sets of managers when there is only, in very broad
terms, one company. This is certainly true in a horizontal acquisition where both of
the involved firms are in the same industry and this could also be true in a vertical
takeover where the managers of the acquiring firm are at least familiar with the general
industrial area in which the target firm operates if not with the precise market area. In
a conglomerate takeover, however, it is quite likely that the managers of the bidding
firm will have little or no knowledge of the field in which the target operates and so it
is possible that some of the target managers may be retained. In the event that the
target's managers are fired then the future for these individuals is rather bleak. Recent
research suggested that it is also difficult for them to find new positions after loosing
their jobs in these circumstances. Agrawal and Walkling (1994) examined the impact
of takeovers on the careers of chief executive officers (CEO's) using UK data. These
authors found that fifty-five percent of the CEO's in their sample were sacked after the
successful acquisition of their company. In addition to this, sixty-five percent of these
CEO's were still unemployed twelve months after the deal had taken place. The
findings of this article clearly demonstrated that there are no benefits to the managers
of a company that is taken over. There is, however, one exception to this rule which
occurs when the managers have golden parachutes.
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A golden parachute is a compensation contract that provides the managers with
financial security whilst they seek another position, in the event that they are sacked.
As a result the managers should be prepared to relinquish control of the company if a
good offer is made by another firm, which would maximise the shareholders wealth.
Regrettably, such a contract is difficult to set up correctly and oflen fails to work
properly. There are two potential problems with these contracts depending on how
much the managers will receive if they leave the firm. If the contracts are not generous
enough, in the opinion of the managers, they will still fight to retain control of the
company in a takeover attempt irrespective of whether the deal is in the interests of the
owners or not. Alternatively, a very generous golden parachute may induce the
managers to actively seek a purchaser for their firm, irrespective of whether the
purchaser is the right company to gain control of the target, so that they can realise the
value of their compensation contract. The use of a golden parachute is just about the
only way that the managers of the target company can benefit from the takeover of
their firm, which explains the current popularity of this type of contract with the
managers of many companies.
6.1.2 Benefits to Shareholders Resulting from Acquisition Activity
Benefits to the Shareholders of the Acquiring Companies
The evidence considering the benefits to the shareholders of acquiring firms is
mixed depending on whether the firms are examined in the long or the short term.
When the long term impact of an acquisition is considered, it is quite likely that the
shareholders of the bidding company will benefit from the increased size of their firm
which could be reflected in higher share prices. An alternative source of benefits exists
if the acquiring firm used the acquisition to engage in some important form of
restructuring that makes its future more secure. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to
examine the long term effects of an acquisition empirically as this would require the
prediction of how the acquiring firm would have behaved, in the event that the
takeover bid had not been made, for a long period of time.
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In the articles considering the short term effects of an acquisition, for example
Lev (1992) and Dodd (1992), there is a theory that states that the shareholders of the
acquiring companies will not benefit as the share price of this firm drops by a
significant amount when the bid is announced and remains low for some time after the
completion of the takeover. This reduces the value of the shareholder's investment
which is clearly not to their advantage. The empirical evidence on this subject,
however, is inconclusive. A typical paper that considers the benefits to the
shareholders of acquiring companies was by Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) in
which the authors considered six hundred and sixty-three acquisitions in America
between 1962 and 1985. The results of their investigation are typically inconclusive.
In the earlier years the bidding firms experience positive excess returns but in the
1980's these abnormal returns become negative in line with the theory discussed above.
Another inconclusive result can be found in the paper by Jensen and Ruback (1985) in
which the authors concluded that the owners of the purchasing firms do not loose in
the acquisition process although there are no significant benefits to these people either.
In some other papers it is suggested that the nature of the bid offer, whether it is cash,
stock or a mixture of the two, could have an impact on the benefits to the acquiring
firms and their shareholders. There is still relatively little empirical work concerning
the acquiring firms, however, when compared to the quantity of empirical analysis that
exists concerning the impact of an acquisition on the shareholders of the acquired
companies.
Benefits to the Shareholders of the Acquired Companies
The shareholders of the target company benefit from the acquisition of their
firm if they sell their shares during the bid. If they do not sell in the acquisition then it
is debatable whether they will benefit from the takeover. Although the value of their
shares may increase these individuals have not realised that profit as they are still in
possession of the stock which could decrease in value in the future. It is also possible
that the new owners of the firm will decide to make a compulsory re-purchase of the
outstanding shares and, in these circumstances, the new owners can decide how much
they will pay irrespective of the market value of the stock at that time. This process is
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known as greenmail and can result in the shareholders receiving far less than their
shares are worth. If the new owners of the firm plan to do this they will often make
their original acquisition bid two-tiered. A two-tiered offer states that the acquiring
company will pay one price for the shares in the course of the acquisition and plans to
instigate a compulsory re-purchase of the remaining stock after completing the deal.
At this time the purchase price will be significantly reduced and under these
circumstances there is little or no benefit to the shareholders of the target firm if they
retain ownership of their shares after the acquisition.
In the event that the shareholders sell their stock in the acquisition then they
will benefit from the purchase of their company. The benefits are created by an
increase in the value of their shares which results from two factors. Firstly it is usual
for the shares of a target company to increase considerably in value when the takeover
is announced or even when the acquisition is rumoured to be imminent. Secondly,
most purchase offers incorporate a premium, in excess of the price of the stock, as an
incentive for the shareholders to sell and the combination of these two values makes an
acquisition beneficial for the shareholders of the target company. This increases the
value of the shareholder's investment irrespective of whether or not the stock is
accurately valued at that time. Consequently, it is very difficult for the shareholders of
the target firm not to benefit from the purchase of their company if they sell when the
purchase offer is made. There has been a considerable amount of empirical work
concerning the gains to target shareholders in an acquisition. A typical paper was by
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) who estimated the cumulative abnormal returns made
by targets in over two hundred acquisitions in the USA between 1963 and 1984. The
authors concluded that there were very large positive increases in the value of the
target stock and, consequently, that the shareholders of these firms benefited greatly
from the purchase of their company. A more recent paper was by Limmack (1994)
who examined the same phenomena for UK companies. Limmack found cumulative
abnormal returns of up to fifty-one percent for the target companies which again
suggests that there are considerable benefits to the shareholders of these firms in an
acquisition.
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6.1.3 Benefits to the Market Resulting from Acquisition Activity
One of the most frequently mentioned motives for acquisition activity is the
removal of inefficient management from the target firm and, as Agrawal and Walkling
(1994) discovered, it is quite probable that the managers of an acquired firm will be
sacked after the takeover. According to Scherer (1988) this particular consequence of
acquisition activity should serve to increase the overall level of efficiency in the market.
He argued that, in a totally efficient market, any firms that were not performing to the
utmost of their abilities and any managerial teams that were ineffective would be
eliminated by the market reaction to this information. Since this does not happen the
acquisition market is necessary to correct for this failure. However, Scherer's
argument is only true if the original managers really are inefficient which discounts a
wide variety of other reasons for acquisition activity that may have absolutely nothing
to do with the effectiveness of the managers. The impact of acquisition activity on
market efficiency cannot be tested, however, and empirical analysis of the benefits that
result from takeovers is limited to the individuals who take part in acquisition activity.
6.2 Methodology and Empirical Results
In the introduction to this chapter it was stated that two different ways of
calculating the results will be used. The examination of the benefits that are received
by the shareholders centres on the calculation of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR's).
The first methodology is the use of the market model to estimate the behaviour of the
share prices which is a very popular technique in articles on benefits such as Franks
and Harris (1993). The second methodology represents a theoretical improvement on
the market model methodology. Here the market model is improved by extending it to
reflect changing levels of volatility in the share price which could bias the estimations if
left unaccounted for. Section 6.2.1 describes these techniques.
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6.2.1 Methodology
Abnormal Returns
Abnormal returns are used as a measure of the change in the return on a share
that results from some specific event. In this case the event is an acquisition. The
abnormal return is calculated by subtracting the expected value of that share from the
actual value, as in equation 6.1.
AR, = Ra — E(Rit)	 (6.1)
where
AR, is the value of the abnormal return experienced by firm i in time period t as the
result of some event
E(Ra) is the expected value of the returns for firm i at time t, as will be calculated
empirically using two forms of the market model
Ra is the actual returns on shares in firm i at time t
This equation represents the abnormal return experienced by a particular firm in
a single time period. It is usual to consider the impact of an acquisition over several
time periods and to estimate the cumulative abnormal return for each of the firms in
question. The average abnormal return is calculated by summing together the
individual abnormal returns within the sample period that is being used and dividing
them by the length of that sample period. Equation 6.2 represents the calculation of
the average abnormal return for a single company.
n AR
AR' =I
t=1
where the total impact of the takeover is considered over a period of n time periods.
This value represents the total difference between the actual and expected
values of a share over a certain time period, or event window. If there is a significant
difference then it is possible to say that an acquisition generates excessive returns,
either positive or negative, for the companies in the data sets and consequently the
(6.2)
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benefits or losses that the takeover generates can be evaluated. There are many
different ways that the expected value of the shares can be calculated. In this chapter
the market model will be used in two different ways.
The Market Model
In most of the articles concerning the benefits of acquisition activity the market
model is used to estimate the value of a company's beta. The market model can be
represented in the form of equation 6.3, below.
RI( -= a; + 13,Rmt + eit	 (6.3)
where
13, is a scalar that represents the degree of reaction in the firm share price generated by
an alteration in the return on the market,
Rmt represents the return on the market as a whole, which is represented here by the
returns on the FTA index and
oc, is a constant
The market model in its original form incorporates a constant coefficient. This
means that the model is incapable of incorporating information -about -the relative
volatility of the firm and the market returns. It is possible that the riskiness of the asset
may change fundamentally at some point, owing to alterations in external conditions.
Previous papers such as Ferson, Kandel and Stambaugh (1987) and Mark (1988)
incorporated time varying betas in their estimations of asset prices for exactly this
reason. It is also possible to identify time variance in the betas for the firms in the data
sets that will be used here. For this demonstration a small number of firms were
randomly selected from the data sets that will be used in this chapter. The results
given here are for one of the targets, one of the bidders and one firm from each of the
control samples. There is no link between these firms and they were not involved in
the same takeovers. A simple demonstration of the time variance in the beta values
involves estimating the market model using recursive regression. It is clear that none
of the beta values resulting from these estimations are constant over time as Figure 6.1,
below, shows. Furthermore, a Chow test confirms that these value are not constant
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- Worcester (Acquired)	 Hunter (Acquiring)
- Merrydown (Acquired Control) • 	 Avon (Acquiring Control)
over time. The Chow test examines the stability of regression coefficients under the
null hypothesis that there is no change with time and assuming that the variances of the
data series are equivalent. For all of the firms tested here the Chow test is rejected at
the 95% level implying that the values of beta alter with time.
Figure 6.1 Recursive Regression Beta Values
Since the value of beta alters with time the estimates produced using the
market model may be improved by using a time varying version of this coefficient.
This could be done using the recursive regression technique that produced the terms
shown in Figure 6.1 but this methodology assumes that the residuals have a constant
variance and a mean of zero as discussed by Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975). This
assumption may not hold for the firms in these data sets which would reduce the
accuracy of the estimations. Instead a GARCH model can be used to estimate the
time-varying coefficient for the market index. This approach is preferable to the simple
form of the market model as it will account for any fundamental alterations in the
riskiness of a company's share price which may create an error in the more usual
estimations of the market model. The GARCH model was devised following the work
of Engle (1982).
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GARCH models are an extension of the ARCH process (autoregressive
conditional heteroscedasticity). Arch models are used to solve one of the most
persistent problems of non-linear modelling; namely that the residuals rarely have a
constant covariance matrix. If this matrix changes with time then estimating it's value
can be difficult. Engle suggested that the expected value of the covariance matrix can
be can be estimated using information about the past errors. The GARCH model
(generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity) is an extension of this
approach which allows other terms to be used in the estimation of the covariance
matrix in conjunction with the previous errors. To estimate the multivariate GARCH
model five equations are used, equations 6.4 to 6.8, below. These equations specify
the returns series for the company and the market, the variances for these two series
and the covariance between the two, respectively. Using the BHH algorithm these
equations can be used to generate a estimates for the variance and covariances of the
data. Once these two values have been estimated then the time varying beta can be
calculated as the ratio of the covariance of the returns on the individual company and
the market divided by the variance of the returns on the market.
R, = cc+ aoCovR„„R, + et
	 (6.4)
R„, = 13 + floVarh.,+ut
	 (6.5)
	
= ao + a	 a2e21-1
	 (6.6)
	
hR„,,, = 0. + 13	 +13274_1
	 (6.7)
CovR„„R,== 
Co ÷ C (et2_1.u2t ) + C2 COVRm,Ru-i
	 (6.8)
6.2.2 Data
All of the data used in this chapter represents company share prices for
acquiring companies, acquired companies and the firms in the control samples. The
size of the sample used in this chapter is a reduced version of the sample used in the
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earlier chapters of this thesis. It was not possible to gather share price data on all of
the firms that were used in the data sets in Chapters 4 and 5 and so the data sets are
smaller than previously. The boom period data set has been reduced to one hundred
acquisitions whilst the recession sample has been reduced to sixty-eight takeovers.
When attempting an event study it is necessary to select an appropriate window
around the acquisition. The window will stretch from a certain date before the first
announcement of the acquisition until a certain number of days after the last
announcement concerning the bid. For example, the event window could run from ten
days before the announcement until ten days after the last announcement. In the recent
empirical work concerning the benefits of acquisition activity there is no consistency in
the size of the event windows that has been used. The size of the event window ranges
from five days before the takeover is announced until five days after it is completed, as
in Bradley, Desth and Kim (1988), up to twelve months before to twelve months after
the takeover, as in Asquith and Kim (1982), and there are many different windows
used in other papers. It has been suggested, by authors such as Asquith and Kim
(1982), that the market anticipates many acquisitions before they are announced and so
a slightly larger window could be more effective although it is unlikely that this would
have an impact on market behaviour a long time before the bid.
An acquisition offer in the UK must be open for at least twenty-eight days
under the current legal system. In addition to this there will be a certain period before
and after the bid that will also be included in the event window and finally six months
of data prior to the window will be used to facilitate the calculation of accurate
estimates. Owing to limitations in the availability of share prices on the target firms it
is not possible to examine share prices beyond twenty days after the end of the
acquisition attempt. In total it is possible to examine windows of three different sizes,
five days before and after the bid, ten days before and after the bid and twenty days
before and after the bid.
In addition to the share prices for these companies there is also available
information on the nature of the deals themselves. Some of the deals were successfully
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completed whilst others failed. There is evidence to suggest that abnormal returns still
exist even when acquisitions are incomplete, as Parkinson and Dobbins (1993)
investigated. Their analysis considered failed acquisition attempts in the UK and
concluded that the abnormal returns created by the acquisition attempt remained even
after the bid lapsed. In addition, some of the acquisition attempts considered here
were hostile and resisted vigorously by the target firm or involved more than one
bidding firm. Lastly, there were a few acquisitions that involved white knights and a
very small number of takeovers that were referred to the Mergers and Monopolies
Commission for investigation. Unfortunately, there was insufficient data to model the
referred bids and so they had to be eliminated from the sample. It would be interesting
to determine whether the different nature of the acquisitions in the sample will affect
the level of the abnormal returns that are generated by the takeover process.
The data sets span the years from January 1987 to December 1994. This
period stretches from a boom through a recession and the beginning of the next
upswing in the economic cycle. As in the previous chapter the different effects of the
economic cycle can be examined here to determine whether the underlying condition of
the economy has an impact on the level of the abnormal returns realised by the
companies involved in the takeovers. As before, the boom period is taken to be the
years from 1987 to the end of 1990 and the recession period is from 1991 to the end of
1993. The year 1994 appears to be the start of another period of relative economic
prosperity but it is still too early to determine whether or not that supposition is
correct. There are also very few takeovers in that year of the data set for which the
necessary data was available and, as a consequence, this year will be left out when
examining the abnormal returns created by these acquisitions.
6.2.3 Empirical Results
The results generated using the two methodologies outlined earlier in this
chapter, see section 6.2.1 above, produced results that were virtually identical when
they were applied empirically to the data sets. The results produced using the
time-varying beta were of a slightly larger magnitude than the results generated with
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the original form of the market model but this is the extent of the differences between
them. There are also no real differences between the three different event windows
that were used although the size of the abnormal returns did increase a little with the
longer windows. This provides some support for the notion that the stock market may
anticipate acquisition activity but these findings are not conclusive on this point. Given
the very close resemblance that exists between all of the results it is only necessary to
give one table of results here. A complete set of results can be found in Appendix V.
The tables of results here was generated using the time varying beta over an event
window that runs from twenty days before the bid was announced to twenty days after
the last announcement concerning the final outcome of the acquisition attempt.
The results contained in this table represent the average values of the
cumulative abnormal returns for the companies in the data sets for a certain window.
The results are given for each year within the data set and are also grouped into boom
and recession periods. The first four lines in the tables contain the results for all of the
takeovers in a certain year irrespective of the outcome of these acquisition attempts.
The next two sets of results represent the successful and unsuccessful attempts,
respectively. It is not possible for a single deal to fall into both the successful and
unsuccessful groups simultaneously as these two events are clearly mutually exclusive.
The last three groups in the tables of results all refer to the nature of this bid as it was
reported at the time; hostile, contested or white knight. Acquisitions can fall into none
of these groups, more than one of these groups and it is even possible for a single deal
to lie in all three of the categories in certain circumstances. The first of these are the
hostile bids in which the target managers strenuously attempted to prevent the sale of
the firm. An example of this type of acquisition was Godfrey Davis' bid for Sketchley
in February 1990. Godfrey Davis offered £138m for Sketchley in an attempt to
expand its textile and cleaning interests. The bid was a mixed offer in which the
shareholders were asked to swap three of their Sketchley shares for five Davis shares
and three pounds fifty pence in cash. Despite a positive response from at least one
large institutional shareholder, Sketchley's management rejected the offer as
inadequate. Sketchley's managers then released a profits forecast which was far below
market expectations which caused an immediate drop in the value of Sketchley's shares
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on the market. Godfrey Davis promptly withdrew the offer, realising that it vastly
over-estimated Sketchley's value. Shortly afterwards another bid was made for
Sketchley. This time the acquirer was the laundry firm Compass who offered just one
hundred and six million pounds, all in shares, reflecting Sketchley's much lower market
value. Once again, Sketchley rejected the offer and used their profits forecast to drive
off a potential purchaser. This time, they claimed, the profits forecast was even worse
as it had to take into account the cost of fighting off the first acquisition attempt. To
this day, no-one has managed to make a successful offer for Sketchley. Any
acquisition that generates a defensive measure from the target, irrespective of the final
outcome, is classed as hostile and placed in the first of these groups.
The second of these sub-divisions represents contested bids. These
acquisitions involve more than one potential purchaser. A classical example of this
type of takeover involved Macarthy, a pharmaceuticals chain, in May 1991. The first
bid was made by the conglomerate Grampian Holdings, which made a mixed bid worth
a total of £56.6 million. This bid was unsuccessful at the first closing date as less than
one percent of Macarthy shareholders agreed to sell their stock. Grampian increased
the value of the offer to £63.3 million but again received a negligible response and let
the bid lapse. One of the reasons for this failure was a contesting bid launched by the
pharmaceutical firm Unichem at the same time as Grampian's revised offer. Unichem
valued Macarthy at seventy three million pounds and offered shareholders seven shares
and four pounds twenty pence in exchange for six Macarthy shares. Unichem fared
little better than Grampian and, despite extending the closing date on two occasions,
their bid seemed unlikely to succeed. Finally, in September 1991, Unichem's offer was
referred to the Mergers and Monopolies Commission (MNIC) and was allowed to
lapse. Unichem's offer was not accepted by the shareholders because, in August, a
third contesting bid was launched which offered even more for Macarthy. Lloyds
Chemist's offered nearly eighty million pounds for Macarthy in the form of a mixed
offer involving the exchange of one Lloyds share and twenty-one pence for one
Macarthy share. This offer was also referred to the Mergers and Monopolies
Commission but the MMC let it go ahead and, in March 1992, Lloyds declared the
deal was unconditional and took control of Macarthy.
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Lastly, there are the deals involving the white knights. There are very few of
these acquisitions in the data sets. The reason for this is probably two-fold. Firstly,
very few companies are genuinely prepared to become white knights as this is a costly
procedure that generates relatively little benefit for the firm in question unless they are
already seeking to acquire, and secondly target firms are often distrustful of companies
that purport to be white knights as, recently, some "white knights" have proved to be
less than chivalrous once they have gained a stake in the target firm. In many cases in
this data set the white knight company comes from overseas rather than the UK.
Nevertheless, these deals do occur periodically although it is rare to see more than two
or three in any year. A good example of a white knight in action is the acquisition of
the chemical firm Chemoxy International in February 1990. Chemoxy was a relatively
small firm that was the recipient of an unwanted takeover bid from another chemical
company MTM. MTM valued Chemoxy at just under twelve million pounds and
offered shareholders one hundred and eighty-six MTM shares in return for one
hundred Chemoxy shares. There was also a cash alternative of four pounds a share.
Chemoxy's managers said that the bid was inadequate and advised their shareholders to
reject the offer. MTM announced that it would not revise its offer at which point a
white knight appeared. The white knight was the industrial holding company Suter.
Suter made an all cash offer of four pounds fifty a share which valued Chemoxy at
approximately thirteen and a half million pounds. Chemoxy's managers recommended
that the shareholders should accept this new offer. MTM refused to be drawn into a
bidding war with Suter and allowed their bid to lapse leaving Suter to take control of
Chemov. This type of bid is primarily worth note because of the presence of a white
knight but it is also a demonstration of how it is possible for a single acquisition
offered to fall into more than one of these classifications. MTM's bid was rejected by
Chemoxy's managers which classifies this takeover as hostile and the presence of two
potential acquirers also makes it a contested bid. This means that this acquisition will
fall into each of the three classifications representing the nature of the takeovers which
appear in the lower sections of the tables of results.
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A T-statistic can be used to determine whether the mean value of each series of
cumulative abnormal returns is significantly different from zero. These statistics will
be calculated for each group of takeovers in each of the years that are considered here
and the null and alternative hypotheses are
Ho' : the mean of the series of cumulative abnormal returns is equal to
zero
HA' : the mean of the series of cumulative abnormal returns is not equal
to zero
The test statistic appears in many previous articles considering the benefits of
acquisition activity. The notation used here comes from DeAngelo and Rice (1983)
and is defined in equation 6.9, below. Each of the calculated values will be compared
to the appropriate critical value from the standard two-tailed T tables which will
depend on the number of takeovers there are in the series under examination. The
results for this t-test will appear with the average abnormal returns in the first table of
results.
-0
[ 1 7 (Ai? _ (N-, AR 
))2]O5
n— 1 '	 ' n— 1
where
Ai? is the mean value of the sequences of cumulative abnormal returns in each of the
samples and
n is the number of observations in each of the sequences of cumulative abnormal
returns to the examined
A second set of t-tests are also used to determine whether the average
abnormal return differs between groups of companies. For example, whether the
average abnormal return for the acquired firms in a certain year is different from the
abnormal return for the acquiring companies in the same year. These statistics will be
calculated between the acquired and acquiring firms, and between both sets of involved
1=	 AI? (6.9)
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firms and their respective control samples. The null and alternative hypotheses here
are :
H02 : the difference between the mean values of the two series of
cumulative abnormal returns is equal to zero
FIA2 : the difference between the mean values of the two series of
cumulative abnormal returns is not equal to zero
The results of these calculations will appear in the second table of results. It
will not be possible to calculate a value for this statistic in the acquisitions involving
white knights as there are too few takeovers of this type in the data sets and this will
also be true for some other groups of acquisitions where there is a single takeover is
consider.
Table 6.1, below, contains the average values of the cumulative abnormal
returns for the firms in these data sets using an event window from twenty days before
the first announcement until twenty days after the date of the last announcement
concerning the outcome of the takeover attempt. The first group of results in the table
represent all the acquisitions in these data sets irrespective of the outcome and nature
of these bids. The average abnormal returns for the acquired firms are always positive
in these takeover which corresponds to the findings in recent articles on this subject
such as Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) and Limmack (1994). The average gain in
the boom period is 12.3% whilst the average for the recession period is 9.03%. The
acquiring firms received negative average abnormal returns in all of the periods which
again corresponds to the frequently quoted theories on this subject, for example Lev
(1992) or Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988). The average abnormal return in the boom
period is -0.25% whilst the equivalent value for the recession period is -0.56%. These
losses are smaller than might be expected given the size of the gains in the value of the
target firms demonstrating that the reaction of the market to the announcement of an
acquisition is not symmetrical and the benefits to the targets clearly outweigh the
losses incurred by the acquiring companies. The difference between these two figures
represents the gain in value of the target firm created by the reaction of the market to
311
the announcement of the acquisition bid and, as can be seen in Table 6.2, on average
the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the average abnormal returns to
the targets and the bidders can be rejected at the one percent level. This means that it
is better to be the owner of an acquired firm than an acquiring company and also
implies that the managers of the acquiring firms are not acting to enhance the value of
the shareholders investment.
In Chapters 4 and 5, there were data sets of control companies that were used
in conjunction with the data sets of acquired and acquiring firms to examine the
differences between the nature of those firms that became involved in takeovers and
companies of the same size that remained uninvolved in the market for corporate
control. These control samples are used again in this chapter to determine how firms
that were not involved in acquisition activity performed, compared to expectations, in
the same way as the acquired and acquiring firms are examined. By examining the
abnormal returns for the firms in the control samples it should be possible to view the
impact of the acquisition on targets and bidders more accurately. The control sample
paired with the target firms shows that these uninvolved firms are performing better
than expected in the boom and very much as would be expected in the recession which
suggests there is more benefit to the shareholders of an acquiring firm in a recession
than in a boom. The average abnormal returns for the control firms in these periods
are 11.9% and 0.1% respectively. The level of these returns does not, however, match
the returns experienced by the target firms and Table 6.2 confirms that many of these
values are statistically different. This means that shares in the acquired firms are
outperforming shares in firms of an equivalent size that were not involved in takeovers.
Considering these companies supports the theory that the abnormally high returns
demonstrated by the target firms are generated by the announcement of the acquisition
attempt and are not created by some unknown external factor as this would,
presumably, have had an impact on all firms of a similar size in the stock market. Once
again this supports the theory that the shareholders of acquired firms benefit from the
acquisition of their company.
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Table 6.1 Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated for a Twenty Day
Window
Type of Bid
Window : 20 days before the acquisition to 20 days after
Boom Period (%) Recession Period (%)
1987 1988 1989 1990 All 1991 1992 1993 All
All bids 27 26 28 19 100 32 15 21 68
Acquired firms 17.7* 20.5* 1.5 9.42* 12.3* 18.6* 0.13 0.81 9.03*
Acquiring firms -2.5** -3** -3** -1.05 -0.25 -0.22 -1.33 -0.52 -0.56
Acquir'd control 15.9* 0.81 29.4* 4.16* 11•9* -0.41 -0.4 0.57 -0.1
Acquir'g control 2.7** -2** 1.4 -7.42* -0.8 -1.28 2.8** 3.71* 1.16
Successful bids 18 16 21 15 70 23 12 19 54
Acquired firms 17.6* 1.9** 0 7•4* 6.53* 15.8* -1.8** -0.58 6.17*
Acquiring finns -3.4** 2.6** -4.05* -1.6 -1.8** -0.3 -1.25 -0.63 -0.63
Acquir'd control 15.9* 3.2** 37•7* -2.2** 15.6* 0.52 0.5 -9.95* -3.2**
Acquir'g control -3.7* -0.44 -0.43 -6.73* 2.6** 4.09* 1.58 -1.8** -2**
Failed bids 9 10 7 4 30 9 3 2 14
Acquired firms 18* 29.7* 6.14* 2** 17* 25.6* 7.67* -33.5* 13•4*
Acquiring firms -0.7 -3.7** 1.29 0.25 -1.1 0 -1.6 -11* -1.9**
Acquir'd control 15.9* -2.1** 9.14* -0.5 6.13* -2.8** 4* 19* 0.07
Acquir'g control 15.6* 1.1 7.86* -2.3** 6.57* 6* 7.67* -0.5 5.43*
Of which :
Hostile bids 2 5 5 4 16 3 0 2 5
Acquired firms 11* 14* -6.2* 14.8* 7•5* 25.3* -	 - -8.5* 11.8*
Acquiring firms -1 -10.4* -1.2 -0.25 -3.8** 0 - -6* -2.4**
Acquir'd control 18* -2.8** -159* -3** -49.3* -12.7* - 16.5* -I
Acquir'g control 15* -10.8* -0.8 -8.5* -3.9** -29.7* - 30.5* -5.6*
Contested bids 1 4 5 1 // 2 0 1 3
Acquired firms 40* 16.8* 2.4** 19* 12.6* 21* - -23* 6.33*
Acquiring firms 18* -12* 0.4 -1 -2.6** -3** - -12* -6*
Acquir'd control 0 2.8** 42.4* -13* -19.5* -8* - 0 -5.33*
Acquifg control 11* 1.8 2.4** 10* 3.64* 10* - 14* 11.3*
White knight
bids
0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 1
Acquired firms - -19* -1 - -10* -18* - - -18*
Acquiring firms - 4** 6* - 5** - * - - -6*
Acquied control - 0 0 - 0 -16* - - -16*
Acquir'g control - 1 3** - 2 20* - - 20*
Significant at 1% *, 5% ", 10% ***
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Table 6.2 T-Statistics Testing the Null Hypothesis that the Difference Between the
Means of the Two Groups is Equal to Zero
Type of Bid
Window : 20 days before the acquisition to 20 days after
Boom Period (%) Recession Period (%)
1987 1988 1989 1990 All 1991 1992 1993 All
All bids 27 26 28 19 100 32 15 21 68
Acquired & Acquiring 2.89* 5.58* 1.49 2*** 5•7* 3.62* 0.32 0.31 3.06*
Acquired & Control 1.36 4•39* 0.85 2.7** 0.17 3.17* 0.81 0.21 2**
Acquiring & Control 1 0.26 1.52 2*** 0.83 0.16 1.11 0.94 0.82
Successful bids 18 16 21 15 70 23 12 19 54
Acquired & Acquiring
Acquired & Control 1.15 2.52* 0.78 2.2** 0.11
Acquiring & Control
Failed bids 9 10 7 4 30 9 3 2 14
Acquired & Acquiring 2.6** 5•33* 1.18 1.46 4.89* 3.6* 0.42 1.84 2.1**
Acquired & Control 0.75 6.27* 0.98 5.4** 0.44 3.41* 1.8 1.94 2.8**
Acquiring & Control 2*** 0.79 2.8** 1.6 2.3** 0.76 0.75 0.59 0.96
Of which :
Hostile bids 2 5 5 4 16 3 0 2 5
Acquired & Acquiring 0.98 3.6** 3.2** 1.38 3.1* 4.3 - 0.25 1.7
Acquired & Control 0.34 1.86 0.96 3.3** 0.6 0.59 - 20.3* 4.2*
Acquiring & Control 0.39 0.84 0.65 1.05 0.88 0.21 -- 3*** 0.7
Contested bids 1 4 5 1 11 2	 c 0	 c 1	 c 3	 s
Acquired & Acquiring - 1.35 0.9	 ' - 1.31 1 0.66 1 -	 1 -	 1 0.51 1
Acquired & Control - 0.7 0.83 - 0.79	 0.94 - - 0.47
Acquiring & Control - 1.38 0.78 - 1.03	 1.12 - - 2.17
White knight bids 0 1 1 0 2	 1 0 0 I
Acquired & Acquiring - - - - 1.84	 - - - -
Acquired & Control - - - - 1.09	 - - - -
Acquiring & Control - - - - 11.8*	 - - - -
Reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is equal to zero at
1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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The impact of examining the firms that are paired with the bidders is even more
revealing. The firms in the control sample have negative abnormal returns in the boom
period where the average value for these companies is -0.8% which decreases to
-1.161% in the recession. Acquiring companies are performing better in the boom but
not as well the recession period as firms of an equivalent size which suggests that,
from the shareholders perspective, it may be better to remain uninvolved in acquisition
activity than to attempt to purchase another firm. This corresponds with the findings
of previous research such as Lev (1992) who claimed that bidding firms suffer a loss in
value when an acquisition is announced. This difference is not statistically significant,
however, suggesting that any drop in the value of the acquiring firms is not, on the
whole, great enough to impact very negatively on the shareholders. This demonstrates
the importance of one of the innovations introduced in this chapter; analysing the
control samples as well as the involved firms. This places added clarity on the results
which enables more accurate conclusions to be drawn and the impact of acquisition
activity on the acquired firms to be more accurately evaluated. The drop in the value
of the acquired firms is indicative, however, of the opinion held by the stock market of
the acquiring companies actions. This reflects some scepticism about the wisdom of
attempting to purchase another firm which may suggest that the acquisitions are not,
on average, a natural step for the purchasing firms to take. This offers some support
for the theory that a large proportion of the acquisitions are motivated by reasons
other than the good of the acquiring firm and its shareholders as these individuals
suffer from their firms involvement in the takeover process. This supports the findings
in Chapters 4 and 5 that many takeovers are prompted by managerial ambition rather
than for the good of the firms owners.
The second group of results in Table 6.1 refer to those acquisitions that were
known to be successful. The results here generate the same overall impression as
above. When examining the targets in this group it is clear that the cumulative
abnormal returns are always positive for these companies. The average abnormal
returns for these successful acquisitions are 6.53% in the boom period and 6.17% in
the bust period. Again this result mirrors the findings in previous research in this area,
such as the article by Holderness and Sheehan (1992), and suggests that there are
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considerable gains to be made by the shareholders of target firms. In comparison the
average abnormal returns for the acquiring firms are negative in both the boom and
recession periods. In the boom period the average abnormal return is -1.84% which
rises to -0.63% in the recession. This result is in accordance with theories concerning
the negative impact that an acquisition has upon an acquiring company, as authors
such as Lirnmack (1994) stated. The smaller loss incurred in the recession period
could be a reflection of the fact that a successful bid is a considerable achievement in a
recession when most firms are avoiding risks as much as is possible. Again, the
differences between these mean values is statistically significant at the one percent level
indicating very clearly that the abnormal returns for the acquired and acquiring firms
are distinctly different, as Table 6.2 shows. The next line of results in Table 6.1 refers
to the control sample that is paired with the target firms. In the boom period the
average abnormal return is 15% which decreases to -3.17% in the recession period.
These abnormal returns demonstrate some differences when compared to the target
abnormal returns but there are no clear conclusions here and, on average, Table 6.2
shows that the acquired firms do not have different abnormal returns when compared
with these control companies. The average abnormal returns for the sample of firms
that are paired with the bidders are negative in both the boom and the recession. The
average values are -2.61% and -2.02% for these periods. Once again it appears that
the shareholders of acquiring firms may suffer as a result an acquisition attempt but the
shareholders of companies of an equivalent size that do not purchase another firm are
in somewhat worse position, although the null hypothesis that these values are
different cannot be rejected. These smaller negative abnormal returns could be a
reflection of the fact that these bids were all successfully completed and the share
prices of the bidding firms may recover when it becomes clear that the bid is going to
be a success. Nevertheless, there is still no benefit in these bids for the owners of the
acquiring firm and it still cannot be said that the takeovers were attempted for their
benefit which, once again, offers support for the idea that there is a clear agency
problem in many firms and that managerial ambition was a major motivator for
acquisition activity in the years under examination here.
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The third group of results in the table refer to the failed acquisition attempts.
The average gain to the shareholders of a target firm are 17% in the boom period and
13.4% in the recession which implies that the shareholders of the targets still benefit
even if the bid fails. In 1993 Parkinson and Dobbins investigated failed bids and found
that the gains to the targets were maintained after the takeover attempts had failed,
which is the same as the results here. They suggested that the acquisition attempt
improved the economic performance of the target firm which justified the higher share
value. It is possible that the market expects an increase in efficiency to follow and the
share price remains high in expectation of future improvements. The acquiring
companies in these data sets have negative abnormal returns with average values of
-1.1% and -1.93% for the boom and recession periods respectively which corresponds
to the theory concerning the impact of a takeover on the acquiring firm. Once again,
the t-tests in Table 6.2 demonstrate that these values are very different and the null
hypothesis that they are the same can be rejected at the one percent level in the boom
years and at the five percent level in the recession. The control sample of firms that
are paired with the targets are positive in most of the years under examination here.
The average cumulative abnormal return in the boom period is 6.1% and 0.07% in the
recession. Both of these average abnormal returns are lower than the returns
experienced by the target firms and significantly different in several if the years under
examination which serves to emphasises the magnitude of the benefits that accrue to
the shareholders of the target firms in a takeover attempt. The last line in this section
of the table refers to the non-involved firms that are paired with the bidding companies.
In the boom period these firms have an average abnormal return of 6.57% which is far
larger than the loss for the acquiring companies whilst in the recession period the
average abnormal return for these control firms is 5.43%. The boom period is one of
the few cases in which the average abnormal returns for the bidding companies are
statistically different to the equivalent values for the control firms, as Table 6.2 shows.
This emphasises the fact that there are few benefits to the shareholders of the bidding
firm in the short term as the value of their investment decreases and falls to a far lower
rate than the returns on companies of a similar size. In the long term they may well
benefit of the acquisition enables their firm to scale new heights and make greater
profits, but this type of long term benefit cannot be seen in this sort of study and would
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require more information than was available on many of the firms here. This offers
more support for the theory that managerial ambition may prompt many acquisitions
that are considered ill-advised by the stock market. The fact that these takeover
attempts all failed may be a further reflection of the fact that the acquisition may not
have been in the best interests of the bidding firm and the target was poorly chosen.
There can be little doubt that the interests of the owners of the bidding companies
were not considered when these acquisition attempts were launched and there is no
indication that they benefited in anyway from their companies involvement in the
takeover process.
The remaining three groups of results consider the nature of the acquisitions
rather than final outcome. The first of these is the case of hostile acquisitions where
the target makes a determined attempt to avoid being purchased. As in the earlier
sections of this table the acquired firms have positive average abnormal returns. In the
boom period the average value is 7.5% which increases to 11.8% in the recession
although these values are a little lower than in the other sections of Table 6.1. Other
recent research on this topic has not drawn any definite conclusions concerning hostile
acquisition attempts and so there is no precedent to assist in providing an explanation
for this result. If a firm becomes the subject of an acquisition attempt it may be viewed
as a good way of realising a profit for the shareholders and rejecting such an offer is,
perhaps, thought to indicate considerable confidence concerning the firms future
prospects. Alternatively, the gains could be created by the announcement of the
takeover attempt and are not altered by any later announcements concerning the nature
of the bid. In comparison, the acquiring companies have negative average abnormal
returns in hostile bids which are slightly larger than in most of the other sections of this
table. In the boom period the average abnormal return is -3.8% which rises slightly to
-2.4% in the recession. The values in Table 6.2 demonstrate that these values are
different and that the second null hypothesis in this chapter can be rejected but only
during the boom years. This may reflect the fact that the stock market views takeover
bids that are strenuously rejected as ill-advised potential investments. The fact that the
target firm elects to reject the acquisition offer may imply that the bid has less chance
of success than in other takeovers where the target does not make a vigorous attempt
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to mount a defence. This could be the reason behind the somewhat lower abnormal
returns that the target firms receive. Equally, selecting a target that defends itself again
an acquisition attempt may also reflect badly on the bidding company which could be
the reason why these firms have larger average abnormal returns that other companies.
The magnitude of these losses are relatively large which implies that the market may
view hostile acquisitions as being poorly selected investments for the potential
acquirer, compared to takeovers in which the target offers little or no resistance.
The firms that are paired with the target companies demonstrate negative
average abnormal returns in both the boom period and in the recession. Comparing
these values to the average abnormal returns for the target companies emphasises the
fact that being the shareholder of a firm that is the subject of an acquisition attempt is a
far more beneficial position to occupy even if that takeover does not generate the level
of abnormal returns that other types of bids receive. The slightly lower average
abnormal returns received by the targets means that the acquired firms and the control
sample with which they are paired do not demonstrate different mean abnormal returns
in the majority of years as the figures in Table 6.2 demonstrates. Finally, there are the
companies that were not involved in acquisition activity that are paired with the
bidding firms. In the boom period the average abnormal return for these companies is
. .	 -
-3.9% which is virtually the same as the abnormal return for the acquiring companies.
In the recession period the average abnormal return is negative and larger than the
equivalent value for the acquiring companies. This result implies that the shareholders
of the acquiring firms suffer a loss but entering the market for corporate control may
be a little better than remaining uninvolved in takeover activity. Table 6.2 shows that
the average abnormal returns between the acquiring firms and the companies in this
control sample are not statistically different as the null hypothesis that the difference is
zero cannot be rejected in the majority of years under investigation here.
The penultimate group of results in this table are the contested bids involving
more than one potential bidder. In theory this type of bid should increase the benefits
to the target shareholders as it could result in a bidding war between the contesting
acquirers as they each make bids of increasing value until only one bidder can afford to
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continue. Conversely it is thought that the winning bidder, assuming that one of the
potential acquirers manages to purchase the target, suffers from the "winner's curse"
which results in particularly large negative abnormal returns to the acquiring firm as it
could end up paying far more for the target than that firm is actually worth. Both of
these ideas appear in the theoretical papers but are the subject of little or no empirical
work in the recent literature. The acquired firms in this section have positive average
abnormal returns for both the boom and recession periods, with average values of
12.55% and 6.3% respectively which are all significantly different from zero. The
results for these periods are not very different from any of the other sets of target firms
in the other groups of acquisitions represented in Table 6.1. This result suggests that
the contested acquisitions were either resolved quickly or the bidders accurately valued
the target and did not offer much more than was necessary as the shareholders of the
target firms benefit from their involvement in the takeover process but the magnitude
of their gains is no greater in a contested acquisition than in any other type of takeover
attempt. The bidding firms in this group have average abnormal returns of -2.64% in
the boom period and -6% in the recession and the majority of the values for these
companies are statistically different from zero. This corresponds to the idea that
bidding firms loose value when a takeover is announced but these values is not
noticeably larger than the losses shown by acquiring firms in other sections of this table
which is again contrary to the idea of a "winner curse" in bids of this nature. For the
first time, the mean values for the target and the bidding firms are not different as the
t-tests in Table 6.2 illustrate. This is a most unusual finding and is quite contrary to
expectations although it may be due to the relatively small number of takeovers of this
type in the data sets. The control sample of firms that are paired with the targets have
a large average abnormal return in the boom period, -19.5%, although the recession
period value is much smaller. Compared to these firms the acquired companies display
much larger gains in both periods but it is difficult to determine whether there are any
extra gains generated by the presence of multiple bidders. The relationship between
the non-involved firms and the acquirers suggest that it is unwise to attempt this type
of takeover in either a boom or a recession as the presence of more than one bidder
may suggest that the target is a company that is worth purchasing but it is debatable
whether the extra expense incurred through a bidding war is justifiable. Once again,
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these findings imply that the managers of the bidding company are not thinking of their
shareholders as they begin the takeover process. The owners of these firms suffer in
the takeover from the negative abnormal returns that the firm experiences which
reduces the value of their investment. This is clearly against their interests and, given
that this frequently happens in takeovers, it demonstrates that there must be an agency
problem in the firms that enables the managers to undertake this type of investment
without worrying about the impact that it will have on the owners of their company.
Finally, there are the white knight deals. These results are based on a very
small number of takeovers and the findings cannot be generalised in any way. Equally,
it is not possible to calculate t-tests to determine whether the mean abnormal returns
for each of the groups of firms are different from each other in the years in which such
takeover were reported as there are too few observations in this section. There are,
however, a few surprises in these results. The target companies do not benefits from
their inclusion in these deals as they have negative average abnormal returns whilst the
acquiring companies gain from their involvement in the same deals. When compared
to the control samples, it appears that it is more beneficial to remain uninvolved in
acquisition activity than to take part in this type takeover. None of these results would
be expected in an acquisition but, given that none of the previous research has
concentrated on this type of purchase it is possible that deals involving a white knight
do not conform to the usual behavioural patterns. It is also important to note that
there are so few takeovers of this type in these data sets that these results may be
specific to these few deals and cannot be generalised in any way.
The results in these tables provide the same conclusions as much of the
previous research on this topic. The owners of the target firms benefit in a takeover
due to the increased value that the event places upon their shares. This corresponds to
the empirical work already existing in this area, for example Limmack (1994) and
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988). This increase in the value of the target's shares is
particularly clear when the acquired firms are compared to the bidding companies. In
these results it is clear to see that there are consistently negative average abnormal
returns generated by acquisition activity for the shareholders of these companies and
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that these sets of values are clearly different as the null hypothesis that the difference
between them is zero can be rejected without hesitation at the one percent level in all
of the different types of takeovers considered here except the white knight bids. As
with the findings concerning the acquired companies, this results corresponds to the
current theories concerning the impact of acquisitions on the purchasing firms, as can
be seen in papers such as Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988). The poor performance
of the bidding firms also corresponds with the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 in which it
was suggested that acquisitions are often prompted by the managers of the purchasing
firm and that the motivation behind these takeover attempts has little or nothing to do
with the shareholders best interests. When the control samples are included they serve
to highlight further the level of positive gains that are received by the acquired firms as
the control companies rarely perform as far above expectations as the target firms
although it is not always possible to reject the hypothesis that there are no differences
between the average values for these two groups of firms. The opposite is true of the
control sample which is paired with the acquiring firms. Here the average abnormal
returns received by these firms are rarely different to the returns experienced by the
firms in the control samples. This suggests that, in the short term, it may not be too
bad to be a shareholder in a company that attempts to purchase another firm than to
own shares in a non-involved firm although shares in the bidding firms always decrease
in value by an amount that is considerably greater than zero. This recurring results
offers strong support for the theory that many acquisitions are motivated by managerial
ambition rather than from any desire to benefit the shareholders as the actions of the
managers in entering the corporate control market are not to the advantage of the
shareholders who would almost certainly prefer that their firm remained uninvolved to
preserve the value of their shares on the stock market.
Conclusion
This chapter was designed to investigate the benefits of acquisition activity.
The benefits that can be examined in this way are created by fluctuations in the share
prices away from the expected levels for each firm. Two methodologies were used to
estimate the abnormal returns reported here. The first of these was the market model
322
as has been used in previous papers and the second approach involved the estimation
of a time varying beta for use in the market model. A further innovation involved
comparing the firms that took part in the takeovers with companies of an equivalent
size that remained uninvolved in the acquisition process. Lastly, the outcome and the
nature of the individual acquisitions were examined to further increase the level of
detail that could be applied to these results. The results in this chapter are consistent
across all of the event windows that were considered and across both of the
methodologies that were used. Furthermore, these findings agreed with previous
research on the benefits that are created by takeovers in the cases where there is a
precedent in the literature.
In brief the findings of this chapter are as follows. The target firms have
positive average abnormal returns during an acquisition attempt that are significantly
greater than zero and frequently exceed the returns on firms of equivalent size that
remain uninvolved in takeovers by a clear margin. These positive returns represent a
gain for the shareholders of these firms whose investment increases in value even when
the takeover attempt fails. The high abnormal returns in failed bids could be a
reflection of the fact that takeover attempts, even failed ones, are thought to increase
the efficiency of the target firms which could result in improved future performance.
The only surprising results when examining the acquired firms come when the
acquisitions are subdivided into groups reflecting the nature of these takeovers. In
particular, the contested bids yielded some unexpected findings. In these takeovers the
shareholders of the target firms are thought to benefit to a greater extent as the
presence of multiple bidders is thought to elevate the offer price. In the contested
acquisitions that appear in these estimations there is no evidence of this outcome.
However, when the contested bids that feature in these data sets are examined it
becomes clear that the majority of them were settled without a prolonged bidding war
which could account for this unusual result. Alternatively, this result could be a
reflection of accurate pricing on behalf of the bidding companies but, as the purchasers
have incomplete information when making their bid, this seems to be a rather more
unlikely explanation for these results.
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The results for the purchasing firms also reflect the theories concerning the
benefit for the shareholders. In general, the average abnormal returns for these firms
are negative and greater than zero which reflects a loss in value for the shareholders.
This result offers empirical support for the theory that most firms have an unresolved
agency problem that allows the managers to behave as they wish to without any
limitations on their authority. In this case this agency problem manifests itself in the
purchasing of another firm which is rarely to the advantage of the shareholders of the
bidding company. The shareholders investment decreases sharply in value when the
bid is announced and remains low for some time after the bid is completed, irrespective
of the outcome. It is well known that the share prices of purchasing firms often fall
when a takeover attempt is announced and yet these bidding companies went ahead
with takeover attempts with seemingly little regard for the impact that this would have
on the value of the shares. Such an investment is highly unlikely to be approved of by
the shareholders which means that the managers are able to behave as they want
without any fear of reprisals from the owners of the firms for which they work. This is
a clear demonstration of the agency problem that allows managers to attempt
takeovers for their own gain rather than for the good of their company.
These results only reflect a short time around the takeover_ and cannot reflect
_
the long term impact of making an acquisition which may eventually lead to the
restoration of the bidding firms share price and might even be to the shareholders
benefit. Results of this kind cannot be reflected in this type of event study and it is
impossible to infer whether benefits of this nature would follow a takeover. The
findings presented here correspond to the previous literature concerning the bidding
companies. An unexpected result came from the analysis of the contested takeover
attempts as it did with the target firms above. Here the victorious bidding company is
thought to incur exceptionally large negative average abnormal returns as a result of
over-paying for the target in a bidding war. There is no evidence of this "winner's
curse" in these data sets which is surprising but could be a reflection of the fact that
very few of the contested bids examined here involved protracted bidding wars. In the
majority of cases all but one of the potential bidders dropped out after a very short
period of time. These results make it clear, however, that there are no short term
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benefits for the shareholders of firms that become bidders in acquisitions. There may
be long term benefits but the identification of these potential gains is outside the reach
of this study. In the previous chapters it was apparent that the majority of acquisitions
are prompted by the managers of the bidding firms for reasons that rarely have
anything to do with maximising the shareholders wealth. The results in this chapter
offer clear support for these arguments as there are no short term benefits to these
shareholders in the majority of takeovers.
When the results for the acquired and acquiring firms are compared it becomes
clear that there is a difference between the magnitude of the gains that the target
companies make and the losses experienced by the bidders. The target firms gain far
more than the bidding companies loose and the hypothesis that these values are the
same can be comprehensively rejected as Table 6.2 illustrated. This implies that the
benefits created by the acquisitions are not simply the result of a transfer of value from
the shareholders of the purchasing firm to the shareholders of the target company. The
reaction of the stock market to the announcement of an acquisition seems to create
extra value for the target companies that they receive in excess of the value that is
transferred from the bidding firms. If the value of a company increases, perhaps
because it is the target of an acquisition attempt, then it is possible that individuals who
_
observe this change will also buy shares in that firm as they hope to benefit from
continued increases in the price. These purchases serve to push the value of shares up
even further which could account for the extra value that is created for the acquired
firms during an acquisition attempt.
There is also some evidence to support the suggestion that the stock market
pre-empts acquisition activity and begins to adjust share prices before the takeover
offer is made. The results calculated using the larger windows have greater magnitude
in many cases than in smaller windows. Equally, it appears that the gains are made
when the acquisition is announced rather than throughout the bid or when the takeover
attempt ends. In the failed acquisitions the average abnormal returns to both the
targets and the bidding firms are very similar to the returns in successful bids. This
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implies that the alterations in the share prices created by the takeover correspond to
the starting of the bid rather than the ending.
Lastly, it remains to observe that this chapter only examined to benefits that
manifest themselves in the share price of the involved firms. It was possible to infer
from these results that managerial ambition is an important motive in takeover activity
and that many companies suffer from agency problems but the precise benefits that
acquisitions create for the managers of the bidding firms are unknown as no
information was available about the details of the managers contracts or the impact
that an acquisition might have on their pay and bonuses. Furthermore, the impact of
the takeovers were only considered for a short time period around the takeover and
any long term impacts will not be reflected in these findings. Both of these factors
represent areas for potential future research.
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Conclusion
This thesis aimed to investigate acquisition activity in the UK in recent years.
Chapter 1 introduced the literature review and demonstrated the diversity of topics
that exist within this field. It demonstrated the diversity of previous literature and
many of the short-comings of the previous research. The first of the empirical chapters
was Chapter 2. Here the behaviour of the market for corporate control was examined
and it was demonstrated that there is a link between takeovers and the economy.
Chapter 4 examined the firms that became involved in takeovers and clarified the
motives that prompted these acquisitions. This chapter also introduced a new type of
model, which incorporates an element of time, into the estimation. Chapter 5
combined the results of the previous two chapters by adding macro-economic data to
the models that were used to identify the firms that took part in the acquisitions. This
investigated the impact that differing economic conditions have on the selection of
firms that are involved in takeovers and, once again, represents an innovation in this
area. The last empirical work was contained in Chapter 6. Here the benefits created
by the takeovers were investigated by comparing the expected returns on the shares of
the involved companies with the actual returns.
Summary of Previous Results
The first chapter was the literature review. Although it contained no empirical
work it represented a very thorough examination of the previous literature on the
subject of acquisitions. In particular, it illustrated the wide range of subjects within
this field. The articles considered ranged from purely hypothetical papers such as
Berkovitch and Khanna (1991), in which the authors used games theory to model
acquisitions, to entirely practical articles such as Creehan and Leger's paper (1994) on
competitive positioning. In this chapter there was also a consideration of the laws that
control acquisition activity and a discussion of the legal requirements that are involved
in attempting a takeover. This examination of the literature also demonstrated the
eccentricities in the market for corporate control. For example, under certain
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circumstances it is possible for an acquisition defence to increase the probability of a
takeover. Equally a perceived saviour, a white knight, can become a thoroughgoing
villain in a very short period of time. It is debatable if any other area of finance could
contain so many tales of adventurous action, unscrupulous behaviour or, on occasions,
total stupidity.
Chapter 2 starts the empirical work with an investigation of the levels of
acquisition in the UK. In the past other authors have examined the level of acquisition
activity in various countries but have failed to derive a single theory that can account
for the level of takeover activity. Furthermore, there is still some debate about
whether the behaviour of the corporate control market is random or not. This chapter
started by addressing this issue and investigated the level of acquisition activity in two
different ways. The first approach was to replicate a test from the paper by Golbe and
White (1987). By examining the residuals of a simple regression estimation, which
modelled the number of acquisitions against time, it was possible to determine that
there is a link between acquisition numbers in consecutive time periods. This was
followed by a Box-Jenkins analysis of the same data which confirmed that the number
of acquisitions in the UK display a clear autoregressive component. These two
findings made it possible to reject the suggestion that acquisition activity is random
and, therefore, unpredictable. Once this decision had been made it was then possible
to examine the relationship between the level of acquisition activity and the economic
conditions in the proceeding months using the general to specific methodology. The
results of these estimations indicated a clear link between economic conditions and the
level of takeovers in the following periods. It appears that an increase in takeover
numbers follows increases in industrial production and share prices and decreases in
foreign exchange rates, interest rates and the price of North Sea oil. These factors
could encourage managers to attempt more investment and suggest that their firms are
in a good financial position. The combination of these economic factors makes a very
effective model for acquisition numbers but the model in unable to predict accurately
during the merger wave period. This model is incapable of predicting the heights to
which the corporate control market will rise during a merger wave although they can
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accurately identify the upswing in acquisition numbers that marks the start of such a
wave.
It appears that merger waves are triggered by an upturn in the economic
conditions, but then the level of acquisitions rises above the expected level. This
description makes a merger wave sound like a rational bubble in which the fundamental
series is the economic cycle. The last empirical section in Chapter 2 considered this
possibility and it appeared that this could be a viable explanation for the observed
patterns of acquisition behaviour. However, none of the features identified there, that
characterise a bubble, are unique to bubbles and consequently this does not offer
definitive proof for this idea. Nevertheless, it could explain why it has not been
possible in the past to create a single theory that can explain acquisition numbers.
Chapter 3 dealt with the issues of sampling theory. Companies involved in
acquisitions make up a relatively small percentage of the total number of firms. When
examining acquisitions it is important to maximise the amount of information that can
be gathered on this small section of the population, which often leads to deliberate
over-sampling of the firms that are involved in acquisitions. Various methods of
constructing the samples were considered in this chapter, starting with simple random
sampling and progressing through stratified sampling to choice based sampling. The
earlier methods of sampling were rejected on the grounds that they do not allow for
the deliberate over-sampling. Choice-based sampling is the only technique that allows
the deliberate over-sampling of a small proportion of the firms in the population which
makes it the most suitable manner in which to construct a sample containing acquired
or acquiring firms. This sort of sampling technique, however, may not be acceptable
with certain methods of estimation and could create a significant bias in the results.
This is certainly the case with logit models if they are estimated using the maximum
likelihood technique. In this situation the use of a choice based sample can result in a
significant bias in the results. This bias increases the probability that the individuals in
the sample will be identified as belonging to the over-sampled section of the data,
irrespective of whether this is correct or not. Superficially, this produces impressive
looking results but has very little to do with the adequacy of the model. Fortunately,
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the magnitude of this bias can be evaluated and the predicted values adjusted
accordingly. There is no problem at all with the proportional hazard function models,
which are estimated with a partial likelihood function and are unaffected by the
construction of the samples. This means that it is possible to use this type of sample in
the empirical work in this study.
The acquired and acquiring companies in the data sets are also matched with
firms that were not involved in takeovers during the period under consideration. The
companies were paired according to their size and all of the data was represented as
percentage deviations from the industry average. This last change removes any
difficulties that may result from using companies that operate in many different
industries. Certain industries can exhibit behavioural patterns that are quite distinct
from other areas and these natural differences can create misleading results. By
representing the data as percentage deviations from the industry average this type of
problem can be removed and the data can be used to investigate the characteristics of
companies that take part in the acquisition process. This chapter also included tables
which represent the variables that appeared in previous empirical work, the theories of
acquisition activity and the covariates that were used in the empirical work in Chapters
4 and 5. These tables demonstrate the diversity of variables used in the previous
_
empirical work and show that the terms selected for use in the empirical work in this
thesis all have strong links to previous work in this area.
Chapter 4 deals with the identification of firms that took part in takeovers.
Samples were created that represented the data in each of the five years before the
acquisition took place and these, coupled with the data sets including the non-involved
firms, made it possible to examine the differences between the bidders and the targets
as well as between the two sets of involved and non-involved firms over several years
before the takeover occurred. The results indicated that there were clear differences
between the acquired and acquiring companies and also between both of these groups
of firms and the non-involved companies with which they were paired. The results of
these investigations can be simply summarised. Firstly, the level of information in the
results was far greater when using a hazard function model than with the logit
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methodology. This supports the idea that this new methodology, involving the length
of time for which a company has lived, is more suitable to the analysis of takeovers
than the more conventional discrete choice approach. The results created with these
models were consistent over all of the five years of data suggesting that the involved
firms are not subject to rapid alterations in their performance or conditions. Both the
acquired and acquiring companies demonstrated distinct sets of characteristics that
distinguished these firms from each other and from the companies that remained
uninvolved in takeovers. Specifically, the target firms were found to be less efficient
than either the bidding firms or the non-involved companies. They were less profitable
than the non-involved firms although they were not always less profitable that the
bidders. These companies paid high dividends to their shareholders but had relatively
low price to earnings ratios which implies that they possess the potential to invest in
new projects in the future but are probably undervalued on the stock market. The
impression of poor managerial efficiency is increased by the fact that the acquired firms
have low liquidity whilst the fact that they have low tax charges reflects their relatively
low profitability. The overall impression created by these results is that target
companies are relatively inefficient and poorly managed. They are also poor
performers although they have the potential to do far better in the future.
In comparison the acquiring companies appeared to be more efficient than
either the acquired firms or the companies that were not involved in acquisitions.
Furthermore, they have higher profits than the non-involved firms with which they are
paired. Unlike the acquired firms these companies have both high dividends and high
price to earnings ratios which implies that these companies are in a secure financial
position and could fund at least part of the takeover with retained dividends. The
liquidity of these firms is higher than either the target firms or the companies that
remain uninvolved in takeovers which suggests they are in a sound financial position.
The published tax charge for the acquiring firms is higher than either of the groups of
firms that they are modelled against which is probably a reflection of their higher
profitability. Lastly, the acquiring firms have a higher managers to employees ratio
which, according to Lecraw (1984), suggests that they are likely to diversify into new
areas in order to provide the managers with something to occupy their time. In short,
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the acquiring firms are profitable and well run companies that may be seeking new
investments or new market areas into which they can expand their interests.
The results in this chapter suggested that acquisitions may be motivated by the
ambition of the managers of the acquiring company. Alternatively, these managers
could be seeking another firm to buy in order to expand their interests into new areas
or to restructure their firm. The targets are inefficiently run companies that are
under-performing at the time of the takeover but have demonstrated that they possess
the potential to do much better in the future, provided that new investment
opportunities can be found.
Chapter 5 added macro-economic factors to the accounting variables that were
used in the previous chapter. The selection of the macro-economic terms that were
used in these component terms was based on the results of Chapter 2 although these
series contained an increased quantity of data. Furthermore, the data in this sample
was split into two sections representing the boom and recession periods in the UK
economy. This innovation took place to determine whether different macro-economic
factors are important under different economic conditions. When these results are
considered it appears that the addition of macro-economic factors does not
significantly alter the characteristics of the companies that become either bidders or
targets in an acquisition. These findings correspond to the previous chapter in many
respects and these findings there is considerable support for both the managerial
inefficiency and the managerial ambition motives for takeovers in addition to the
restructuring and diversification theories.
The main difference in this chapter comes when the macro-economic factors
are considered. Here there were clear differences between the boom and recession
periods. In a time of economic prosperity the important macro-economic variables
were all concerned with the value of equity and funding but in a recession the emphasis
changed to production, sales and business confidence. The overall impression was that
takeovers in a boom period were more opportunistic and linked to the easier funding
options that are thought to exist at that time. In a recession period acquisitions can be
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linked to production, sales and business confidence. This implied that takeovers were
used to secure the acquiring company's position and market share rather than to branch
out into new areas. The targets were lower risk companies in these periods and
takeovers may be used as a substitute for overseas investment if the value of Sterling
drops significantly.
The last chapter in this thesis, Chapter 6, was concerned with the benefits
created by acquisition activity. The innovations in this chapter were concerned, firstly
with an improvement in the method that was used to estimate the returns for each
share and secondly with the many different types of acquisitions that were considered.
It was possible to sub-divide the acquisitions in the sample depending on the outcome
of the bid and also on the nature of the takeover process itself Lastly, the acquisitions
were divided into boom and recession periods, as in Chapter 5, to investigate whether
the different economic conditions can have an impact on the level of benefits that result
from the takeover.
In all cases there were obvious benefits to the shareholders of the target firms
as the value of their investment increased significantly. The cumulative abnormal
returns were positive even when the takeover attempt failed and the target firm
_
remained independent. This suggested that the gains may be associated more with the
initial announcement of the acquisition than with any later announcements concerning
the outcome of the takeover attempt. When the contested bids are considered the
target firms should experience unusually large returns as the bidding war between the
contesting bidders should result in an increase in the value of the offer they receive.
However, there was no evidence of this result and the gains to the shareholders of the
targets are no greater than in any other type of purchase. Furthermore, there are no
statistically significant differences between the level of returns generated in the boom
period and the recession for the shareholders of the acquired firms as the returns on
targets do not alter by a significant margin between these periods.
The returns for the acquiring firms, in virtually all of the different types of
takeovers considered here, demonstrate negative cumulative abnormal returns. Such a
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results represents a loss to the shareholders of these companies as the value of their
investment decreases. As with the target firms, a surprising result occurs when the
contested bids are examined. In the recent literature it has been thought that these
types of bids result in larger losses to the acquiring firm than in other instances. The
bidding war that is supposed to develop in these cases can result in significant over
payment for the acquired firm. However, in these takeovers there is no evidence of
this phenomena, known as the "winner curse", taking place. The cumulative abnormal
returns to the acquiring firms were negative here as in other cases but are not
particularly larger than the equivalent values for other types of takeovers. Once again
there are no significant differences between the boom and recession periods and the
condition of the economy does not seem to have an impact of acquisition benefits.
These results imply that the takeovers benefit the shareholders of the target
companies but not the shareholders of the purchasing firms. This corresponds to the
theories in the previous literature concerning the benefits of takeovers but cannot
represent the benefits to the managers of these companies or reflect the long term
impact that an acquisition can have. These findings confirm the results in the previous
chapters in which it appeared that takeovers are prompted by the managers of the
acquiring firms and that their motives for attempting to purchase another firm have
little or nothing to do with creating benefits for their shareholders. It " is possible,
however, that the acquisition may place the acquiring firm in a stronger position and
could improve its prospects for the future which would, eventually, benefit the
shareholders by increasing the profits that the company makes which can, in turn,
increase the value of their investment.
Areas for Future Research
The literature concerning acquisitions is very wide spread and there are still
many possible areas for future research in this field. There is still no theory that
comprehensively links acquisition activity to the economy which is also certainly the
main area for further research. The results in Chapter 3 suggest that the bubble
explanation appears to fit the observed behaviour however none of the tests there are
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conclusive as none of the characteristics that they distinguish are unique to bubbles.
There is an unique test, in a paper by McQueen and Thorley (1994), that employs
duration dependence to determine the probability that a sequence of abnormal values
will end and this would presence an ideal starting point for further research in this area.
Chapters 4 and 5 both offer the prospects for future research. In both cases
extra variables could be added to the data sets. In particular, information on the
ownership structure of the firms could be added, as could data concerning any defence
techniques that the targets use and the nature of the managers contracts. In this last
point it would be especially interesting to know if the managers of the bidding
companies are rewarded for increasing the size of the firm and whether the target
managers have golden parachutes. All of these factors are thought to influence
behaviour in acquisitions and their addition in the data sets could increase the
information that can be gathered about the firms that take part in takeovers and the
motives that prompt those takeovers. It may also be possible to alter the structure of
the data sets themselves in the future. Stratification variables could be added that
subdivide the data sets into groups based on either the nature of the bid, the value of
the bid or the outcome of the takeover attempt. The samples could be also
reconstructed to form panel data sets. These could be made to analyse the impact that
passing time has on the results which would also increase the level of information that
can be inferred from these data sets.
Lastly, the study of acquisitions benefits in Chapter 6 also suggests some
potential areas for future research. The share prices and the event study
methodologies that were used in this study can only measure the impact that a
takeover has in the short term and cannot examine the consequences of an acquisition
over a longer period. Analysing the accounts of the involved firms may be more
informative, especially when considering the impact that a takeover has on the firm as
a whole. Furthermore, share prices only reflect the benefits that the acquisition creates
for the owners and cannot reflect the impact that the takeover has on the managers or
on the firm as a whole. The managers may own shares in their firm but this does not
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convey any information about the impact that a takeover may have on their
remuneration packages.
Cross-border acquisitions are occasionally examined in the previous literature
but do not appear to have been subjected to the same level of scrutiny that domestic
acquisitions have endured. Chapter 1 demonstrates the large volume of work that
exists on domestic takeovers and the variety of approaches that can be taken in
analysing these acquisitions. Virtually all of those areas would be applicable in the
case of cross-border takeovers and this represents a very large area for potential
research.
Finally, the empirical work included here could be repeated on larger data sets
by adding information on the takeovers that have occurred since the end of 1994.
Hopefully, these results would confirm the findings already given here and add to the
knowledge that already exists on the nature of acquisition activity in the UK.
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Appendix I. Companies
Included in the Data Sets
for Chapters 4 and 5.
Acquired Firms
A Goldberg
AGB Research
API
Abaco Investments
Aberdeen Construction
Aberdeen Petroleum
Airflow Construction
Alida
Allebone
AmBrit International
Anchor Chemical
Arlington Securities
Armstrong Equipment
Arncliffe
Ash & Lacy
Associated Fisheries
Associated Newspapers
Atlantic Computers
Avana
Ayrton Saunders
BTS
Babygro
Baker Perkins
Bank of Wales
Banro Industries
Barham
Bassett
Beatson Clark
Beckenham
Bejam
Berisford International
Berisfords
Birmid Qualcast
Birmingham Mint
Blackwood Hodge
Boase Massimi Pollitt
British Car Auction
British Syphon Industries
Britoil
Broadcast Communications
Burgess Products
C D Bramall
C H Beazer
C Walker & Sons
CCA Publishing
Cahill May Roberts
Camford Engineering
Camotech
Carbo
Carless, Cape! & Leonard
Catalyst Communications
Central Independent TV
Chase Property
Checkpoint Europe
Chemoxy
Clifford Foods
Coalite
Colroy
Combined English Stores
I
Consolidated Gold Fields
CoxMoore
Cramphorn
Crosby
Crossley
Crown House
Crystalate
Cundell
D G Durham
DDT
DPCE
Daks Simpson
Dale
Dale Electric International
Davenport Vernon
Davies & Metcalfe
Davy Corporation
De La Rue
Deritend Stamping
Derwent MacDee
Desoutter Brothers
Dixons
Dom
Dowty
Dubilier International
Ealing Electro-Optics
Edbro
Ellerman
Empire Stores
Enterprise Computer Services
Etam
Eucalyptus Pulp Mills
Evans
Evode
Extel
F H Lloyd
Feb International
Ferranti
Fitch Lovell
Flightspares
Framlington
Freeman Group
Freemans
G W Thornton
Gabicci
Garfimkels Restaurants
Garner Booth
Gateway
Granyte Surface
Coatings
Habit Precision Engineering
Handley-Walker
Hargreaves Quarries
Harrison Industries
Hawthorn Leslie
Henlys
Hestair
Higgs & Hill
Hillards
Hille Ergonom
Hobsons Publishing
Hogg Group
Holt Lloyd International
Horizon Travel
II
Hoskyns
Hugh Mackay
Hunslet
Hunter Saphir
Hunting Associated Industries
Imperial Continental Gas
Interlink Express
Irish Distillers
J A Devenish
James Burrough
James Finlay
James Wilkes
Jessups
John Crowther
John Green
Johnsen & Jorgensen
Juliana's
Keep Trust
Kembrey
Kennedy Brookes
Kingsgrange
Kingsley & Forester
LDH
LWT
Laidlaw Thomson
Lambert Howarth
LandLeisure
Lec Refrigeration
Lee (Arthur) & Sons
Linread
London Shop
Lyon & Lyo n
Macarthy
Macmillan
Magnetic Materials
Manders
Marina Development
Matthew Brown
Matthew Hall
Mayfield
Melville Engineering
Micrelec
Midlands Radio
Millford Docks
Millward Brown
Mitchell Cotts
Mofins
Monument Oil & Gas
Morland
Mount Charlotte Investments
Myson
Norcros
Norfolk Capital
Nottingham Brick
Octopus
Owners Abroad
Pacific Media
Parkdale
Parkway
Peachey Property
Pearl
Peerless
Penny & Giles International
Pickwick
III
Pittard Garner
Plastic Constructions
Pleasurama
Plessey
Plumb
Powerline International
Quotient
Racal Electronics
Radio City
Ratcliffes (Great Bridge)
Riley Leisure
Robertson
Ross Catherall
Rowntree Mackintosh
Royal Sovereign
Rub eroid
SMAC
Samuelson
Sandhurst Marketing
Sarasota Technology
Savage
Scholes
Scott Greenhorn
Scott's Restaurant
Shield
Sintrom
Southampton Isle of Wight & S of Eng
Royal Mail Steam Packet
Southern Radio
Sovereign Oil & Gas
Stag Furniture
Stead & Simpson
Steetley
Stothert & Pitt
Superdrug
Sutherland
TMD Advertising
Tace
Technical Components
Telephone Rentals
Tenby Industries
Teredo Petroleum
Textured Jersey
Thames Television
Thermax
Thomas Robinson
Thomson T-Line
Thurgar Bardex
Tilbury
Tootal
Torday & Carlisle
Touchstone
Trade Promotion Services
Trans World
Trebor
Trent
Tricentrol
Trimoco
Triton Europe
Tysons
UCL
UEI
Unilock
United Packaging
IV
Viking Packaging
WSL
Walter Lawrence
Walter Runciman
Ward White
Wayne Kerr
Westland
Westpool Investments Trust
Wetten Brothers
Whitbread Investment Company
Wilding Office Equipment
Williams Collins
Wolstenholme Rink
Woodhouse & Rickson
Worcester
Wordplex Information Systems
Yougal Carpets
Zetters Leisure
Acquiring Firms
600 Group
AAH
ACT
AMEC
APV
Aegis
Air Products and Chemicals
Airtours
Alan Cooper
Albert Fisher
Allied Textile
Anglo United Development
Antares
Apricot Computers
Associated British Foods
Associated British Ports
Atlas Copco AB
Australia Mutual Provident (AMP)
Avis Europe
BET
BM
BS Group
BSG International
Bank of Scotland
Bardsey
Barry Wehrniller
Bass
Beauford
Belhaven
Berkeley
Blacks Leisure
V
Blue Circle Industries
Boddington's Brewery
Booker McConnell
Boots
Boustead
Bowater Industries
Bowthorpe Holdings
Brent Walker
Brierley Investment
Britannia Security
British & Commonwealth
British Aerospace
British Petroleum
British Steel
Bromsgrove Industries
Cable & Wireless
Cadbury Schweppes
Cairn Energy
Cambridge Electronic
Cap Gemini Sogeti
Caparo Group
Capital Radio
Carclo Engineering
Carlton Communication
Cattle's
Charles Baynes
Charter Consolidated
Charterhall
Chloride
Clayform Properties
Coats Viyella
Coloroll
Conder
Cookson
Corton Beach
Culver Holdings
Daily Mail & General Trust
Delta
Dewhist
Donelon Tyson
Dowding & Mills
EIS
EIT
EMAP
Eagle Trust
Elf Aquitaine
Emess Lighting
Epicure
Evans Halshaw
Farnell Electronics
Ferguson Industrial
Ferrari Holdings
Ferry Pickering
Fitzwilton
GEC
GICN
Glynwed International
Goode Durrant
Govett Strategic Investment Trust
Granada
Graystone
Greenalls
Greene King
Guardian & Manchester Evening News
VI
HTV
Hanson Trust
Harrisons & Crossfield
Hartwell
Hawley
Hazlewood Foods
Helene
Heywood Williams
Hollis
Holmes & Marchant
Hoplcinsons
Hunter
IIVII
Ibstock Johnsen
Iceland Frozen Foods
Inchcape
International Business Communications
Isosceles
John Mowlem
John Waddington
Johnson & Firth Brown
Kalon
Kelt Energy
Kingfisher
Ladbroke
Laporte Industries
Leisure Investments
Lilley
Linton Park
Lloyds Chemists
Local London
London Merchant Services
Lookers
Lynwood
MJ Gleeson
MTM
Markheath Securities
Marley
Marrel
Maxwell Communication
Mayne Nickless
McKechnie Brothers
McLeod Russell
Mecca Leisure
Meggitt
Midsummer Leisure
Minerals & Resources Corporation
Morgan Crucible
NMC
Neste Oy
Nestle
Newman Tonks
News International
Next
Nimex Resources
Norsk Data AS
Norton Opax
Oakwood
Oceana
Omnicom
P-E International
Pavilion Leisure
Peek Holdings
Peel Holdings
VII
Pentos
Pergamon Professional Financial Services
Pernod Ricard
Peter Black
Pittard
Pittencrieff
Polypipe
Porter Chadburn
Queen's Moat
RHP
RMC
Raine Industries
Ranks Hovis McDougal
Redland
Redoute
Reed International
Robert Bosch
Robert H Lowe
S Casket
SI Group
Sankyo Seiko
Scott & Robinson
Scottish &
Newcastle Brewers
Seacon Holdings
Sears
Severn Trent Water
Sheffield Insulations Group (SIG)
Sime Darby
Simon Engineering
Spring Ram
Stratagem
Strong &Fisher
Sunleigh Electronics
Suter
Systems Reliability
T Cowie
TI
TT
Tarmac
Tate & Lyle
Telfos
Tesco
Thorn EMI
Throgmorton Trust
Thyssen Industries
Tozer Kemsley & Millbourn
Tractebel
Trafalgar House
Triplex
Triton Energy
Trusthouse Forte
Tyzack Turner
Unigate
United Energy
United Newspapers
Vickers
Vodafone
W H Smith
WPP
Wace
Wagon International
Wassell
Waverley Cameron
VIII
Wembley
Wereld haven
Wheway
Whitbread
Whittington
Williams Holdings
Woolworth
Wyevale Garden Centres
Y J Lovell
Yule Catto
Acquired Control Firms
A Beckman
AG Barr
AG Holdings
Aberdeen Steak Houses
Adwest Group
Aim Group
Air London International
Alexandra Workwear
Alexon Group
Allied Colloids
Amersham International
Anagen
Appleyard Group
Arjo Wiggins
Arlen
Armour Trust
Asda
Asprey
Ayrshire Metal
BBA Group
BNB Resources
Barratt Development
Beckman (A)
Bemrose Corporation
Bernard Matthews
Bilston & BSea
Black Arrow
Blockleys
Bluebird Toys
Bodycote International
Bogod Group
IX
Borthwicks
Bostrom
Boxmore International
Brammer
Breedon
Bridport-Gundry
British Bloodstock Association
British Borneo
British Dredging
British Polythene
British Vita
Briton Group
Brown & Jackson
Brown (N) Group
Brunel Holdings
Bryant Group
Bullough
Bunzl
Burnfield
CI Group
Caffyns
Calor Group
Cantors
Cape
Carpetright
Castings
Castle Mill International
Chamberlaine & Hill
Charter
Chieftan Group
Chiroscience
Clarkson (Horace)
Cluff Resources
Clyde Petroleum
Cobham
Concentric
Courts
Crabtree Group
Crean (James)
Crest Nicholson
Danka Business
Delaney Group
Devro International
Dinkie Heel
Diploma
Dolphin Packaging
Domino Printing
Druck Holdings
Dudley Jenkins
ERF Holdings
Eadie Holdings
Eclipse Blinds
Elbief
Elliott (B)
Ensor Holdings
Eurocamp
Eurotherm
Eve Group
Expamet International
Eyecare Products
FIAT Thorpe
Fairey Group
Farepak
Faupel Trading
X
Filofax
Fine Art Development
Forminster
Forward Technology
Friendly Hotels
Fuller Smith
GBE International
Galliford
Gaskell
Gates (Frank G)
Gibbon Group
Gibbs & Dandy
Crraseby
Greenacre
Gresham Computers
HP Bulmer
Hadleigh Industries
Haggas (John)
Hallite
Hampden Group
Hamp son
Industries
Hardy Oil & Gas
Harmony Property
Hartlepools
Hay (Norman)
Hickson International
Highland Distilleries
Hollas Group
Home Counties Newspapers
Howard Holdings
Howden Group
Isotron
Jaks
James Fisher
James Latham
Jarvis
Jeyes
Jo Walker
Jones & Shipman
Kalamazoo Computers
Kelsey Industries
Kwik Save Group
Laser Scan Holdings
Laura Ashley
Leeds Group
Liberty
Lilleshall
Linx Print Technology
Loades
London & Clydeside
Lopex
Low & Bonar
M.R. Data Managment
MMT Computing
Macallan-Glenlivet
Macdonald Mart
Manganese Bronze
Mansfield Breweries
Manweb
Martin International
Maunders (John)
Mayborn Group
Mayflower Corporation
XI
Menvier-Swain
Merrydown
Metalrax Group
Metsec
Microgen holdings
Mid-States
Moran Holdings
More O'Farrell
Morgan Sindall
Morris Ashby
NSM
National Express
Neepsend
Newarthill
Nichols (Vimto)
North Midland Construction
North West Water
Novo Group
Ocean Group
Oceanics
Orbis
Osbourne & Little
Oxford Instruments
Parldand Group
Pegasus
Pendragon
Perry Group
Phoenix Timber
Photo-Me International
Polar
Powell Duffryn
Powerscreen
Prospect Holdings
Psion
Quadrant Group
Ramus Holdings
Readicut International
Real Time Control
Reckitt & Coleman
Record Holdings
Redrow
Reed Exectutive
Reg Vardy
Regal Hotels
Regent Corporation
Renishaw
Renold
Rexam
Richards Group
Ropner
Rugby Group
Sandersons Electric
Scholl
Scottish TV
Seafield Group
Security Services
Seet
SelecTV
Select Appointments
Servomex
Shiloh
Silent Night
Sims Food Group
Sirdar
XII
World of Leather
Wyefield Group
Young (H)
Sleepy Kids
Smith & Nephew
Somic
Soundtracs
Southern Newspapers
Spandex
Storm Group
Surrey Group
Sutcliffe Speakman
Sycamore Holdings
T&S Stores
Tay Homes
Taylor Woodrow
Thomas Jourdan
Time Products
Transport Development
Transtec
Trinity International
Try Group
Ugland International
Unipalm
United News and Media
Usbourne
Vendome Luxury
Verson International
Vista Entertainment
WM Morrison
Wakebourne
Watmough's Holdings
Whatman
Widney
Wilson (Connolly)
XIII
Acquiring Control Firms
AF Bulgin
Acatos & Hutchinson
Acorn Computers
Alex Holdings
Alexon Group
Allied Colloids
Allied Domecq
Alvis
Amalgamated Metal Corp
Amber Industrial
Amec
Amersham International
Amstrad
Anglian Water
Arlen
Arthur Wood
Asda
Asprey
Astec (BSR)
Austin Reed
Avon Rubber
BAA
BBA Group
BCE Holdings
BOC
BPB Industries
BSS
Baggeridge Brick
Bedford (William)
Bellway
Bensons Crisps
Bentalls
Bespak
Betterware
Beverley Group
Black (A&C)
Black Arrow Group
Body Shop International
Brammer
Brasway
Brent International
British Fittings
British Mohair
British Thornton
Bunzl
Burndene Investments
Burton Group
Campari International
Central Motor Auction
Cheam Group
Chrysalis Group
City Centre Restaurants
Clinton Cards
Copymore
Cordiant
Cosalt
Costain Group
Countryside Property
Courts
Cussins Property
Dawson Holdings
Denmans Electricals
Dobson Park
XRT
Dyson
ERA Group
ERF Holdings
Electrocomponents
Enviromed
European Colour
Eurotherm
Excalibur Group
Eyecare Products
FIT Group
FKI
Faber Priest
Feedback
Fife Indmar
Finelist Group
First Choice Holidays
First Leisure
Firth Holdings
Flextech
French
Gieves Group
Glaxo Wellcome
Global Group
Great Universal Stores (GUS)
Greggs
Guiness
Hall Engineering
Hartons Group
Haynes Publishing
Hewden-Stuart
Hickson International
Hill & Smith
How Group
Huntingdon International
ISA International
J Bibby
Jacks (William)
James Latham
Jarvis Porter
Johnson Matthey
Kwik Save Group
LEP Group
Laing (J)
Lamont Holdings
Laura Ashley
Liberty
Logica
Lonhro
Macallan-Glenlivet
Macdonald Mart
Macfarlane Group
Mansfield Breweries
Marks & Spencer
Marshalls
Matthew Clark
McAlpine
McCarthy & Stone
Menzies
Merchant Retail
Metal Bulletin
Mid-States
Midlands
Mitie Group
North West Water
Northern Foods	 Scantronic
Nurdin & Peacock	 Scapa Group
OEM	 Scottish TV
OMIT International	 Securicor Group
Ocean Wilsons	 Security Group
Oliver Group	 SelecTV
Owen & Robinson	 Senior Engineering
P&O	 Seton Health Care
PCT Group	 Shandwick
Paterson Zoch	 Shell Transport
Photo-Me International	 Shoprite Group
Pifco Holdings
	
Smith & Nephew
Pilldngton
	
Smith (David S)
Plysu	 Smith Industries
Pochins	 Smithldine Beecham
Portsmouth & Sunderland Newspapers 	 South Green Holdings
Premier Oils
	
Spirax-Sarco
Princedale Group
	
St Ives
Protean	 Stalcis
Quicks Group
	
Stanley Leisure
Radius	 Staveley Industries
Ransom (William)	 Stylo
Readicut International	 Swan (John)
Reckitt & Coleman	 T&N
Reuters Holdings	 T&S Stores
Rexam
	
Telspec
Rexmore	 Thames Water
Ricardo Group	 Thompson Marston
Richards	 Thorntons
Rolls-Royce
	
Ticketing
Rotork	 Travis Perkins
Rugby Group	 Treatt
XVI
Tunstall Group
Unilever
United News and Media
VSEL
Vardon
Vaux Group
Vega Group
Victaulic
Volex Group
WEW Group
Wainhomes
Walker Greenbank
Waterhouse Group
Watson & Philip
Weir Group
Welpac
William Morrison
Wilson (Connolly)
Wilson Bowden
Wimpey (George)
Wolseley
Worthington Group
Yorkshire Chemicals
Young & Co
Appendix II: Consistency of the Hazard Function and
Logit Results
In many of the results, the hazard function and logit methodologies appear to
generate results that are substantially different. There are several points that can be
made to demonstrate that these models are, in fact, consistent and that any error is
more likely to lie in the logit estimations than the hazard models.
The hazard function specification includes a duration term that increases the
level of information present in the models. This is in direct contrast to the logit
methodology for which the absence of a time factor is an often mentioned problem.
Thus it is reasonable to state that the hazard model is theoretically a superior result
compared to the logit estimation, as it is not subject to this serious deficit. This point
is also made by Ravenscraft and Scherer (1991). Furthermore, the hazard function
models are nearly always better specified at both the multiple and individual variable
levels; the t-statistics and likelihood ratio tests are usually higher for these models. In
addition to this, the hazard function models always include more variables than the
equivalent logit estimations. Clearly, a model is more likely to be statistically
consistent if it involves more terms. Both of these points suggest that the hazard
function models are better specified in practice as well as in theory. A last point to be
made in support of this supposition is that fact that the logit models fail to replicate any
of the popular theories concerning the motives for acquisitions and the nature of the
involved firms. The opposite holds for the hazard function results which further
supports the idea that they are the better models.
The obvious extension from this finding is to suggest that any inconsistencies
lie with the logit methodology rather than the hazard function. These inconsistencies
are likely to be created during the construction of the models that are given in the text.
The hazard function models and the logit models are consistent, to within two standard
errors, when the models are estimated using all the data; the starting point for the
creation of the presented models. The tables below show two of the original models
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from which the results are created. The first column represents the logit model and it
is easy to show that, with the sole exceptions of the total sales and capital gearing
terms, all of the variables in this model lie comfortably within two standard errors of
the value given in the second column, the equivalent hazard function model. The total
sales item and the capital gearing term are both subject to very high levels of volatility
but nevertheless the terms in the logit model lie within three standard errors of the
values given in the hazard model. Throughout the estimations the coefficients are
consistently very small. Thus, it is possible to see how the signs could change without
altering the consistency of the results. Furthermore, it is possible to say that the hazard
function and logit models are initially consistent and that any differences that appear in
the later models are almost certainly due to the reduced informational content of the
logit methodology.
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Table A2.1 Initial Logit and Hazard Function Models
Variable Type of Model
Logit Hazard Function
Turnover to assets employed -0.15 0.25
(-0.32) (1.08)
Turnover to fixed assets 0.38 -0.18
(1.24) (-1.99)
Sales per employee 0.5 -0.31
(1.14) (-1.22)
Stock ratio -0.19
(-1.24)
Return on capital employed -0.1 0.08
(-0.57) (0.66)
Return on s'holders equity 0.17 -0.1
(1.16) (-1.17)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin -0.15 -0.17
(-0.39) (-0.6)
Dividends per share -0.01 0.18
(-0.06) (1.43)
Earnings per share -0.19 0.21
(-1.46) (2.12)
Dividend yield
P/e ratio 0.01 0.12
(0.04) (0.7)
Capital gearing -0.05 0.03
(-0.54) (0.47)
Current ratio 0.71 -0.81
(1.11) (-1.69)
Acid test ratio
Debtor days -0.36 0.61
(-0.61) (1.25)
Creditor days -0.2 -0.12
(-0.32) (-0.22)
Total sales -0.05 0.03
(-1.66) (1.13)
Manager/employee ratio -0.12 0.04
(-1.2) (2.44)
Total tax charge -0.08 0.03
(-1.31) (0.54)
Likelihood ratio test 27.76 40.38
(Critical value in parentheses) (27.59) (27.59)
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -3), t-statistics in parentheses
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Appendix Ill : Complete Hazard Function and Logit
Results for Chapter 4
A3.1 Acquiring and Acquired Companies
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets 0.32**
(1.78)
0.28***
(1.66)
0.31***
(1.66)
0.4**
(2.49)
0.32***
(1.69)
0.3
(1.61)
Sales per employee 0.29(1.31)
0.49
(1.49)
0.5
(1.56)
Stock ratio 0.21***
(-1.66)
-0.26
(-1.6)
0.2***
(-1.92)
0.2***
(-1.93)
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
-0.21***
(-1.75)
0.19***
(-1.75)
-0.43
(-1.38)
-0.41
(-1.43)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield 0.42(1.38)
-0.4
(-1.3)Pie ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio
Acid test ratio 0•43***
(1.78)
0.39***
(1.7)
Debtor days
Creditor days
Total sales -0.05***
(-1.66)
-0.05
(-1.6)
0.06***
(-1.92)
-0.06***
(-1.93)
Manager/employee ratio
-0.71
(-1.28)
-0.12
(-1.17)
-0.07
(-1.28)
-0.13
(-1.18)
0.11***
(-1.82)
-0.11***
(-1.86)Total tax charge
Likelihood ratio test 18.59* 12.58* 19.22* 12.45* 16.78** 14.66*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Acquiring Firms
42
48
46
52
38
52
42
48
42
52
38
48
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10-3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Table A3.1.2 Logit Results Two Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets 0.27
(1.39)
0.28
(1.47)
Sales per employee 1.56*
(2.91)
1.74*
(3.18)
1.45*
(2.8)
1.61*
(3.05)
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin -1.17*
(-3.47)
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield 0.93*
(3.52)
0.86*
(3.35)
0.93*
(3.6)
0.87*
(3.41)
Pie ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio 0.46
(1.61)
0.48***
(1.65)
Acid test ratio
Debtor days
Creditor days -1.19*
(-3.13)
-1.86*
(-3.2)
-1.46*
(-2.7)
-1.38**
(-2.54)
Total sales -1.18*
(-3.53)
-1.09*
(-3.43)
-1.06*
(-3.34)
Manager/employee ratio
Total tax charge
Likelihood ratio test 45.05* 41.79* 41.49* 38*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Acquiring Firms
48
52
42
40
40
42
40
36
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Table A3.1.3 Logit Results Three Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee
Stock ratio 0.13
(1.17)
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield 0.45*
(1.97)
0.46*
(2.04)
Pie ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio
Acid test ratio
Debtor days 0.7***
(1.79)
0.67***
(1.75)
Creditor days
Total sales -1.26* -
(-3.29)
-1.11*
(-3.13)
Manager/employee ratio
Total tax charge
Likelihood ratio test 21.33* 19.47*
Predictive Accuracy (%). Acquired firms
Acquiring Firms
42
38
38
44
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Table A3.1.4 Logit Results Four Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee
Stock ratio	 0.21	 0.26***	 0.23
(1.37)	 (1.7)	 (1.46)
0.22
(1.41)
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield
Pie ratio
Capital gearing	 -0.47
(-1.16)
Current ratio	 1.2*
(2.92)
Acid test ratio	 1.56*
(3.1)
1.21*
(3.03)
Debtor days	 1.4*
(3.05)
Creditor days
Total sales	 -1.13*	 -1.59*	 -1.26*
(-3.2)	 (-3.33)	 (-3.04)
-1.35*
(-3.26)
Manager/employee ratio 	 -0.07
(-1.46)
-0.06
(-1.4)
Total tax charge	 -0.13	 -0.12	 -0.12
(-1.36)	 (-1.31)	 (-1.34)
-0.13
(-1.37)
Likelihood ratio test	 21.05*	 22.59*	 25.16* 23.77*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms	 36	 38	 42
Acquiring Firms	 40	 44	 36
38
36
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Table A3.1.5 Logit Results Five Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share -0.12
(-1.36)
-0.11
(-1.22)
Dividend yield -0.83**
(-2.45)
-0.74**
(-2.06)
-0.74**
(-2.07)
P/e ratio 0.84*
(2.59)
0.75**
(2.33)
0.72**
(2.26)
Capital gearing
Current ratio 1.24*
(2.62)
1.17
(2.5)
Acid test ratio
Debtor days
Creditor days
Total sales -1.31*
(-3.05)
-1.33*
(-3.07)
Manager/employee ratio
Total tax charge -0.25**
(-2.18)
Likelihood ratio test 21.3* 27.08* 25.51*
Predictive Accuracy (%). Acquired firms
Acquiring Firms
30
44
41
37
42
42
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10-3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Table A3.1.6 Hazard Function Results One Year Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed 0.32
(1.47)
0.32
(1.4)
0.31
(1.37)
0.28
(1.24)
Turnover to fixed assets 0.19**
(-2.23)
-0.19**
(-2.2)
-0.11
(-1.46)
0.18**
(-2.1)
-0.19
(-2.17)
Sales per employee -0.36
(-1.54)
-0.33
(-1.41)
-0.3
(-1.54)
-0.37
(-1.55)
-0.45
(-2.13)
0.39**
(-2)
Stock ratio 0.35*
(2.89)
0.37*
(2.99)
0.36*
(2.9)
0.33*
(2.87)
0.34*
(2.75)
0.3*
(2.6)
0.3*
(2.59)
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share 0.17
(1.35)
0.18
(1.41)
0.21***
(1.66)
0.21***
(1.76)
0.21***
(1.79)
Earnings per share 0.2**
(2.07)
0.26**
(2.54)
0.2**
(2.01)
0.23*
(2.29)
Dividend yield 0.21
(1.31)
P/e ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio 0.84**
(-2.05)
-0.94*
(-2.69)
-0.67
(-1.37)
0.11**
(-2.43)
Acid test ratio 0.28***
(-1.8)
0.42*
(-3.61)
-0.34*
(-3.16)
0.33*
(-3.11)
Debtor days 0.53
(1.43)
0.47
(1.53)
0.61
(1.54)
0.41***
(1.7)
0•75***
(1.67)
0.36
(1.45)
0.4*
(2.64)
Creditor days
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio 0.4**
(2.55)
0.4*
(2.61)
Total tax charge
Likelihood ratio test 33.51* 26.5* 31.44* 26.33* 26.53* 24.67* 21.42*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Acquiring Firms
72
66
70
64
70
66
68
66
70
68
68
66
66
62
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10-3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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Table A3.1.7 Hazard Function Results Two Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets -0.06
(-1.39)
-0.06
(-1.45)
-0.06
(-1.42)
-0.06
(-1.59)
-0.06
(-1.45)
Sales per employee -0.19
(-1.26)
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity 0.15
(0.96)
0.2
(1.21)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin 0.46*
(-2.76)
Dividends per share
Earnings per share 0.07
(1.12)
0.07
(1.23)
0.07
(1.22)
0.09
(1.49)
Dividend yield 0.4*
(-2.31)
-0.3***
(-1.85)
0.3***
(-1.74)
-0.25
(-1.5)
-0.33
'k
(-1.88)
-0.36
(-2.19)
-0.32
***
(-1.85)
Pie ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio -0.29
***
(-1.89)
-0.28
***
(-1.92)
Acid test ratio
Debtor days 0.03*
(-3.46)
-0.27*
(-3.18)
Creditor days
Total sales 0.82*
(4.64)
0•84*
(5.25)
0.86*
(5.02)
0.81*
(4.89)
0.79*
(4.95)
0.7*
(4.82)
0.83*
(4.53)
Manager/employee ratio
Total tax charge -0.03
(-1.19)
-0.03
(-1.06)
-0.03
(-0.99)
Likelihood ratio test 38.92* 33.18* 34.64* 30.65* 34.5* 29.76* 37.37*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Acquiring Firms
72
68
70
66
70
66
68
62
70
66
66
64
70
66
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Table A3.1.8 Hazard Function Results Three Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets -0.04
(-1.25)
Sales per employee -0.57**
(-2.57)
-0.55**
(-2.52)
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed 0.66***
(1.92)
0.55***
(1.65)
Return on s'holders equity -0.02
(-1.6)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield
P/e ratio -0.24***
(-1.67)
-0.25***
(-1.68)
Capital gearing
Current ratio
Acid test ratio
Debtor days -0.62* _
(-2.97) (-2.89)
Creditor days
Total sales 1.08*
(4.01)
1.12*
(4.16)
Manager/employee ratio 0.06
(1.41)
Total tax charge
Likelihood ratio test 42.36* 37.88*
Predictive Accuracy (%). Acquired firms
Acquiring Firms
66
62
66
60
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Table A3.1.9 Hazard Function Results Four Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets
employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee -0.41**	 -0.4**
(-2.09)	 (-2.01)
-0.46**
(-2.44)
-0.43**
(-2.25)
-0.43**
(-2.2)
-0.43**
(-2.25)
Stock ratio
Return on capital
employed
Return on s'holders
equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share -0.12
(-1.12)
-0.13
(-1.22)
Earnings per share -0.07
(-1.29)
Dividend yield 0.22
(1.29)
0.23
(1.35)
Pie ratio
Capital gearing 0.41	 0.43
(1.58)	 (1.64)
0.39
(1.41)
0.36
(1.3)
0.34
(1.26)
0.36
(1.3)
Current ratio -0.81**	 -0.79**
(-2.39)	 (-2.34)
Acid test ratio -0.58***
(-1.83)
-0.58***
(-1.78)
-0.58***
(-1.79)
-0.58***
(-1.78)
Debtor days
Creditor days
Total sales 1.07*	 1.16*
(4.04)	 (4.26)
1.04*
(4.01)
1.06*
(4.04)
1.01*
(3.89)
1.06*
(4.04)
Manager/employee ratio
Total tax charge 0.08
(1.08)
0.09
(1.14)
Likelihood ratio test 43.65*	 39.36* 40.63* 37.24* 39.65* 37.24*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Acquiring Firms
60	 60
56	 56
58
52
60
54
56
56
58
54
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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Table A3.1.10 Hazard Function Results Five Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee
Stock ratio 0.15
(1.28)
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity 0.41***
(1.76)
0.38
(1.62)
0.36
(1.45)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share 0.08
(1.07)
Dividend yield 0.87*
(3.82)
0.91*
(3.96)
0.74*
(3.17)
0.96*
(4.17)
0.99*
(4.55)
0.79*
(3.43)
0.78*
(3.37)
Pie ratio -0.51**
(-2.53)
-0.52**
(-2.55)
-0.39***
(-1.87)
-0.54*
(-2.64)
-0.46**
(-2.32)
-13.39***
(-1.89)
0.38***
(-1.87)
Capital gearing
Current ratio -1.16***
(-1.69)
-0.69**
(-2.33)
-0.63**
(-2.15)
Acid test ratio 0.71
(1.33)
Debtor days 1.1***
(1.82)
1.19***
(1.95)
0.65
(1.35)
Creditor days -1.37**
(-2.16)
-1.32**
(-2.06)
-0.88**
(-2.44)
Total sales 0.93*
(3.2)
0.95*
(3.47)
0.96*
(3.5)
Manager/employee ratio
Total tax charge 0.24*
(2.69)
0.22*
(2.84)
0.21**
(2.55)
0.23*
(3.11)
Likelihood ratio test 56.19* 54.46* 56.41* 51.39* 46.64* 55.61* 54.31*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Acquiring Firms
52
48
52
48
46
42
48
46
46
42
50
48
48
42
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10"), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
A3.2 Acquired and Non-Involved Companies
Table A3.2.1 Logit Results One Year Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed 1.97*
(4.57)
1.93*
(4.14)
1.98*
(4.57)
1.93*
(4.14)
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share -0.27***
(-1.82)
-0.3**
(-2.11)
-0.33**
(-2.2)
-0.3**
(-2.11)
Dividend yield 0.66***
(1.73)
0.64***
(1.67)
P/e ratio -0.55
(-1.49) (-1.65)
Capital gearing
Current ratio
Acid test ratio -0.82***
(-1.76)
-0.95**
(-2.13)
-1.59**
(-2.27)
-0.95**
(-2.13)
Debtor days
Creditor days 0.7
(1.22)
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio -0.8*
(-4.88)
-0.75*
(-4.92)
-0.75*
(-4.8)
-0.75*
(-4.92)
Total tax charge
Constant 0.17
(1.48)
Likelihood ratio test 89.84* 84.53* 89.19* 84.53*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Non-Involved Firms
32
78
26
75
30
66
24
72
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Table A3.2.2 Logit Results Two Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets
employed
0.96
(1.53)
0.7
(1.16)
0.68
(1.13)
Turnover to fixed assets 0.86***
(1.99)
1.1*
(3.21)
0.95**
(2.14)
1.1*
(3.21)
1**
(2.2)
1.15*
(3.3)
Sales per employee
-0.45
(-1.29)
-0.44
(-1.24)
Stock ratio
Return on capital
employed
-1.41*
(2.93)
-1.23*
(-3.26)
-1.49*
(-3.23)
-1.23*
(-3.26)
-1.57*
(-3.33)
-1.34*
(-3.47)
Return on s'holders
equity
0.27
(1.31)
0.22
(1.17)
0.19
(1.06)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield 0.43**
(1.98)
0•39**
(1.97)
0.35***
(1.68)
0.39**
(1.97)
P/e ratio 0.45**
(2.28)
0.48*
(2.59)
Capital gearing
Current ratio
Acid test ratio
Debtor days
Creditor days
(-1.87)
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio
Total tax charge 0.06***
(1.87)
Likelihood ratio test 25.48* 18.23* 22.68* 18.23* 24.65* 21.32*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Non-Involved Firms
30
66
26
72
25
66
22
75
35
62
25
70
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10-s), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Table A3.2.3 Logit Results Three Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed 1.69*
(2.82)
1.54*
(2.65)
1.63*
(2.76)
1.55*
(2.68)
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee -0.99**
(-2.33)
-0.89**
(-2.15)
-0.91**
(-2.19)
-0.86**
(-2.1)
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed -1.72*
(-2.61)
-1.21**
(-2.2)
-1.69*
(-2.59)
-1.31**
(-2.35)
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield 0.48*
(2.27)
0.47*
(2.23)
Pie ratio 0.34***
(1.78)
0.38**
(2.03)
Capital gearing
Current ratio
Acid test ratio
Debtor days 0.39
(1.27)
0.37
(1.24)
Creditor days
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio
Total tax charge
Constant -0.13
(-1.2)
Likelihood ratio test 21.09* 17.99* 20.29* 18.63*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Non-Involved Firms
27
66
26
72
24
66
26
62
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10-3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Table A3.2.4 Logit Results Four Years Before the Acquisition
Variable	 Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets 0.61**
(2)
0.6**
(2.02)
Sales per employee
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed -1.45**
(-2)
-0.65**
(-2.1)
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield
P/e ratio 0.28
(1.37)
Capital gearing
Current ratio
Acid test ratio
Debtor days
Creditor days 0.57
(0.89) -
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio -0.24*
(-3.07)
-0.25*
(-3.1)
Total tax charge
Likelihood ratio test 30.86* 26.51*
Predictive Accuracy (%). Acquired firms
Non-Involved Firms
23
63
24
58
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10-3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Table A3.2.5 Hazard Function Results One Year Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets
employed
-0.32
(-1.59)
-0.25*
(-3.78)
-0.32
(-1.59)
-0.26*
(-3.96)
-0.36***
(-1.79)
-0.36***
(-1.81)
Turnover to fixed assets -0.23*
(-3.0)
-0.23*
(-3.0)
-0.23*
(-3.01)
-0.23*
(-3.04)
Sales per employee
Stock ratio
Return on capital
employed
Return on s'holders
equity
-0.16
(-1.55)
-0.16
(-1.51)
-0.17
(-1.64)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share 0.14
(1.17)
0.15
(1.28)
Earnings per share 0.29**
(2.51)
0.2***
(1.88)
0.22***
(1.94)
0.28**
(2.53)
0.22***
(1.92)
0.28**
(2.56)
Dividend yield -0.18
(-0.75)
P/e ratio 0.18
(0.84)
Capital gearing
Current ratio
Acid test ratio
Debtor days 2.46*
(3.27)
2.15*
(3.15)
2.33*
(3.1)
2.04*
(2.98)
2.57*
(3.55)
2.55*
(3.59)
Creditor days -1.91*
(-2.75)
-1.88*
(-2.86)
-1.82*
(-2.62)
-1.91*
(-2.89)
-1.97*
(-2.98)
-2.05*
(-3.14)
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio 0.06*
(4.83)
0.07*
(5.73)
0.07*
(5.88)
0.07*
(5.7)
0.07*
(5.86)
Total tax charge -0.05**
(-2.50)
-0.05**
(-2.22)
Likelihood ratio test 46.05* 20.82* 46.77* 41.31* 49.39* 45.89*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Non-Involved Firms
75
66
66
60	 ,
75
72
66
60
72
66
70
66
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Table A3.2.6 Hazard Function Results Two Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets
employed
-0.65*
(-3.02)
-0.7*
(-3.3)
-0.63*
(-2.89)
-0.68*
(-3.19)
-0.68*
(-3.12)
-0.72*
(-3.48)
Turnover to fixed assets -0.05
(-1.11)
-0.05
(-1.11)
-0.05
(-1.15)
Sales per employee
Stock ratio
Return on capital
employed
Return on s'holders
equity
-0.23***
(-1.92)
-0.22***
(-1.88)
-0.22***
(-1.83)
-0.22***
(-1.82)
-0.19
(-1.46)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin -0.29
(-1.52)
-0.31***
(-1.69)
Dividends per share 0.22**
(2.55)
0.22**
(2.54)
0.23*
(2.62)
0.22*
(2.65)
0.27*
(2.98)
0.27*
(2.92)
Earnings per share -0.27***
(-1.72)
Dividend yield
P/e ratio -0.26
(-1.63)
Capital gearing 0.1
(1.0)
Current ratio -0.29***
(-1.72)
-0.29***
(-1.75)
Acid test ratio
Debtor days
Creditor days 1.11*
(4.11)
1.21*
(4.7)
1.46*
(4.82)
1.47*
(4.87)
1.62*
(5.14)
1.47*
(5.15)
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio
Total tax charge -0.08*
(-3.68)
-0.08*
(-3.71)
-0.08*
(-3.8)
-0.08*
(-3.83)
-0.09*
(-4.09)
-0.09*
(-3.99)
Likelihood ratio test 30.15* 27.8* 30.44* 29.5* 35.09* 31.93*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Non-Involved Firms
72
66
66
66
72
70
70
66
75
66
70
64
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Table A3.2.7 Hazard Function Results Three Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed -0.31
(-1.11)
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed 1.22*
(2.96)
1.25*
(4.77)
1.12*
(4.17)
1.15*
(4.34)
Return on s'holders equity -0.03***
(-1.74)
-0.01
(1.6)
-0.03***
(-1.78)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share 0.11
(1.35)
0.12
(1.31)
Earnings per share
Dividend yield 0.23
(1.26)
0.28
(1.52)
0.32***
(1.77)
Pie ratio -0.41*
(-2.85)
-0.26***
(-1.93)
-0.42*
(-2.95)
-0.42*
(-2.94)
Capital gearing
Current ratio
Acid test ratio
Debtor days -0.58*
(-2.76)
-0.5**
(-2.45)
-0.49**
(-2.41)
-0.49**
(-2.38)
Creditor days
Total sales 0.33
(1.35)
Manager/employee ratio
Total tax charge
Likelihood ratio test 37.19* 26.37* 33.62* 29*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Non-Involved Firms
66
62
60
56
64
62
62
60
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Table A3.2.8 Hazard Function Results Four Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets -0.24
(-1.31)
-0.24
(-1.31)
Sales per employee
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin 0.09*
(4.07)
0.09*
(3.82)
Net profit margin 0.07*
(3.88)
0.06*
(3.62)
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield
P/e ratio -0.05
(-1.29)
-0.05
(-1.27)
Capital gearing
Current ratio
Acid test ratio
Debtor days 2.75*
(6.14)
2.47*
(6.08)
2.71*
(6.06)
2.44*
(5.99)
Creditor days -1.98*
(-5.01)
-1.96*
(-4.97)
-1.92*
(-4.9)
-1.9*
(-4.86)
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio
Total tax charge
Likelihood ratio test 37.29* 34.68* 36.6* 34.03*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquired firms
Non-Involved Firms
62
52
54
50
58
52
54
50
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10-3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
A3.3 Acquiring and Non-Involved Companies
Table A3.3.1 Logit Results One Year Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee
Stock ratio -0.36**
(-2.24)
-0.4**
(-2.42)
-0.15***
(-1.71)
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity -0.29***
(-1.77)
-0.29***
(-1.74)
-0.19
(-1.33)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield
Pie ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio -3.21**
(-2.22)
Acid test ratio -4.11*
(-2.99)
-4.16*
(-2.87)
-3.83*
(-2.76)
Debtor days 3.55**
(2.46)
4.28*
(3.06)
4.51*
(3.08)
4.28*
(3.05)
Creditor days
Total sales 0.19
(1.24)
0.21
(1.39)
Manager/employee ratio -0.11**
(-2.4)
-0.15*
(-2.75)
-0.16*
(-2.69)
-0.15*
(-2.73)
Total tax charge 0.3*
(2.77)
0.31*
(2.86)
0.06
(1.37)
Likelihood ratio test 49.02* 29.66* 53.26* 37.11*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquiring firms
Non-Involved Firms
34
62
32
54
36
60
30
56
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Table A3.3.2 Logit Results Two Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets 0.76*
(3.06)
0.77*
(3.12)
1.3*
(2.59)
1.41**
(2.37)
1.24*
(2.37)
1.41**
(2.37)
Sales per employee -1.6*
(-2.62)
-0.99**
(-2.03)
-0.8
(-1.44)
-0.99**
(-2.03)
Stock ratio -0.13
(-1.3)
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin 0.82***
(1.8)
Net profit margin
Dividends per share -0.45*
(-2.63)
-0.41**
(-2.49)
-0.54*
(-3.18)
-0.46*
(-2.84)
-0.55*
(-3.03)
-0.46*
(-2.84)
Earnings per share 0.08
(1.41)
Dividend yield -0.42***
(-1.85)
-0.43***
(-1.87)
Pie ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio
Acid test ratio
Debtor days
_
Creditor days
Total sales 0.1
(0.88)
Manager/employee ratio -0.29*
(-2.98)
-0.28*
(-2.92)
-0.23**
(-2.49)
-0.25*
(-2.65)
0.27*
(-2.64)
0.25*
(-2.65)
Total tax charge 0.05
(1.45)
Likelihood ratio test 37.64* 34.95* 40.07* 37.02* 44.29* 37.02*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquiring firms
Non-Involved Firms
32
54
30
56
32
50
34
46
40
42
34
50
All coefficients are m thousands (x 10 -3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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Table A3.3.3 Logit Results Three Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed 
Turnover to fixed assets 0.91**
(2.1)
0.85**
(2.04)
0.79***
(1.87)
0.9**
(2.12)
0.79**
(1.96)
Sales per employee
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield
Pie ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio -1.16**
(-2.55)
-1.12**
(-2.35)
-1.51*
(-3.22)
-1.17*
(-2.82)
Acid test ratio -4.44*(-3.29)
Debtor days 3.21**(2.54)
Creditor days
_
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio -0.09***
(-1.82)
-0.09***
(-1.85)
-0.14*
(-2.73)
-0.08***
(-1.83)
-0.09**
(-2.02)
Total tax charge 0.07
(1.61)
0.11**
(2.13)
0.07
(1.51)
Constant -0.23**
(-2.07)
-0.19***
(-1.78)
-0.26*
(-2.33)
-0.17
(-1.61)
Likelihood ratio test 29.63* 26.75* 30.66* 26.33* 22*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquiring firms
Non-Involved Firms
28
60
26
56
32
60
28
56
34
66
All coefficients are in thousands (x 1(Y), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is si gnificant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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Tabl
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets 1**
(2.03)
1.1*
(2.86)
0.94**
(2.07)
0.9**
(2.06)
Sales per employee -1.15*
(-2.72)
-1.09*
(-2.79)
-1.23*
(-2.86)
-1.27*
(-2.98)
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin -0.38
(-1)
-0.52
(-1.3)
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share -0.17
(-1.54)
-0.19***
(-1.74)
-0.2***
(-1.77)
-0.22***
(-1.95)
Dividend yield
Pie ratio -0.49**
(-2.02)
-0.52**
(-2.28)
-0.54**
(-2.21)
-0.6**
(-2.49)
Capital gearing
Current ratio -1.44
(-1.44)
Acid test ratio -2.4**(-2.37)
-2.34**
(-2.31)
Debtor days 1.93***
(1.77)
Creditor days 3.25*(2.99)
2.84*
(2.83)
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio -0.12**
(-2.07)
-0.11**
(-2.02)
-0.12***
(-1.75)
-0.11***
(-1.77)
Total tax charge 0.12***
(1.72)
0.13***
_ (1.82)
0.13***
(1.8)
0.12***
_ (1.77)
Likelihood ratio test 64.7* 59.36* 72.35* 70.51* :
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquiring firms
Non-Involved Firms
30
58
30
60
32
56
28
54
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -s), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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Table A3.3.5 Logit Results Five Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets
employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee
Stock ratio -0.35*
(-2.63)
-0.28**
(-2.35)
Return on capital
employed
Return on s'holders
equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield 0.47
(1.31)
P/e ratio -0.8**
(-2.33)
-0.35***
(-1.91)
-0.39*
(-2.59)
-0.31**
(-2.23)
Capital gearing
Current ratio
Acid test ratio -0.44*
(-2.66)
-0.36**
(-2.3)
-
Debtor days
Creditor days
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio -0.14**
(-2.03)
-0.14**
(-2.06)
-0.14**
(-2.12)
-0.14**
(-2.12)
-0.17**
(-2.34)
-0.16**
(-2.32)
Total tax charge 0.09
(1.48)
0.11
(1.54)
0.09
(1.47)
Constant -0.2***
(-1.7)
-0.19***
(-1.81)
Likelihood ratio test 21.93* 18.01* 35.99* 29.27* 21.57* 17.71*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquiring firms
Non-Involved Firms
32
56
26
54
37
60
24
48
28
50
32
48
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -s), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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Table A3.3.6 Hazard Function Results One Year Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed -0.53(-1.2)
-0.82***
(-1.73)
Turnover to fixed assets 0.3(1.15)
0.44
(1.62)
Sales per employee
Stock ratio
0.23*
(2.79)
0.22*
(2.71)
Return on capital employed
0.1**
(2.04)
0.08***
(1.75)
Return on s'holders equity 0.09***
(1.77)
0•09***
(1.74)
0.09***
(1.8)
0.09***
(1.7)
0.09***
(1.77)
0.08***
(1.68)
Pre-tax profit margin
0.72**
(-2.28)
0.73**
(-2.34)
Net profit margin
Dividends per share 0.26**
(2.22)
0.29**
(2.45)
0.27**
(2.3)
0.27**
(2.3)
0.33*
(2.7)
0.32*
(2.67)
Earnings per share 0.09
(1.24)
Dividend yield
Pie ratio
Capital gearing -0.08
(-1.55)
-0.08
(-1.58)
-0.08
(-1.63)
Current ratio 0.51*
(2.85)
0.5*
(3.04)
0.83**
(2.28)
0.53***
(1.72)
Acid test ratio 0.83*(3.07)
0.61*
(3.52)
-
Debtor days
0.4***
(1.73)
0.38***
(1.74)
Creditor days
Total sales -0.01
(-1.53)
-0.01***
(-1.66)
-0.01
(-1.63)
-0.01***
(-1.68)
-0.01***
(-1.9)
-0.01**
(-1.99)
Manager/employee ratio
Total tax charge 0.03**
(-2.4)
0.03**
(-2.47)
0.04*
(-2.71)
0.03**
(-2.5)
0.05*
(-3.57)
0.04*
(-3.24)
42.68*
70
64
39.25*
66
66
43.46*
70
66
42*
68
64
57.49*
72
66
54.66*
70
66
Likelihood ratio test
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquiring firms
Non-Involved Firms
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10') t-statistics in parentheses
is sionficant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***Denntes term
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Table A3.3.7 Hazard Function Results Two Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets
employed
-0.16
(-0.68)
-0.15
(-0.63)
-0.22
(-0.89)
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee 0.32
(0.9)
0.46
(1.28)
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed 0.5**
(2)
0.42**
(1.96)
0.5***
(1.94)
0.43***
(1.88)
0.43**
(2.12)
0.42**
(1.96)
0.54**
(2.23)
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin -0.94*
(-2.85)
-0.96*
(-2.93)
-0.88*
(-2.73)
-0.88*
(-2.68)
-1.12*
(-3.13)
-0.96*
(-2.93)
-1.1*
(-3.04)
Net profit margin
Dividends per share 0.6*
(4.68)
0.6*
(4.69)
0.61*
(4.74)
0.6*
(4.71)
0.61*
(4.75)
0.6*
(4.69)
0.61*
(4.79)
Earnings per share
Dividend yield
Pie ratio 0.24***
(1.7)
0.25***
(1.8)
0.25***
(1.74)
0.26***
(1.83)
0.26***
(1.82)
0.25***
(1.8)
0.25***
(1.72)
Capital gearing 0.28
(0.72)
Current ratio 0.69**
(2.12)
0.64**
(2.03)
0.48
(1.38)
0.64**
(2.03)
Acid test ratio 0.33
(0.76)
0.54***
(1.76)
_
0.41
(1.27)
Debtor days
Creditor days
Total sales 0.03**
(-2.18)
-0.03**
(-2.23)
0.03**
(-2.21)
0.03**
(-2.19)
0.03**
(-2.27)
0.03**
(-2.23)
0.02**
(-2.17)
Manager/employee ratio 0.16**
(2.04)
0.15**
(1.99)
0.15**
(2.05)
0.14**
(1.97)
0.14***
(1.85)
0.15**
(1.99)
0.14***
(1.86)
Total tax charge
Likelihood ratio test 65.59* 64.59* 64.6* 63.79* 65.42* 64.59* 65.76*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquiring firms
Non-Involved Firms
70
68
68
66
70
64
68
66
72
68
70
68
70
62
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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Table A3.3.8 Hazard Function Results Three Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
-0.22
(-1.46)
0.25***
(-1.74)
0.25***
(-1.69)
-0.24
(-1.57)
0.25***
(-1.71)
-0.23
(-1.54)Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee 0.48**(1.97)
0.49**
(2)
0.53**
(2.05)
0•49**
(2.12)
0.5***
(1.91)
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
0.34
(0.98)
Net profit margin 0.3
(1.09)
0.33
(1.04)
Dividends per share 0.13(1.09)
Earnings per share -0.06(-1.22)
Dividend yield 0.34**
(2.18)
0•37**
(2.36)
0•35**
(2.13)
0.39**
(2.44)
0•39**
(2.43)
0.38**
(2.39)
0•4**
(2.52)
Pie ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio 0.55***(1.79)
0.55***
(1.85)
Acid test ratio 0.68**
(2.27)
0.8*
(4.76)
0.93**
(2.13) _
0.56**
(2)
0.9**
(2.06)
Debtor days -0.79(-1.39)
-0.73
(-1.34)
Creditor days
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio 0.05
(1.04)
0.05
(1.11)
0.05
(1.08)
Total tax charge 0.06**
(-1.99)
0.06**
(-2)
0.06**
(-2.38)
0.06**
(-2.25)
0.06**
(-2.29)
0.06**
(-2.3)
0.07**
(-2.34)
58.72*
68
60
54.81*
62
58
61.42*
68
62
59.72*
66
62
63.45*
64
60
60.27*
64
58
63.47*
68
62
Likelihood ratio test
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquiring firms
Non-Involved Firms
All coefficients are in thousands (x K), t-statistics in parentheses
term is sienificant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***nenntec
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Table A3.3.9 Hazard Function Results Four Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets -0.46**
(-2.49)
-0.4**
(-2.12)
-0.51*
(-2.68)
-0.49**
(-2.51)
Sales per employee 0.36***
(1.76)
0.42**
(2.13)
0.46**
(2.22)
0.48**
(2.32)
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed 0.92***
(1.88)
1.08**
(2.26)
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin 0.34
(1.56)
0.28
(1.2)
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share 0.17**
(2.02)
0.2**
(2.26)
0.17**
(1.97)
0.19**
(2.14)
Dividend yield
Pie ratio 0.3***
(1.84)
0.36** ,
(2.31)
0.27***
(1.65)
0.3***
(1.89)
Capital gearing 0.48**
(2)
0.57**
(2.49)
0.62**
(2.35)
0.62**
(2.26)
Current ratio
Acid test ratio _
Debtor days
Creditor days -1.01**
(-2.37)
-1.02**
(-2.45)
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio 0.08**
(2.21)
0.08**
(2.29)
0.08**
(2.33)
0.09**
(2.36)
Total tax charge -0.03
(-1.39)
-0.04
(-1.52)
Likelihood ratio test 85.76* 81.96* 89.69* 86.54*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquiring firms
Non-Involved Firms
62
56
56
54
62
58
58
50
All coefficients are in thousands (x 101, t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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Table A3.3.10 Hazard Function Results Five Years Before the Acquisition
Variable Models
-0.36
(-1.15)
-0.49
(-1.25)
-0.45
(-1.37)Turnover to assets
employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee 0.18(1.14)
0.18
(1.04)
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed 0.63(1.31)
-0.02
(-1.09).Return on eholders equity
Pre-tax profit margin -0.05(-1.5)
Net profit margin
0.14
(1.61)
0.15***
(1.7)
0.15***
(1.69)
0.15***
(1.7)
0.14
(1.61)Dividends per share 0.14(1.56)
Earnings per share
Dividend yield
Pie ratio 0.31***
(1.97)
0.37**
(2.44)
0.33**
(2.07)
0.35**
(2.27)
0.36**
(2.3)
0.35**
(2.27)
0.32**
(2.02)
0.4
(1.1)
0.58***
(1.81)
0.65*
(3.95)
0.53*
(2.66)
0.65*
(3.95)
0.41
(1.12)Capital gearing
0.75*
(4.63)
0.58
(1.34)Current ratio 0.66(1.56)
Acid test ratio
Debtor days
Creditor days
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio 0.1**
(2.31)
0.11**
(2.34)
0.1**
(2.27)
0.09**
(2.28)
0.09**
(2)
0.09**
(2.28)
0.09**
(2.04)
-0.04**
(-2.5)
0.04**
(-2.16)
0.04**
(-2.13)
M.04**
(-2.28)
M.04**
(-2.13)
M.04**
(-2.26)Total tax charge -0.04**(-2.18)
Likelihood ratio test 76.59* 71.92* 76.65* I 74.08* 76.18*
74.08* 77.68*
Predictive Accuracy (%).
Acquiring firms
Non-Involved Firms
52
50
50
46
52
48
52
48
54
54
56
52
54
50
All coefficients are in thousands (x 101, t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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A3.4 Hazard Function Results for the Boom and Recession Periods
Table A3.4.1 Hazard Function Results for the Boom and Recession Periods
Variable Models
Acquired and Acquiring
Firms
Acquired and Non
-Involved Firms
Acquiring and Non
-Involved Firms
Boom Recession ,	 Boom Recession Boom Recession
Turnover to assets
employed
-0.36
(-0.4)
-0.56
(-1.17)
-0.04
(0.91)
0.03
(2.32)
Turnover to fixed
assets
0.01
(0.54)
0.02
(0.79)
-0.16
(-0.25)
-0.02
(-0.19)
Sales per employee
Stock ratio
Return on capital
employed
-0.01
(0.48)
-1.04
(-1.72)
Return on s'holders
equity
@0
(0.88)
-0.13
(-1.59)
Pre-tax profit margin 0.24
(0.61)
-0.25
(-0.35)
Net profit margin 0.05
(0.64)
-0.08
(-0.14)
Dividends per share 024
(1.68)
0.1
(0.39)
0.15
(0.18)
0.53
(1.84)
Earnings per share 0.11
(1.28)
0.05
(0.63)
Dividend yield 0.35
(1.24)
0.34
(0.44)
Pie ratio -0.06
(-0.34)
0.36
(0.9)
0.03
(0.91)
0.49
(0.99)
Capital gearing
Current ratio -0.99
(-2.94)
-0.44
(-0.57)
0.18
(0.73)
1.23
(1.53)
Acid test ratio
Debtor days I
Creditor days ,
I
0.18
(0.36)
1.01
(1.29)
Total sales 0.5
(2.09)
0.08	 1
(0.3)
	 1
-0.17
(-0.91)
-0.03
(-0.92)
Manager/
employee ratio
4
0.2
(0.013)
0.52
(1.91)
Total tax charge 0.05
(0.47)
0.12
(2.03)
-0.01
(-0.24)
0.08
(1.16)
-0.03
(0.64)
-0.03
(0.45)
Likelihood ratio test
(Critical value in
parentheses)
13.97
(12.59)
7.2
(12.59)
6.86
(15.51)
14.79
(15.51)
26.59
(16.91)
41.23
(16.91)
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 -3), t-statistics in parentheses
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Appendix IV: Complete Hazard Function and Logit
Results for Chapter 5
A4.1 Acquiring and Acquired Companies
Table A4.1.1 Logit Results For Acquired and Acquiring Firms In the Boom Period
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee 2.14*
(2.6)
2.06*
(2.6)
2.27*
(2.82)
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed
Return on eholders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield
P e ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio 2.93
(1.16)
Acid test ratio _
-
Debtor days
Creditor days
Total sales -0.51
(-1.62)
-0.49
(-1.58)
Manager/employee ratio -0.07
(-1.33)
-0.08
(-1.48)
-0.08
(-1.51)
Total tax charge
Macrol
Macro2
Macro3 -4.26
(-1.59)
-1.75**
(-2.18)
-1.48***
(-1.83)
Macro4
1v1acro5
Macro6
Likelihood ratio test 22.24* 14.52* 19.31*
Predictive Accuracy (°0). Acquired firms
Acquiring Firms
63
52
55
34
55
34
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes tennis significant at 1 0 0 8, 5% **, 10°0***
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Table A4.1.2 Logit Results For Acquired and Acquiring Firms In the Bust Period
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share -0.29
(-1.34)
Dividend yield
Pie ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio 2.47***
(1.74)
2.06*
(2.15)
Acid test ratio
Debtor days
Creditor days
Total sales -2.07
(-1.48)
Manager/employee ratio
Total tax charge -0.24
(-1.55)
-0.24
(-1.53)
Constant 26
(1.25)
24
(1.22)
Macrol -2.33
(-1.61)
-1.6
(-1.48)
Macro2
Macro3 1.78***
(1.67)
Macro4 0.77
(1.43)
Macro5 0.69***
(1.92)
0.66***
(1.83)
Macro6
Liicelihood ratio test 15.54* 15.12* 11.34***
Predictive Accuracy (%). Acquired firms
Acquiring Firms
63
60
63
66
55
58
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10') t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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Table A4.1.3 Hazard Functions Results For Acquired and Acquiring Firms In the
Boom Period
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee 0.31**
(-2.2)
-0.38*
(-2.86)
-0.34**
(-2.41)
-0.32**
(-2.27)
-0.33**
(-2.35)
-0.33**
(-2.34)
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share 0.11
(1.25)
0.11
(1.26)
Dividend yield 0.46
(1.4)
0.47
(1.5)
0.54***
(1.73)
0.5
(1.53)
0.39
(1.35)
0.53***
(1.68)
P e ratio -0.2
(-1.24)
0.27***
(-1.74)
0.24***
(-1.57)
-0.2
(-1.23)
-0.22
(-1.42)
Capital gearing 1.37**
(2.44)
1.44**
(2.56)
1.47*
(2.64)
Current ratio -OA**
(-2.35)
-1.33"
(-2.26)
-1.38**
(-2.38)
-1.38**
(-2.33)
Acid test ratio
Debtor days 0.91**
(-2.38)
Creditor days -1.26**
(-2.13)
Total sales 0.63"
(2.38)
0.52**
(2.09)
0.59**
(2.26)
0.62**
(2.33)
0.63**-
(2.37)
0.64"
(2.38)
Manager employee ratio 0.05*"
(1.8)
0.05*"
(1.76)
0 05***
(1.83)
0.05*"
(1.87)
0.05*"
(1.81)
0.05***
(1.74)
Total tax charge
Macrol 0.8**
(-1.99)
0.98**
(-2.54)
0.83**
(-2.04)
0.78***
(-1.91)
-035***
(-1.84)
Macro2
Macro3 1.49**
(2.52)
0.97
(1.55)
1.52**
(2.57)
Macro4
Macro5
Macro6
Likelihood ratio test 27.59* 21.66* 27.17* 28.87* 25.55* 25.78*
Predictive Accuracy (0 o). Acquired
Acquiring Firms
75
50
66
59
66
52
75
58
58
42
75
52
All coefficients are in thousands (x 1(Y4), t statistics in parentheses
Denotes tennis significant at 1°0*, 50 0 **, 1000***
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Table A4.1.4 Hazard Function Results For Acquired and Acquiring Firms In the Bust
Period
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee -0.31
(-1.23)
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity -0.11
(-1.27)
-0.12
(-1.46)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share 0.25
(1.47)
0.23
(1.3)
Dividend yield
Pie ratio 1.37***
(1.86)
1.25***
(1.71)
Capital gearing
Current ratio 4.62**
(-2.19)
Acid test ratio
-2.26**
(-2.2)
Debtor days
Creditor days
_
_ 2.8
(1.15)
Total sales 1.75
(1.63)
1.28
(1.25)
Manager/employee ratio -0.04
(-1.26)
-0.04
(-1.25)
Total tax charge
Macrol
Macro2
Macro3
Macro4 -0.66
(-1.61)
-0.48
(-1.23)
Macro5
Macro6
Likelihood ratio test 16.18** 13.46***
Predictive Accuracy (%). Acquired firms
Acquiring Firms
83
66
.
75
58
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10-3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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A4.2 Acquired and Non-Involved Companies
Table A4.2.1 Logit Results For Acquired and Non-Involved Firms In the Boom
Period
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed 2.2*
(2.89)
2.14*
(2.81)
1.95*
(2.61)
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed -4.54*
(-3.2)
-4.31*
(-3.02)
-4.13*
(-2.97)
-3.75*
(-2.7)
-5.97*
(-3.6)
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield -0.49
(-1.39)
P e ratio
Capital gearing -1.55***
(-1.95)
Current ratio
Mid test ratio
Debtor days
Creditor days 1.25
(1.43)
1.23
(1.41)
- 1.38
(1.35)
Total sales
Manager employee ratio
Total tax charge
Constant 19.68
(1.64)
17.79
(1.49)
Macrol
Macro2 1.43
(1.51)
1.14
(1.22)
Macro3 1.78**
(1.97)
1.73***
(1.91)
5.31*
(2.67)
Macro4
Macro5
Macro6 3.51*
(2.59)
3.48"
(2.47)
Likelihood ratio test 22.17* 24.84* 20.03* 22.09* 29.35*
Predictive Accuracy (°0). Acquired firms
Non-Involved Firms
66
42
50
33
66
42
50
25
66
42
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1°0 *, 50 o **, 100 0 *5*
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Table A4.2.2 Logit Results For Acquired and Non-Involved Firms In the Bust Period
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed 1.38
(1.72)
Turnover to fixed assets 0.84***
(1.71)
Sales per employee
Stock ratio 1.11
(1.62)
1.39
(1.83)
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin 8.01
(2.17)
Net profit margin
Dividends per share -0.63
(-1.41)
-0.57
(-1.3)
Earnings per share
Dividend yield
Pie ratio
Capital gearing -0.17
(-1.48)
-0.3
(-1.25)
Current ratio
Acid test ratio -11.45
(-2.72)
Debtor days
Creditor days -5.39
(-1.74)
-2.28
(-1.86)
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio
Total tax charge
Macrol
Macro2
Macro3 1.5
(1.15)
Macro4
Macro5 1.52
(2.41)
Macro6 4.59
(1.46)
Likelihood ratio test 21.11* 16.41* 8.31
Predictive Accuracy (%). Acquired firms
Non-Involved Firms
66
50
58
42
50
42
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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Table A4.2.3 Hazard Function Results For Acquired and Non-Involved Firms In the
Boom Period
Variable Models
Tumover to assets employed -1.08*
(-2.6)
-1.14*
(-2.72)
-1.13*
(-2.7)
Turnover to fixed assets -0.79*
(-2.61)
-0.78*
(-2.57)
-0.53
(-1.26)
Sales per employee -0.1
(-0.65)
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed 3.01*
(3.21)
2.88*
(3.19)
3•37*
(3.42)
3.38*
(3.41)
3.19*
(3.63)
2.64*
(3.57)
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share 0.16
(1.11)
0.17
(1.22)
0.18
(1.3)
0.15
(1.12)
Earnings per share
Dividend yield 043***
(1.72)
P e ratio
Capital gearing
Cunent ratio 0.93
(1.18)
0.77
(I)
Acid test ratio
Debtor days -1.44*
(-3.16)
-0.81
(-1.55)
-1.61*
(-3.05)
-1.42*
(-2.94)
4.15*
(-2.99)
Creditor days -1.8*
(-2.92) -
-1.64*
(-3.04)
Total sales 0.21
(1.01)
Manager employee ratio 0.06*
(3.12)
0.07*
(3.53)
0.06*
(3.18)
0.06*
(3.26)
0.06*
(3.3)
Total tax charge
Macrol -1.32*
(-2.99)
-1.19**
(-2.43)
-1.2**
(-2.47)
-1.19**
(-2.44)
Macro2 1.19
(1.28)
1.1
(1.16)
Macro3 -0.89
(-1.13)
-0.81
(-1.15)
-0.84
(-1.12)
-0.58
(-0.75)
Macro4
Macro5
Macro6 -0.75
(-1.1)
Likelihood ratio test 26.09* 17.01** 25.56* 26.7* 25.31* 24.81*
Predictive Accuracy (°0). Acquired firms
Non-Involved Firms
75
66
83
58
83
66
75
66
75
66
75
58
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10-3), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1°0*, 5°0**, 10°0***
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Table A4.2.3 Hazard Function Results For Acquired and Non-Involved Firms In the
Bust Period
Variable	 Models
Turnover to assets employed -0.55
(-1.25)
-0.66
(-1.55)
-0.66
(-1.55)
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee -0.03
(-1.23)
-0.03
(-1.24)
-0.03
(-1.22)
Stock ratio -0.52*
(-3.15)
-0.47*
(-2.93) (-2.93)
Return on capital employed -1.43**
(-2.22)
Return on s'holders equity -1.14
(-1.32)
-1.4***
(-1.78)
-1.37***
(-1.68)
-1.36***
(-1.67)
Pre-tax profit margin -6.14**
(-2.08)
-5.86**
(-2)
-5.97**
(-2.05)
Net profit margin -2.78
(-1.41)
Dividends per share 0.39
(1.51)
0.31
(1.16)
Earnings per share
Dividend yield
Pie ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio
Acid test ratio
Debtor days -
Creditor days 4.9**
(2.14)
8.81**
(2.56)
8.68**
(2.54)
8.77*
(2.58)
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio
Total tax charge
Macrol
Macro2
Macro3 0.53
(1.11)
Macro4
Macro5 0.68***
(-1.78)
-1.1**
(-2.2)
-1.04**
(-2.09)
-1.06**
(-2.14)
Macro6
Likelihood ratio test 19** 25.47* 24.06* 23.01*
Predictive Accuracy (%). Acquired firms
Non-Involved Finns
70
55
75
66
83
66
75
66
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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Models
-1.74
(-1.63)
-1.02
(-1.42)
-1.87**
(-2.13)
-1.03
(-1.61)
(-2.32)
-4.17***
(-1.79)
2.03**
(2.02)
1.5
(1.55)
1.78***
(1.75)
-0.37*
(-2.66) (-2.18) (-2.33)
-0.29**
(-2.13) (-2.22)
0.18
(1.51)
-6.59** -6.51** -6.51***
(-2.15) (-2.07) (-1.91)
3.68**
(2.12)
5.39***
(1.82)
5.24***
(1.8)
5.36**
(2.18)
6.63***
(1.95)
3.19**
(2.13)
24.58* 25.37* 22.54* 22.59* 29.33*
66
51
66
50
34
25
54
41
66
50
A4.3 Acquiring and Non-Involved Companies
Table A4.3.1 Logit Results For Acquiring and Non-Involved Firms In the Boom
Period
thousands (x 10-3), t-statistics in parentheses
gnificant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Variable
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield
P/e ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio
Acid test ratio
Debtor days
Creditor days
Total sales
Manager/employee ratio
Total tax charge
Macro!
Macro2
Macro3
Macro4
Macro5
Macro6
Likelihood ratio test
Predictive Accuracy (%). Acquirig Fir
Non-Involved Firms
All coefficients are ir
Denotes term i Si
Table A4.3.2 Lo it Results For Acquiring and Non-Involved Firms In the Bust Period
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee
Stock ratio -0.37
(-1.52)
-0.47
(-1.62)
Return on capital employed 11.1**
(2.45)
Return on s'holders equity -2.63**
(-2.12)
Pre-tax profit margin 6.19**(2.14)
Net profit margin
Dividends per share
Earnings per share
Dividend yield -1.01
(-1.37)
-1.06
(-1.44)
-1.38
(-1.56)
-1.04
(-1.3)
Pie ratio
Capital gearing
Current ratio -7.04***
(-1.9)
-9.49**
(-2.16)
Acid test ratio
Debtor days
Creditor days 5.32***
(1.91)
Total sales .
Manager/employee ratio -1.03**
(-2.52)
-0.94*
(-2.58)
-1.04**
(-2.33)
-1.05**
(-2.5)
Total tax charge 0.23
(1.32)
0.32
(1.38)
Macrol
Macro2 0.14
(1.18)
-7.56***
(-1.78)
Macro3
Macro4
Macro5 1.2***(1.74)
Macro6 2.16
(1.54)
2.61***
(1.57)
Likelihood ratio test 37•55* 37.62* 53.92* 39.34*
Predictive Accuracy (%). Acquiring
Firms
Non-Involved Firms
42
25
42
34
66
50
66
50
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10-3 ), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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Table A4.3.3 Hazard Function Results For Acquiring and Non-Involved Firms In the
Boom Period
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee
Stock ratio
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity
Pre-tax profit margin -0.06
(-1.39)
Net profit margin 0.31
(1.56)
Dividends per share 0.16
(1.4)
0.16
(1.4)
0.16
(1.41)
Earnings per share 0.06***
(1.89)
0.06
(1)
0.06*"
(1.9)
Dividend yield 0.14
(1.5)
P e ratio 0.16
(1.55)
Capital gearing -0.46"
(-2.34)
-0.45"
(-2.29)
Current ratio 2.14*
(2.62)
Acid test ratio
Debtor days -0.22
(-0.42)
-0.24
(-0.4)
-0.42
(-0.68)
Creditor days -0.42
(-1.51)
-0.45
(1.53) _
-0.46
(-1.55)
Total sales
Manager employee ratio 0.21*
(2.71)
0.22*
(2.62)
0.22*
(2.58)
0.22"
(2.46)
0.2"
(2.54)
0.21*
(2.79)
Total tax charge -0.02
(-0.4)
Macrol -0.47
(-0.9)
-0.47
(-0.9)
-0.46
(-0.8)
Macro2 1.9*
(3.17)
1.93*
(2.58)
1.58*"
(1.93)
1.33"
(2.18)
2.05"
(2.47)
Macro3 -1.18"
(-2.24)
-1.22"
(-2.33)
-1.21*
(-2.67)
-1.18"
(-2.23)
Macro4
Macro5 0.01
(0.73)
Macro6
Likelihood ratio test 30.74* 29.52* 28.45* 28.2* 30.38* 31.56*
Predictive Accuracy (°0). Acquiring
Non-Involved Firms
75
83
66
75
75
66
58
66
58
66
66
58
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10 4), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1°0*, 5 0 0", 1000***
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Table A4.3.4 Hazard Function Results For Acquiring and Non-Involved Firms In the
Bust Period
Variable Models
Turnover to assets employed
Turnover to fixed assets
Sales per employee -0.77
(-1.26)
-0.78
(-1.3)
Stock ratio 0.22
(1.51)
0.23
(1.57)
0.23
(1.6)
0.3***
(1.87)
0.25***
(1.66)
0.19
(1.33)
Return on capital employed
Return on s'holders equity 0.73
(1.4)
0.71
(1.47)
0.68
(1.45)
0.87***
(1.74)
1.02***
(1.81)
0.66
(1.38)
Pre-tax profit margin
Net profit margin
Dividends per share 0.89*
(2.65)
0.75**
(2.13)
0.97**
(2.56)
0.7**
(2.2)
0.45
(1.57)
0.81**
(2.16)
Earnings per share -0.17
(-1.65)
0.18**
(-1.94)
-0.19**
(-1.97)
-0.18***
(-1.93)
Dividend yield
Pie ratio
Capital gearing -1.36**
(-1.99)
Current ratio 1.89**
(2.37)
1.66**
(2.15)
1
(1.54)
Acid test ratio
Debtor days
Creditor days
Total sales _
Manager/employee ratio 0.79*
(2.76)
0.66**
(2.54)
0.74*
(2.82)
0.82*
(2.79)
0.79*
(2.6)
0.71*
(2.67)
Total tax charge -0.09*
(-3.03)
Macrol
Macro2 1.11***
(1.7)
Macro3 -1.71**
(-2.13)
-1.72**
(-2.17)
-1.03
(-1.49)
-2.06**
(-2.53)
-1.17**
(-2.22)
Macro4 0.02*
(-2.96)
0.02*
(-3)
-0.01*
(-2.67)
0.16*
(-2.88)
Macro5
Macro6 -0.45
(-1.3)
Likelihood ratio test 46.97* 45.65* 42.36* 41.19* 39.31* 44.32*
Predictive Accuracy (%). Acquiring
Non-Involved Firms
75
66
66
83
66
83
58
66
66
58
75
58
All coefficients are in thousands (x 10), t-statistics in parentheses
Denotes term is significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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Appendix V: Complete Set of Results for Chapter 6
All Results Generated with the Original Form of the Market Model
Table A5.1.1 Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated for a Five Day
Window
Type of Bid
Window : 5 days before the acquisition to 5 days after
Boom Period (%) Recession Period (%)
1987 1988 1989 1990 All 1991 1992 1993 All
All bids 27 26 28 19 100 32 15 21 68
Acquired firms 10.7* 21** 0.25 3.42** 9.05* 18.6* 3•47** 2.5** 10.26*
Acquiring firms -0.41 -3.4** -0.14 -0.89 -1.21 -0.06 4.6* -1.43 -1.49
Acquirld control 3.96* 0.58 0.11 -5.79* 0.15 0.56 -2.6** -2.5** -1.09
Acquieg control 2.6** -1.12 2.04** -5.47* -0.06 1.7** 5.13* 3•57* 3**
Successful bids 18 16 21 15 70 23 12 19 54
Acquired firms 8.78* 16.5* 116.7* 0.53 41.16* 15.7* 3.92* 5•47* 9.48*
Acquiring firms -2.4** -4.38* -3.81* -1.53 -3.1** -0.74 -2.4** -2.6** -1.8**
Acquir'd control 2.5** 0.31 23.9* -7* 6.39* -1.13 -1.17 -2.5** -1.6
Acquir'g control 1.44 -2.3** 0.81 4* -0.76 0.65 8.67* 4.11* 3.65*
Failed bids 9 10 7 4 30 9 3 2 14
Acquired firms 14.33* 28.9* -6.43* 1.5 12.63* 27.44* 1.67 -26* 14.29*
Acquiring finns 3.7** -2.8** 11.29* 1 2.93** -1.67 13* 40* 0.29
Acquied control 7* 1 138.9* 0.25 35•1* 4.89* -8.33* -2** 1.07
Acquieg control 4.89* 0.5 57.71* 4* 14•57* 4•33* 13.33*. -1.5 5•43*
Of which :
Hostile bids 2 5 5 4 16 3 0 2 5
Acquired firms 39* 13.2* 4** 12.5* 10.88* 29.33* - -0.5 374*
Acquiring firms -4** -13.6* -9.6* 0.75 -7.56* 0.33 - -7* -2.6**
Acquied control 4** 4.4** -34.6* -1.5 -12.1* -3** - 13.5* 3.6**
Acquir'g control -2** -10.2* 2.2** -7.5* -4.6** 1.67 - 1.5 1.6
Contested bids 1 4 5 1 11 2 0 1 3
Acquired firms 44* 19.5* -6* 26* 12.73* 30•5* - 81* 47•33*
Acquiring firms 14* 15.5* 2.2 12* 9* -2.5** - -14* -6.33*
Acquir'd control 19* 11* 129.8* 21* 66.64* -10.5* - 24* 1
Acquieg control 13* 2.25** 0.6 7* 2.91** 9* - 13* 10.33*
White knight bids 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 1
Acquired firms - -9* 3** - -3** -15* - - 45*
Acquiring firms - 9* 5** - 7* -5** - _ _5**
Acquir'd control - -15* -173* - -21* -21* - - -21*
Acquir'g control _	 - 0 1 - 0.5 -1 - - -/
Significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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Table A5.1.2 T-Statistics Testing the Null Hypothesis that the Difference Between the
Means of the Two Groups is Equal to Zero
Type of Bid
Window : 5 days before the acquisition to 5 days after
Boom Period (%) Recession Period (%)
1987 1988 1989 1990 All 1991 1992 1993 All
All bids 27 26 28 19 100 32 15 21 68
Acquired & Acquiring 1.69 3•74* 0.23 0.4 4•43* 3•45* 0.59 0.87 3.08*
Acquired & Control 0.51 3.14* 0.97 2*** 0.6 0.12 0.34 0.9 3.19*
Acquiring & Control 0.28 0.5 0.44 0.15 0.45 0.87 0.54 0.49 1.16
Successful bids 18 16 21 15 70 23 12 19 54
Acquired & Acquiring 3.46* 2*** 0.7 0.7 3•34* 2.4** 1.16 0.64 2.79*
Acquired & Control 1.2 2*** 1 1.23 0.15 1.12 0.48 0.28 2.6**
Acquiring & Control 0.36 0.59 0.51 0.48 1.27 0.96 0.35 0.64 0.74
Failed bids 9 10 7 4 30 9 3 2 14
Acquired & Acquiring 0.54 2.7** 0.7 1.2 3.05* 1.04 0.98 1.07 1.3
Acquired & Control 2*** 4•9* 0.53 0.69 0.53 2*** 0.37 0.49 2***
Acquiring & Control 0.58 0.67 0.19 0.36 0.68 0.26 0.27 0.57 0.96
Of which :
Hostile bids 2 5 5 4 16 3 0 2 5
Acquired & Acquiring 1.82 2 0.69 0.7 3.61* 1.65 - 0.84 2***
Acquired & Control 1 1.96 0.7 1.3 0.76 1.4 - 1.74 1.15
Acquiring & Control 0.94 0.52 0.4 0.8 1.23 0.91 -- 0.36 0.82
Contested bids 1 4 5 1 11 2 0 1 3
Acquired & Acquiring - 0.76 3•9** - 0.59 0.58 - - 1.26
Acquired & Control - 0.62 0.61 - 0.7 0.44 - - 0.89
Acquiring & Control - 0.18 0.58 - 1.32 0.58 - - 1.82
White knight bids 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 I
Acquired & Acquiring - - - - 1.2 - - - -
Acquired & Control - - - - 0.89 - - - -
Acquiring & Control - - - - 0.84 - - - -
Reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is equal to zero at
1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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Table A5.1.3 Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated for a Ten Day
Window
Type of Bid
Window : 10 days before the acquisition to 10 days after
Boom Period (%) Recession Period (%)
1987 1988 1989 1990 All 1991 1992 1993 All
All bids 27 26 28 19 100 32 15 21 68
Acquired firms 18* 21* 2.4** 4.32* 11.8* -2.3** 4•53* 3.57* 1.03
Acquiring firms -1.48 -3.4** -0.57 -2.2** -1.9** -0.66 4•53* -1.33 -1.7**
Acquir'd control -0.11 0.58 -0.21 -5.84* -1.05 -0.25 -0.33 4.14* -147
Acquir'g control 3.63* -1.12 1.07 -7.05* -0.35 1.8** 5.8* 4.19* 3•4*
Successful bids 18 16 21 15 70 23 12 19 54
Acquired firms 18.1* 16.5* 1.7 1.4 9.21* 16.7* 4.25* 6.53* 10.4*
Acquiring firms -4.06* -4.38* -3.4** -3** -3.71* -1.13 -2.5** -2.4** -2**
Acquied control 5* 0.31 22.6* -6.87* 6.66* -0.83 0.67 4.16* -1.7
Acquieg control 1.44 -2.2** -0.1 -5* -1.23 0.7 9.75* 4.53* 4.06*
Failed bids 9 10 7 4 30 9 3 2 14
Acquired firms 17.8* 28.9* 4.71* 2** 14.2* 27.2* 5.67* -24* 15•3*
Acquiring firms 3.7** -2.7** 8.43* 1.25 2.3** -0.67 12.7* 42.5* 0.5
Acquied control 9•33* 1 18.6* 0.25 75* 1.22 4.3* 4* -0.71
Acquir'g control 6.78* 0.5 4.57* -5.25* 2.5** 4.56* 12.3* 1 5•71*
Of which :
Hostile bids 2 5 5 4 16 3 0 2 5
Acquired firms 21* 13.2* -5.4* 13.3* 8.38* 30.3* -	 - -3**. 17*
Acquiring firms -5* -13.6* -6* -0.25 -6.81* 0.33 - -7* -2.6**
Acquied control 7•5* 4•4** -52.2* -2.5** -17.4* -2.3** - 13.5* 4**
Acquieg control 9* -10.2* 1.8 -9.5* -3.9** -1.33 - 2.8**
Contested bids 1 4 5 1 11 2 0 1 3
Acquired firms 39* 19.5* -6.2* 26* 10.2* 27* - 48* 34*
Acquiring firms 19* 15.5* 2 14* 9•55* -1.5 - -14* -5.67*
Acquir'd control 19* 11* 162* 67* 85.9* 5** - 12* 7•33*
Acquir'g control 13* 2.3** 0.8 3 2.7** 11* - 41* 21*
White knight
bids
0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 1
Acquired firms - -9* 1 - -4** -18* - - -18*
Acquiring firms - 9* 6** - 7•5* -3** - - -3**
Acquir'd control - -15* -26* - -20.5* 10* - - 10*
Acquir'g control - 0 1 - 0.5 9* - - 9*
Significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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Table A5.1.4 T-Statistics Testing the Null Hypothesis that the Difference Between the
Means of the Two Groups is Equal to Zero
Type of Bid
Window : 10 days before the acquisition to 10 days after
Boom Period (%) Recession Period (%)
1987 1988 1989 1990 All 1991 1992 1993 All
All bids 27 26 28 19 100 32 15 21 68
Acquired & Acquiring 2.5** 3•75* 0.47 1.19 4.15* 4•95* 2*** 0.68 2.96*
Acquired & Control 0.27 3.14* 1 0.44 0.5 0.26 0.9 0.54 3.26*
Acquiring & Control 0.35 0.49 0.54 0.71 1.08 r 0.74 0.62 0.42 0.91
Successful bids 18 16 21 15 70 23 12 19 54
Acquired & Acquiring 4.2* 2*** 0.47 0.9 3.2* 3•5* 1.14 0.53 2.3**
Acquired & Control 0.8 1.84 0.79 0.83 0.24 2*** 0.92 0.18 2.6**
Acquiring & Control 0.59 0.6 0.15 0.56 2** 0.79 0.39 0.63 0.58
Failed bids 9 10 7 4 30 9 3 2 14
Acquired & Acquiring 0.25 2.7** 0.85 0.64 2.7** 0.84 0.63 1.2 2***
Acquired & Control 1.6 4•9* 0.57 0.66 0.52 0.55 0.4 0.96 2.3**
Acquiring & Control 0.41 0.6 0.26 0.29 0.68 0.41 0.51 0.5 0.75
Of which :
Hostile bids 2 5 5 4 16 3 0 2 5
Acquired & Acquiring 0.83 2 0.94 0.84 2.3** 2.3 - 0.77 1.44
Acquired & Control 0.87 1.96 0.88 1 0.78 1.2 - 2 0.75
Acquiring & Control 0.59 0.52 0.2 0.63 0.77 0.95 -- 0.36 0.54
Contested bids 1 4 5 1 11 2 0 1 3
Acquired & Acquiring - 0.76 3.4** - 0.9 0.64 - - 0.91
Acquired & Control - 0.62 0.58 - 0.62 0.73 - - 0.5
Acquiring & Control - 0.18 0.42 - 1.2 0.62 - - 1.6
White knight bids 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 /
Acquired & Acquiring - - - - 1.89 - - - -
Acquired & Control - - - - 0.89 - - - -
Acquiring & Control - - - - 3.8 - - - -
Reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is equal to zero at
1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
LXV
Table A5.1.5 Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated for a Twenty Day
Window
Type of Bid
Window : 20 days before the acquisition to 20 days after
Boom Period (%) Recession Period (%)
1987 1988 1989 1990 All 1991 1992 1993 All
All bids 27 26 28 19 100 32 15 21 68
Acquired firms 21.9* 21* 3.1** 2.7** 12.7* 19.6* 6* 1.29 10.9*
Acquiring firms 3.7* -3.4** -0.79 -1.47 -0.38 -1.31 -3.6* 0.05 -1.4
Acquied control 11.9* 0.62 -19.1* -5.84* -3.1** 1.9** -0.2 -13 -3.2**
Acquir'g control 6* -1.15 3.1** -9.05* 0.47 2.1** 6.13* 4.71* 3.81*
Successful bids 18 16 21 15 70 23 12 19 54
Acquired firms 23* 16.5* 1.24 -0.47 9.96* 17.7* 4.42* 5•74* 10.5*
Acquiring firms -0.39 -4.38* -3.5** -2** -2.6** -1.35 -1.17 -1.05 -1.2
Acquir'd control 7.67* 0.38 20.1* -6.33* 6.73* 2** 1 -12.1* -3.2**
Acquir'g control 2.9** -2.2** 1.05 -6.07* -0.74 -0.3 10.2* 5.11* 3.93*
Failed bids 9 10 7 4 30 9 3 2 14
Acquired firms 19.6* 28.9* 8.71* 0.75 17.6* 26.7* 12.3* 41* 13•9*
Acquiring firms 11.9* -2.7** 8* 1 4.67* 1.22 13.3* -10.5* 2.1**
Acquied control 20.2* 1 28.1* -0.5 12.9* 1.56 -5* -22* -3.2**
Acquieg control 12.2* 0.5 9.29* -10.8* 4.57* 8.33* 12* 1 8.07*
Of which :
Hostile bids 2 5 5 4 16 3 0 2 5
Acquired firms 39* 13.2* -3** 14* 11.6* 31* -	 - 4** 20.2*
Acquiring finns -1.5 -13.4* -9* -0.5 -7.31* 0.33 - -14.5* -5.6*
Acquir'd control 12.5* -4.2** -93.4* -3.5** -29.8* -6* - 16* 2.8**
Acquir'g control 15* -10* 1.4 -10 -3.3** -1.67 - 24* 8.6*
Contested bids 1 4 5 1 11 2 0 1 3
Acquired firms 44* 19.5* 5•4** 34* 16.6* 24* - 33* 27*
Acquiring firms 39* 15.5* 2 11* 11.1* -4** - -29* -12.3*
Acquir'd control 13* 11* 22.8* 23* 17.6* -6.5* - 26* 4.33*
Acquir'g control 12* 2.3** 4** 17* 5•3** 20* - 14* 18*
White knight
bids
0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 1
Acquired firms - -9* 0 - -4.5** -18* - - -18*
Acquiring firms - 9* 2 - 5.5** -8* - - -8*
Acquir'd control - -15* -46* - -30.5* -13* - - -13*
Acquir'g control - 0 3** - 1.5 -8* - - -8*
Significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
LXVI
Table A5.1.6 T-Statistics Testing the Null Hypothesis that the Difference Between the
Means of the Two Groups is Equal to Zero
Type of Bid
Window : 20 days before the acquisition to 20 days after
Boom Period (%) Recession Period (%)
1987 1988 1989 1990 All 1991 1992 1993 All
All bids 27 26 28 19 100 32 15 21 68
Acquired & Acquiring 3.87* 3•77* 2*** 4•4* 3.09* 5.1* 0.19 0.74 2.81*
Acquired & Control 0.4 3.12* 0.98 1.29 0.3 3•5* 0.9 0.15 3.2*
Acquiring & Control 0.54 0.49 0.31 0.54 0.77 0.9 0.7 0.29 0.91
Successful bids 18 16 21 15 70 23 12 19 54
Acquired & Acquiring 3.4* 2.2** 1.32 0.79 2.9* 3.4* 0.93 2*** 2.3**
Acquired & Control 0.77 1.8 0.86 2*** 0.4 2.7** 1.18 0.97 2.69*
Acquiring & Control 0.32 0.59 0.18 0.8 1.44 0.62 0.32 0.39 0.68
Failed bids 9 10 7 4 30 9 3 2 14
Acquired & Acquiring 2.9** 2.7** 0.87 1.75 2.1** 2.4** 0.61 1.1 1.68
Acquired & Control 2*** 4•9* 0.65 0.88 0.76 1.55 0.36 1.1 1.73
Acquiring & Control 0.68 0.61 0.53 0.36 0.43 0.38 0.79 0.64 0.62
Of which :
Hostile bids 2 5 5 4 16 3 0 2 5
Acquired & Acquiring 0.93 2.2** 0.85 0.9 2.8** 1.76 - 0.66 1.28
Acquired & Control 0.91 1.96 0.93 1.1 0.78 1.29 - 1.9 0.68
Acquiring & Control 0.54 0.52 0.11 0.7 0.89 0.95 -- 0.16 0.59
Contested bids 1 4 5 1 11 2 0 1 3
Acquired & Acquiring - 0.76 0.74 - 0.8 0.6 - - 1.04
Acquired & Control - 0.62 0.53 - 0.56 0.55 - - 1.15
Acquiring & Control - 0.18 0.43 - 2*** 0.5 - - 1.42
White knight bids 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 I
Acquired & Acquiring - - - - 1.33 - - - -
Acquired & Control - - - - 0.52 - - - -
Acquiring & Control - - - - 3** - - - -
Reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is equal to zero at
1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
A5.2 Results Generated with the Market Model and a Time Varying
Beta
Table A5.2.1 Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated for a Five Day
Window
Type of Bid
Window : 5 days before the acquisition to 5 days after
Boom Period (%) Recession Period (%)
1987 1988 1989 1990 All 1991 1992 1993 All
All bids 27 26 28 19 100 32 15 21 68
Acquired firms 8.48* 15.54* -2.7** 6.95* 6.9* 17.59* 5.07* 2.86** 10.28*
Acquiring firms -3.2** -3.62* -0.71 -0.47 -2.1** -0.81 -0.67 -0.14 -0.57
Acquir'd control 5.78* -0.15 -3.96* -3.4** -0.23 -1.25 -1.8** -2.4** -1.7**
Acquieg control -1.3 -1.27 1.46 -447* -1.12 -1.38 1.93** 2.14** 0.44
Successful bids 18 16 21 15 70 23 12 19 54
Acquired firms 5.89* 10.25* -1.19 4•93* 4.56* 10.91* 4.67* 4•79* 7•37*
Acquiring firms -5.28* 4.25* -0.33 -0.93 -2.6** 0.17 -2 0.89 -0.06
Acquied control 6.83* 0.25 4•57* -3.93* -0.4 -1.78 -0.58 -2.42* -1.74
Acquieg control -3.6** -3** 1.14 -3.1** -1.9** -2.8** 2.17* 2.63* 0.22
Failed bids 9 10 7 4 30 9 3 2 14
Acquired firms 13.67* 24* -7.14* 14.75* 12.4* 34.7* 6.67* -15.5* 21.5*
Acquiring firms 0.78 -2.6** -1.86 1.25 -0.9 -3.44* 5* -10* -2.6**
Acquird control 3.56** -0.9 -22.1* -1.25 -4.57* 0.11 -6.67* -2 -1.64
Acquieg control 3.33** 1.5 -2.4** -9.75* -0.37 2.22* 1 -2.5* 1.29
Of which :
Hostile bids 2 5 5 4 16 3 0	 _ 2 5
Acquired firms 2 8* -3** 13* 5.06* 23.67* - -9* - 10.6*
Acquiring firms -2.5** -12.6* -1.8 0.75 -4.6** 0 - -5* -2
Acquied control 13.5* -3.4** -97.6* -1.5 -30.3* -6.33* - 14.5* 2
Acquieg control 4.5** -8.8* 1.4 -6.75* -3.44 -29.7* - -1 -18.2*
Contested bids 1 4 5 1 11 2 0 1 3
Acquired firms 28* 3•75** -12.2* 31* 1.18 28* - -13* 14.33*
Acquiring firms 17* -5.3** 1.8 4** 0.82 -1.5 - -10* -4.3**
Acquied control 0 7•5* 198* 52* 97.64* -12.5* - 0 -8.44*
Acquieg control o 2 1.2 7* 1.91 2.5** - -2 /
White knight bids 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 1
Acquired firms - 0 -9* - -4.5** -15* - - 45*
Acquiring firms - 0 6* _ 3** _3 ** _ _ _3**
Acquir'd control - 0 0 - 0 -25* - - -25*
Acquirt control - 0 2 -
,
1 4** - _	 - -4**
Significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Table A5.2.2 T-Statistics Testing the Null Hypothesis that the Difference Between the
Means of the Two Groups is Equal to Zero
Type of Bid
Window : 20 days before the acquisition to 20 days after
Boom Period (%) Recession Period (%)
1987 1988 1989 1990 All 1991 1992 1993 All
All bids 27 26 28 19 100 32 15 21 68
Acquired & Acquiring 1.63 5.85* 0.7 1.35 3•5* 3.86* 2*** 0.5 3.55*
Acquired & Control 0.31 3•97* 0.36 2*** 0.61 3•55* 1.59 0.76 3•45*
Acquiring & Control 0.55 0.93 1.09 1.63 0.73 0.16 0.87 0.78 0.51
Successful bids 18 16 21 15 70 23 12 19 54
Acquired & Acquiring 1.05 4.48* 0.32 0.91 2.3** 2.2** 1.74 0.57 2.4**
Acquired & Control 0.7 2.3** 0.36 1.4 0.48 2.3** 1.14 0.96 2.5**
Acquiring & Control 0.36 0.35 0.59 0.9 0.17 0.83 0.96 0.54 0.29
Failed bids 9 10 7 4 30 9 3 2 14
Acquired & Acquiring 2.9** 6.1* 0.64 0.69 3•35* 4•73* 0.31 1.31 3.58*
Acquired & Control 1.86 4.8* 0.8 0.73 0.38 3.63* 2*** 2.8 3•54*
Acquiring & Control 0.5 1.09 1.5 1.35 1.23 .. 1.8 0.62 0.73 1.09
Of which :
Hostile bids 2 5 5 4 16 3 0 2 5
Acquired & Acquiring 0.24 3•5** 0.7 1.4 0.73 1 - 2.5 0.7
Acquired & Control 0.5 2*** 0.91 2.8** 0.91 2.3 - 2.6 0.91
Acquiring & Control 0.33 0.73 0.64 0.9 0.12 1.64 --; 1.13 1.51
Contested bids 1 4 5 1 II 2 0 1 3
Acquired & Acquiring - 1.1 3** - 2.2** 0.72 - - 0.87
Acquired & Control - 0.63 0.92 - 1.16 1.34 - - 0.48
Acquiring & Control - 4.2** 1.8 - 0.31 0.71 - - 1.03
White knight bids 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 I
Acquired & Acquiring - - - - 3*** - - - -
Acquired & Control - - - - 4.4** - - - -
Acquiring & Control - - - - 0.29 - - - -
Reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is equal to zero at
1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
LXIX
Table A5.2.3 Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated for a Ten Day
Window
Type of Bid
Window : 10 days before the acquisition to 10 days after
Boom Period (%) Recession Period (%)
1987 1988 1989 1990 All 1991 1992 1993 All
All bids 27 26 28 19 100 32 15 21 68
Acquired firms 15.4* 17.4* -0.75 7•95* 9•97* 17.3* 4•4* 33* 19•3*
Acquiring firms -5.56* -3.1** -3** -1.9** -3.5* -0.03 0 -0.1 -0.04
Acquir'd control 10.7* 0.23 -13.4* -3.3** -1.4 -0.13 -0.87 -3.2** -1.25
Acquir'g control 0 -2** 0.32 -6* -1.57 -1.25 2.5** 3.1** 0.91
Successful bids 18 16 21 15 70 23 12 19 54
Acquired firms 14.7* 12.7* 0.95 5.67* 8.17* 10.7* 3.2** 5•47* 7•19*
Acquiring firms -8.67* -2.5** -3.5** -2.4** -4.37* 0.61 -2.3** 1.26 0.2
Acquir'd control 11.9* 0 -23.7* -3.5** -4.8* -0.61 -0.08 -3.2** -1.41
Acquir'g control 4.78* 4* -0.33 4.2* -3.1** -3** 2.6** 3.5** 0.54
Failed bids 9 10 7 4 30 9 3 2 14
Acquired firms 16.9* 24.8* -6* 16.5* 14•1* 34.1* 9* -17* 21.4*
Acquiring firms 0.67 -4* -1.29 0 -1.43 -1.78 9* -13* -1.07
Acquir'd control 8.44* 0.6 17.7* -2.5** 6.53* 1.11 4* -3.5** -0.64
Acquir'g control 9.56* 1.2 2.3** -12.8* 2.1** 3.2** 2.3** 0 2.6**
Of which :
Hostile bids 2 5 5 4 16 3 0 2 5
Acquired firms -3.5** 12.8* -3** 13.5* 6* 25* -	 - -10.5* 10.8*
Acquiring firms -4.5** -11.4* 1.4 -0.25 -3.8** 0 - -6* -2.4**
Acquir'd control 19* -2.6** -121 -2.8** -371* -7.33* - 14.5* 1.4
Acquieg control 2.5** -10.8* 0.6 -10* -5.38* -28.3* - 10* 43*
Contested bids 1 4 5 1 11 2 0 1 3
Acquired firms 33* 5•5** -11.6* 27* 2.18 24.5* - -14* 11•7*
Acquiring firms 8* -5** -0.2 -12* -2.27 0 - -12* -4**
Acquir'd control 0 7•5* 22.2* 40* 16.5* 3** - 0 2
Acquir'g control 2 1.75 1.8 12* 2.7** 10* - 4** 8*
White knight
bids
0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 1
Acquired firms - 0 -6* - -3** -18* - - -18*
Acquiring firms - 0 6* - 3** 0 - - 0
Acquir'd control - 0 0 - 0 6* - - 6*
Acquir'g control - 0 1 - 0.5 -5* - - -5*
Significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
LXX
Table A5.2.4 T-Statistics Testing the Null Hypothesis that the Difference Between the
Means of the Two Groups is Equal to Zero
Type of Bid
Window : 10 days before the acquisition to 10 days after
Boom Period (%) Recession Period (%)
1987 1988 1989 1990 All 1991 1992 1993 All
All bids 27 26 28 19 100 32 15 21 68
Acquired & Acquiring 2.8** 5•93* 0.69 2*** 4.96* 3•45* 1.37 0.56 3.25*
Acquired & Control 0.46 4.27* 0.13 2.1** 0.43 3* 1.21 0.89 3.07*
Acquiring & Control 1.34 0.38 1.34 1.32 1.18 0.32 0.79 0.81 0.45
Successful bids 18 16 21 15 70 23 12 19 54
Acquired & Acquiring 2*** 4•5* 1.29 1.24 3.66* 2*** 1.59 0.88 2.2**
Acquired & Control 0.18 2.6** 0.2 1.55 0.38 1.59 0.64 1.08 2.1**
Acquiring & Control 0.71 0.45 1.02 0.59 0.32 0.7 1.49 0.53 0.89
Failed bids 9 10 7 4 30 9 3 2 14
Acquired & Acquiring 3.52* 7.15* 0.63 1.6 3•97* 4.89* 1.2 0.83 3.13*
Acquired & Control 1.72 5.28* 0.7 1.7 0.2 4.56* 3*** 15.1* 3•35*
Acquiring & Control 1.39 1.19 1.13 1.22 2*** 0.71 0.94 0.94 0.7
Of which :
Hostile bids 2 5 5 4 16 3 0 2 5
Acquired & Acquiring 0.5 3.63* 1.17 1.5 2.2** 1.17 - 1.76 0.95
Acquired & Control 0.9 2.1** 0.96 3** 0.31 1.8 - 2.21 0.54
Acquiring & Control 0.7 0.9 0.18 1.2 0.2 1 -- 5,3** 0.57
Contested bids 1 4 5 1 11 2 0 1
Acquired & Acquiring - 0.94 3*** - 0.2 0.58 - - 0.61
Acquired & Control - 0.8 0.86 - 0.87 0.47 - - 0.35
Acquiring & Control - 1.38 0.49 - 0.49 0.7 - - 1.41
White knight bids 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 1
Acquired & Acquiring - - - - 5.1** - - - -
Acquired & Control - - - - 1.94 - - - -
Acquiring & Control - - - - 0.56 - - - -
Reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is equal to zero at
1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
Table A5.2.5 Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated for a Twenty Day
Window
Type of Bid
Window : 20 days before the acquisition to 20 days after
Boom Period (%) Recession Period (%)
1987 1988 1989 1990 All 1991 1992 1993 All
All bids 27 26 28 19 100 32 15 21 68
Acquired firms 17.7* 20.5* 1.5 9.42* 12.3* 18.6* 0.13 0.81 9.03*
Acquiring firms -2.5** -3** -3** -1.05 -0.25 -0.22 -1.33 -0.52 -0.56
Acquir'd control 15.9* 0.81 29.4* 4.16* 11.9* -0.41 -0.4 0.57 -0.1
Acquir'g control 2.7** -2** 1.4 -7.42* -0.8 -1.28 2.8** 3.71* 1.16
Successful bids 18 16 21 15 70 23 12 19 54
Acquired firms 17.6* 1.9** 0 7.4* 6.53* 15.8* -1.8** -0.58 6.17*
Acquiring firms -3.4** 2.6** 4.05* -1.6 -1.8** -0.3 -1.25 -0.63 -0.63
Acquied control 15.9* 3.2** 37•7* -2.2** 15.6* 0.52 0.5 -9.95* -3.2**
Acquirt control -3.7* -0.44 -0.43 -6.73* -2.6** 4.09* 1.58 -1.8** -2**
Failed bids 9 10 7 4 30 9 3 2 14
Acquired firms 18* 29.7* 6.14* 2** 17* 25.6* 7.67* -33.5* 13•4*
Acquiring firms -0.7 -3.7** 1.29 0.25 -1.1 0 -1.6 -11* -1.9**
Acquir'd control 15.9* -2.1** 9.14* -0.5 6.13* -2.8** -4* 19* 0.07
Acquieg control 15.6* 1.1 7.86* -2.3** 6.57* 6* 7.67* -0.5 5•43*
Of which :
Hostile bids 2 5 5 4 16 3 0 2 5
Acquired firms 11* 14* -6.2* 14.8* 7•5* 25.3* -	 - -8.5* 11.8*
Acquiring firms -1 -10.4* -1.2 -0.25 -3.8** 0 - -6* -2.4**
Acquir'd control 18* -2.8** -159* -3** -49.3* -12.7* - 16.5* -I
Acquir'g control 15* -10.8* -0.8 -8.5* -3.9** -29.7* - 30•5* -5.6*
Contested bids 1 4 5 1 11 2 0 1 3
Acquired firms 40* 16.8* 2.4** 19* 12.6* 21* - -23* 6.33*
Acquiring firms 18* -12* 0.4 -1 -2.6** -3** - -12* -6*
Acquir'd control 0 2.8** 42.4* -13* -19.5* -8* - 0 -5.33*
Acquir'g control 11* 1.8 2.4** 10* 3.64* 10* - 14* 11•3*
White knight
bids
0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 1
Acquired firms - -19* -1 - -10* -18* - - -18*
Acquiring firms - 4** 6* - 5** -6* - - -6*
Acquir'd control - 0 0 - 0 -16* - - -16*
Acquir'g control - 1 3** - 2 _ 20* - - 20*
Significant at 1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
LX,CI
Table A5.2.6 1-Statistics Testing the Null Hypothesis that the Difference Between the
Means of the Two Groups is Equal to Zero
Window : 20 days before the acquisition to 20 days after
Type of Bid Boom Period (%) Recession Period (%)
1987 1988 1989 1990 All 1991 1992 1993 All
All bids 27 26 28 19 100 32 15 21 68
Acquired & Acquiring 2.89* 5.58* 1.49 2*** 5•7* 3.62* 0.32 0.31 3.06*
Acquired & Control 1.36 4•39* 0.85 2.7** 0.17 3.17* 0.81 0.21 2**
Acquiring & Control 1 0.26 1.52 2*** 0.83 0.16 1.11 0.94 0.82
Successful bids 18 16 21 15 70 23 12 19 54
Acquired & Acquiring 2*** 4•57* 1.03 1.59 3.95* 2.4** 0.9 0.93 2.4**
Acquired & Control 1.15 2.52* 0.78 2.2** 0.11 2*** 0.78 0.63 1.4
Acquiring & Control 1.67 0.74 0.89 1.47 0.54 0.74 0.75 0.7 0.21
Failed bids 9 10 7 4 30 9 3 2 14
Acquired & Acquiring 2.6** 5•33* 1.18 1.46 4.89* 3.6* 0.42 1.84 2.1**
Acquired & Control 0.75 6.27* 0.98 5•4** 0.44 3.41* 1.8 1.94 2.8**
Acquiring & Control 2*** 0.79 2.8** 1.6 2.3**_ 0.76 0.75 0.59 0.96
Of which :
Hostile bids 2 5 5 4 16 3 0 2 5
.Acquired & Acquiring 0.98 3.6** 3.2** 1.38 3.1* 4.3 - 0.25 1.7
Acquired & Control 0.34 1.86 0.96 3•3** 0.6 0.59 - 20.3* 4.2*
Acquiring & Control 0.39 0.84 0.65 1.05 0.88 0.21 -- 3,*** 0.7
Contested bids 1 4 5 1 11 2 0 1 3
Acquired & Acquiring - 1.35 0.9 - 1.31 0.66 - - 0.51
Acquired & Control - 0.7 0.83 - 0.79 0.94 - - 0.47
Acquiring & Control - 1.38 0.78 - 1.03 1.12 - - 2.17
White knight bids 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 I
Acquired & Acquiring - - - - 1.84 - -
Acquired & Control - - - - 1.09 - - - -
Acquiring & Control - - - - 11.8* - - - -
Reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is equal to zero at
1% *, 5% **, 10% ***
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